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Draft budget of the administratil'e expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 1 
Opinion of the Council 
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11th September 1991 
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Secretary-General of WEU, dated 15th July 1991 
- Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, to Mr. Pontillon, 
President of the Assembly, dated 25th July 1991. 
Explanatory Memorandum 
1. At its June 1991 session, the Assembly agreed to a revision of its draft budget on the basis of 
Document 1241 Addendum 2. 
2. This new draft budget was transmitted to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and to the Sec-
retary-General of WEU. The Council's continuing difficulty in giving a unanimous answer became 
apparent from an exchange of correspondence between the President of the Assembly and the Secre-
tary-General (see appendices). 
3. The refusal of a majority of the members of the Council to an increase in the Assembly's budget 
over 5.51% forced the Assembly to cut down the amounts earmarked for its work in order to be able to 
recruit two officials on the planned dates, while maintaining its overall budget within the prescribed 
limits. The President of the Assembly, for his part, had emphasised how impossible it was for the 
Assembly to reduce credits assigned to its activities in order to offset the creation of new posts. 
4. During the visit by the President of the Assembly to London, the Secretary-General of WEU 
organised a working dinner with the Permanent Council which allowed the deadlock to be broken. 
5. A compromise solution was reached because the Council's late approval of the draft budget of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1991 would inevitably delay the process of recruitment to fill the 
two new posts. Consequently, savings could be released from the amounts included in Head I, the 
overall total of the Assembly's budget thus remaining within the limits of a 5.51% increase. 
6. In a letter dated 25th July 1991, reference VII.69, the Secretary-General informed the President 
of the Assembly that the Council, meeting that day, had officially confirmed its agreement to this 
solution. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved by the Presidential Committee. 
Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Lagorce, Maass (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Roman), 
Antretter, Bowden (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Biichler, Cauwenberghs, Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. 
Garcia Sanchez (Alternate: Pedregosa), Greco (Alternate: Stegagnim), Mrs. Haas-Berger (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), 
MM. Masseret, Meyer zu Bentrup, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond, Regenwetter, Silva Marques (Alternate: Fernandes 
Marques), Sinesio (Alternate: Parisi), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Vara (Alternate: Soares Costa). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
lO 
DOCUMENT 1241 ADDENDUM 3 
7. To facilitate an analysis of the problem and the decisions which will have to be taken by the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee, a table has been 
prepared setting out the budgetary implications of the aforementioned solution, showing the inclusion 
in the 1991 budget of the credits necessary for the recruitment of two new grade A officials. It is under-
stood that the sums relating to certain allowances for these officials which might be committed at the 
end of the trial period of three months will be requested in 1992. 
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Recapitulation of budget estimates resulting from the United Kingdom proposals 
Heads - sub-heads 
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF 
Sub-Head: 
Draft 1991 
budget 
(Doe. 1241 Add.) 
1 - Basic salaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 219 000 
2 - Allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 15 5 000 
3 - Social charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 977 000 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
departure of permanent officials . . . . . . . -
5 - Medical examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 000 
TOTAL • . . • • • • • • . . . . • . • • • • . . • • • • . • • • . . 14 362 000 
HEAD 11- TEMPORARY STAFF 
Sub-Head: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assem-
bly work between sessions ............ . 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the 
Clerk ............................... . 
9 - Social charges ....................... . 
TOTAL ••.••••.••••.•••••.••••.•••..•• 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES 
AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises ............................ . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............ . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions ................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of 
sessions ............................. . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the 
Office of the Clerk .................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture .. . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment .......................... . 
1 7 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction 
2 902 000 
568 000 
15 000 
150 000 
3 635 000 
525 000 
10000 
570000 
65 000 
15 000 
35 000 
Supplementary 
budget 
+ 155 000 
+ 45 000 
+ 35 000 
+ 86 400 
+ 600 
+ 322 000 * 
Revised 
budget 
10 374 000 
2 200000 
2 012 000 
86 400 
11 600 
14 684 000 
2 902 000 
568 000 
15 000 
150000 
3 635 000 
525 000 
10000 
570 000 
65000 
15 000 
35 000 
and other office equipment ............ r---=5-=3-=4-=00:....:....:0_+----------l---=-5=-34..:.....:.0..:..00.:..._----l 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 754 000 - 1 754 000 
* These budget estimates are based on the possibility of creating, with effect from 16th October 1991, one grade A2 post and one 
grade A5 post, the latter corresponding to the Council's proposal to create a grade A4 post and to regrade an existing grade A4 
post to grade A5. 
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Heads - sub-heads 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents .......................... . 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
Draft 1991 
budget 
(Doe. 1241 Add.) 
560000 
DOCUMENT 1241 ADDENDUM 3 
Supplementary 
budget 
Revised 
budget 
560000 
and other office supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 000 - 280 000 
20 - Printing and publication of documents . 1 154 000 - 1 154 000 
21 - Purchase of documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 000 - 70 000 
22 - Official cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 000 - 45 000 
23- Bank charges ......................... t-----5_0_0___,r---------t----50_0--t 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 109 500 - 2 109 500 
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances 
and insurance for the President of the 
Assembly, chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs .......................... . 
25 - Expenses for representation ........... . 
26 - Committee study missions ............ . 
27 - Official journeys of members of the 
Office of the Clerk .................. . 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor ... . 
29 - Expenditure on information .......... . 
30 - Expenses for political groups ......... . 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
200000 
260000 
5 000 
630000 
30000 
455 000 
484000 
200000 
260000 
5 000 
630 000 
30000 
455 000 
484 000 
elsewhere provided for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 000 - 3 000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes ................. l---=-28~0..:..00-=-----l---------f-____;2=-8=-0-'-00"--'----f 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 095 000 - 2 095 000 
Operating budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 955 500 + 322 000 24 277 500 
Receipts ..................................... 1-----=-1..:..0=-5 ...;:,.o..:..oo-=-----l------___..-~10=-5=-0-'-0=-0'-----t 
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET . • • • • . . • • • • . • 23 850 500 + 322 000 24 172 500 
Pensions expenditure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 366 000 - 3 366 000 
Receipts ..................................... f---6_2_1_0_0_0_-+-_+ __ 10_0_0_0_+-_6_31_0_0_0_-f 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET • • . • • • . . • • • . • • . 2 745 000 - 10 000 2 735 000 
NETGRANDTOTAL ••••••.•••••.••..•••••.. 26595500 +312000 26907500 
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Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1990 to 1991 
1990 19~1 '* b- a o
a a l 
" 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. Permanent staff 13 292 000 14 684 000 + 10.47 
Head 11. Temporary staff 4 045 000 3 635 000 - 10.13 
Head Ill. Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 1 576 000 1 754 000 + 11.29 
Head IV. General administrative costs 2 085 500 2 109 500 + 1.15 
Head V. Other expenditure 2 022 000 2 095 000 - 3.61 
Total expenditure ....................... 23 020 500 24 277 500 + 5.46 
Receipts ................................ 110 000 105000 - 4.55 
NET TOTAL 22 910 500 24 172 500 + 5.51 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and leaving allowances .......... 3 151 000 3 366 000 + 6.82 
Receipts 572 000 631 000 + 10.31 
NET TOTAL 2 579 000 2 731 000 + 5.89 
GENERAL NET TOTAL 25 489 500 26 907 500 + 5.56 
14 
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APPENDIX 
Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, dated 11th July 1991 
London, 11th July 1991 
During your visit to Bonn on Monday, 8th July, we had the opportunity to discuss, inter alia, 
developments in connection with the Assembly budget for 1991. 
In your letter to Mr. Dumas on 5th June, you expressed the hope that the Council of Ministers 
would look carefully at the revised draft budget for 1991 which the Assembly adopted on 5th June. 
You sent me a copy of your letter, but did not enclose a copy of the draft budget. Subsequent to our 
meeting, the Secretariat of the Assembly sent me a copy of the latter by fax on 9th July. 
Following our discussion in Bonn, I raised the issue again at the meeting of the Permanent Council 
today and have formed the view that the Council would be able to accept an operational budget of 
F 24 172 000 representing an increase of 5.5% over the equivalent figure for 1990. The pensions figure 
(F 2 745 000) must of course be added to this, making a total budget for 1991 ofF 26 917 000. 
This sum covers the effect of inflation and allows the creation of one A2 post from 1st June 1991, 
the creation of one A4 post from 1st October 1991 and the upgrading of one A4 post to A5 from the 
same date. 
It seems to me that the best way forward would be to submit a revised budget along the above 
lines. This would enable the Council to reach the required formal decision. I would in that case, of 
course, do my utmost to help to achieve this as soon as possible. 
For your information, I may add that the next sessions of the Council are scheduled for 25th July 
and 25th September, but the Council may be able to proceed more quickly by silent procedure. 
Mr. R. PoNTILLON 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
43, avenue du President-Wilson 
75775 Paris Cedex 16 
Letter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, 
Yours sincerely, 
Willem VAN EEKELEN 
to Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, dated 15th July 1991 
Paris, 15th July 1991 
Thank you for your letter of 11th July 1991, sending me your views on what might be the position 
of the Council concerning the Assembly's budget for the current year. I note that the amount of the 
operating budget you indicate would not allow the strength of the Office of the Clerk to be increased 
without reducing the credits under Heads 11 to V, which are destined to cover the Assembly's work. 
The Assembly had already voluntarily reduced these credits to a level lower than what would have been 
necessary to offset inflation. 
However this may be, the revised draft budget which the Assembly adopted unanimously at its last 
session has been transmitted officially to the Council. I should therefore be most grateful if you could 
15 
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communicate to me the Council's official position, so that I might make this known to the Presidential 
Committee and to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration which are to meet in Paris 
on 11th September next in order to prepare the draft budget for 1992. 
H.E. Mr. Willem VAN EEKELEN 
Secretary-General of WEU 
9, Grosvenor Place 
London SW 1 X 7HL 
Yours sincerely, 
Robert PONTILLON 
Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, dated 25th July 1991 
London, 25th July 1991 
Since your letter of 15th July concerning the Assembly budget for 1991, we had the pleasure of 
meeting together with members of the Council or their deputies at a working dinner in London on 18th 
July. 
You will recall that following further clarification and the understanding reached in our exchange 
of views, you felt able to propose to the Assembly a total budget for 1991 of F 26 91 7 000. 
I am pleased to say that the Permanent Council, at its meeting today formally confirmed its 
agreement to a global financial ceiling of F 26 917 000 for the 1991 budget which includes an opera-
tional budget ofF 24 172 000 representing an increase of 5.51% over the equivalent figure for 1990. 
This is on the understanding that the two new appointments and the upgrading will be made as soon as 
practicable, but before 31st December 1991. It is also understood that the Assembly will be submitting 
a revised budget along these lines to the Council for formal approval within the agreed financial 
ceiling. 
I hope the Standing Committee of the Assembly will be able to follow our agreement so that a 
revised budget can be submitted accordingly. 
We also agreed that you would try to submit the draft budget for 1992 as early as possible in order 
to allow us to schedule a meeting of the Permanent Council in which you could explain the underlying 
assumptions and objectives. 
Mr. R. PoNTILLON 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
43, avenue du Prt!sident-Wilson 
7 5 77 5 Paris Cedex 16 
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Yours sincerely, 
Willem VAN EEKELEN 
Document 1277 31st October 1991 
AGENDA 
of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session 
Paris, 2nd-5th December 1991 
I. Report of the Council 
Thirty-seventh annual report of the Council 
(first part) 
ll. Political questions 
1. General report - activities of the WEU 
Council 
2. European union and developments in 
Central and Eastern Europe 
3. WEU's external relations - the enlar-
gement of WEU 
Ill. Defence questions 
1. Operational arrangements for WEU -
the Yugoslav crisis 
2. Arms control negotiations - new initia-
tives for WEU 
IV. Technological and aerospace questions 
1. Arms and equipment for a European 
rapid action force 
2. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland 
V. Budgetary questions 
1. Draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1992 
2. Accounts of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1990 - the auditor's 
report and motion to approve the final 
accounts 
VI. Parliamentary and public relations 
1. The evolution of WEU's public rela-
tions 
2. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation 
in security and defence matters 
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Report tabled by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the 
Political Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the 
Political Committee 
Report tabled by Sir Geojfrey Finsberg on behalf 
of the Political Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf 
of the Defence Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the 
Defence Committee 
Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of 
the Technological and Aerospace Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the 
Technological and Aerospace Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration 
Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration 
Report tabled by Mr. Ewing on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions 
Report tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares on behalf of 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations 
Document 1278 22nd November 1991 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session 
Paris, 2nd-5th December 1991 
MONDAY 2nd DECEMBER 
Morning 
11 a.m. 
Meetings of political groups. 
1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary 
session. 
5. Action by the Presidential Committee: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Soares Costa. 
Debate. 
6. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
7. The evolution of WEU's public relations: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ewing on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Address by Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece. 
2. WEU's external relations- the enlargement of WEU: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Com-
mittee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
TUESDAY 3rd DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. General report- activities of the WEU Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the Political Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee. 
Debate. 
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Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Address by Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic. 
2. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
3. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares on behalf of the Committee for Par-
liamentary and Public Relations. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft order. 
4. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee. 
Operational arrangements for WEU- the Yugoslav crisis: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Com-
mittee. 
Joint debate. 
WEDNESDAY 4th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council - presentation of the first part of the thirty-seventh 
annual report of the Council. 
2. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe; 
Operational arrangements for WEU- the Yugoslav crisis: 
Resumed joint debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council - Address by Mr. Wimmer, Parliamentary Secretary 
of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany. 
2. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe; 
Operational arrangements for WEU- the Yugoslav crisis: 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft budget. 
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 - the 
auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts. 
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5. Arms control negotiations- new initiatives for WEU: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the Defence Committee. 
Debate. 
THURSDAY 5th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Arms control negotiations- new initiatives for WEU: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Technological and 
Aerospace Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE SECOND PART OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1990 
THE AUDITOR'S REPORT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY TO THE AUDITOR SUBMITTING THE 
ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1990 - 6th May 1991. 
LETTER FROM THE AUDITOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY- 13th June 1991. 
REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON 
THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1990 - 13th June 1991. 
CERTIFICATE OF THE AUDITOR FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1st JANUARY TO 31st DECEMBER 
1990- 13th June 1991. 
APPENDICES 
I. Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1990 - financial 
position as at 31st December 1990. 
II. Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the 
financial year 1990. 
Ill. Contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1990. 
IV. Provident fund - account for the financial year ended 31st December 1990. 
V. 1990 balance sheet for the United European Left Group. 
VI. 1990 balance sheet for the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European 
Democrats. 
VII. 1990 balance sheet for the Liberal Group. 
VIII. 1990 balance sheet for the Socialist Group. 
Lener from the President of the Assembly 
to the Auditor submiuing the accounts 
for the financial year 1990 
6th May 1991 
Dear Mr. Arpaillange, 
In accordance with Article 14 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly ofWEU, 
I have the honour to submit to you the accounts 
for the financial year 1990 in accordance with 
the statements attached hereto, which refer to: 
1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure 
- financial position as at 31st 
December 1990 (Appendix I); 
21 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11); 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill); 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
As is customary, after being audited these 
tables will be signed by the President of the 
Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the 
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration before being sub-
mitted to the Assembly. 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a 
saving ofF 710 837, whereas the final statement 
DOCUMENT 1279 
of income and expenditure shows a credit 
balance ofF 720 333. The difference between 
these two figures, i.e. F 9 496, shows an excess of 
receipts over estimates: 
F F 
- Bank interest 39 181 
- Sundry receipts 60189 
- Sale of publications 25 538 
- Contributions 7 % 556 588 
691 496 
- Receipts for 1990 
estimated in the 
budget 682 000 
+ 9 496 
3. Excess expenditure under Heads IV and V 
of the operating budget - account being taken of 
credits blocked under Head V (F 208 000) -
amounting to F 328 695 has been met by 
transfers from other heads of the budget. Excess 
expenditure under the pensions budget 
amounting to F 25 000 has been met by a 
transfer from Head I. 
4. The statement of contributions for the 
financial year 1990 (revised 1990 budget) 
received from the Secretary-General of WEU, 
London, is given at Appendix Ill. 
5. Amounts in the provident fund of the 
Assembly staff are incorporated with those of 
the other organs of WEU and the joint fund is 
administered by the Secretary-General in con-
sultation with the Clerk of the Assembly. 
On 31st December 1990, these amounts 
totalled F 5 603 997 as shown in Appendix IV. 
On that date there remained two loans to two 
staff members amounting to F 655 540. 
The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of these funds. On 31st December 
1990 the fund was held by Montagu Investment 
Management Limited in London. 
6. Also appended to the accounts of the 
Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed 
to the political groups drawn up in accordance 
with the directives issued by the Presidential 
Committee (document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as 
follows: 
- Unified European Left Group; 
- Federated Group of Christian Demo-
crats and European Democrats; 
- Liberal Group; 
- Socialist Group. 
These reports will be considered as an 
integral part of the accounts of the Assembly; 
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they give details of the use of credits included in 
Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the 
Assembly. 
Yours sincerely, 
Robert PONTILLON 
President of the Assembly 
Mr. Pierre ARPAILLANGE 
Premier President de la Cour des Comptes 
13, rue Cambon 
75001 PARIS 
Letter from the Auditor 
to the President of the Assembly 
13th June 1991 
Dear Mr. Pontillon, 
I have the honour to enclose the accounts 
of the Assembly of Western European Union for 
the financial year 1990 together with my 
opinion and report on these accounts. 
Yours sincerely, 
Pierre ARPAILLANGE 
(Premier President de la 
Cour des Comptes de France) 
Commissaire aux comptes 
Mr. Robert PoNTILLON, 
President of the Assembly of 
Western European Union 
43, avenue du President-Wilson 
75116 PARIS 
Report of the External Auditor 
to the Assembly of Western European Union 
on the accounts for the financial year 1990 
13th June 1991 
I have audited the accounts of Western 
European Union for the financial year 1990 in 
accordance with Article 15 of the Financial Reg-
ulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the 
correct management of the budget and the book-
keeping. 
The final statement of income and 
expenditure shows a credit balance ofF 720 333 
due to: 
- a saving of F 710 837 in budget 
authorisations for expenditure and 
credits; 
- higher receipts than the estimated 
F 9 496. 
The total saving in the budget, as shown 
by the statement of authorisations and expend-
iture, may be summarised as follows: 
Total 
credit Total 
after expenditure Balance transfers 
F F F 
Part 1: 
Operating budget 
Head I 
Permanent staff 13 217 000 12 908 564 308 436 
Head 11 
Temporary staff 3810590 3 672 540 138 050 
Head Ill 
Expenditure on 
premises and 
equipment I 531 715 I 481 682 50033 
Head IV 
General adminis-
trative costs 2 098 765 2 098 750 15 
Head V 
Other 
expenditure 2 337 430 2 129 358 208 072 
Head VI 
Premises 6 650 163 6 650 160 3 
Part 11 
Pensions budget 
Head I 
Pensions, 
allowances 
and social 
charges 3 176 000 3 169 772 6 228 
Total 710 837 
The financial situation compared to that 
on 31st December 1989 has therefore improved 
significantly compared with the tendency noted 
when the accounts for previous financial years 
were audited as shown in the following table: 
Final statement Difference 
of income Saving on between 
and expenditure expenditure estimates 
on 31st December and income 
of the financial year 
1987: + 35 + 153 549 - 153 514 
1988: + 6 591 + 82 179 - 75 588 
1989 : + 106 113 + 42 973 + 63 140 
1990: + 720 333 + 710 837 + 9 496 
In particular, it should be noted that, 
while the result for the financial year shows an 
accentuation of the tendency noted in previous 
financial years, it may, because of its magnitude, 
seem to be due to circumstances. The initial 
budget had been adopted bearing in mind esti-
mated expenditure ofF 708 000 for holding the 
spring ordinary session away from the seat of the 
Assembly; since this credit was not required it 
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was partly unblocked - F 312 000 - and the 
balance - F 396 000 - is included in the final 
result. 
It should also be noted that there has been 
an increasingly accurate adjustment of esti-
mated receipts as shown in the budget compared 
with actual expenditure under the following: 
- bank interest; 
- sundry receipts; 
- sale of publications; 
- contributions 7%. 
In 1990, there was a credit balance of 
F 9 496 (F 63 140 in 1989). 
Part I: 
Operating budget 
Head I 
Head 11 
Head Ill 
Head IV 
Head V 
Head VI 
Part 11: 
Pensions budget 
Head I 
Total 
* 
* * 
Situation of transfers 
between heads in I 990 
+ 
114 300 
226 284 
55 115 
233 130 
327 660 
323 502 
63 300 
I 343 291 
It should be noted that: 
189 300 
460 694 
99 400 
219 865 
12 230 
323 502 
38 300 
I 343 291 
There were two transfers from Head I, 
i.e.: 
- F 25 000 to Head I of the pensions 
budget; 
- F 50 000 to Head 11, Sub-Head 8 -
Temporary staff for the Office of the 
Clerk. 
These transfers were made in accordance 
with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. 
Net transfers between heads were mainly 
to Head V - Other expenditure (+ F 315 430) 
and in particular: 
- 24: Travelling and subsistence allow-
ances and insurance for the President of 
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the Assembly, chairmen of committees 
and rapporteurs; 
- 27: Official journeys of members of the 
Office of the Clerk; 
- 29: Expenditure on information. 
Due to the transfers effected, the credits 
opened increased respectively from one 
financial year to another by: 
- Sub-Head 24: + 61.7% 
- Sub-Head 27: + 29.2% 
- Sub-Head 29: + 26.1% 
As pointed out when the 1989 accounts 
were audited, estimates under a certain number 
of sub-heads seem to have been included 
without any precise thought for the needs or 
even the tendencies noted previously in the way 
credits are spent, thus forming reservoirs that 
are available during the year for other purposes; 
such transfers therefore significantly modify the 
shape of the budget initially adopted. 
As an example: 
Head 11 (temporary sta.IJ) 
Sub-Head 6.3: Translation service 
-16.72% (-14% in 1989) 
Sub-Head 7: Interpretation staff required for Assembly work 
between sessions 
-33% (- 11.5% in 1989) 
Head IV (General administrative costs) 
Sub-Head 20: Printing and publication of documents 
- 19.4% (- 12.7% in 1989) 
* 
* * 
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Having completed this audit, I thank the 
Clerk and staff of the Assembly for their 
co-operation in the exercise of my duties as 
Auditor. 
Pierre ARPAILLANGE 
(Premier President 
de la Cour des Comptes de France) 
Commissaire aux Comptes 
Certificate of the Auditor for the .financial year 
1st January to 31st December 1990 
13th June 1991 
In application of Article 15 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of 
Western European Union, I have examined the 
appended financial statements of the Assembly 
comprising the summary of income and expend-
iture for the financial year 1990. 
My examination included verification of 
the books and other relevant documents that I 
deemed necessary. 
As a result of this examination, my 
opinion is that these statements faithfully record 
the bookkeeping operations for the financial 
year and that these operations were in con-
formity with the budget estimates, the Financial 
Regulations, the financial instructions and other 
decisions of the legislative authority, and that 
they are a correct record of the financial situ-
ation for the year ended 31st December 1990. 
Pierre ARPAILLANGE 
(Premier President 
de la Cour des Comptes de France) 
Commissaire aux Comptes 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1990 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix Ill) ........ . 32 139 663 
Miscellaneous 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Bank interest ......................................... . 39 181 
Sundry receipts ....................................... . 60189 
Sale of publications ................................... . 25 538 
(B) Pensions 
Contributions (7%) .................................... . 566 588 
691 496 
Budget credits ........................................ . 32 831 159 
Total expenditure (see Appendix 11) .................... . 32 110 826 
Excess of income over expenditure ..................... . F 720 333 
Financial position as at 31st December 1990 
Assets 
Contributions received ................................. . 
Miscellaneous debtors ................................. . 
Contributions 7% ..................................... . 
Non-recoverable taxes ................................. . 
Liabilities 
Balance at the bank ................................... . 
Miscellaneous creditors ................................ . 
Sums paid ............................................ . 
Excess of income over expenditure ..................... . 
Robert PONTILLON 
President of the Assembly 
Certified correct: 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
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4 351 671 
65 847 
21 744 
1 963 418 
F 6 402 680 
4 359 075 
14 841 
1 308 431 
720 333 
F 6 402 680 
Tim RA THBONE 
Chairman of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration 
4 
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APP 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITU 
(in Fr~ 
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1990 
A.l. - ORDINARY EXPENDITURE 
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 Basic salaries 9 389 000 ; 
Sub-Head 2 Allowances 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 881 000 
2.2. Household allowance 407 000 
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons 472 000 
2.4. Rent allowance 85 000 
2.5. Education allowance 60000 
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2000 
2.7. Overtime 59000 
2.8. Home leave 61 000 
Sub-Head 3 Social charges 
3.1. Social security 1 254 000 
3.2. Supplementary insurance 415000 
3.3. Provident fund 167 000 
Sub-Head 4 Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of 
permanent officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts -
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of per-
manent officials and their families -
4.3. Removal expenses 30000 
4.4. Installation allowance - ! 
l j 
Sub-Head 5 Medical examination 10000 
'I 
Total of Head I 13 292 000 
I 
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XII 
ID UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1989 
ICS) 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
75 000 9 314 000 9 125 233 188 767 
881 000 850 735 30265 
407 000 383 567 23 433 
472 000 447 957 24043 
21 500 63 500 56 160 7 340 
60000 59 079 921 
2000 - 2000 
21 500 80 500 80 470 30 
61000 56 001 4 999 
42 800 1 211 200 1 197 582 13 618 
50000 365 000 352510 12 490 
3 500 170 500 170 426 74 
- - -
- - -
86 500 116 500 116 044 456 
- - -
2 800 12 800 12 800 0 
114 300 189 300 13217000 12 908 564 308 436 
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PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1990 
• HEAD 11- TEMPORARY STAFF 
t Sub-Head 6 Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly 
t 
6.1. Sittings service 1 575 000 I 6.2. Interpretation service 685 000 6.3. Translation service 915000 ; 
6.4. Other services 42000 I Sub-Head 7 Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between 
sessions 640000 ; 
l 
Sub-Head 8 Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 15 000 I t 
Sub-Head 9 Social charges j 9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 16 000 
• 9.2. Provident fund for interpreters 150 000 
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 7000 
Total of Head 11 4045 000 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 10 Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises 400000 
i 
Sub-Head 11 Hire of committee rooms 10000 ' j 
Sub-Head 12 Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions 555 000 
Sub-Head 13 Various services for the organisation of sessions 100000 
Sub-Head 14 Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the i Clerk 13 000 
Sub-Head 15 Purchase or repair of office furniture 35 000 
Sub-Head 16 Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment 2000 
Sub-Head 17 Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other 
office equipment 461 000 
Total of Head Ill 1 576 000 
-
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
80384 1 494 616 1 356 616 138 000 
137 455 822 455 822 451 4 
153 710 761 290 761 283 7 
20 880 62 880 62 874 6 
211 990 428 010 428 002 8 
67 949 82 949 82 945 4 
6000 10000 9 990 10 
6 220 143 780 143 775 5 
2 390 4 610 4 604 6 
226 284 460 694 3 810 590 3 672 540 138 050 
36 510 363 490 363 482 8 
6 500 3 500 3 500 0 
4130 550 870 550 863 7 
28 250 128 250 78 248 50002 
14 350 27 350 27 340 10 
8080 26 920 26 919 1 
12 515 14 515 14 513 2 
44180 416 820 416 817 3 
55 115 99400 1 531 715 1 481 682 50033 
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j 
PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget 1 for 1990 
i 
' 
HEAD IV- GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS l 
i 
Sub-Head 18 Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents 480 000 
! 
~ 
Sub-Head 19 Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other 
l 
; 
office supplies 280 000 l 
Sub-Head 20 Printing and publication of documents 1 120 000 l 
' 
Sub-Head 21 Purchase of documents 65 000 l 
Sub-Head 22 Official cars 140 000 l Sub-Head 23 Bank charges 500 
Total of Head IV 2 085 500 
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE ~ 
l 
Sub-Head 24 Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance 
for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of corn-
mittees and rapporteurs 190 000 
Sub-Head 25 Expenses for representation 230 000 
l 
Sub-Head 26 Committee study missions 5 000 j ~ Sub-Head 27 Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk 680 000 j 
Sub-Head 28 Expenses of experts and the auditor 30000 
Sub-Head 29 Expenditure on information 455 000 
Sub-Head 30 Expenses for political groups 403 000 I 
Sub-Head 31 Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere l provided for 3000 
Sub-Head 32 Non-recoverable taxes 26 000 ~ 1 
Total of Head V 2 022 000 l l 
Total 23 020 500 l 
~ 
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
145 580 625 580 625 576 4 
2 765 277 235 277 233 2 
217 100 902 900 902 899 1 
8 610 73 610 73 606 4 
78 760 218 760 218 760 0 
180 680 676 4 
233 130 219 865 2 098 765 2 098 750 15 
114 470 304 470 304 467 3 
36020 266 020 266 014 6 
5 000 - - -
72 530 752 530 544 530 208 000 
23 350 53 350 53 342 8 
81290 536 290 536 282 8 
403 000 403 000 0 
1 520 1480 1 455 25 
5 710 20290 20 268 22 
327 660 12 230 2 337 430 2 129 358 208 072 
956 489 981 489 22 995 500 22 290 894 704 606 
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET 
A.2. - EXTRAORDINARY EXPENDITURE 
HEAD VI - PREMISES 
Sub-Head 33 Reorganisation of the building 
Sub-Head 33.1 Feasibility study 
Sub-Head 33.2 Work on utilities 
Sub-Head 33.3 Prime contractorship 
Sub-Head 34 Installation of committee rooms 
Sub-Head 34.1 Interpretation equipment 
Sub-Head 34.2 Furnishing committee rooms 
Sub-Head 34.3 Furnishing corridor 
Sub-Head 35 National delegation offices 
Sub-Head 35.1 Furniture and other office equipment 
Sub-Head 35.2 Typewriters 
Sub-Head 36 Lounge in the first basement 
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Total budget 
for 1990 
7 300 
5 129 315 
126 645 
930 174 
263 947 
36000 
118000 
12 000 
26 782 
Total of A.2 6 650 163 
Total of Part I 29 670 663 
i 
f 
t 
• I 
t 
' I 
f 
l 
I 
l 
! 
I 
l 
I 
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
7 300 0 0 
5 129 315 5 129 314 1 
126 645 126 644 1 
316 202 613972 613 972 0 
75 858 339 805 339 805 0 
4 239 40239 40239 0 
175 255 293 255 293 254 1 
12 000 12 000 0 
68 150 94 932 94 932 0 
323 502 323 502 6 650 163 6 650 160 3 
1 279 991 1 304 991 29 645 663 28 941 054 704 609 
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PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
HEAD I - PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES 
Sub-Head 1 Pensions and leaving allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 
1.2. Invalidity pensions 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions 
1.5. Leaving allowances 
Sub-Head 2 Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances 
2.2. Children's and dependants' allowances 
2.3. Education allowances 
Sub-Head 3 Supplementary insurance 
Robert PoNTILLON 
President of the Assembly 
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Total of Head I 
Total 
Total budget 
for 1990 
2 582 000 
239 000 
54000 
-
-
116 000 
42000 
35 000 
83 000 
3 151 000 
32 821 663 
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Transfers Total after 
+ - transfers 
56 300 2 638 300 
4 700 243 700 
300 54 300 
-
-
2000 118 000 
18 300 23 700 
13 000 22000 
7000 76000 
63 300 38 300 3 176 000 
1 343 291 1 343 291 32 821 663 
rlOULIAS 
1e Assembly 
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Total Unexpended 
expenditure credits 
2 638 247 53 
243 637 63 
54 285 15 
- -
- -
117 808 192 
23 076 624 
19 763 2 237 
72 956 3044 
3 169 772 6 228 
32 110 826 710 837 
Tim RATHBONE 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetflry Affairs and Administration 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1990 
1990 budget C-B (89) 24 
Brought over from 1989 C-B (90) 9 
Supplementary budget to the extraordinary 
budget C-B (90) 23 
Sub-total 
Carried over to 1991 
NET TOTAL 
Contributions received for 1990: 
8th February 1990 
14th February 1990 
4th April 1990 
30th April 1990 
14th May 1990 
14th May 1990 
18th May 1990 
28th June 1990 
20th August 1990 
15th October 1990 
31st October 1990 
7th November 1990 
29th December 1990 
4th January 1991 
31st January 1991 
15th March 1991 
Balance at the close of 1989: 
Brought over from 1989 
Surplus for 1989 
TOTAL PAYMENTS 
36 
F 
25 459 500 
6 601 941 
424000 
32 485 441 
345 778 
32 139 663 
F 
1 127 432.50 
545 233.75 
1 108 950.00 
2 545 950.00 
3 840 141.25 
2 760 580.95 
1 108 950.00 
3 859 545.32 
2 673 278.95 
1 283 355.55 
849 764.41 
3 797 708.75 
849 764.41 
2 538 974.79 
1 265 937.69 
546 758.52 
1 331 222.92 
106 113.24 
32 139 663.00 
1 
l 
' 
l 
l 
l 
1 
i 
• j 
• I 
l 
APPENDIX IV 
PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1990 
in French francs 
F F 
Balance brought forward: 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 
1990 4 771 055 Withdrawals 21 647 
Contributions of staff members and of the 
Assembly of Western European Union 252 023 
Repayments of loans by staff members 177 600 Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st 
December 5 603 997 
Interest received during the year 426 562 Loss on valuation at 31st December 1990 1 596 
5 627 240 5 627 240 
Robert PONTILLON 
President of the Assembly 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
Tim RATHBONE 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
...... 
< 
DOCUMENT 12 79 
APPENDIX V 
1990 Balance sheet for the Unified European Left Group 
Assets 
1. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) ...................... . 
2. Interest ................................................................. . 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1990 ................. . 
Liabilities 
I. Expenditure 
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ............... . 
3. Seminars and meetings .................................................. . 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staffl ..................... . 
5. Jnterpretation costs ...................................................... . 
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) ............................ . 
7. Sundry expenses ........................................................ . 
II. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) ......................... . 
Total ................................................................. . 
Signatures of the Treasurer (PIERALLI) .................. . 
and two auditors of the group (BENASSI) ................ . 
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F 
44042 
16 141 
7 666 
8 263 
4 315 
3 787 
3 186 
684 
44042 
l 
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APPENDIX VI 
1990 Balance sheet for the Federated Group 
of Christian Democrats and European Democrats 
Assets 
1. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) ...................... . 
2. Interest ................................................................. . 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1990 ................. . 
Total ................................................................. . 
Liabilities 
I. Expenditure 
F 
219 424.60 
12 494.48 
156 004.00 
387 923.08 
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 000.00 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 682.60 
3. Seminars, meetings and interpretation costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 400.65 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and staff) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 554.21 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 637.46 
11. Surplus at 31st December 1990 (bank accounts, cash) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 285.62 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 923.08 
Signatures of the Treasurer (JuNo, Dudley SMITH) ....... . 
and two auditors of the group (V ALLEIX, LENTZ-CORNETTE) 
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APPENDIX VII 
1990 Balance sheet for the Liberal Group 
Assets 
F 
1. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 096.16 
2. Interest.................................................................. 1 901.31 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 761.00 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 758.47 
Liabilities 
I. Expenditure 
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ............... . 
3. Seminars and meetings .................................................. . 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staffl ..................... . 
5. Interpretation costs ...................................................... . 
25 320.00 
9 680.00 
20 658.83 
3 800.00 
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 500.00 
7. Sundry expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600.00 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 558.83 
II. Surplus at 31st December 1990 (bank accounts, cash) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 199.64 
Total.................................................................. 113758.47 
Signatures of the Treasurer (VoHRER) .................. . 
and two auditors of the group (MARTINO, IRMER) ........ . 
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APPENDIX VIII 
1990 Balance sheet for the Socialist Group 
Assets 
l. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) ...................... . 
2. Interest ................................................................. . 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1990 ................. . 
4. Sundry assets ........................................................... . 
Total ................................................................. . 
Liabilities 
I. Expenditure 
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ............... . 
3. Missions and meetings .................................................. . 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) ..................... . 
5. Seminars ............................................................... . 
F 
156475.14 
12 116.44 
134 193.00 
216.00 
303 000.58 
82· 561.00 
2 475.00 
26 889.00 
20 201.00 
6. Interpretation costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7 50.00 
7. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) ............................ . 
8. Sundry expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291.00 
11. Surplus at 31st December 1990 (bank accounts, cash) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 833.58 
Total ....................................................... : . . . . . . . . . . 303 000.58 
Signatures of the Treasurer (LAGORCE) ................. . 
and two auditors of the group (GARRETT, TuMMERs) ..... . 
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Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1990 
11th September 1991 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1990 1 
The Assembly, 
submitted on behalf of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur 
I 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1990, together with f. 
the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 17 of the financial regulations, ~ 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his 
financial responsibility. 
! 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. l 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Lagorce, Maass (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: 
Roman), Antretter, Bowden (Alternate: Lord Mackie of Benshie), Biichler, Cauwenberghs, Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk, Dame Peggy 
Fenner, MM. Garcia Sanchez (Alternate: Pedregosa), Greco (Alternate: Stegagnini), Mrs. Haas-Berger (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-
Schlaman), MM. Masseret, Meyer zu Bentrup, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond, Regenwetter, Silva Marques (Alternate: 
Fernandes Marques), Sinesio (Alternate: Parisi), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Vara (Alternate: Soares Costa). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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INFORMATION LETIER 
from Mr. van Eelcelen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs 
(22nd May- 30th September 1991) 
24th October 1991 
London, 23rd October 1991 
In the summer of 1991 we have seen the springtide of peoples that first flowered in 1989 and 
1990 lead to the disintegration of two federations, whose arduous creation had so marked the first half 
of the century. As little as six years ago, one of them, the Soviet Union, was still seen as a world super-
power and regarded as a formidable potential threat. Today it is a country that has lost its bearings, its 
borders frayed and torn, in quest of immediate food aid and facing a perilous future. The other 
country, Yugoslavia, created by the will of the Slavs in the south in the aftermath of the first world war, 
and elevated to a federal republic in 1946, followed by nearly four decades of stability which had 
almost made it a model in a Europe divided by the cold war, is once again the battleground for bloody 
ethnic conflict. 
The second major event has been the final dispelling of the Marxist/Leninist myth in Russia. 
This imposture, with its declared aim to liberate humanity and its price the subjection to single-party 
rule, was nonetheless regarded by many great minds in the early 1980s as " the intranscendible horizon 
of our times " despite the manifest economic failure of most of its embodiments and despite its totali-
tarianism and police state methods. 
Yugoslavia's unhappy fate is just one more illustration of how vain and illusory were the expec-
tations that once the Soviet adversary had vanished there would be the" end of history". It is only 
natural that the abolition of an ideological colonialism concealing a perennial lust for conquest should 
light a flame of nationalism. Adding fuel to that flame has been the instinctive reflex to search for an 
identity, the most spontaneous and visible expressions being the rediscovery of national history and 
ethnic roots and a return to the values of religion. The fact that this has led to demands - all the more 
vigorously pressed in that the yoke of oppression had been so heavy to bear - does not mean that vio-
lence is unavoidable, still less justifiable. What is vital now is that the flame should not be fanned. 
In celebrations of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo on 28th June 1989, Slobodan 
Milosevic delivered a harangue in which he combined nationalism and populism, communism and 
demagogy. He said that Serbia, lauded as the founder nation, had a mission to protect Yugoslav 
integrity. On several occasions thereafter he held up the Croats and Albanians as the scapegoats, raising 
the temperature in such a way as to help place Yugoslavia on the path towards dismemberment and 
then conflagration. 
Since last June, the federal army, dominated by its Serb officers who are generally loyal to com-
munist ideology, has been nibbling away at the Croat frontiers- historic frontiers that were in essence 
confirmed by the 1946 constitution. Encouraged by the absence of foreign reaction to the declarations 
of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, the army has pursued its campaign, despite the agreed mora-
torium and despite several cease-fires. With the shifting front lines characteristic of any civil war, it is 
hard to distinguish between the roles of aggressor and victim. Today, however, the conflict is gradually 
emerging as a war of aggression by a civil and military apparatus comparable to the group that was 
behind the abortive coup in Moscow. Its objectives in fact appear to be the control of Slavonia and 
Dalmatia. 
Faced with this situation, can Europe beat about the bush much longer, paralysed by the fear of 
creating a precedent? Can it just stand by and watch? Can there be dual standards depending on what 
is at stake, Croatia or Kuwait? These are weighty questions, for the future of democracy to the east of 
our continent might one day depend on the response we decide to make to them in the short term. The 
Yugoslav situation also forces us to reflect on how far the right of interference should be stretched if the 
aim is to prevent crises that would generate great risks in Europe, not just political risks but also in 
terms of socio-economic development and the environment. 
Europe must act for the simple reason that all the alternatives to action, all the pretexts for 
inaction, might well have consequences far worse than those of an engagement whose rules are yet to be 
laid down and the conditions for which have been clearly defined. Our continent may be on the 
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threshold of a new era of conflict, both within and around the regions made all the more vulnerable by 
ethnic or frontier claims. The scale of the effort needed in order to reinforce democracy and improve 
the standard of living of tens of millions of Europeans renders undesirable and unrealistic any policy of 
ringing areas of instability with a cordon sanitaire, abandoning them to the throes of declared or 
insidious civil war. The responsibilities incumbent on Western Europe transcend the interests at stake 
and impose a duty on Europe to intervene realistically to help create the conditions for peacemaking 
and peacekeeping. If a policy of stirring up trouble, a desire to redraw frontiers by force, is allowed to 
take hold, a dangerous precedent will have been set. 
European action to consolidate a cease-fire in Yugoslavia is inconceivable unless it is sanctioned 
by the United Nations Security Council (whose Resolution 713 has now given clear support for Com-
munity action), and endorsed by CSCE, decided by the Twelve and implemented by the WEU Nine 
which, as a body, has available the bulk of European military resources for a peacekeeping operation. 
Certain countries of Central Europe have expressed the wish to be associated with an initiative of this 
kind if the situation so demands. ' 
The Gulf conflict cannot be referred to as a precedent: in a Yugoslavia in turmoil, the opposing 
forces are the army and the government on the one hand, the republics among themselves on the other. 
Apart from stabilising the situation in the short and medium term, a European reaction might well 
accelerate current developments in three institutional circles. The first is in CSCE. The Yugoslav crisis 
offers an opportunity for a further step forward towards its institutionalisation. The creation of a ~ 
European court of arbitration for the settlement of conflicts among minorities and the frontier disputes l 
that sometimes ensue has been proposed and is being debated. Secondly, in the Community, the urgent i 
need for progress towards common foreign and security policies, with all that entails in the way of par- ' 
allel strategic thinking, is increasingly evident. Thirdly, in WEU, the milestone is the assignment of a 
truly operational role and a definition of the resources with which it should be equipped if it is to 
perform that role. 
The implications of a European commitment to peace in the Balkans are now being considered 
by the WEU ad hoc Group, reactivated by a decision of the Ministerial Council in The Hague on 
19th September last. In the future, the ability of Europeans to guarantee the stability of the continent 
depends a good deal on the Nine's concerted conversion of their military apparatus, an apparatus pri-
marily planned and trained to defend a specific area in Germany against possible conventional 
aggression that might involve the use of chemical and nuclear weapons. 
The disintegration of the former Soviet Union requires us to maintain a credible collective 
defence. Everything that used to make up Soviet patriotism is up for grabs. The failure of the coup has 
precipitated the dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party and brought the bureaucratic incarnation 
of the communist dream to an end. The real power is now in the hands of the republics. In some places 
their independence raises the problem of frontier demarcation. The arrangements for their association 
in matters of foreign policy and defence may depend on those frontiers, as may the size of their t 
respective armies. The problem of maintaining a flow of trade and economic exchange becomes 
endemic if each republic intends to retain closer control over its own resources. The question of the 
control of industry and nuclear weapons in itself symbolises the complexity of a situation that offers 
much scope for confrontation among the republics, many of which are also subjected to centrifugal 
pressures. 
In a continent whose map will perhaps be more fragmented than ever before in its tumultuous 
history, is it right that Europe aspires no higher than to be a free trade area? A pole of stability, the 
WEU Nine and the Community Twelve must confront the perils of the current situation and lead the 
way for a new European renaissance. The process of European union will have to adjust to the vitality 
of the democracies of Eastern Europe and of those countries whose fate we mistakenly believe we could 
settle at not too great a cost after the two great European civil wars. The Community was brought into 
being to prevent the recurrence of war. Its exemplary success must be extended eastward. The self-
affirmation of nations revived or rediscovered must not once again become an instrument of their 
destruction or enslavement. On the contrary, this precious right to one's own identity, a right they so 
ardently espouse, may be a sound and proper milestone on the journey towards European unity. 
The goal of harmonising European architecture will be not so much to create a homogenous 
Europe as to build a coherent Europe out of a whole variety of elements: historic nations, provinces 
and regions, where the desire to live their own lives is being affirmed by peoples whose very diversity is f,· 
enriching. A united Europe is not a single Europe, but a Europe that is at one with itself. 
The institutional arrangements whereby the Twelve can become a true interlocutor on the inter-
national scene is the issue at the heart of the intergovernmental conference on political union. Europe 
must be able to express clear political choices with a single voice in the service of its specific interests 
on a global scale, not just continental or regional. 
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Today, however, there is a strong risk of imbalance in the move towards European union. Ifwe 
were merely to deepen the economic dimension of European integration without taking great strides 
towards a common foreign and security policy, little scope would be left for responding to the claims 
and expectations of the new democracies. To a great extent our own stability and prosperity depend on 
their political stability and their economic development. Our priority should be to export more eco-
nomic aid and therefore more democracy rather than the reverse. Economics, however, is a tool of 
political action. Economic union should accompany, not precede, political union, so that the European 
Community and WEU should be fully capable- each within its own respective sphere- of serving as 
frameworks of reference for the solution of the major problems that arise on the continent of Europe. 
The single market is an historic opportunity to move forward to a strong, prosperous and united 
Europe which will, through this strength, have the resources and dynamism needed to open out some-
thing that has already been accepted. In principle, this opening out will also lead to a broadening, 
although it must not be a false trail for its future beneficiaries, who rightly vest so many of their hopes 
in its future realisation. Monetary union is arguably the model for deepening Europe, thus paving the 
way for enlargement given the resources that it would help to release, in particular for a policy of 
investing in Eastern Europe. 
Europe's malady is its refusal to act as a collective power, hence its reluctance at the prospect of 
rapidly acquiring a military instrument that would enable it to stand up for itself. This instrument is 
vital, however, in that the issue at stake in the future is not so much defence within Europe as the 
means of providing for the defence of Europe. With yesterday's Gulf conflict, with the jolts and shocks 
of Yugoslavia today, history is offering Western Europe an opportunity to progress towards the 
organisation of its security and stability. 
* 
* * 
Since 21st May, the Permanent Council has met three times at ministerial level (on 27th June in 
Vianden [Luxembourg] and, to discuss the repercussions of the Yugoslav crisis, in The Hague on 
19th September, and then in Brussels on 30th September). rhe Permanent Council met in London on 
eight occasions (on 21st May, lOth June as an enlarged Council to prepare for the Ministerial Council 
in Vianden, 26th June, 5th, 11th and 25th July and 7th August, to discuss the worsening situation in 
Yugoslavia, and finally on 18th September). 
On the political side, the Council's discussions over this period continued to bear on develop-
ments in the situation in the Middle East, WEU's role and place in the new European security archi-
tecture, contacts with the democratically-elected countries of Central and Eastern Europe and relations 
with third countries who are members of the Community or the Atlantic Alliance. 
Preparations for the Vianden ministerial meeting were the main subject of the meeting of the 
Permanent Council on 21st May and the enlarged Council on lOth June. In its discussions, the Council 
concentrated on the discussion paper for ministers on WEU's role and place in the emerging European 
security architecture, which was revised to take into account the positive outcome of the North 
Atlantic Ministerial Council in Copenhagen. Other reports to ministers were the reviews of work on 
space co-operation, co-operation in the field of verification and relations with Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
At the Permanent Council on 26th June, the United Kingdom representative explained the pro-
posals made by the United Kingdom Minister of Defence as regards British forces stationed on the 
mainland of Europe, on which SACEUR had made his views known in accordance with Article VI of 
Protocol 11 of the modified Brussels Treaty. On 11th July, the Permanent Council took note of the 
United Kingdom's intentions in this respect. 
At the time of their meeting in Vianden on 27th June, WEU ministers made a public statement 
on the Yugoslav situation and issued a press release summarising the main guidelines for the work of 
the working groups during the second half of 1991. The decision reached by ministers to set up a WEU 
satellite centre was a major step forward towards European space co-operation. 
The Permanent Council meeting on 5th July marked the transfer of the Presidency of the WEU 
Council from France to Germany. The sudden deterioration in the situation in Yugoslavia was a 
matter of particular concern for the delegations, who reviewed current diplomatic efforts, especially 
within the framework of CSCE and the Twelve. This problem together with the problem of Iraq, was 
one of the main issues discussed at the Council meetings on 11th and 25th July. The German Presi-
dency convened a meeting of the Permanent Council on 7th August, in the wake of the EPC extraor-
dinary ministerial meeting at The Hague. This meeting was devoted solely to the deterioration in the 
hostilities between Croats and Serbs and the options open to WEU in terms of a contribution towards 
maintaining the agreed cease-fire. 
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The meetings on 11th July and 18th September were also the occasion for considering the man-
dates given by ministers on 27th June and to debate the prospects for developing contacts with the 
democratically-elected countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The extraordinary ministerial meetings on 19th and 30th September were devoted to the 
Yugoslav situation and were held in The Hague and Brussels respectively. At these meetings the WEU 
ad hoc Group was activated and its first report considered. The work of these meetings was subject to 
the rules of confidentiality and the Assembly has been informed of their content separately by the 
WEU Council Presidency. 
The Council Special Working Group (SWG) and the Defence Representatives Group (DRG) held 
two series of meetings (one series on 17th and 18th July, the other on 16th and 17th September). The 
Special Working Group continued to review all the fields of potential co-operation that might 
strengthen WEU's operational nature and intensify the politico-military concertation within WEU in 
order to contribute to the work of both the Atlantic Alliance and the Twelve, with particular regard for 
the future development of CSCE and disarmament negotiations on the one hand and the items on the 
agenda for the Twelve having security implications. 
Contacts with Central and Eastern Europe were considered with a view to their intensification, 
on the basis of three initiatives. The first has been to set up information links with Hungary, Poland 
and Czechoslovakia. These links have now been established with their embassies in London and will 
continue at ministerial level between the minister of foreign affairs in the country holding the WEU 
Presidency and his counterparts in the three countries concerned. The next has been to hold a seminar 
under the auspices of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, attended by officials responsible for 
politico-military affairs within the defence and foreign ministries of WEU member states and their 
counterparts from the five countries of Central and Eastern Europe. On 18th September the Permanent 
Council decided to invite Bulgaria and Romania as well. Lastly, joint Presidency/Secretariat missions 
are going to Bulgaria and Romania. The question of WEU's future relations with the former Soviet 
Union and its republics is likely to be a major topic of discussion for the Special Working Group in the 
near future. 
The Defence Representatives Group has been tackling an ambitious work programme since the 
Vianden meeting: · 
- a review of the withdrawal of the coalition forces from northern Iraq and southern Turkey and 
the conclusion of mine-clearing operations in the Gulf; 
- a study of the military repercussions of WEU being assigned a more operational role. The pre-
requisite for this study is a review of the possible tasks for WEU's future operational capa-
bility and the needs that will arise. Another prerequisite, from a more institutional viewpoint, 
is an analysis of new military co-ordination and operational planning structures which will 
prove to be necessary as soon as the political decisions have been taken; 
- the relaunching of European co-operation in the field of armaments due to the fairly slow 
progress being made by other existing bodies. This item will be retained on the group's 
agenda; 
- Europe's strategic mobility needs, currently the subject of an in-depth Franco-German study 
to be forwarded to the group as soon as possible; 
- co-operation among member states' defence colleges is also on the group's agenda. 
With regard to the broader aspects of European security, the DRG has continued with its review 
of the military situation in Europe in the context of the implementation of the CFE Treaty. It has also 
discussed situations that might create a threat to peace, including the ballistic weapon threat, particu-
larly in the southern region. 
The Mediterranean Sub-Group of the Special Working Group met on 18th June and 20th Sep-
tember. In continuing with its discussion of risk situations, the group covered the situation in the 
Balkans, Algeria, the Sahara and Cyprus as well as the development of both bilateral and multilateral 
co-operation relationships between the four WEU member countries most concerned and the five 
partners in the Arab Maghreb Union. Pursuant to the ministerial mandate it was given on 
lOth December 1990, confirmed in Vianden on 27th June 1991, the group continued its work on 
defining the essential principles that might serve as the basis for future efforts for settling security ques-
tions in the Mediterranean. The draft CSCM was discussed with this in mind. The group felt that, with 
the Gulf conflict and the Middle East peace conference, it would be premature to launch this initiative. 
A comparison of the work and discussions on security in the Mediterranean (European political 
co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance and the United Nations) confirmed the specific nature and 
value of the WEU Mediterranean Sub-Group, which will henceforth work in liaison with the Defence 
Representatives Group on subjects of common interest to the two groups. 
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Experts on the verification of arms control agreements met three times at the Secretariat (on 
26th July and on 3rd and 27th September). Their agenda included many exchanges of information and 
also the procedures for practical co-operation on the implementation of an open skies agreement, the 
procedures for opening national inspection teams of member states, co-operation on the training of 
inspectors and inspection exercises. 
On 1Oth September the Special Working Group disarmament experts held a meeting devoted 
mainly to discussing the foreseeable consequences of events in the former Soviet Union on disarm-
ament efforts, and the content and institutional framework of future disarmament negotiations fol-
lowing the forthcoming Helsinki conference, with due regard for the development of CSCE security 
functions. 
The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space met on 31st May, 23rd and 24th July, lOth, 11th and 12th Sep-
tember and on 23rd and 24th September. The ministerial decision to set up the WEU satellite centre 
was taken on 27th June and the group has focused on the implementation of that decision, launching 
studies prior to its establishment: choice of location, appointment of a director, access to the satellite-
derived data needed for its operation and a preliminary draft budget. The definition of medium- and 
long-term studies on space co-operation is at the pre-feasibility stage as regards a satellite system based 
on the identification by member states of operational needs. The ad hoc sub-group's work has aroused 
interest in specialist circles, but delegations thought it was too early to make more detailed information 
on current work public before the end of the year, either directly or through other WEU bodies. 
* 
* * 
Two-way information contacts with the democratically-elected governments of Central and 
Eastern Europe have entered a new phase of development since 27th June 1991, with ministers 
approving a series of measures designed to deepen and broaden WED's dialogue with those countries. 
These are mainly: 
- establishing contacts on an ad hoc basis at ministerial level with Hungary, Poland and Czecho-
slovakia on specific subjects of common interest; 
- establishing information links between the Secretariat-General and the embassies of Czecho-
slovakia and Poland and between the government of each of these countries and the 
Presidency's embassies there, as was done on 9th, lOth and 31st July respectively; 
- fact-finding missions by the Presidency and Secretary-General to Bulgaria and Romania; 
- awarding WEU Institute study grants to young research workers in those countries; 
- promoting the exchange of views among experts on subjects of common interest, in particular 
through seminars organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies. 
* 
* * 
As part of our contacts with the government authorities of member states, I had the opportunity, 
while attending the NATO workshop on 11th to 14th June 1991, to meet Mr. J. Fernando Nogueira, 
Portuguese Foreign Minister, and Mr. Joao Deus Pinheiro, Portuguese Defence Minister, with whom I 
had useful discussions on preparations for the Ministerial Council in Vianden. 
- on 22nd July, Ambassador Holthoff and I met the new WEU Chairman-in-Office, Mr. H. -D. 
Genscher, German Foreign Minister, in Bonn, where we had a wide-ranging discussion on the 
prospects for the process of European construction and reviewed the German Presidency's 
objectives with regard to the role of WEU; 
- on 11th September, I met Mr. Jacques Santer, Prime Minister of the Grand Duchy ofLuxem-
bourg, in that country. We reviewed the status of negotiations in intergovernmental confer-
ences with a view to the European summit meeting in Maastricht. 
* 
* * 
In the field of public relations and public information on WED's current and future role and 
missions, my colleagues and I took part in the following events: 
- on 21st May, I attended a round table discussion organised by the publishers, Brassey's, at the 
Naval and Military Club in London to mark the publication of the book by John Leech, 
" Halt! Who goes where? The future of NATO in the new Europe "; 
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- on the same day, at the Secretariat, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, 
received students attending a course on security policy in Germany and gave them a briefing 
on WEU; 
- on 22nd May, I went to The Hague to attend the international conference on parliamentary 
democracy and international security policy arranged by the Netherlands Atlantic Com-
mission; 
- on 23rd-24th May, I attended SHAPEX in Casteaux; 
- on 24th-27th May, Ambassador Holthoff represented the Secretariat-General at the spring 
session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Rotterdam; 
- on 28th May, I spoke to the Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) 
in Athens on the subject of changes in the European security environment; 
- on 31st May, I welcomed a group of Dutch students from the University of Utrecht to the 
Secretariat; 
I 
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- from 6th to 9th June, I visited Bardejov (CSFR) to take part in the 1991 Institute for , 
East-West security studies international conference on western assistance to East Central f 
Europe; .}; 
- on 7th June, Mr. D. Williams, Head of the Council Secretariat section, attended the con-
ference of the European Movement in London on the subject of European foreign and security 
policies, giving a talk entitled "From Western European Union to European union"; l 
- on 11th June, I made a speech on WEU to the Joint Service Defence College, Greenwich; i 
- on 11th-14th June, I attended the NATO workshop on political military decision-making in 
Sintra, Portugal, and gave a paper entitled " The present conditions of security: Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union"; 
- 16th-18th June, at a meeting of the European Strategy Group (ESG) in Berlin, I spoke on the 
problems of European security; 
- on 19th June, I gave a talk on WEU to a colloquium in Brussels arranged by the Belgian 
members of the European Parliament Liberal Group on the subject of " The future relation-
ships between the European Community and the United States "; 
- also on 19th June, I took part in a seminar in Clingendael on " The future of European 
security and the role of the institutions " organised by the Dutch Institute for International 
Relations in co-operation with the NATO Information and Press Bureau, where I gave a paper 
on the role of WEU; 
- on 20th June, I made a speech on WEU to the English Speaking Union ofthe Commonwealth 
in Taunton; 
- on 22nd June, I went to Vinkeveen to take part in the Nederlands Europa beleid (Netherlands 
European policy) colloquium; 
- on 24th June, I attended a meeting of the Security and Disarmament Sub-committee of the 
European Parliament Political Committee, where I spoke about WEU; 
- on 25th June, in the colloquium on Western European Union and European defence, in Paris, 
organised by the Forum International de Politique, I gave a speech and made introductory 
remarks; 
- on 26th June, I spoke about the role and place of WEU to the Foreign Press Association in 
London; 
- on the same day, Ambassador Holthoff welcomed to the Secretariat a group of German jour-
nalists accredited to the United States Embassy in Bonn; 
- on 28th June, I was visited by a delegation from the Netherlands Naval Staff College at the 
Secretariat; 
- on 30th June, Mr. Paolo Casardi, Director of Political Affairs, and I visited Naples for the 
conference on the Atlantic Alliance and the new European architecture, organised by the 
Comitato Italiano della Gioventu to mark the 40th anniversary of AFSOUTH. I gave a paper 
on the subject of European security developments ahead: the role of WEU; 
- on 2nd July, I discussed WEU's role at the Central Fortress 1991 conference in Brunssum, 
organised by AFCENT; 
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- on the same day, I spoke to a parliamentary conference of the Parti Populaire Europeen in 
Brussels on the future of European security and defence, while Ambassador Holthofftook part 
in a debate on European security, at the invitation of the European Commission; 
- from 3rd to 5th July, I went to Berne to take part in a colloquium under the auspices of the 
Swiss Confederation's Federal Military Department of Defence on the subject of military and 
political lessons from the Gulf conflict; 
- on 16th July, I spoke about WEU and armaments co-operation in Paris at the fourth seminar 
on armaments co-operation organised by the Defence Systems Management College of Fort 
Belvoir, Virginia; 
- on 19th July, I attended the 19th annual session in Berlin of the Standing Conference of 
Atlantic Organisations (SCAO), on the theme of the future of NATO: new dimensions of 
European security and the role of Japan; 
- on 16th August, Mr. Bruch represented the Secretariat-General at the seminar on " After the 
Gulf war: the necessity of European defence", organised by the Driekant Foundation in 
Valkenburg, the Netherlands, where he gave a paper on WEU and the future of European 
security; 
- on 6th-8th September, I attended the second Antalya international conference organised by 
the Turkish North Atlantic Treaty Association on the subject of " NATO in a larger per-
spective: keeping in mind the necessity of establishing a new world order for a durable peace "; 
- on 9th-10th September, I took part in Rottach-Egern (Germany) in a seminar organised by the 
Brookings Institution on the subject of the new Germany and the new Europe; 
- on 11th September, I gave the opening address in the symposium on the new support chal-
lenge, organised by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) and Senior 
NATO Logistician Committee (SNLC) of the Atlantic Alliance in Luxembourg; 
- on 12th-15th September, I attended the 30th annual conference of the International Institute 
of Security Studies in Zurich on the subject of new dimensions in international security; 
- on 15th September, while in Zurich I took part in the colloquium on the current situation in 
the USSR, organised under the auspices of the Swiss Confederation Federal Military 
Department; 
- on 17th September, I addressed the Bow Group in London on the European defence identity; 
- on 18th September, I spoke at an audition in Brussels of the European Parliament Political 
Commission on the problems of European security; 
- on 20th September, my colleagues Mr. Jacomet and Mr. Bruch welcomed to the Secretariat-
General a group from the Fondation Nationale Entreprise et Performance (France), where it 
was briefed on WEU and discussed European security; 
- on 22nd September, I chaired a session of the conference on the theme of" The new Europe -
integration versus disintegration", organised by the University of Southampton; 
- on 24th September, my colleagues Mr. Casardi, Mr. Jacomet and Mr. Williams received a del-
egation at the Secretariat from the Netherlands National Defence College; 
- on 25th September, I attended the conference on European security towards 2 000, in Pitts-
burgh, organised by the University of Pittsburgh. 
Over these four months, I have continued our regular contacts with members of the press, radio 
and television and also with specialists in European and strategic problems, both in London and in the 
course of my travel abroad. These meetings gave me an opportunity to clarify the direction that WEU 
is currently taking in its work. 
Attached to this information letter are the texts of two papers I gave in June 1991, one in Sintra 
and the other in Paris. Both are in the language in which they were delivered. 
* 
* * 
At the request of the Permanent Council, the Secretariat produces summaries of what the inter-
national press says about WEU and the debate as to its future role. Below is a summary of the notes for 
May, June, July and September 1991, together with a brief analysis of press articles directly relating to 
WEU published in August. The figures in brackets are references to the list of the more significant 
articles appearing since 1st May, reproduced at the end of this letter. 
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I. During the first half of May 1991, the international press paid less attention to WEU than in late 
April (1-16). Journalists started to take a renewed interest in WEU from mid-May on, as the European 
Parliament had met on 15th May to debate the prospects for a European security policy (Pottering 
Report) (17, 21). 
Further comment on WEU was sparked off by Chancellor Kohl's visit to Washington on 20th 
and 21st May. This was a major demarche, the main aim being to reassure the Americans about the 
directions being taken towards a future European security policy and the work of WEU ( 19). 
Several interesting articles appeared in the run-up to the NATO Defence Planning Committee 
meeting which was held on 28th and 29th May, some of them analysing France's position in the 
security debate (18, 20, 22). With the DPC meeting and the important decision to set up a rapid 
reaction force, journalists also discussed the European pillar of the alliance in general terms as well as 
WEU's possible role (24, 26, 27-32, 34, 38-43). In May 1991, the German press paid a good deal of 
attention to the debate on security in general and WEU's role in particular (23, 25, 33, 35-37, 44-46). 
11. WEU featured in the international press throughout June 1991 (47-50, 69, 71). Early in the 
month, a few commentators reported that a European reaction force with French participation might 
be set up under WEU auspices. The French positions on the rapid reaction force generated a good deal 
of comment on the potential for WEU (51-62, 66-68, 70). 
The Assembly session (3rd-6th June) naturally received more coverage in France than in other 
member states. Speeches by Foreign Ministers Mr. Roland Dumas and Mr. Douglas Hurd on this 
occasion were widely reported in the press. 
The Copenhagen meeting of the Atlantic Council on 6th and 7th June gave the press a further 
opportunity to discuss the European dimension of defence and to analyse WEU's role (63.:65). 
The CSCE meeting, which opened in Berlin on 19th June, was the subject of many editorials and 
a good deal of comment, although WEU did not feature prominently (72-74). 
The debate was revived at the end of the month with the WEU ministerial meeting in Vianden 
on 27th June and the EC Luxembourg summit that followed. Many articles appeared, analysing the 
prospects for European political union and the role and place of WEU in that union. There was satis-
factory coverage of WEU's ministerial meeting (75, 87). 
Ill. Early in July, WEU attracted the attention of the international press following the EC summit at 
the end of June (89, 92). The Yugoslav crisis also gave rise to a good deal of comment and analysis on 
WEU's possible role (88). 
Germany's succession to WEU's Presidency earned no special comment in the press, even in 
Germany. The focus was on events in Yugoslavia, the role of the troika acting on behalf of the Twelve 
and the new Dutch Presidency ofthe European Community (94-97, 99-102, 105, 108 and 110-114). 
During the second half of July, WEU featured more·prominently in the German press, following 
the German and French foreign ministers' meeting in Bonn (98). Publication of the United Kingdom 
Government's white paper on defence also sparked off many comments in the British press as to 
WED's future role, to which the white paper referred (103-104, 106). 
Later in the month, the debate on European security and therefore on WEU was pushed out of 
the headlines by the emphasis attached by diplomatic correspondents to the G7 meeting- the seven 
more industrialised nations - in London (1 07). 
It should be pointed out that on 2nd July Mr. Woerner declared in Brussels that the European 
Community could not take the place of NATO, although he approved of the idea of making WEU the 
main body working to strengthen defence. Mr. Jacques Chirac also made two speeches, one in Bonn on 
1st July and the other in London on lOth July, in which he discussed the strengthening ofWEU (93). In 
July, therefore, WEU was once again in the forefront of debate on European security. 
IV. This impression was confirmed early in August when WEU earned unprecedented press cov-
erage, with various speculation as to the organisation's possible role in the search for a solution to the 
Yugoslav crisis (115-119). The absence of immediate results from the European Community's attempts 
at mediation meant that the press often equated the approach by the Twelve with the " failure " of 
attempts to formulate a common foreign and security policy (120, 122-124). At the same time, doubts 
were expressed as to the desirability and feasibility of any military engagement by WEU and the Com-
munity in the Yugoslav conflict to separate the opposing forces (121). With the abortive coup in 
Moscow, the international press rapidly shifted its attention from the Yugoslav crisis to the crisis in the 
Soviet system. 
V. The signing of a peace plan, early in September, by the European Community and the leaders of 
the six Yugoslav republics led to the despatch of an international cease-fire observation mission to 
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Croatia. In practice these events were the point of departure for WEU's gradual involvement in the 
crisis and a revival in media interest in WEU (125-128, 130-133). 
The announcement and then the holding of a WEU ministerial meeting on 19th September were 
widely noted in the press. At the time of the WEU ministerial meeting in Brussels on 30th September, 
however, journalists were more concerned with the EPC meeting being held on the same day (134-156). 
At his press conference on 11th September, President Mitterrand made a significant reference to 
WEU in declaring that Europe should adopt a firmer position on security and defence and that " WEU 
is in this respect a preliminary embryo " ( 129). As a whole, coverage of WEU in the international press 
was favourable, with particular stress on its possible operational role. 
* 
* * 
The following is a list of the more significant articles: 
1. Europe's teetering pillar, Edward Mortimer, Financial Times, 1st May 1991, Press Review 
No. 80. 
2. EC's defence split forces NATO to postpone summit, John Palmer, Guardian, 1st May 1991, 
Press Review No. 80. 
3. United States denies NATO slowing EC progress on security, David Buchan, Financial Times, 
2nd May 1991, Press Review No. 81. 
4. Defence in a warm climate, Peter Jenkins, Independent, 2nd May 1991, Press Review No. 81. 
5. Pillar in a world of instability, Robert Mauthner, Financial Times, 7th May 1991, Press Review 
No. 83. 
6. France-OTAN: le chat et la souris, Claire Trean, Le Monde, 4th May 1991, Press Review No. 83. 
7. Problem awaiting a solution, Edward Mortimer, Financial Times, 8th May 1991, Press Review 
No. 85. 
8. For a real transatlantic security partnership, Rene J. Foch, Hercild Tribune, 9th May 1991, Press 
Review No. 85. 
9. EC outlines scheme for "superstate ", Boris Johnson, Daily Telegraph, 9th May 1991, Press 
Review No. 85. 
10. Brandt presses Europe to set up intervention force, David Marsh, Financial Times, lOth May 
1991, Press Review No. 86. 
11. Atlantic News, No. 2320, 11th May 1991, Press Review No. 87. 
12. NATO: Briicke zum Osten und europaischer Pfeiler, Fritz Wirth, Die Welt, 13th May 1991, Press 
Review No. 87. 
13. Baker und Genscher wollen flir die NATO eine starkere politische Rolle, FAZ, 13th May 1991, 
Press Review No. 88. 
14. Europaer im Wettlauf, Peter Hort, FAZ, 14th May 1991, Press Review No. 88. 
15. Land der Liigen, Dieter Wild, Der Spiegel, 13th May 1991, Press Review No. 88. 
16. Vor Schwachung der NATO gewarnt, FAZ, 16th May 1991, Press Review No. 90. 
1 7. Strassburg verlangt Zustandigkeit der EG in der Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik, F AZ, 16th May 
1991, Press Review No. 90. 
18. Atlantic News of 15th May 1991, Press Review No. 91. 
19. Kohl to reassure Bush over Europe, Herald Tribune, 20th May 1991, Press Review No. 92. 
20. In the beginning was the word, and the word was defence, The Economist, 18th May 1991, Press 
Review No. 92. 
21. Atlantic News, No. 2322, 17th May 1991, Press Review No. 92. 
22. United States and Europe closer on security, Peter Ridell, Financial Times, 22nd May 1991, 
Press Review No. 94. 
23. Frankreich wartet auf Antworten, Giinter Nonnenmacher, FAZ, 22nd May 1991, Press Review 
No. 94. 
51 
DOCUMENT 1280 
24. Tomorrow's NATO: A mobile force for post-cold war era, Joseph Fitchett, Herald Tribune, 
27th May 1991, Press Review No. 96. 
25. Hammer oder Pinzette, Riidiger Moniac, Die Welt, 28th May 1991, Press Review No. 96. 
26. NATO's Galvin is endeavouring to create a smaller, more flexible fighting force, Timothy Aeppel, 
Wall Street Journal, 27th May 1991, Press Review No. 96. 
27. Rethinking NATO, The Economist, 25th May 1991, Press Review No. 96. 
28. Eine neue Strategie, Lothar Riihl, Die Welt, 28th May 1991, Press Review No. 96. 
29. Debat stokt over rol van WEU in het Europees defensiebeleid, de Volkskrant, 24th May 1991, 
Press Review No. 96. 
30. Defense europeenne sous controle OTAN, Pierre Letevre, Le Soir, 29th May 1991, Press Review 
No. 97. 
31. Ergernis op NA VO over vaagheid van " Europese identiteit ", Mia Doornaert, De Standaard, 
23rd May 1991, Press Review No. 97. 
32. No rapid reaction from France, The Independent, 29th May 1991, Press Review No. 97. 
33. Die NATO und Europa, Karl Feldmeyer, FAZ, 29th May 1991, Press Review No. 97. 
34. Europeans could have their force, Fran~ois Heisbourg, Herald Tribune, 29th May 1991, Press 
Review No. 97. 
35. Schneller Geleitzug, Herbert Kremp, Die Welt, 29th May 1991, Press Review No. 97. 
36. Der Durchlauferhitzer, Giinther Nonnenmacher, FAZ, 27th May 1991, Press Review No. 97. 
37. Friedenssicherung und Krisenmanagement als neue Aufgaben, Karl Feldmeyer; FAZ, 27th May 
1991, Press Review No. 97. 
38. NATO's radical changes: manoeuvering to outflank the EC, Alan Riding, Herald Tribune, 
30th May 1991, Press Review No. 98. 
39. NATO's new structure, Financial Times, 30th May 1991, Press Review No. 98. 
40. Europe and a security dimension, Giovanni Jannuzzi, NATO Review of April 1991, Press 
Review No. 99. 
41. Defense et diplomatie europeenne, Nicole Kern, Le Figaro, 30th May 1991, Press Review No. 99. 
42. Las fuerzas de reacci6n nipida de la OT AN intervendnin fuera de zona si hay acuerdo aliado, 
Felix Monteira, El Pais, 30th May 1991, Press Review No. 99. 
43. A new start, The Economist, 1st June 1991, Press Review No. 99. 
44. Ko-operation, Verteidigungsfahigkeit und Dialog sind Elemente der NATO-Politik, FAZ, 
31st May 1991, Press Review No. 99. 
45. Debatte iiber Zukunft der WEU, FAZ, 1st June 1991, Press Review No. 100. 
46. Europe must fall in for a bigger, better NATO, Norman Stone, Sunday Times, 2nd June 1991, 
Press Review No. 100. 
47. Kritik der WEU an den Amerikanern, FAZ, 4th June 1991, Press Review No. 101. 
48. Roland Dumas: la France restera fidele a l'UEO, Philippe Desaubliaux, Le Figaro, 5th June 1991, 
Press Review No. 102. 
49. Keiner Entscheidung iiber die WEU, FAZ, 5th June 1991, Press Review No. 102. 
50. Hurd digs in over defence of Europe, lan Davidson, Financial Times, 6th June 1991, Press 
Review No. 103. 
51. Esclaves de l'independance, Fran~ois de Rose, Le Monde, 6th June 1991, Press Review No. 103. 
52. Die NATO vedirgert Frankreich, Jochen Hehn, Die Welt, 6th June 1991, Press Review No. 103. 
53. France vs NATO: Both sides could end up losers, Frederik Bonnart, Herald Tribune, 6th June 
1991, Press Review No. 103. 
54. Frankreichs Schliisselrolle bei der Gestaltung der Biindnispolitik, FAZ, 6th June 1991, Press 
Review No. 103. 
55. Le nouvel OTAN bride la force europeenne, Alfred Valladao, Liberation, 7th June 1991, Press 
Review No. 104. 
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56. Les europeens doivent accroitre leurs capacites d'operations exterieures; un entretien avec 
Fran~ois Heisbourg, Le Figaro, 7th June 1991, Press Review No. 104. 
57. NATO sets strict conditions on European defence aims, David Usbome, The Independent, 
8th June 1991, Press Review No. 105. 
58. Paris et Washington reduisent leurs divergences sur la defense, Claire Trean, Le Monde, 8th June 
1991, Press Review No. 105. 
59. LaCE no podra formar su proprio pilar defensivo en el seno de la OTAN, Felix Monteira, El 
Pais, 8th June 1991, Press Review No. 105. 
60. NATO role firm as France loses defence debate, Boris Johnson, The Daily Telegraph, 8th June 
1991, Press Review No. 105. 
61. Defending Europe, The Financial Times, 8th June 1991, Press Review No. 105. 
62. France- in a pout, The Economist, 8th June 1991, Press Review No. 107. 
63. Nichts vergessen, nichts dazugelemt, Christoph Bertram, Die Welt, 9th June 1991, Press Review 
No. 105. 
64. Stiirme:ini Wasserglas, Giinther Nonnenmacher, F AZ, 12th June 1991, Press Review No. 107. 
65. Hurd sees risk of deadlock in EC, John Pienaar, The Independent, 13th June 1991, Press Review 
No. 108. 
66. La France au balcon, Baudouin Bollaert, Le Figaro, 13th June 1991, Press Review No. 109. 
67. Die NATO behalt ihre Kemfunktion bei, Herbert Kremp, Die Welt, 14th June, Press Review 
No. 110. 
68. Prance-Defence: Twin-track strategy, Ian Davidson, The Financial Times, 17th June 1991, Press 
Review No. 110. 
69. Basic principles bolstered, lan Davidson, The Financial Times, 17th June 1991, Press Review 
No. 110. 
70. Defense europeenne: la strategie de la tortue, Thierry de Montbrial, Le Figaro, 17th June 1991, 
Press Review No. 111. 
71. L'Europe a la croisee des chemins, Mr. Eyskens, Le Figaro, 17th June 1991, Press Review 
No. 111. 
72. A security limbo, Robert Mauthner, The Financial Times, 19th June 1991, Press Review 
No. ,112. 
73. A phoney war of phoney words, The Independent, 20th June 1991, Press Review No. 113. 
74. Europe: collective security is taking shape, Flora Lewis, Herald Tribune, 21st June 1991, Press 
Review No. 114. 
75. EC dash looms on defence, John Palmer, The Guardian, 24th June 1991, Press Review No. 115. 
76. London fur Abschluss der Verhandlungen, FAZ, 24th June 1991, Press Review No. 115. 
77. Major wins time on Europe, Michael White and John Palmer, The Guardian, 25th June 1991, 
~ress Review No. 116. 
78. View from P~uis, D. Mo'isi, NATO Sixteen Nations, May/June 1991, Press Review No. 116. · 
79. EC draft treaty is big step toward unity, but falls short of a united states of Europe, Mark 
M. Nelson, The Wall Street Journal, 26th June 1991, Press Review No. 117. 
80. La France sans l'OTAN ou l'anachronisme d'une illusion, A. Lloyd, Liberation, 25th June 1991, 
Press Review No. 118. 
81. L'UEO resta il nucleo della difesa europea, Leonardo Maysano, 11 Jomale, 27th June 1991, Press 
Review No. 118. 
82. EC digs in (Qr fight on defence, George Brock, The Times, 27th June 1991, Press Review No. 118. 
83. Identisch oder gespalten?, Bemt Conrad, Die Welt, 27th June 1991, Press Review No. 118. 
84. WEU treads path of independence, John Palmer, The Guardian, 28th June 1991, Press Review 
No. 119. 
85. Britain and France act to avoid dispute on defence, Tom Walken, The Times, 28th June 1991, 
Press Review No. 119. 
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86. Summit shelves federalism issue, George Brock and Robin Oakley, The Times, 28th June 1991, 
Press Review No. 119. 
87. Compromise may avert defence row, Sarah Lambert and Sarah Helm, The Independent, 
28th June 1991, Press Review No. 119. 
88. Ohne Verzug soll der KSZE-Mechanismus anlaufen, Bemt Conrad, Die Welt, 29th June 1991, 
Press Review No. 120. 
89. Political union casts shadow over accord, John Palmer, The Guardian, 1st July 1991, Press 
Review No. 120. 
90. La position britannique sur l'union politique demeure tres restrictive, Philippe le Maytre, 
Le Monde, 2nd July 1991, Press Review No. 121. 
91. NATO aide tells EC not to snub United States power, Herald Tribune, 3rd July 1991, Press 
Review No. 122. 
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The present conditions of security: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
(A. WEU perspective) 
14th June 1991 
Dr. W. van Eekelen 
Secretary-General 
Western European Union 
Some twenty months ago, Francis Fukuyama published his highly controversial essay on " The 
end of history". Though Mr. Fukuyama soon claimed to have been" so misunderstood by so many", 
today, in mid-1991, hardly anybody would venture to proclaim the "end of history" again. 
Perestroika, the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet acceptance of the 
unification of Germany within NATO and WEU, the signing of the conventional forces in Europe 
treaty, the announced withdrawal of all Soviet troops based on the territory of Moscow's Warsaw Pact 
allies, the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the unanimous United Nations Security 
Council condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent endorsement of economic 
sanctions and military action - these unprecedented developments cannot fail to convince us that not 
the " end " in the history of world affairs has been reached, but rather a whole series of crucial turning-
points. 
One important turning-point was undoubtedly NATO's London Declaration of July 1990, as it 
extended the hand of friendship to the Warsaw Pact countries. In November, the London Declaration 
was followed by the signing of the Paris Charter, which took stock of the momentous changes of 1989 
and solemnly proclaimed " a new era of peace and co-operation in Europe ". 
In the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States Secretary of State referred to "a 
critical juncture in history", the British Foreign Secretary to a "defining moment" in which "the 
international community through the United Nations" could create a "new world order" if the Iraqi 
challenge to the United Nations principle of border inviolability were crushed. 
The eruption of the Gulf conflict was a timely and cruel reminder of Europe's role and responsi-
bilities in the world at a time when many of our countrymen were indulging in geopolitical 
Eurocentrism and were only too eager to see their governments reap the peace dividends of the new 
detente. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, some even advocated a swift dismantling of security 
institutions- WEU and NATO- which had guaranteed four decades of peace. But unlike the Warsaw 
Pact, WEU and NATO are communities of value and do not need an enemy in order to survive. 
In Europe, the iron curtain has been lifted but many tangled barriers remain or may be put up 
again. Since the mid-1980s, the complexity of Europe's geopolitical situation has grown almost expo-
nentially. Although it would seem that after the revolutionary changes which have taken place over the 
past two years, the risk of a major European conflagration has been considerably reduced, the seeds of 
confrontation and conflict still exist, from the Baltic shores to the Balkans - not to mention the unfore-
seeable repercussions of a disintegration of the Soviet Union: civil war, ethnic strife, economic chaos 
and mass migrations. 
No, history has not come to an end. On the contrary, it has accelerated on an unprecedented 
scale. The magnitude of the events which have taken place since 1989 would even suggest that history 
has made a quantum leap. Perpetual stability is not in the offing. Time is pressing. This is why prac-
tical decisions are needed as soon as possible. 
1. The English and French texts of this annex are not identical. They consist of two speeches by the Secretary-General on the same subject, one in 
English, the other in French, made at close intervals. It should therefore be considered that they are two equivalent expressions of the same commu-
nication. The Secretariat-General consequently decided not to have them translated. 
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Before considering with you the implications for the present conditions of security of the situ-
ation in Central and Eastern Europe including the Soviet Union, I should like to stress that the 
outcome of NATO's strategy review, the results of the intergovernmental conference's work on 
European political union and, finally, WEU's transformation into a more operational organisation con-
tributing to a more distinct European role in the revamped Atlantic Alliance will be of crucial impor-
tance for our ability to react adequately to future pan-European and out-of-Europe challenges. 
The coherence of the three ongoing reviews is of paramount importance not only for the security 
of Western Europe, but also for the security of the continent as a whole. WEU's future is very much 
dependent on their outcome since its reactivation placed it at the crossroads of the process of European 
integration with the ultimate goal of a fully-fledged political union on the one hand, and the vitally 
important transatlantic security solidarity on the other. 
Given the changing environment, we have a duty to redefine the criteria for European security. 
Today, we no longer speak of" threats" and we prefer the terms" risks" and" challenges", as for a 
threat to exist, there must be a combination of aggressive capabilities with the political will to resort to 
military force and a crisis situation that could serve as a pretext for resorting to force. 
Gorbachev's perestroika, the " de-Sovietisation " of Central and Eastern Europe, the crisis and 
then the war in the Gulf will obviously have a bearing on our strategic thinking for the 1990s and 
beyond. I shall try to set out some of the lessons to be learned from the " acceleration " in European 
affairs from a WEU perspective. 
* 
* * 
The risks and challenges to our security in continental Europe come und~r two main headings: 
- those associated with the Soviet Union's military capabilities and with its growing insta-
bility; 
- those associated with the uncertain political developments in the Central and Eastern 
European countries, more specifically the Balkans. Indeed, the worst of all possible scenarios - the 
" Balkanisation " of Central and Eastern Europe in conjunction with the " Lebanonisation " of the 
USSR, both with unpredictable consequences - cannot be excluded yet. 
There are two main elements in the Soviet Union's situation today that justify not only circum-
spection but also the maintenance of adequate military resources: 
- the persistent crisis in the Soviet Union's federal structure, for which the prognoses are gen-
erally fairly bleak; 
- the development and constant modernisation of the most powerful nuclear and conventional 
arsenal in Europe. 
Since his March 1985 accession to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev and his programme of reform have attracted intense worldwide 
interest. Nearly six years later, the General Secretary's and President's reforms remain unfinished and 
lack firm institutionalisation. Gorbachev's most recent accommodations to conservative elements 
have considerably lowered opinion of him among his most ardent supporters in the East and West. 
Political reform has run ahead of economic reform in the USSR, with the highly destabilising conse-
quence that opportunities for the expression of discontent have expanded, while improvements in eco-
nomic conditions have not been felt by the population. On the contrary, Soviet economic performance 
-already modest by western standards- has declined drastically. In addition to these unsatisfactory 
conditions, the lack of consensus on mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of internal disputes is 
most conspicuously evident in the difficult question of the renegotiation of the contractual basis for the 
relationship among the nationalities of the USSR. 
Mounting economic chaos and nationalist separatism have eroded the centre ground that 
Mikhail Gorbachev has been trying to build on. By the beginning of 1991, the strength of the reac-
tionary backlash had become painfully evident. Unable to continue his reforms, the Soviet President 
seemed to be attempting to placate the party and military die-hards with the crackdown in the Baltic 
republics and the increasing concessions on the " new thinking " that has undoubtedly transformed the 
international scene. 
It is still too early to evaluate the implications of the most recent Soviet attempts to devise a 
framework for overcoming the current crisis of the USSR: after the end of perestroika's " romantic 
phase ", will the new " Gorbachev-Y eltsin pact ", the joint efforts made by both men in calling for the 
speedy conclusion of a new union treaty, which should be followed by the adoption of a new consti-
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tution and by fresh elections to central state organs, and also the plans for economic reform and 
stabilisation recently agreed by the Soviet central government and the majority of the USSR's con-
stituent republics herald a new phase of perestroika? Much will of course depend on the outcome and 
on the aftermath of the RSFSR presidential elections. 
For us in the West, just as for the newly democratising countries, to see democracy taking root in 
the minds and institutions of the peoples of the Soviet Union is an important element in our future 
security and a prerequisite for the development of comprehensive co-operation with the USSR, to the 
mutual advantage of all the parties involved. We are fully justified in our constant efforts to attract the 
Soviet Union into the pan-European architecture that is evolving out·ofthe CSCE. But would the cur-
rently discussed " grand bargain " be enough to mitigate the residual threat posed by the militarily 
most powerful country in our continent? 
By the mid-nineties, most if not all of the Soviet forces should have withdrawn from Central 
Europe. The signing of the CFE treaty has been a decisive step in the removal of the immediate Soviet 
threat, but its implementation rapidly ran into considerable difficulties. Though a compromise has 
now been reached, we must not close our eyes to the fact that the USSR is still fast modernising its 
forces and will retain the largest nuclear and conventional forces in Europe. 
Whereas ethnic strife could, under certain circumstances, weaken the Soviet army's cohesion, 
other factors related to the USSR's nationality problems cause considerable concern in the West. 
Should the USSR collapse, who would take control of its nuclear weapons? Who, for instance, would be 
in charge of the Soviet Union's fleet of nuclear submarines? Thus, the major risk for Europe is that of 
an " Ottoman-style " fragmentation of the world's second nuclear power. But at the same time, we 
should not forget that Russia does not need an empire in order to remain the foremost military power 
in Europe. 
I welcome the end of the cold war. The political climate has fundamentally changed, and in the 
right direction. In the future security policy, purely military elements are losing importance in com-
parison to C(H)perative aspects. But it would be irresponsible not to take account of risks connected 
with the USSR's evolution when we come to make assessments about our own defence efforts. 
* 
* * 
Under the second heading, risks and challenges are associated with the resurgence of nationalism 
and ethnic conflict in Central and Eastern Europe that might be aggravated by instability in the Soviet 
Union. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, the political battle for democracy has been won in Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The most obvious danger is that of a civil war in Yugoslavia. Economic 
backwardness and traditional nationalist tensions in this country are an explosive cocktail, with the 
danger of a spill-over to neighbouring Balkan countries, in which the seeds of division are also visible. 
The world cannot afford another Sarajevo. 
The first and most difficult task for the post-communist governments of Central and Eastern 
Europe is the reconstruction of civil society from what was left behind by nearly five decades of fascist 
and communist totalitarianism. Only the re-emergence of civil societies will signify the " return to 
Europe" of this region and create the necessary preconditions for political stability. 
Charles Gati, one of the leading experts on the Central and Eastern European area, pointed out 
in the New York Times of 14th February that the Soviet conservatives, while perhaps not strong 
enough to re-establish Soviet domination in the region, hope that the experiment with pluralism and 
market economy will fail. They would use this failure to reinforce their case against perestroika before 
the Soviet public. According to Gati, the Soviet conservatives'" road to power is paved with Central 
European instability ". Thus, the political and economic stability of Central Europe is crucial not only 
for the " return to Europe " of this region, but also for the future of perestroika. 
After the collapse of the Soviet domination in Central and Eastern Europe, much has been said 
and written about the " security vacuum " in this region. Indeed, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
have shown signs of feeling insecure because of developments in the Soviet Union, particularly in con-
nection with the onset of a more conservative system of government in Moscow, the crackdown in the 
Baltic republics, and the prolonged stay of Soviet troops in Germany and Poland. To enhance their 
national security, the three Central European countries have advocated an all-European security 
system based on the CSCE process, debated the idea of neutrality, sought contacts with NATO and 
WEU, and joined one another for consultations. As their membership in NATO and WEU is for 
obvious reasons not a realistic option, they are trying to pursue their security interests through a mul-
titude of associative ties with Western European institutions and with one another. 
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The treaty recently signed between the USSR and Romania deserves a special mention, as it lays 
a foundation for a Soviet droit de regard on Romania's security policy. Government officials in the 
Central European capitals are highly critical of the security clauses agreed to by Romania, and refuse 
such terms for the bilateral treaties with the USSR to be concluded by their countries in the near 
future. 
The idea that a security guarantee for the newly democratising nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe could be obtained through some kind of military function of the Helsinki process has now 
receded into the distant future. In Central Europe, the disenchantment on CSCE grew when it failed to 
condemn the Soviet repression in the Baltic republics unequivocally which it could not do because of 
the principle of unanimous voting that prevails in the organisation. The Soviets would not have sup-
ported such a condemnation. 
From the outset, we in the West shared the aspirations of our counterparts in the newly 
democratising countries to establish an effective European security system based on the CSCE. But we 
always saw and still see such a structure as a supplement to and not as a replacement for our existing 
western alliance system. This approach is now increasingly shared by our eastern neighbours. 
Jaroslav Jiru, a Czech publicist writing in Lidove Noviny of 11th February has suggested that 
" the grey zone " of association by commonality rather than by membership is the area in which 
Central and Eastern Europe has to find its bearing for the foreseeable future and that it need not fare 
badly if it does so. Mter all, not every western country has always been, or indeed is, a member of 
NATO and the EC. "Several European states", writes Mr. Jiru, "have survived decades in peace in 
this way. Perhaps we can do the same. "I very much agree with Mr. Jiru, but I would suggest that we 
no longer refer to a " grey " zone, but rather to a zone of concrete and manifold contacts, consultations 
and co-operation. Indeed, even without giving the Central and East Europeans a status of full or asso-
ciate membership in the western alliance structures, much can be done to address their security 
concerns. 
In this context, I very much welcome the statement on " Partnership with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe " issued by the North Atlantic Council on 6th June, which states that " the 
consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom 
from any form of coercion or intimidation ( ... ) are of direct and material concern" to the sixteen 
NATO members. I also welcome the series of measures to strengthen NATO co-operation known as 
" liaising" with the Central and Eastern European countries, as they have been outlined in the same 
statement. 
Western European Union has recently acquired an enhanced profile by virtue of its role in 
co-ordinating the military presence of member countries in the Persian Gulf. But by no means has it 
been idle in the field of relations with the USSR's former Warsaw Pact allies. 
On the basis of its April 1990 ministerial mandate, WEU has established and is developing con-
tacts with the democratically-elected governments in Central and Eastern Europe. Secretary-GeneraV 
Presidency fact-finding missions have been conducted to Hungary (October 1990), Czechoslovakia 
(November 1990) and Poland (March 1991). On 11th-12th March 1991, under the aegis of the WEU 
Institute for Security Studies, a seminar was held which brought together the officials responsible for 
politico-military affairs in the foreign and defence ministries of both the WEU member states and 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The WEU Institute has begun to establish contacts with the 
research communities in the Central and Eastern European countries and in the USSR. Further steps 
to extend and deepen WEU's dialogue on European security with the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe might be taken at the 27th June WEU Council of Ministers. 
The WEU parliamentary Assembly - the only European parliamentary assembly founded by 
treaty with competence in defence matters - has established contacts with the parliaments of Central 
and Eastern European countries. It appears today that all Central and Eastern European governments 
are interested in contacts with WEU. Increased contacts with the new democratising countries should 
allow us to take account of their preoccupations in the formulation of our own positions in regard to 
future negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
All in all, the risks associated with developments in Central and Eastern Europe and in the 
USSR will diminish only on four essential conditions: the re-emergence of civil societies in this region, 
which will signify its " return to Europe " and create the necessary preconditions for political and eco-
nomic stability; the existence of functioning mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of internal dis-
putes in these countries; the continuation of western support for democratic and market-oriented 
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe; and finally the development of a comprehensive network of 
complementary institutions and co-operative relationships, in which WEU and NATO, the 
EC/political union and the CSCE will be the main, but by no means the only building-blocks. 
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Much will depend on the successful continuation of our efforts to develop the 
institutionalisation of the CSCE. The forthcoming Berlin meeting should be a decisive step towards its 
enhancement. With the Helsinki CSCE follow-up meeting scheduled for 1992, I can only repeat yet 
again that time is pressing. 
In mid-1991, the situation in Europe remains very much in a state of flux. In this context, our 
strategy must continue to be directed mutatis mutandis, by the policy guidelines laid down by Pierre 
Harmel in 1967, and be based on a combination of: 
- a more intensive political dialogue designed to extend co-operation and continue the process 
of arms control. The implementation of the CFE treaty and the development of confidence-building 
and stabilising measures will be the starting point for future progress; 
- a strategy of deterrence of the use of force to settle conflicts in Europe. 
* 
* * 
There can be little doubt that the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which took 
place in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June will be another important landmark in the development of 
European affairs. Its final communique explicitly welcomes " efforts further to strengthen the security 
dimension in the process of European integration " and recognises " the significance of the progress 
made by the countries of the European Community towards the goal of political union, including the 
development of a common foreign and security policy". "Practical arrangements" will be developed, 
says the final communique, " to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the 
European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and the alliance". 
Now that Europe has a framework for overall co-operation, namely the CSCE, and a defensive 
alliance dedicated to deterrence from war, should it not look to WEU for an organisation that could 
help to contain potential crises in close consultation with NATO and give Europe a certain autonomy 
of action? Situations may arise in which NATO as such would not be able to act, but in which the Euro-
peans would nevertheless like to take on certain responsibilities. Should WEU therefore not develop its 
own operational capability and have at least minimal military structures, which would enable it to 
perform a role as and when required, both inside and outside Europe? Such questions cannot be 
evaded and many people are putting them to us with some urgency, especially the leaders of the new 
democracies with which we are developing an open and constructive dialogue. 
* 
* * 
Europe is no longer a continent of immobility and division. A sense of urgency has been injected 
and is accelerating progress towards the unity of the continent, but it has a corollary: unpredictability. 
Under the pressure of events, Western Europe is advancing towards a political union which will make 
it the mainstay and the motive force for a new European order. There is a time and place for theo-
retical debate, and a time and place for action. Today, it is our duty to act, so that the pan-European 
peace order, which we hope will evolve from the Paris Charter of 1990, will not fail. 
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Schlaman), MM. Masseret, Meyer zu Bentrup, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond, Regenwetter, Silva Marques (Alternate: 
Fernandes Marques), Sinesio (Alternate: Paris1), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Vara (Alternate: Soares Costa). 
N.!i. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Expltmatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. At the time of preparing this draft budget for the financial year 1992, the Assembly still does not 
have a formally approved budget for the financial year 1991. However, during an exchange of views 
between the President of the Assembly and the members of the Permanent Council on 8th July 1991, 
an agreement was reached on the growth rate for this budget and the terms for creating two new grade 
A posts: this agreement will be submitted to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and the Presidential Committee at their meetings scheduled for 11th September 1991. 
2. In so far as a comparison between the two budgets appears legitimate, the data for the financial 
year 1991 can be considered firm. 
3. It is important to emphasise that the Assembly's activities are constantly expanding. As will be 
seen under Head Ill, these include the establishment of relations with Eastern European and Mediter-
ranean countries. For its action to be effective and for its efforts to benefit the cause of peace, the 
Assembly requires the means requested in this budget. 
4. Before analysing the new budgetary proposals, it is also important to emphasise that all estimates 
translating these proposals into financial terms have been made with the greatest possible accuracy: 
where specific references were lacking, account has been taken of experience. The Assembly thus tries 
to make its budget as realistic as possible, taking due account of the requirements recalled by the 
auditor. 
5. In 1990 (Accounts for the financial year 1989), the auditor made the following comment: "A 
determination of estimates taking account of the conditions in which the previous budget was imple-
mented and as accurate an assessment as possible for the financial year in question would make it pos-
sible to respect more strictly the initial shape of the budgetary appropriations. " He repeated the same 
comment in his report for his audit of the accounts for the financial year 1990: " As pointed out when 
the 1989 accounts were audited, estimates under a certain number of sub-heads seem to have been 
included without any precise thought for the needs or even the tendencies noted previously in the way 
credits are spent, thus forming reservoirs that are available during the year for other purposes; such 
transfers therefore significantly modify the shape of the budget initially adopted. " 
6. While reserving the right to revert to this question when the report on the accounts for 1990 is 
presented to the Assembly, your Rapporteur can but emphasise the effort to achieve accuracy in pre-
paring the Assembly's budgets. Admittedly, between estimates and reality there can sometimes be a not 
negligeable gap due to corrections made by the Assembly in its priorities in the course of the year; this 
was particularly so in 1989 and 1990, estimates having been affected by the uncertainty about the date 
of the effective participation of Portuguese and Spanish members in the work of the Assembly and 
their possible collaboration in organising the different services of the session. 
7. The situation being clarified in the meantime, it is possible to bring estimates closer to reality in 
this draft budget for 1992 without the management of the budget thereby being reduced to a mere 
question of accountancy because the Assembly, particularly in this era of great political changes, might 
always adapt these estimates to possible variations in programmes of work which might prove nec-
essary in the course of the year. 
8. Bearing these considerations in mind, the proposals presented in this draft budget will be 
analysed in three separate chapters corresponding to the following three categories of expenditure: 
- expenditure relating to permanent staff (Head I of the budget); 
- operating expenditure (Heads 11 to V of the budget); 
- expenditure relating to pensions. 
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11. Head I - Expenditure relating to permanent staff 
9. The revised draft budget for the financial year 1991, approved unanimously by the Assembly on 
4th June 1991 (Document 1241 Addendum 2), included the creation of five new posts, of which two 
grade A and three grade B, and the regrading of one grade L post and three grade C posts. Of these pro-
posals, only the one for the creation of two grade A posts was approved by the Council. 
10. To complete the programme for restructuring the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, it is nec-
essary to include in the draft budget for 1992 credits relating to the other proposals for: 
- creating three new grade B3 posts; 
- regrading four existing posts (one grade Land three grade C). 
11. Regarding the proposal to create three new posts of assistant, your Rapporteur can but quote the 
opinion of the experts in their report on the organisation of the Office of the Clerk (Part 3, paragraph 3) 
which reads as follows: 
" The creation of three grade B3 posts of assistant is justified by the creation of new senior posts 
and the increase in the tasks of the research and administrative services although the Office of 
the Clerk proposes only two. 
The post of assistant to the Political Committee is essential in so far as the committee would be 
run independently of the Clerk Assistant. 
While the duties and responsibilities of the administrative Clerk Assistant are not questioned 
and must remain as they are, the creation of a post of assistant in the administrative services is 
made necessary by the increase in material tasks resulting from the Assembly's opening to the 
outside world (mail, printing, etc.). 
The third post of assistant should bring the research and documentation service up to strength 
and allow it to be equipped with modern documentary data retrieval systems essential for the 
smooth running of the Assembly bodies. " 
12. It should also be mentioned that in the explanatory memorandum of the draft budget for 1991 
(paragraph 13) the place of the two grade B3 assistants in the political section of the Office of the Clerk 
is specified: they will be assigned to the two new grade A officials. According to the opinion of the 
experts, this section should be able to count on: 
" - a secretariat for the Political Committee consisting of a grade AS secretary and a grade B3 
assistant. 
This is essential to allow the Clerk Assistant, now Secretary of the committee, to carry out 
his new tasks in full; 
- a grade A3/4 head of the research and documentation service and a grade B3 assistant. The 
creation of an efficient research and documentation service specific to the Assembly is 
essential to allow the Presidency and the committees to give a new dimension to their work. 
This service should not have a cumbersome structure but a dynamic organisation using 
modern technology for the retrieval and processing of documentation so as, in particular, to 
ensure a computerised link with existing sources of documentation (national parliaments, 
specialised institutes, etc.). However, the attribution of enough staff from the outset is a con-
dition for the success of this operation. " 
13. As for the third post of grade B3 assistant for the archives, the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly has a true need for this since the archives section is also responsible for sending out docu-
ments for sessions (the Assembly does not have a dispatching office as is the case, for instance, in the 
Council of Europe) and is faced with an increase in the volume sent out in 1989 and 1990 of 250% 
compared with 1988. This figure will probably be higher in 1991. The table at Appendix VII clearly 
shows this evolution. It is quite clear that the person in the archives service, in spite of the occasional 
assistance of temporary staff, is no longer in a position to carry out all these duties alone. Should it not 
be possible to employ an assistant here, an alternative might be to employ the services of a dispatching 
firm. In this case, the budget should include a suitable increase of estimates under sub-head 18 -
postage, telephone, telefax and transport of documents. 
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14. Finally, for the regrading of four existing posts, your Rapporteur can but refer to the justifica-
tions already given in the explanatory memorandum of the budget for 1991, which remain fully valid 
and are summarised below. 
15. Regarding the regrading, in a personal capacity, of the post of translator-interpreter from grade 
L3 to grade L4, it should be noted that the holder has 28 years of experience as a linguist, 16 of which 
in NATO (at grade L4 for 10 years). Transferred to the WEU Assembly after having worked for the 
WEU agencies for security questions, she has taken over, under the responsibility of the Clerk Assistant 
for Administrative and Financial Questions, co-ordination of the teams of interpreters and also takes 
part herself in the work of these teams, which allows the Assembly to limit recruitment to 20 inter-
preters instead of 22 for each session and five interpreters instead of six for other meetings, thus 
making a considerable saving. In addition, she also works in conjunction with the French translation 
section, which is particularly valuable since she also translates from Italian and Spanish. Finally, at the 
request of the WEU Secretariat-General, the Assembly places the services of this official at the disposal 
of the Council for ministerial meetings; the Secretariat-General recently expressed its official appreci-
ation for the extremely valuable assistance thus provided, particularly during the year of the French 
presidency. 
16. The other regradings concern the posts of three members of the staff assigned to the storage of 
and accounting for equipment and the reproduction service. In its reports on the budgets of the minis-
terial organs, the Assembly has on several occasions drawn the Council's attention to the problem of 
the staffs career possibilities, an essential condition for ensuring maximum motivation. This problem 
now arises more specifically for the three grade C officials (one C6 and two C4) who, having reached 
the ceiling of their grades, have no further prospect of advancement, although their work has changed, 
not only quantitatively but qualitatively. Such regrading is thus fully in line with the principle that 
there should be concordance between duties to be carried out, qualifications and the professional 
category of staff. To raise the three officials to category B (the grade C6 official to grade B4 and the two 
grade C4s to grade B3) is justified by their qualifications and increased knowledge. It should be pointed 
out that their colleagues in the reproduction service of the WEU ministerial organs are already in cat-
egory B. To move these three officals to category B would, in the immediate future, have financial 
advantages for only one of them, who would become entitled to the expatriation allowance, but in the 
years to come they would be entitled to the subsequent steps provided for in category B. 
1 7. The programme for restructuring the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly described in the last 
few paragraphs will render the latter more effective, in accordance with the report of the three experts 
on " the organisation of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly ". These experts pointed out that the 
Office of the Clerk " works well but in precarious conditions which may have a considerable impact on 
any development in the Assembly's role". They concluded that" the standard of work in the Office of 
the Clerk is therefore closely linked with the Assembly's role in WEU and the very role ofWEU. It can 
already be foreseen that this will grow in the years ahead thus raising, here and now, the question of 
strengthening the staff of the services". This role has indeed increased considerably, particularly fol-
lowing the exceptional events which took place in 1990. As a result, the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly must be strengthened, particularly where the committee services are concerned. The two 
grade A officials (Spanish and Portuguese) and the two grade B members of staff who will be assigned 
to the committee services will allow the Clerk Assistant for Political Affairs to co-ordinate his depart-
ment's activities more effectively and to organise research and study in such a way as to constantly 
provide a thorough analysis of the world political situation for the various Assembly committees. 
18. The estimates in Head I take account of the restructuring proposals and therefore concern the 
overall strength of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly which, in 1992, should have 37 officials in 
the various services (see Appendix I and organogram at Appendix 11). The cost of creating three new 
posts and regrading four existing posts amounts to F 895 000, i.e. a nominal growth rate, compared 
with the previous financial year, of 6.09%. 
19. However, a comparison of estimates in Head I for the financial years 1991 and 1992 shows a 
total increase in expenditure of F 2 498 000, resulting from: 
- the financial incidence of the proposals for restructuring of the Office of the Clerk mentioned 
in paragraph 16 above; 
- the incidence of the creation in 1991 of two new grade A posts affecting only two and a half 
months of this financial year (the difference may be assessed at approximately F 743 000); 
- the amount required for the revision of salary scales with effect from 1st July 1991 and the 
steps granted to the staff concerned, which sum may be estimated at about F 860 000. 
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Ill. Operating budget 
20. Before starting to analyse the estimates under Heads 11 to V of the operational budget, where the 
Assembly has budgetary autonomy, one preliminary remark is necessary. Compared with the financial 
year 1991, this part of the budget shows a growth rate of 5.91% (see Appendix V). However, in view of 
the foreseeable inflation rate of 3% in 1992, it may be considered that the real growth of 2. 91 o/o is jus-
tified, compared with the work of the Assembly which is expected to be developed in 1992 through 
more far-reaching contacts, particularly with Eastern European and Mediterranean countries. 
21. It should be underlined that if it has been possible to keep the growth rate to a modest level in 
spite of the considerable increase in the number of the Assembly's correspondents (governments, par-
liaments, press, requests for information and documents) and the amount of travelling which has 
already had to bear the increase in air-fares of some 20o/o between July 1990 and July 1991 -it is 
thanks to the continuous revision of the organisation of the services of the Office of the Clerk with a 
view to rationalising methods of work as more efficient means are placed at their disposal. 
22. Thus, estimates under Head 11, sub-head 6 - staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly - take 
account of a reduction in the number of staff recruited for sessions from 106 in 1991 to 100 (see 
Appendix 111.1) in 1992. This reduction has been possible on the one hand thanks to the replacement 
of old offset machines by photocopying machines (shown in Appendix IV- five-year modernisation 
and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk) which are operated by 
smaller teams of offset assemblers and, on the other hand, by a trial run of the use of word-processors 
in the French section of the service of the verbatim reporters. 
23. The estimates under sub-head 7 which, together with sub-heads 24 and 27 of Head V, are the 
most affected by the Assembly's programme of work, are calculated on the understanding that as many 
interpreters as possible are recruited where meetings are held. Account has also been taken of the fact 
that the interpreter of the Office of the Clerk will be part of all the teams recruited in Paris and, as 
appropriate, teams recruited for meetings outside Paris. These estimates show a marked increase com-
pared with credits for the financial year 1991, but it should be noted that the increases in salary scales 
and the cost of travelling (between 18% and 20%) have been taken into account in order to obtain a 
realistic assessment of these estimates. 
24. Conversely, estimates under sub-head 8- temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk- have been 
reduced to F 15 000 in view of the creation of three new posts of assistant. Should these posts not be 
created, credits under this sub-head will obviously have to be increased at least to the level of actual 
expenditure foreseen in 1991, i.e. F 90 000. 
25. Thanks to the measures mentioned in the previous paragraphs, it has been possible to keep the 
growth rate under Head 11 to 3.9%, which bears witness to the Assembly's effort to make economies. 
26. Regarding the estimates under Head Ill - expenditure on premises and equipment, except for 
sub-head 10, share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises- which shows the Assembly's share in 
expenditure for managing the building under the responsibility of the administrative service of the 
WEU Institute for Security Studies, most of the sub-heads are calculated accurately on the basis of con-
tracts for the provision of s~rvices or supplies. 
27. Estimates under sub-head 17- hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment- are 
analysed in detail in Appendix IV. In particular, it should be noted that the contract for maintaining 
word-processors (item 10.3 of this programme) has been renegotiated to obtain a reduction of 30% of 
the initial sum. Also, the replacement of offset machines by photocopying machines has resulted in a 
reduction of temporary staff as explained in paragraph 22 above and maintenance costs are more 
favourable (see item 1.8 of the programme) with the result that it is no longer necessary to include spe-
cific estimates for maintenance in sub-head 17. 
28. Thanks to these measures, the total nominal growth rate under Head Ill is very slight, showing 
an increase of only 0. 7 4% over the previous financial year, this increase being less than the foreseeable 
3% rate of inflation in 1992. · 
29. Compared with the financial year 1991, Head IV shows an increase of 9.10% due mainly to the 
increase in postage, telephone, telefax (sub-head 18) and the inclusion in sub-head 22 of the cost of 
hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the President of the Assembly. For sub-heads 19, 20 and 21, an 
increase of 3% corresponding to the average rate of inflation has been foreseen. 
30. The increase under sub-head 18 is justified by the considerable increase in the amount of mail 
sent out by the archives office (already mentioned in paragraph 13 above), particularly as a result of the 
impetus given by the press service to communications on WEU's activities and the greater number 
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of pages sent by fax. Moreover, the credits requested under this sub-head correspond to actual expend-
iture in 1990 and 1991 and the narrowing of estimates and expenditure corresponds to the recommen-
dations of the auditor. 
31. The inclusion of an amount for hiring a chauffeur-driven car under sub-head 22 is merely a tem-
porary reversion to the practice of previous years, broken off in 1991 because of the proposal to create 
a post of chauffeur. In fact, the Assembly reserves the right to envisage having an official to take on, in 
particular, the duties of usher, messenger and receiving clerk and, therefore, to put forward a proposal 
in the draft budget for 1993. 
32. Head V is the one on which the Assembly's programme of work has the greatest impact. The lim-
itations the Council has imposed on the credits granted for the financial year 1991 have made it nec-
essary to cancel or defer until next year certain visits to the United States, Asian countries, Eastern 
Europe and the Mediterranean planned by various committees of the Assembly. 
33. It seems paradoxical that the Assembly should be obliged to thus limit its activities at a time 
when many European and non-European countries are turning to it in search of a dialogue they con-
sider necessary so as not to be isolated in such a rapidly-changing world and to make their contribution 
to a just and lasting peace. In addition to the visits mentioned above, the programme of work for 1992 
takes into account the holding of a symposium on European defence which the Political Committee is 
to hold in one of the member countries. 
34. Answering the Assembly's Recommendation 494, the Council welcomed " the activities con-
ducted by the Assembly, such as the joint meeting of its committees in Palermo on 24th-26th March 
1991 and the visit of a delegation to Egypt from 28th April-2nd May, a useful contribution towards 
enhancing international awareness of WEU ". The Assembly is touched by this appreciation which 
encourages it to pursue its action. 
35. The President of the Assembly was therefore quite right in writing to the new Chairman-in-
Office of the Council on 4th July 1991 in the following terms: 
" The programme established by the Council at its meeting in Vianden responds, to a degree 
which should be emphasised, to the Assembly's concerns and the recommendations it has com-
municated to the Council. This should allow exchanges between the two parts of WEU to be 
developed with special intensity and I have no doubt that the German presidency will join its 
efforts with mine to achieve this. However, for the useful and harmonious development of these 
exchanges, it would be essential for the Council to agree to take into account the budgetary 
implications of the strengthening of WEU and of the increase in its activities where the 
Assembly is concerned. " 
36. Your Rapporteur can but endorse the wishes expressed by the President of the Assembly and 
trusts the Council will agree to take a favourable view of the Assembly's requests. For such a tiny 
financial effort, the governments would achieve positive results at political level. 
IV. Pensions budget 
37. A new invalidity pension, which will probably be granted in 1991, is taken into account in the 
estimates for 1992 which cover all the pensions for the 14 retired officials ( 11 old-age pensions, 2 inva-
lidity pensions and 1 survivor's pension), adjusted as for permanent staff in accordance with the 5.56% 
increase in salary scales. 
38. Regarding receipts under this part of the budget, which consist of contributions by the staff to 
the pension scheme (7% of basic salary) account has been taken of the contributions corresponding to 
the creation of three new posts and the regrading of four existing posts. These contributions amount to 
approximately F 35 000 and should be withdrawn from the budget if these proposals are not accepted. 
V. Summary of the estimates of the draft bullget 
of the Assembly for 1992 (operating and pensions budget) 
39. Finally, as may be seen from the table at Appendix V, the general net total of estimates in the 
draft budget ofthe Assembly for 1992 (operating budget plus pensions budget minus receipts) amounts 
to F 30 158 500 which, compared with the general net total of the budget for the financial year 1991, 
shows a growth rate of 12.08%. 
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Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts 
for the financial year 1992 
Details Expenditure 
PART 1: Operating budget 
Section A: Expenditure 
Head I: Permanent staff 17 182 000 
Head Il: Temporary staff 3 777 000 
Head Ill: Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 1 767 000 
Head IV: General administrative costs 2 301 500 
Head V.· Other expenditure 2 315 000 
Section B: Receipts 
27 342 500 
NET TOTAL 
27 342 500 
PART 11: Pensions budget 
Section A: Expenditure 
Head I: Pensions, allowances and social 
charges 3 655 000 
Section B: Receipts 
3 655 000 
NET TOTAL 
3 655 000 
NET TOTAL BUDGET 
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Receipts 
105 000 
105 000 
27 237 500 
27 342 500 
734 000 
734 000 
2 921 000 
3 655 000 
30 158 500 
Budget estimates 
PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I - Permanent staff 
Estimates 
Sub-Heads for 
1992 
Sub-Head 1 - Basic salaries 11 860 000 
Sub-Head 2 - Allowances: 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 1 263 000 
2.2. Household allowance 569 000 
2.3. Allowance for children and 
other dependent persons 611 000 
2.4. Rent allowance 60000 
2.5. Education allowance 63 000 
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2000 
2. 7. Overtime 55 000 
2.8. Home leave 60000 
2 683 000 
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges: 
3.1. Social security 1 644 000 
3.2. Supplementary insurance 570 000 
3.3. Provident fund 190 000 
2 404 000 
Sub-Head 4 - Expenses relating to the recruit-
ment and departure of permanent 
officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi-
dates for vacant posts 5 000 
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of permanent 
officials and their families 18 000 
4.3. Removal expenses 120 000 
4.4. Installation allowance 78000 
221 000 
Sub-Head 5 - Medical examination 14000 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 17 182 000 
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Budget 
for 
1991 
10 374 000 
2 200000 
2 012 000 
86400 
11 600 
14 684 000 
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Expected Actual 
expenditure expenditure 
in 1991 in 1990 
10 180 000 9 125 233 
2 100 000 1 933 969 
2 075 000 1 720 518 
86 400 116 044 
11 600 12 800 
14 453 000 12 908 564 
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Explanations 
Sub-Heads 1 and 2 
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to 
permanent staff in accordance with Chapter Ill of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU 
Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 
30th June 1990 1, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 4% as from 1st July 1991 and 3% 
as from 1st July 1992. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 840 000. 
These estimates take account of the financial implications of creating two new grade A posts 
authorised by the Council in 1991 and proposals for restructuring the Office of the Clerk set out in this 
budget (creation of three new posts and regrading of four existing posts). 
The table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and 
the organogram at Appendix II. 
Sub-Head 3 
Estimated expenditure for " Social charges " is based on commitments stemming from: 
- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the 
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1) 2; 
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2) 3; 
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the 
Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension 
scheme (Sub-Head 3.3). 
Sub-Head 4 
No officials are expected to leave in 1992. Estimates under this sub-head relate only to the new 
posts included in the organogram of the Office of the Clerk and to certain allowances or refunds 
(removal expenses, installation allowance, etc.) to which the two new members of staff recruited in 
1991 may be entitled at the end of the probationary period. 
Sub-Head 5 
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff 
must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried 
out at the OECD medical centre. 
1. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU 
Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). 
2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and 
old-age pensions. 
3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent 
disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the benefici-
aries he has named. 
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Head 11 - Temporary staff 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for expenditure expenditure 
1992 1991 in 1991 in 1990 
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions of the 
Assembly 
6.1. Sittings service 1 340 000 
6.2. Interpretation service 662 000 
6.3. Translation service 921 000 
6.4. Other services 65 000 
2 988 000 2 902 000 2 780000 3 003 224 
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for 
Assembly work between sessions 618 000 568 000 650 000 428 002 
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of 
the Clerk 15 000 15 000 90000 82 945 
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges 
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff 
other than interpreters 10000 
9.2. Provident fund for inter-
preters 140 000 
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 6000 
156 000 150 000 140 000 158 369 
ToTAL oF HEAD 11 3 777 000 3 635 000 3 660000 3 672 540 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 6 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to: 
(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the 
reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation 
and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at 
Appendix Ill. 
(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post 
office technician, typewriter mechanic, guards for the security service, etc.). 
Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 30th June 1991 in the co-ordinated 
organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the 
same way as for permanent staff, the adjustment amounting to F 137 000. 
In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the Interna-
tional Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the 
basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 6%. 
Sub-Head 7 
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at 
meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, 
travelling time and travelling expenses). 
Estimates are based on the recruitment of five interpreters for each meeting (200 working days, 
of which 120 in Paris), the sixth interpreter being the permanent official recruited in 1990. Salaries and 
working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. the note on Sub-Head 6 
above). Their salary adjustment for 1992 amounts to F 24 000. 
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Sub-Head 8 
A small amount is shown for this sub-head since the creation of three new grade B posts should 
reduce the need to recruit temporary staff. In 1991, the non-availability of the three assistants 
requested will result in an overspending under this sub-head of some F 7 5 000. The Council will be 
requested to authorise the transfer of this sum from Head I to Head 11, sub-head 8. These estimates 
include an overall sum covering salaries, possible travelling expenses and insurance. 
Sub-Head 9 
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges: 
Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 
Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against 
the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 
40% by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premiums as from May 
1988. 
Provident fund for interpreters 
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU 
has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund, or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a con-
tribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters. 
Insurance for interpreters 
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary ofStewart Wrightson in London, 
covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them 
from working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk 
(0. 7%) and the interpreters (0.4%). 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for expenditure expenditure 
1992 1991 in 1991 in 1990 
Sub-Head 10 - Share of joint expenditure on 
the Paris premises 540 000 525 000 525 000 363 482 
Sub-Head 11 - Hire of committee rooms 10000 10000 - 3 500 
Sub-Head 12 - Technical and other installa-
tions for Assembly sessions 587 000 570000 564 000 550 863 
Sub-Head 13 - Various services for the organ-
isation of sessions 105 000 65 000 95 000 78 248 
Sub-Head 14 - Maintenance of the premises of 
the Office of the Clerk 15 000 15 000 10000 27 340 
Sub-Head 15 - Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture 35 000 35 000 18 000 26 919 
Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and 
other office equipment - - - 14 513 
Sub-Head 17 - Hire and maintenance of repro-
duction and other equipment 475 000 534 000 520 000 416 817 
TOTAL OF HEAD Ill 1 767 000 1 754 000 1 732 000 1 481 682 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 10 
Estimates under this sub-head represent the 30% share of joint expenditure relating to joint ser-
vices shared by the WEU organs in Paris. Following the abolition of the agencies, the Council con-
firmed the validity of the previous system of sharing this expenditure and made the administrative 
service of the WEU Institute for Security Studies responsible for managing joint services. 
Sub-Head 11 
For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous 
interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in 
certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hiring a room or installing portable interpretation 
equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to 
cover such expenditure if necessary. 
Sub-Head 12 
As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous 
interpretation equipment, telephone booths, telefax, screens, a detection gate and other installations in 
the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions. 
Sub-Head 13 
Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of vari.ous services during 
Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, transport of reproduction equipment 
loaned free of charge, etc.). To usual expenditure must be added the cost of using new reproduction 
machines (approximately F 30 000) lent free of charge. This expenditure is justified by the considerable 
improvement in the operation of the service allowing the number of staff operating offset machines 
during sessions to be reduced, thus making a saving of an equivalent amount in sub-head 6.1. 
Sub-Head 14 
As in the past, this sum is requested to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of 
the Office of the Clerk. 
Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17 
Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year modernisation and maintenance pro-
gramme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget. The considerable reduction in the 
amounts under sub-head l 7 is due to the end of the leasing contract for three computers and the rene-
gotiation of maintenance contracts for the Assembly's computer equipment which shows a marked 
reduction due to the numbers involved compared with former contracts. No expenditure is expected in 
1991 under sub-head 15 since the programme for the purchase of office furniture has been suspended 
in order to offset expected overspending in other sections of the budget. 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for expenditure expenditure 
1992 1991 in 1991 in 1990 
Sub-Head 18 - Postage, telephone, telefax and 
transport of documents 630 000 560 000 630 000 625 576 
Sub-Head 19 - Duplication paper, headed 
writing paper and other office 
supplies 287 000 280000 280000 277 233 
Sub-Head 20 - Printing and publication of 
documents l 187 000 1 154 000 1 000 000 902 899 
Sub-Head 21 - Purchase of documents 72000 70000 70000 73 606 
Sub-Head 22 - Official car 125 000 45000 100000 218 760 
Sub-Head 23 - Bank charges 500 500 500 676 
ToTAL oF HEAD IV 2 301 500 2 109 500 2 080 500 2 098 750 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 18 
Estimates under this sub-head take account of the considerable increase in the volume of docu-
ments being pos~ed which, compared with 1988, increased by 250% in 1989 and 1990 and will pre-
sumably be higher in 1991 and 1992. 
Sub-Head 19 
In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the foreseeable variation of prices 
in this sector (+3%), the increase in the estimate compared with the previous financial year is only 
slight. This has been made possible by modernising reproduction equipment, thereby economising 
paper and expendable items. For the consumption of paper, for instance, the replacement of two offset 
machines by two photocopying machines has allowed far more documents to be produced while 
remaining within the bounds of available credits. 
Sub-Head 20 
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in prices (3%). 
Sub-Head 21 
There is a slight increase in estimates under this sub-head as compared with the financial year 
1991 due to the need to purchase a wider range of documentation essential for the preparation of 
studies and reports. 
Sub-Head 22 
Estimates under this sub-head include the cost of running the official car of the Office of the 
Clerk (garage, petrol, servicing, insurance, etc.) and of hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the President of 
the Assembly. 
Sub-Head 23 
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged. 
Head V - Other expenditure 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for expenditure expenditure 
1992 1991 in 1991 in 1990 
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence 
allowances and insurance for 
the President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs 230000 200000 210000 304 467 
Sub-Head 25 - Expenses for representation 360000 260000 360000 266 014 
Sub-Head 26 - Committee study missions 5000 5 000 - -
Sub-Head 27 - Official journeys of members 
of the Office of the Clerk 650000 630000 600000 544 530 
Sub-Head 28 - Expenses of experts and the 
auditor 50000 30000 30000 53 342 
Sub-Head 29 - Expenditure on information 455 000 455 000 400000 536 282 
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political groups 534000 484000 484000 403 000 
Sub-Head 31 - Contingencies and other 
expenditure not elsewhere pro-
vided for 3000 3000 - 1 455 
Sub-Head 32 - Non-recoverable taxes 28000 28000 28000 20268 
ToTAL OF HEAD V 2 315 000 2 095 000 2 112 000 2 129 358 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 24 
The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and 
committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries, as are those of members of the 
Bureau and Presidential Committee. 
The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for visits by the President 
of the Assembly, rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairman when these visits are con-
nected with the preparation of a report or the work of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen 
and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee. Estimates take into account the 
18-20% increase in air fares compared with the previous year. 
Sub-Head 25 
The participation in sessions of the Assembly of very high-ranking official speakers and the ever-
increasing number of visits by parliamentary delegations from countries of Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean to the Assembly justify the increase in credits requested under this sub-head. 
Sub-Head 26 
Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure for committee study visits. As 
these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year. 
Sub-Head 27 
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the variation in per diem allowances provided 
for in the 270th report of the Co-ordinating Committee and the 18-20% increase in air fares; they are 
based on figures for previous financial years and are due to the intensification of the Assembly's work, 
with particular regard to contacts with North American countries and eastern and Mediterranean 
countries. A symposium to be organised by the Political Committee in one of the member countries 
has also been taken into account. 
Sub-Head 28 
In addition to the cost of auditing the Assembly's accounts, which is done by the Premier 
President de la Cour des Comptes of France, this estimate includes some F 20 000 to cover the partici-
pation of experts in the symposium to be organised by the Political Committee in 1992. 
Sub-Head 29 
The estimate is unchanged compared with 1991, mainly in order to give the press service means 
of developing its action. 
Sub-Head 30 
The estimate under this sub-head was increased by 20% in 1990 because of the increase in the 
number of parliamentarians following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU and by 20% in 
1991. However, the chairmen of political groups have expressed their concern at the small resources 
made available to them, particularly now that they intend, through more intensive action, to help to 
strengthen the role that will be incumbent upon the WEU Assembly in the new European structure. 
There is therefore an increase of 10% in estimates for 1992 compared with the previous year. By 
decision of the Presidential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in pro-
portion to the number of members listed and has to submit a balance sheet at the close of the financial 
year. All the balance sheets are appended to the accounts ofthe Assembly and are consequently subject 
to verification by the auditor. 
Sub-Head 31 
The same amount is requested as for 1991. 
Sub-Head 32 
The same amount is requested as for 1991. 
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PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimates Budget Estimates Actual 
for for for receipts 
1992 1991 1991 in 1990 
1. Sale of publications 35 000 35 000 34000 25 538 
2. Bank interest 60000 60000 40000 39 181 
3. Receipts 
(reimbursements, social security, etc.) 10000 10000 30000 60189 
TOTAL RECEIPTS 105 000 105 000 104000 124 908 
Explanations 
Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are based 
on experience. 
PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I - Pensions, allowances and social charges 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
for for 1991 expenditure expenditure 
1992 (authorised) in 1991 in 1990 
Sub-Head 1 - Pensions and leaving 
allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 2 866 000 
1.2. Invalidity pensions 417 000 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 60000 
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' 
pensions -
1.5. Leaving allowances -
3 363 000 3118000 3 184 000 2 936 169 
Sub-Head 2 - Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances 139 000 
2.2. Children's and other 
dependants' allowances 30000 
2.3. Education allowances 16 000 
185 000 169 000 156 600 160 647 
Sub-Head 3 - Supplementary insurance 107 000 79000 100000 72 956 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 3 655 000 3 366 000 3 440 600 3 169 772 
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Explanations 
Sub-Heads 1 and 2 
In 1992, the Assembly will be paying fourteen pensions, as follows: 
- eleven old-age pensions; 
- two invalidity pensions; 
- one survivor's pension. 
Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provi-
sions of the pension scheme rules. The foreseeable overspending in 1991 is due to the fact that it is 
anticipated that one invalidity pension will have to paid with effect from 1st August 1991. This over-
spending might make it necessary to ask the Council to authorise a transfer from Head I or, should 
savings be insufficient under this head, a supplementary budget. 
Sub-Head 3 
Pensions are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19bis of the collective 
convention in force. 
Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid 
by the Assembly. 
PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
for for receipts receipts 
1992 1991 in 1991 in1990 
Contributions by permanent officials .......... 734 000 631 000 631 000 566 588 
Explanations 
Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by the 
thirty-five permanent staff members of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) 
affiliated to the pension scheme. 
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Grade 
H. G. 
A6 
A5 
A4 
L4 
L2/3 
A2 
A2 
B6 
B4 
B4 
B3 
B3 
B3 
B3 
C6 
C4 
APPENDIX I 
Recapitulatory table showing changes in the sttif.f 
of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU AssemblY 
proposed in the 1992 budget 
Duties 1992 budget 
Clerk 1 
Clerk Assistants 2 
Counsellors 5 
First secretaries 2 
Translator-interpreter 1 
Translator-interpreter -
Controller; Head of private office 2 
Translators; Documentalists 4 
Chief accountant 1 
Qualified assistants 7 
Equipment accountant; 
Head of documents reproduction service 1 
Offset operator; Reproduction clerk 2 
Accountant 1 
Bilingual shorthand-typists 7 
Switchboard operator 1 
Head of documents reproduction service -
Offset operators -
37 
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1991 budget +or-
1 -
2 -
5 -
2 -
- + 1 
1 - 1 
2 -
4 -
1 -
7 -
- + 1 
- +2 
1 -
4 + 3 
1 -
1 - 1 
2 -2 
34 +3 
I 
I I 
Prmdenbal 
Commitu:e 
I 
Clerk Assistant (A6) 
(Politi<aiAffairs) 
-· 
(83/4) 
I 
I 
Committee ServiCe Press and External =:.:~~ Relations Service 
- Head of ServiCe (I) Head of Serv1ce (AS) r-- Secretary (2) 
-· 
(I) Asststant (83/4) Assistant (2) 
4Joumabsts 
Defence Comnuttee 2Asststants 
Sittmgs 
1 Messenger 2 Prestdenbal Counsellors 
-
Secretary (AS) 
AssiStant (83/4) r-- 2 Parliamentary Secretaries 
2Assastants r-
5 Usbets 
Pohbcal Corruruttee 
- ~ ~ Resemcb Office Register of speakers 
Assastant @ffi ~ !@ ,.___ r--1 ASSistant (3) 
Ass.-t 001 I Assistant 
Technologu:al and I Aerosoace Comnunee 
- Secretary (AS) Documentation Section Mmutes• 
ASSIStant (83/4) Documenlabst (A2) ~ 2 Parliamentary Secretanes 1--
I Assistant 2Asststants 
Comnuttee for Parhamentary 
and Publtc Relabons 
- Secretary (A4) 
-· 
(83/4) 
'--
Notes: 
• Service organised/staff recruited during sessions of the Assembly. 
Posts underlmed are those it is proposed to create in 1992. 
• Posts proposed for regrading in the 1992 budget. 
1) The duties of Head of lbe Committee Serv1ce are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for PohbcaJ 
Affairs. His assistant belps him m lhe exerc1se of all these dUbes 
2) The Clerk and his 8SS1stant are responsible for the secretanat of the Comrmttee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privdeges. 
3) 'Jlus post IS normally filled by the assistant m the Enghsh lranslabon Servtce. 
4) The duttes of Head of the Admmtstration and Fmance Service, Head of the Personnel Section 
and Secretary of the Comrmttee on Budgetary Affairs and Admmtstranon are earned out by the 
C1crt Assistant for AdmmtStration and Fmance Hts ass1stant helps bun in the exemse of these 
duties. 
S) 1bcse duties are exercrsed by the translator/interpreter m the French section of the Translabon 
Serltce. 
6) The Deputy Head of the Admmistrabon and Fmance 5ervK:e is responstbJe for GenenJ 
SerltceS. 
7) The assistant 10 the Deputy Head of the Admmistrabon and Fmance Service is also the assistant 
for the Mail and Arch1ves Servtce. 
8) The staff responSible for stonng and accounbng for equtpment IS responsible for the openbon 
of tbe pnntmg workshop. 
9) The dubes of Head of the Translation and Publications Service are exen:ised by the most seruor 
rev1ser who, since I st October 1986, has been the English rev1ser. He is helped in tbe exercise of 
these duties by his ass•stanL 
~ President I Pnvate Office of the President of the I Assembly Head of Pnvate Office (A2) 
ASSIStant (83/4) 
lam 
ASSIStant 
(HO) I 
(B4) 
I 
Clerk ASSIStant (A6) 
(Admlm,tratJOn and Finance) 
Asststant (B4) 
I 
I 
Admm1strabon and 'Ihmslabon and Summary Record• Fmance Serv1ce Pubhcalions Service 
Head of ServiCe (4) - Head of Servtce (9) 2 Heads of Secbon 
Deputy (A2) Assistant (9) - 6 Summary reporters 
AssiStant (4) 6Ass1stants 
I 1 Messenger 
I I 
Corrurunee on Budgetary General Services English Secbon V= Affarrs and Admwstrabon 
Secretary (4) Deputy (6) r-- Revtser (A4/5) 2 Heads of Secbon 
AssiStant (4) ~ (7) Translator (A2) 20 Verbatim reporters 
Assistant (83/4) 4 Verbatun wnters 
-
Temporary Staff • 15 Assistants 
Personnel Secbon Mall and Archives 
3RevJsers 
Head of serviCe (4) Head of the ArchiVes (B4) r-- 4 Translators TypmgPool• 
Asststant (4) I Assutant 001 
2 tneSSellgCB 7 Assistants 13 Assistants 
French Section 
Accounts Sectlon Secunty 
Reviser (A4/5) 
Chief accountant (86) Officer (6) r--
Sergeant-at·arms Translator (A2) 
Accountant (83) 3 assL secunty guards 
2 assistants at reception Translator/Interpreter • (L4) 
- ASSIStant (83/4) 
Interpreters Storage and accounbng Temporary Staff • 
for equipment 
5 Revisers 
I In-- (5) Head Storekeeper • (B4) 1--co-on:li~ 6Translators 
2ASS1stants • (B3) 
(a)lnterpretersr=wted Installations attendant* 6Ass1Stants 
for sessions : 
20 
(b) lnterprelers recruited Reproductlon of documents between sess1ons : 
as requtred 
Head of Serv1ce (8) 1--
2ASS1stanlS (8) 
8 temporary staff 
Mcdtcal Service 
I Doct..-
Otber SerltceS 
1 Swncbboard operator (83 1--
1 Cloakroom attendant 
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DOCUMENT 1281 APPENDIX Ill 
APPENDIX Ill 
Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions 
1. Sittings service 
No. of Daily Duties Number days remu- Total Total 
neration 
F* F F 
Counsellors to the President of Assembly ....... I a 14 I 080 15 120 
I b 16 I 820 29 120 44240 
Heads of sections ............................. I a 8 I 182 9 456 
I a 8 I 236 9 888 
lb 10 I 922 19 220 
I b 12 I 922 23064 61 628 
Sergeant-at-arms .............................. I b 10 I 698 16 980 16 980 
Parliamentary secretaries ....................... 2a 8 958 15 328 
2b 10 I 698 33 960 49 288 
Precis writers ................................. 3a 8 958 22 992 
3b 10 I 698 50940 73 932 
Verbatim reporters ............................ 6a 8 I 101 52 848 
14 b 10 1 698 237 720 290 568 
Editors ....................................... 2a 8 958 15 328 
2b 10 I 698 33 960 49 288 
Principal assistants ............................ 6b 10 I 130 67 800 
Assistants to the President's counsellors ......... 1 a 14 451 6 314 
1 b 16 925 14 800 
Assistants assigned to" other services ............ 12 a 8 574 55 104 
20b 10 I 048 209 600 
I b 12 I 048 12 576 366 194 
Ushers ....................................... 5a 8 476 19 040 
Messengers ................................... 3a 10 476 14 280 
Installations attendant ......................... 1 a 14 374 5 236 
Cloakroom attendant .......................... I a 8 476 3 808 42 364 
Offset-assemblers .............................. 8a 10 476 38080 38 080 
100 1 032 562 
Adjustment for 1992 (5.56%) ............................................... 57 410 
I 089 972 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 250000 
I 339 972 
Rounded up to 1 340000 
* In accordance with scales in force on 30th June 1990. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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2. Interpretation service 
Duties Number No. of days Total 
F 
Interpreters ................................. 13 a 8 317 512 
7b 10 271 250 
20 588 762 
Adjustment for 1992 (5.56 %) .............................................. 32 735 
621 497 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 40000 
661 497 
Rounded up to 662 000 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
N.B. On 30th June 1990, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 3 053. In addition, interpreters recruited outside 
Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) cor-
responding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses. 
3. Translation service 
Duties Number Daily Estimates 1 Total 
remuneration 
F F 
Revisers .................... 5a 1 205 150 625 
3b 1 945 145 875 296 500 
Translators ................. 5a 952 119 000 
3b 1 692 126 900 245 900 
Principal assistants .......... 2a 516 30960 
2b 990 59400 90 360 
Assistants ................... 5a 451 67 650 
5b 925 138 750 206 400 
30 839 160 
Adjustment for 1992 (5.56 %) .............................................. 46 657 
885 817 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 35 000 
920 817 
Rounded up to 921000 
l. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 30 days for assistants. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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Ref. 
No. 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
2 
2.1 
3 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
4 
4.1. 
4.2. 
4.3. 
4.4. 
5 
5.1. 
APPENDIX IV 
Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment 
of the Office of the Clerk 
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices) 
Modernisation and Budgets Equipment equipment programme 1992 1993 1994 
A. Reproduction and 
printing equipment 
Photocopiers 
1 RX 1065 (1987) Hire (rate blocked). 74000 56400 56400 
Maintenance contract (indexed) 18 000 15 000 15 000 
1 Gestetner 2382 ZDF These are leased for a five-year 
period. The contract expires in 
April 1996. The cost of mainte-
nance depends on the number of 
copies made. Estimated cost of 
maintenance 63 500 63500 63500 
2 photocopiers One of these photocopiers 
(model to be chosen) replaces the former RX 3107 
now unfit for use. The other will 
be assigned to the offices on the 
second floor. 
Estimated cost of maintenance 20400 20400 20400 
1 Gestetner 2200 Property of the Assembly. 
Servicing of these machines on 
1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 is included in the 
supply of expendable material. 
The relevant expenditure is 
therefore charged to Sub-Head 
19. 
Offset machines 
1 Gestetner 311 (1984) Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed) 8900 8 900 8 900 
Electrostatic stereotypers 
1 Gestetner PM/9 (1980) Property of the Assembly. 
Reserved for sessions. 
1 Gestetner DT 1 (1985) Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed) 1 500 1 500 1 500 
1 Gestetner 1 OOPM 
(1986) Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed) 3100 3100 3100 
Binding machines 
1 Gestetner 1 00 
1 Orpo Planax 
1 Orpo Thermatic 
Property of the Assembly. This 
machine is in good condition. 
Normal maintenance by the staff 
concerned is enough to keep it in 
good working order. 
Miscellaneous 
equipment 
1 Logabax-Ordina Purchased in 1977, this machine 
7630 assembling is serviced when required, since 
machine with stapler the cost of a maintenance con-
tract is exorbitant. It is no longer 
considered necessary to replace it 
as the printing workshop is now 
equipped with photocopiers that 
assemble. 
A general overhaul and a single 
service are planned for the latter. 8000 8000 8000 
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1995 1996 
56400 56400 
15 000 15000 
63500 28000 
20400 20400 
8 900 8900 
1 500 1 500 
3100 3100 
8000 8000 
6 Office of the Clerk 
6.1 8 Olivetti ET 121 elec-
tronic typewriters 
6.2 1 ET 221 Olivetti 
6.3 1 ET 2400 Olivetti 
6.4 3 Olivetti calculators 
7 For use during sessions 
7.1 4 RX 6015 electronic 
typewriters (English 
keyboard) 
7.2 1 IBM electric type-
writer (French key-
board) 
7.3 2 ET 109 typerwriters 
(Italian keyboard) 
7.4 1 Editor electric type-
writer (Italian key-
board) 
7.5 2 Olivetti ET 2400 
electronic typewriters 
1 Portuguese key-
board 
1 Spanish keyboard 
7.6 
7. 7 Hired typewriters 
Purchased between 1981 and 
1983, these typewriters are in 
good condition. 
Purchased in 1983, this type-
writer is in good condition. 
Purchased m 1989, it is in 
excellent condition. 
These machines are in good 
working order. 
These machines were purchased 
in 1986 and are assigned to 
session services. 
Assigned to a political group. 
Assigned to the Italian Dele-
gation and the Italian summary 
reporters. 
Assigned to the Italian summary 
reporters. 
Purchased in 1989, they are 
assigned to the Portuguese and 
Spanish Delegations. 
All typewriters and calculators 
are serviced twice a year, before 
each session, by a mechanic 
recruited for the purpose, but a 
lump sum should be earmarked 
for possible repairs at other 
times. 9 000 9 000 9 000 9 000 9 000 
To meet the requirements of the 
various services during Assembly 
sessions, the following hire pro-
gramme is envisaged for each 
session: 
- 14 electric machines with 
English keyboards 
- 11 electric machines with 
French keyboards. 28 000 28 000 28 000 28 000 28 000 
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Ref. 
No. Equipment 
8 Typewriters in reserve 
8.1 6 Olympia SGE 51 
electric typewriters 
2 English keyboards 
5 French keyboards 
(one with long car-
8.2 
riaf,e) 21 0 ympia mechanical 
typewriters 
19 English keyboards 
2 French keyboards 
C. Miscellaneous 
equipment 
9 Dictaphones 
9.1 2 Uher 5000 
9.2 l Sony BM 80 
9.3 2 Sony BM 75 (1990) 
9.4 11 Grundig Stenorettes 
1 Sony dictaphone 
BM 88 
9.5 1 stenotype machine 
Grand jean 
9.6 
D. Word processors 
and computers 
10 Computers and 
word processors 
10.1 2 Olivetti ETS 2010 
6 Olivetti M 300 
2 Olivetti M 300 
10.2 8 Olivetti ETS 2010 
10.3 1 Olivetti M 24 
10.4 2 Macintosh SE 30 
E. Office furniture 
11 Office of the Clerk 
Modernisation and 
equipment programme 
Purchased between 1966 and 
1979, they are kept in reserve in 
case of need (e.g. at the request 
of journalists or in the event of 
an electricity cut) 
Purchased in 1971, they will 
remain in service as long as pos-
sible. 
Purchased in 1987, it is in very 
good working order. 
Purchased between 1963 and 
1987, they should be replaced 
gradually as from 1992. 
To replace one of the 11 dicta-
phones under item 9.4 
Purchased in 1974, this machine 
is in good working order. 
Provision for an overall sum in 
the budget for possible repairs to 
equipment in this category. 
These have been hired on a 
five-year leasing basis. The three 
contracts expire in March 1993, 
May 1995 and January 1997 
respectively. Estimates take 
account of their replacement on 
those dates. Cost of hire 
Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance contract (indexed) 
for all word processors and corn-
puters described in paragraphs 
10.1 and l 0.2 
Purchased in 1988 and 1990, 
there will be a maintenance con-
tract for them as from 1992. 
Purchase or replacement of 
various items of furniture. 
84 
Budgets 
1992 1993 1994 
4 500 9000 9000 
4000 4000 4000 
142 000 131000 105 400 
76100 85000 85000 
7 800 7 800 7 800 
35000 35000 35000 
APPENDIX IV 
1995 1996 
9000 9000 
4000 4000 
64400 26000 
85000 85000 
7 800 7 800 
35000 35000 
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Breakdown by budget classification 
Budget classification Ref. No. Budgets 
Head Sub-Head in programme 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Ill 15. Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture 11 35 000 35 000 35 000 35 000 35 000 
Ill 17. Hire and maintenance of 
reproduction and other office 
equipment 1.1 92000 71400 71400 71 400 71400 
1.2 63 500 63 500 63 500 63 500 28 000 
1.3 20400 20400 20400 20400 20400 
2.1 8 900 8900 8 900 8 900 8 900 
3.2 1 500 1 500 1 500 1 500 1 500 
3.3 3100 3 100 3 100 3 100 3100 
5.1 8000 8000 8000 8000 8000 
5.2 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 
5.3 2 200 2200 2200 2 200 2200 
7.6 9000 9000 9000 9000 9000 
7.7 28000 28000 28000 28 000 28000 
9.4 4 500 9000 9000 9000 9000 
9.6 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 
10.1 142 000 131 000 105 000 64000 26000 
10.3 76100 85 000 85 000 85 000 85000 
10.4 7 800 7 800 7 800 7 800 7 800 
TOTAL 475 000 456 800 431 200 390 200 316 300 
ROUNDED UP 475 000 457 000 432 000 391 000 317 000 
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APPENDIX V 
Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1991 to 1992 
1991 1992 
a b 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. Permanent staff 14 684 000 17 182 000 
Head 11. Temporary staff 3 635 000 3 777 000 
Head Ill. Expenditure on premises 
and equipment 1 754 000 1 767 000 
Head IV. General administrative 
costs 2 109 500 2 301 500 
Head V. Other expenditure 2 095 000 2 315 000 
Total expenditure 24 277 500 27 342 500 
Receipts 105 000 105 000 
Net Total 24 172 500 27 237 500 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and leaving allowances 3 366 000 3 655 000 
Receipts 631 000 734 000 
Net Total 2 735 000 2 921 000 
GRAND NET TOTAL (A+ B) 26 907 500 30 158 500 
TOTAL OF HEADS 11 TO V OF OPERATING 
BUDGET 9 593 500 10 160 500 
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APPENDIX VI 
Implications of the various heads for the 1991 and 1992 operating budgets 
1991 1992 
%of %of 
Amount Amount 
A B A B 
A. Operating budget 
Head I - Permanent staff 14 684 000 60.48 60.74 17 182 000 62.83 63.08 
Head 11 - Temporary staff 3 635 000 14.97 15.04 3 777 000 13.80 13.87 
Head Ill - Premises and equipment 1 754 000 7.23 7.25 1 767 000 6.46 6.49 
Head IV - General administrative 
costs 2 109 500 8.69 8.73 2 301 500 8.41 8.45 
Head V - Other expenditure 2 095 000 8.63 8.67 2 315 000 8.50 8.50 
TOTAL 24 277 500 100.00 100.43 27 342 500 100.00 100.39 
Receipts 105 000 -0.43 105 000 -0.39 
NET TOTAL 24 172 500 100.00 27 237 500 100.00 
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Expltznatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Rlltltbone, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. The draft budget for the financial year 1992 (Document 1281) was examined by the Budget and 
Organisation Committee ofWEU on 15th November 1991. This committee decided that the policy of 
budgetary limitations in force in member countries did not allow the total growth rate of 12.08% pro-
posed by the Assembly to be accepted. Consequently, it decided to recommend to the Council: 
- the withdrawal of the proposals concerning the staff of the Office of the Clerk (creation of 
three new posts and re-grading of four existing posts) ; 
- an increase of F 35 000 in appropriations under Head 11 to take account of the 
abovementioned proposals: 
- an overall growth rate for Heads 11 to V of the operating budget limited to 4.5 %. 
2. At its meeting on 26th November 1991, the Council decided to accept the recommendations 
adopted by the Budget and Organisation Committee. 
3. As a result of the reductions made by the Council, the net total budget of the Assembly (oper-
ating plus pensions) is reduced from F 30 158 000 to F 29 176 000. In relation to the financial year 
1991, this new total represents a growth rate of 8.43 %. 
4. The table at Appendix Ill shows the revised estimates for the draft 1992 budget divided into 
heads and sub-heads. 
1. Adopted unanimously in committee and approved by the Presidential Committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman): MM. Lagorce, Maas (Vice-Chairmen): MM. Alvarez, Antretter 
Bowden, Biichler, Cauwenberghs, Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner (Alternate: Lord Mackie of Benshie), MM. 
Garcia Sanchez, Greco, Jurgens, Masseret, Meyer zu Bentrup, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti (Alternate : Giagu Demartim), Redmond, 
Regenwetter (Alternate: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette), Silva Marques, Sinesio (Alternate: Paris!), Triglia, Vara. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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APPENDIX I 
Secretary-General's note 
WEU Assembly budget for 1992 
APPENDIX I 
19th November 1991 
1. The WEU Assembly draft budget for 1992 (Assembly Document 1281) was circulated to the 
Budget and Organisation Committee on 20th September 1991 under reference B (91) 18 and was 
examined during the meeting of the committee on 14th and 15th November 1991 (BR (91) 1 IV, 2 -to 
be circulated). 
2. The net total of the proposed draft budget was: 
A. Operating budget . . . . . . . . . . . . F 27 237 500 
B. Pensions budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2 921 000 
Net grand total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 30 158 500 
This figure represented an increase of 12.08 % over the net grand total (F 26 907 500) of the 
budget for 1991 (C-B (91) 11, Assembly Document 1241 Addendum 3). 
3. The Budget and Organisation Committee considered that the considerable increase proposed 
had to be reconciled with the requirement of zero real growth. In the circumstances of the financial 
constraints which continue to be imposed upon national budgets, the committee could not accept any 
of the new posts or regradings proposed in the 1992 budget document (Document 1281). 
Consequently, Head I (permanent staffl of the operating budget was reduced by F 895 000 
(paragraph 18, Document 1281) , but the committee agreed that, as a corollary, Head 11 (temporary 
staffl should be increased by F 35 000. The pensions budget needed to be adjusted to take account of 
the reduction in contribution income (7 % of net basic salary), following the removal from the oper-
ating budget of the original provision for the cost of the new posts and regradings. In addition, the 
committee was unable to accept for 1992 an increase in the provision in Heads Ill to V inclusive ( oper-
ating budget) greater than 4.5 % over the corresponding provision (F 5 958 500) in 1991 (C-B (91) 11 ). 
The committee left to the discretion of the Assembly how the increase should be allocated to each of 
the chapters. 
4. The committee requested a statement of revised figures reflecting all the adjustments. The 
figures (Annex A) show that, compared with 1991, the increase in the net operating budget for 1992 is 
8.47% and in the net grand total 8.43 %. 
5. The following table shows the original budget proposals (Document 1281) and the revised 
figures recommended by the committee: 
A. Operating budget 
Original credits Revised credits 
Head proposed recommended 
F F 
I. ............................... 18 182 000 16 287 000 
11. ............................... 3 777 000 3 812 000 
Ill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 767 000 I 
IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 301 500 6 227 000 
V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 315 500 
Income ............................ 27 342 500 26 221 000 
105 000 105 000 
Net total operating budget .......... 27 237 500 26 221 000 
B. Pensions budget 
Expenditure ....................... 3 655 000 3 655 000 
Income ........................... 734000 700000 
Net total pensions budget .......... 2 921000 2 955 000 
C. Net grand total ................. 30 158 500 29 176 000 
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6. The committee recommends that the Council give a favourable opinion on the Assembly's draft 
budget for 1992, as amended (F 29 176 000) . 
7. The table at Annex B shows the net contribution to the 1992 budget for each member state. 
8. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting on 26th November 1991. It is recalled 
that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part session opens on Monday, 
2nd December 1991. 
ANNEX A 
Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1991 to 1992 
(B (91) 18 Appendix V revised) 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. Permanent staff ............................ 
Head 11. Temporary staff ........................... 
Head Ill. Expenditure on premises and equipment ..... 
Head IV. General administrative costs ................ 
Head V. Other expenditure .......................... 
Total expenditure .................................... 
Receipts ............................................ 
NET TOTAL (A) ................................... 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions ............................................ 
Receipts ............................................ 
NET TOTAL (B) ................................... 
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B) ......................... 
* 
* * 
TOTAL OF HEADS 11 TO VOF OPERATING BUDGET 
91 
1991 1992 (CB (91) 11) b a 
F F 
14 684 000 16 287 000 
3 635 000 3 812 000 
1 754000 16 227 000 2 109 500 
2 095 000 
24277 500 26 326 000 
105 000 105 000 
24 172 500 26 221 000 
3 366 000 3 655 000 
631 000 700000 
2 735 000 2 955 000 
26 907 500 29 176 000 
9 593 500 10 039 000 
% b-a 
a 
F 
+ 10.92 
+ 4.86 
+ 4.50 
+ 8.44 
-
+ 8.47 
+ 8.58 
+ 10.93 
+ 8.04 
+ 8.43 
+ 4.64 
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ANNEX B 
WEU Assembly budget 1992 
Contributions 
In the following table, the gross contributions to the budget are calculated on the basis of the cost-
sharing formula applicable to the present nine member states. However, the surplus for the financial 
period ended 31st December 1990 is apportioned partly (to 26th March 1990) on the former basis 
applicable to seven member states and partly (for the remainder of 1990) on the present basis appli-
cable to nine member states. 
Agreed distribution Contributions to 1992 budget 
1992 1990 1992 
% budget surplus contributions 
£ £ 
(net) 
£ 
Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.35 2 436 196 62636 2 373 560 
France....................... 17.00 4 959 920 127 489 4 832 431 
Germany . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 17.00 4 959 920 127 489 4 832 431 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.00 4 959 920 127 489 4 832 431 
Luxembourg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.30 87 528 2 217 85 311 
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.35 2 436 196 62 636 2 373 560 
Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 583 520 11052 572 468 
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.00 3 792 880 71 836 3 721 044 
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.00 
1--------1 4 959 920 127 489 4 832 431 
100.00 29176 000 720 333 28 455 667 
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APPENDIX 11 
Letter frDm Mr. 'an Eekek11, Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly 
27th November 1991 
I have the honour to inform you that, at its meeting on 26th November 1991, the WEU Council 
expressed a favourable opinion on the draft budget ofthe Assembly for 1992 as contained in document 
C-B (91) 14. 
Mr. Robert PoNTILLON, 
President, 
Assembly of Western European Union, 
43, avenue du President-Wilson, 
75775 Paris Cedex 16. 
Willem van EEKELEN 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Recapitulatory table of budget estimates for 1992 as a result of the opi•io• of the Council 
Heads - sub-heads 
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF 
Sub-Head: 
1 - Basic salaries ...................... . 
2 - Allowances ........................ . 
3 - Social charges ..................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment 
and departure of permanent officials . 
5 - Medical examination ............... . 
Draft budget 
for 1992 
11 860000 
2 683 000 
2 404000 
221 000 
14000 
TOTAL.............................. 17 182 000 
HEAD 11- TEMPORARY STAFF 
Sub-Head: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions........... 2 988 000 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assem-
bly work between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . 618 000 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the 
Breakdown 
of changes made 
by the Council 
-500000 
-191 000 
- 97 000 
-107 000 
-895 000 
Draft budget 
(opinion of 
the Council) 
11 360 00 
2 492 000 
2 307 000 
114 000 
14000 
16 287 000 
2 988 000 
618 000 
Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 000 + 35 000 50 000 
9 - Social charges ...................... I----=1-=-5-=-6-=0-=-0-=-0-I----------lf----=-1.:...56.:.....::.00.:...0~ 
ToTAL.............................. 3 777 000 + 35 000 3 812 000 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES 
AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises .......................... . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ........... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions .................. . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of 
sessions ........................... . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the 
Clerk ............................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other 
office equipment ................... . 
1 7 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction 
540000 
10000 
587 000 
105 000 
15 000 
35 000 
-
475 000 
- 540000 
- 10000 
- 587 000 
- 105 000 
- 15 000 
- 35000 
- -
- 475 000 and other office equipment ......... . 
r-----~~----~~----~ 
TOTAL •••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••• 1 767 000 - 1 767 000 
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Draft budget Breakdown Draft budget 
Heads - sub-heads for 1992 of changes made (opinion of 
by the Council the Council) 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport 
of documents ....................... 630000 -30000 600000 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing 
paper and other office supplies ....... 287 000 - 287 000 
20 - Printing and publication of documents . 1 187 000 -36 500 1 150 500 
21 - Purchase of documents .............. 72000 - 72000 
22 - Official cars ........................ 125 000 - 125 000 
23 - Bank charges ....................... 500 - 500 
ToTAL .............................. 2 301 500 -66 500 2 235 000 
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances 
and insurance for the President of the 
Assembly, chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs ......................... 230000 -20000 210000 
25 - Expenses for representation .......... 360 000 - 360000 
26 - Committee study missions ........... 5000 - 5000 
27 - Official journeys of members of the 
Office of the Clerk .................. 650000 -60000 590 000 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor .. 50000 - 50000 
29 - Expenditure on information ......... 455 000 -10000 445 000 
30 - Expenses for political groups ......... 534 000 - 534 000 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure 
not elsewhere provided for .......... 3000 - 3000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes ............... 28000 - 28 000 
TOTAL .............................. 2 315 000 -90000 2 225 000 
Operating budget ................... 27 342 500 -1016 500 26 326 000 
Receipts ............................ 105 000 - 105 000 
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET ......... 27 237 500 -1016 500 26 221000 
Pensions expenditure ................ 3 655 000 - 3 655 000 
Receipts ............................ 734000 -34000 700000 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET ........... 2 921 000 + 34000 2 955 000 
NET GRAND TOTAL .................... 30158 500 -982 500 29 176 000 
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APPENDIX IV 
Trend of Assembly budgets from 1991 to 1992 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. Permanent staff ........... 
Head 11. Temporary staff ........... 
Head Ill. Expenditure on premises 
and equipment ............ 
Head IV. General administrative 
costs ..................... 
Head V. Other expenditure ......... 
Total expenditure ................... 
Receipts ............................ 
NET TOTAL ................. ; .. 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and leaving allowances ..... 
Receipts ............................ 
NET TOTAL .................... 
NET GRAND TOTAL (A+ B) ....... 
TOTAL OF HEADS 11 TO V 
OF OPERATING BUDGET ............ 
1991 
a 
14 684 000 
3 635 000 
1 754 000 
2 109 500 
2095 000 
24 277 500 
105 000 
24 172 500 
3 366 000 
631000 
2 735 000 
26 907 500 
* 
* * 
9 593 500 
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1992 %b-a Doe. 1281 
b b 
17182000 + 17.01 
3 777 000 + 3.90 
1 767 000 t 7.00 2 301 500 2 315 000 
27 342 500 + 12.62 
105 000 -
27 237 500 + 12.67 
3 655 000 + 8.58 
734000 + 16.32 
2 921 000 + 6.95 
30158 500 + 12.08 
10 160 500 + 5.91 
APPENDIX IV 
1992 
%£...=.! revised 
c a 
16 287 000 10.92 
3 812 000 4.86 
6 227 000 4.50 
26 326 000 8.44 
105 000 -
26 221 000 8.47 
3 655 000 8.58 
700000 10.93 
2 955 000 8.04 
29 176 000 8.43 
10039 000 4.64 
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First part of the thirty-seventh annual report 
of the Council to the Assembly of WEU 
(1st January to 30th June 1991) 
I. Introduction 
11. Gulf crisis 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
14th October 1991 
Ill. Role and place of WEU in the new European security architecture 
IV. Council activities 
V. Activities of the Special Working Group (SWG) in separate sessions and 
jointly with the Defence Representatives Group (DRG) 
VI. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group (DRG) 
VII. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group 
VIII. Activities of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space 
IX. Activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies 
X. Relations with the Assembly 
ANNEXES 
I. Communique of the extraordinary Ministerial Council on the situation 
in the Gulf held on 17th January 1991 in Paris 
11. Communique on the Gulf published at the extraordinary Ministerial 
Council of 22nd February 1991 in Paris 
Ill. Presidency's conclusions and report published at the end of the extraor-
dinary Ministerial Council on the role and place of WEU in the new 
European security architecture, Paris, 22nd February 1991 
IV. Presidency's conclusions of the informal meeting of WEU ministers on 
the situation in the Middle East, Luxembourg, 8th April 1991 
V. Press release on the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting on 1Oth April 
1991 in Paris 
VI. Communique of the WEU Ministerial Council issued in Vianden on 27th 
June 1991 
VII. Statement on Yugoslavia issued in Vianden on 27th June 1991 
VIII. Fact-sheet on mine-clearance operations and on those relating to the 
enforcement of the naval embargo during the Middle East crisis 
I. Introduction 
During the first half of 1991, the Coun-
cil's activities were particularly intense; the 
exceptional circumstances of the Gulf war, the 
debate on the European security and defence 
identity and the progress made on practical 
co-operation projects all contributed to an inten-
sification of the organisations's work. 
Two extraordinary meetings of the 
Council of Ministers - one on the Gulf crisis 
and the other on the role and place of WEU in 
the new European security architecture - and an 
informal session on humanitarian aid to ref-
ugees in Iraq - preceded the first ordinary 
97 
meeting of the Ministerial Council in 1991. 
Given ministers' very heavy schedule, this 
meeting was organised in the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg by the French Presidency - with 
help from the Luxembourg authorities - on the 
eve of the European Council of 28th June in 
Luxembourg. 
There was also a marked increase in the 
activities of the Permanent Council and its 
working groups, whether in the context of 
topical questions or in the · fields of space 
co-operation, arms control verification and 
politico-military co-operation; in the latter case, 
impetus was provided by the Chiefs of Defence 
Staff meeting on 1Oth April 1991. 
DOCUMENT 1282 
11. Gulf crisis 
1. Extraordinary meeting of t/u Council of Miniaten on 
17th January 1991 in Paris 
For the third time since the outbreak of 
the Gulf crisis, the foreign and defence ministers 
of WEU member states were convened to an 
extraordinary meeting on 17th January 1991 in 
Paris to discuss the situation in the Gulf. 
The Ambassadors of Denmark, Greece, 
Norway and Turkey attended this meeting as 
observers. 
Ministers decided to step up their 
co-ordination, in concert with the other coun-
tries who had undertaken to uphold the rule of 
law. This applied in particular to the 
co-ordination of WEU countries' naval forces 
taking part in the implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 678, and to co-ordination by 
WEU countries in the field of logistics sup-
porting the ground and air forces. 
The Secretary-General has underlined the 
important role played to date by WEU, noting 
that out of 21 000 challenges made since August 
in enforcement of the naval embargo, 16 000 
were made by vessels of WEU countries. 
At the end of this meeting, the text of a 
press communique was adopted (see Annex I 
enclosed). · 
2. Extraordinary mating of the Council of Ministen on 
22nd February 1991 in Paris 
At this meeting, ministers examined the 
latest developments in the Gulf crisis and 
adopted the text of a press communique (see 
Annex 11 enclosed). 
3. Informal meeting of WEU miniaten on t/u situation 
in the Middle East, Luxembourg, 8th Aprill991 
This meeting was called by the French 
Presidency in the margins of the European 
Council meeting that same day with the Danish 
and Greek Foreign Ministers invited to attend 
as observers together with the Turkish Ambas-
sador to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 
The Presidency's conclusions were circu-
lated at the end of the meeting (see Annex IV 
enclosed). 
4. Co-ordination .of WEU naralforcea 
The ad hoc Group on the Gulf, set up at 
the extraordinary Ministerial Council on 21st 
August 1990, met five times in Paris during the 
period under review; it drew up and adopted two 
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sets of guidelines on the application of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 678: 
- "joint specific guidelines for co-
ordinating WEU countries' naval forces 
involved in the application of United 
Nations Resolution 678 ", and 
- "joint specific guidelines for co-
ordination action by the navies of 
WEU countries participating in the 
mine-clearance and humanitarian oper-
ations in the Gulf". 
The naval points of contact and the spe-
cific cell tasked with monitoring WEU vessels in 
the operation zone have continued to exchange 
the information needed to co-ordinate the 
deployment of WEU countries' vessels and to 
exchange information between the capitals of 
WEU countries. 
5. Humanitarian aid to the displaced populationa of Iraq 
(i) In implementation of the conclusions of 
the informal meeting of WEU ministers in Lux-
embourg on 8th April, and following the 
meetings of the ad hoc group on 9th and 23rd 
April, co-operation was organised between 
WEU member countries as regards the imple-
mentation of United Nations Resolution 688; 
among the provisions of this operation was that 
logistic and co-ordination requirements relating 
to aid to the refugees would be dealt with via the 
network of military points of contact, and that 
regular contact would be maintained with the 
European Commission. 
(ii) For its part, the WEU Council, which 
kept this item on its agenda, instructed the 
Secretariat-General to draw up a table of 
member states's contributions based on infor-
mation provided by the latter. 
This table was updated as the situation 
evolved. 
6. Withdrawal of forces from Iraq 
During the period under review, partners 
exchanged information on their respective plans 
in this field. 
?. Lessons of t/u Middle East crisis 
The lessons of the Gulf crisis were dis-
cussed by the Defence Representatives Group 
with a view to preparing the meeting of Chiefs of 
Defence Staff on 1Oth April 1991. 
WEU ministers also addressed this 
subject over lunch at the Ministerial Council in 
Vianden on 27th June, taking as their basis a 
discussion document prepared by the French 
Presidency. 
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The co-ordination within WEU involved 
all the member states to varying degrees. 
It covered the following areas: 
- enforcement of the naval embargo, 
- land and air deployments and action, 
- general naval support operations during 
the hostilities, 
- mine-clearance operations in the mar-
itime approaches to Kuwait, 
- humanitarian assistance to Iraqi 
civilians, notably the Kurds. 
It was at sea that the action taken by 
WEU states was the most significant: 7 5% of the 
naval embargo enforcement operations and a 
similar proportion of the mine-clearance opera-
tions were undertaken by the navies of WEU 
states. 
The missions did of course vary 
depending on the way the crisis developed. 
In its conclusions, the Presidency noted in 
particular that the action carried out under 
WEU auspices during the Gulf crisis was 
unprecedented both in its principle and extent. 
It represented the first autonomous European 
military undertaking on this scale. 
It went on to say that the WEU action put 
down the first markers for European operational 
co-operation. The speed with which the mecha-
nisms for co-ordinating the operations were set 
up testified to the political will of member states 
to move forward in this direction. 
Ill. Role and place of WEU in the new European 
security architecture 
1. On 1Oth December 1990, ministers had 
invited the working groups to continue their 
deliberations on the role and place of WEU in 
the new European security architecture, so that 
they could submit their conclusions to the spring 
ministerial meeting of 1991. 
2. The French Presidency took the initiative 
of convening an extraordinary meeting of the 
WEU Council of Ministers to discuss this subject 
on 22nd February 1991 in Paris. Ministers' dis-
cussions were based on a report by the 
Secretary-General 1, which had been examined 
and revised in the preceding months by the 
Council's working groups and presented to min-
isters under the title " the future of European 
security and defence co-operation ". 
1. Report mentioned under item IV, 3, b of the second part 
of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council to the 
Assembly. 
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Following the discussions, it was agreed 
that this report would be annexed to the 
Presidency's public conclusions, with the stipu-
lation that the report at that stage had not been 
formally agreed (see Annex Ill enclosed). 
The French Presidency circulated the con-
clusions and the annex to the Twelve and the 
Sixteen. 
3. The Council and its working groups con-
tinued their discussion in line with the conclu-
sions reached by ministers on 22nd February 
and instructed the Secretary-General to draw up 
a discussion document with a view to the minis-
terial meeting on 27th June in Vianden. 
Following a final revision to reflect the 
discussions of the enlarged Council on 1Oth 
June, this document - together with a contri-
bution from the Spanish Delegation - was dis-
cussed in great detail by ministers; the results 
are contained in a passage of the communique 
adopted by ministers (see Annex V, point 1 
enclosed). 
The German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Genscher, suggested that ministers meet 
again in extraordinary session to continue their 
discussions in this field; his idea was to meet 
before the second ordinary Ministerial Council 
of 1991 scheduled for 18th and 19th November 
and before the summit of the Twelve on 6th 
December. 
IV. Council activities 
The Council has followed the activities of 
the organisation as a whole and, at each of its 
meetings, has exchanged views and information 
on topical questions relating to European 
security, and particularly on the evolving situ-
ation in the Gulf. 
The Council Working Group 2 met before 
each Council meeting to prepare the Council's 
decisions and if necessary to deal with other 
technical or administrative matters. 
1. Topical questions 
(i) Situation in the Gulf 
The events in the Gulf and the WEU 
co-ordination described in detail in point Ill 
above received constant attention from the 
Council. 
It was briefed by the representative of the 
Presidency on the outcome of meetings held at 
various levels (informal ministerial meeting on 
2. Consisting of the WEU deputies to the Permanent Repre-
sentatives in London. 
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8th April, ad hoc Groups on the Gulf, military 
points of contact, naval points of contact), and it 
took part in preparations for, and follow-up to 
the extraordinary ministerial meeting on 17th 
January devoted to this subject. 
It received regular updates on member 
states' contributions in the region. 
(ii) Political union and security and defence 
questions 
The representative of the Luxembourg 
Presidency of the EC briefed the Council on the 
outcome of the main meetings of the Twelve 
which had taken place on this subject. 
(iii) Relations with the United States 
The French Presidency and the Secretary-
General reported to the Council on their joint 
visit to the American administration in Wash-
ington oa 26th and 27th April, the aim of which 
was to explain to the United States authorities 
the meaning and extent of the discussions taking 
place within WEU on the future European 
security architecture. 
(iv) The topical questions item on the Coun-
cil's agenda also provided an opportunity for 
delegations to inform the Council about various 
activities concerned with European security 
carried out by their respective authorities. 
2. Role IIIUI pill« of WEU in the new European 
security architecture 
The Permanent Council monitored the 
progress of the debate on this subject, a report 
on which is contained in point Ill above. 
3. Activities of the intergo11ernmental organs 
(i) Council working groups 
At each of its meetings the Council took 
note of, and commented on, the results of the 
latest working group meetings. 
(ii) Agency for the Control of Armaments 
The Council took note of the report of the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments on the 
control activity for 1990, submitted pursuant to 
Article VII, 2, c of Protocol No. IV of the Paris 
Agreements. 
(iii) WEU Institute for Security Studies 
The Secretary-General invited the Insti-
tute's Director to attend Council meetings 
whenever the agenda made it useful for him to 
attend. 
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For example, the Director reported to the 
Council on the main activities carried out by the 
Institute from 1st October to 31st December 
1990 and from 1st January to 31st March 1991 
(referred to in detail under point IX below); he 
also consulted the Council on some of the Insti-
tute's proposed future activities. 
He conveyed to the Council his impres-
sions of the various visits he had made either 
alone or in the company of research fellows. 
The Council had received copies of the 
first editions of the Chaillot papers. 
Acting on the proposal from the Institute 
Director, the Council asked the Secretary-
General to appoint Mr. Roberto Zadra to the 
post of research fellow with effect from 1st July 
1991. 
(iv) Meetings of officials of analysis and 
planning centres 
In accordance with the wish expressed by 
WEU ministers at their Council meeting on 1Oth 
December 1990 (see second part of the thirty-
sixth annual report of the Council, point IV, 3, 
b) officials from analysis and planning centres 
met on 18th February in Paris for an initial 
informal exchange of views. A second informal 
meeting took place on 13th June at the 
Secretariat-General in London. 
4. Council meetings held at ministerial level 
(i) The Council was kept informed of the 
preparations for, and follow-up to, the extraor-
dinary Ministerial Councils in Paris on 17th 
January 1991 on the Gulf(referred to in point 11 
above), on 22nd February 1991 on the role and 
place of WEU in the new European security 
architecture (referred to in point Ill above) and 
the Ministerial Council (ordinary session) of 
27th June 1991 in Vianden. 
At this last meeting, Mr. Dumas and Mr. 
Joxe began by reporting on the discussions 
which had taken place during the lunches 
organised separately for the foreign and defence 
ministers. Thereafter, the debates followed the 
agenda approved by the enlarged Council 3• 
- Situation in Yugoslavia 
Ministers agreed on the text of a 
statement (see Annex VII enclosed). 
- Situation in the Gulf and in Iraq 
Ministers had received a report by the 
Presidency on WEU co-ordination during the 
Gulf crisis. 
Their communique contains a passage on 
this subject (see Annex VI enclosed, point 4). 
3. Attendance enlarged to include political directors and 
representatives of defence ministers. 
l 
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- Dialogue with the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe 
Ministers took note of the report on this 
subject approved by the enlarged Council on 
1Oth June, and adopted the proposed future 
measures which accompanied this report. 
Their communique contains a passage on 
this subject (see Annex VI enclosed, point 3). 
-Role and place of WEU in the new 
European security architecture 
Ministers held a detailed exchange of 
views on the basis of the Secretary-General's dis-
cussion paper (see point Ill above) and a contri-
bution from Spain. 
Their communique contains a passage on 
this subject (see Annex VI enclosed, point 1). 
In this context, ministers decided that the 
Defence Representatives Group would, in 
liaison with the Special Working Group, study 
the politico-military repercussions of giving 
WEU a more operational role and, in the mil-
itary field proper, the requirements for 
co-ordination and planning structures. 
- Space co-operation 
Ministers approved the following deci-
sions, the drafts of which had been prepared by 
the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space and approved 
by the enlarged Council on lOth June 1991: 
- the decision to set up a WEU satellite 
centre, and 
- the decision to task the ad hoc Sub-
Group on Space to pursue studies on 
the possibilities for medium- and 
long-term co-operation on a European 
satellite observation system. 
These decisions are referred to in point 6 
of the communique. 
- Co-operation in the field of arms control 
verification 
Ministers approved the proposals put to 
them by the WEU experts on verification. 
They are referred to in point 6 of the 
communique. 
- Security in the Mediterranean 
Ministers adopted a passage on this 
subject, contained in point 5 of their 
communique. 
S. Meeting of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff 
on lOth Apri/1991 in Paris 
(i) The meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff 
agreed on by ministers on 1Oth December 1990 
took place in Paris on 1Oth April 1991; at the 
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end of the meeting a communique was issued, 
the text of which is contained in Annex V 
enclosed. 
(ii) The communique of the Ministerial 
Council of 27th June in Vianden (see Annex VI 
enclosed) referred to this meeting as giving 
further impetus to the discussions under way on 
the possibilities of developing various forms of 
practical co-operation. 
6. Relations with NATO 
(i) Presentation by the SACEUR representative 
on the forces of WEU member states under 
NATO command: implementation of Article IV 
of Protocol No. I! 
The annual presentation to the Council on 
forces of WEU member states under NATO 
command was made by General Antonio 
Milani, SACEUR representative, Deputy Chief 
of Staff (Services) at the meeting of the Per-
manent Council on 27th February. The presen-
tation gave rise to an exchange of views among 
members of the Council and the SHAPE repre-
sentatives, notably on force structures, the 
current review of NATO strategy and the 
concept of multinational forces. 
(ii) Visit of Permanent Representatives to SHAPE 
on 13th May 1991 
As every year, the Permanent Representa-
tives were invited to visit SHAPE. 
Following a presentation by senior 
officers on SHAPE's responsibilities and future 
force structure, the SACEUR, General Galvin, 
addressed the Permanent Representatives and 
held discussions with them. 
The NATO Secretary-General took the 
opportunity of the Permanent Representatives' 
visit to invite each one of them personally for 
discussions. 
7. United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe 
At the Council meeting on 26th June, the 
United Kingdom Representative commented on 
the proposals which the United Kingdom Sec-
retary of State had made in a letter to the Secre-
tary-General, on which the SACEUR had given 
his opinion in accordance with Article VI of 
Protocol No. 11 of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
The Council decided to put this item on 
the agenda of its meeting on 11th July 4• 
4. The Council decision on this subject (already forwarded 
to the Assembly) will be reported in the second part of this 
thirty-seventh report. 
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B. Co11tacts witj tile co,triu of Ce11tral 
flllll Eostem EuroJM 
(i) The Council has regularly monitored 
developments in this field. 
(ii) The visits made in 1990 to Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia by the Secretary-General and 
the Head of the Service des Affaires Strategiques 
et du Desarmement of the French Foreign Min-
istry, who was representing the Presidency 5, 
were followed up on 7th and 8th March 1991 by 
a visit to Poland, during which discussions were 
held with ministers and senior officials from the 
foreign and defence ministries and from the 
President's cabinet, and also with representa-
tives of both chambers of the National 
Assembly. 
(iii) On 11th and 12th March, a seminar was 
organised under the aegis of the WEU Institute 
for Security Studies. It brought together senior 
officials responsible for politico-military ques-
tions from the foreign and defence ministries of 
WEU member states, Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. 
(iv) On 27th June in Vianden, ministers dis-
cussed the next phase of these contacts. They 
approved the proposals set out in the report pre-
pared for them, which had been approved on 
1Oth June by the enlarged Council. 
These proposals are contained in point 3 
of the Vianden communique (see Annex VI 
enclosed). 
9. 1Uiatio1111 witj tje Assembly 
(i) The Permanent Council has closely fol-
lowed and regularly discussed the Assembly's 
activities and its relations with the Council: 
The Secretary-General conveyed his very 
favourable impressions of the meeting of the 
Political Committee on 5th March in Madrid, 
and also his impressions of the grouped meeting 
of committees held in Palermo from 26th to 
28th March. 
The Council took note of the advice to the 
WEU Council of Ministers and to the intergov-
ernmental conference on the future of European 
co-operation in security and defence questions, 
adopted by the Assembly's Presidential Com-
mittee in Palermo on 26th March 1991. It wel-
comed the fact that the points raised by the 
Assembly had been taken into account in the 
debate which it was itself currently conducting 
on the role of WEU in the new European 
security architecture. 
(ii) The Council has given due consideration 
to the question of the draft Assembly budget for 
1991. The Secretary-General has kept the 
5. Cf. Second part of the thirty-sixth annual report, IV, 2. 
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Assembly President regularly informed of the 
results of the Council's deliberations on this 
subject. 
(iii) Meetings and exchanges of information 
(see point X below). 
10. I11terat expressed by otller cou11triu ;, WEU 
(i) Interest expressed by Norway 
The Council was notified of a letter to the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council from the 
Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
expressing his government's wish to establish 
closer contacts between Norway and WEU 
under the same arrangements already agreed 
between WEU and Greece and Turkey. 
In his reply, Mr. Dumas told Mr. 
Stoltenberg of the wholly favourable reception 
to the Norwegian Government's proposal, 
reminding him that the mechanism consisted of 
a meeting at ministerial level with the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council which, for 
timetable convenience, could be arranged to 
coincide with a meeting decided upon else-
where. This exchange of views could, if appro-
priate, be replaced or supplemented by a 
meeting between the Chairman-in-Office and 
the Norwegian Ambassador in the capital of the 
country holding the WEU Presidency. 
(ii) Interest expressed by Greece 
The Council was notified of a letter to the 
Chairman of the Council from the Greek Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs, reminding him of 
Greece's interest in accession to WEU. 
In his reply to Mr. Samaras, Mr. Dumas 
pointed out that, in its discussions on the future 
of the organisation, the Council was bearing in 
mind the wish of the Greek authorities to belong 
to WEU. He noted that co-operation between 
Greece and WEU had become a reality, as dem-
onstrated by the naval co-ordination during the 
Gulf crisis and Greece's close association with 
WEU's action in coming to the help of the 
Kurdish refugee populations of Iraq. He 
reminded Mr. Samaras of the WEU Presidency's 
concern to inform Greece of the organisation's 
work in accordance with the approved pro-
cedure. 
(iii) Interest expressed by Turkey 
The Turkish Ambassadors in Paris and 
Luxembourg were respectively observers at the 
extraordinary meeting in Paris on 17th January 
and the informal meeting on 8th April, both 
devoted to the Gulf. 
Turkish representatives had on several 
occasions taken advantage of contacts with 
Council representatives or the Secretary-General 
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to reiterate the desire expressed by their author-
ities for Turkey to become a member of 
WEU. 
11. Fourth European sesaion of advanced defence studiu 
The German Delegation has told the 
Council that it was prepared to organise this 
session by spring 1992 at the latest. 
The Council warmly welcomed this pro-
posal. 
12. Other quutiona 
The Council also discussed questions per-
taining to the organisation's personnel, and 
administrative and budgetary matters: 
- It approved the appointment of the new 
holder of the post of Head of the 
Political Division. 
- It approved the 265th report of the 
Co-ordinating Committee of Gov-
ernment Budget Experts. 
- It approved WEU's budget for 1991. 
- It approved the proposed reform of 
co-ordination that had already been 
approved by the Councils ofOECD, the 
Council of Europe and NATO. 
- It approved the tax adjustment budget 
for 1991 concerning the pension 
scheme. 
V. Activities of the Special Working Group 
(SWG) in separate sessions and jointly 
with the Defence Representatives Group (DRG) 
During the period under review, the SWG 
met nine times, on seven of those occasions in 
joint session with the DRG. 
- the first meeting of the year was 
devoted to questions specifically asso-
ciated with the conventional arms 
control negotiations; the group kept this 
question under review in its joint 
meetings with the DRG; 
- the role and place of WEU in the new 
European security architecture remained 
on the agenda of all the other meetings 
of the group; 
- the SWG was also interested in the 
organisation of the seminar that took 
place on 11th and 12th March under 
the auspices of the Institute for Security 
Studies, with representatives of Hungary, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia; 
- the SWG/DRG worked on preparations 
for the meeting of Chiefs of Defence 
Staff on 1Oth April 1991; 
- it regularly reviewed the situation as 
regards WEU action in the Gulf; 
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- it was kept informed of progress made 
by the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space; 
- the joint meetings were also an oppor-
tunity to raise the subject of a con-
vention on chemical weapons and of 
open skies negotiations. 
VI. Activities of the Defence Representatives 
Group (DRG) 
(i) Over the period covered by this report, 
the DRG met five times in separate sessions and 
seven times in joint session with the SWG (cf. V 
above). 
During the separate sessions, it addressed 
the military implications of the CFE Treaty for 
European security in the post-CFE period. 
It made preparations for, and followed up 
the Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting on 1Oth 
April 1991. 
It considered a draft ministerial mandate 
prepared for the Ministerial Council in Vianden 
on 27th June 1991. 
The agenda item "Topical questions" 
provided an opportunity for some of the delega-
tions to brief their partners on recent events 
associated with defence that had occurred in 
their respective countries. It also provided the 
opportunity for a regular review by the group of 
WEU's co-ordination in the Gulf. 
(ii) During the same period, the verification 
experts met five times, once in joint session with 
the space experts, to follow up the ministerial 
mandate of 1Oth December 1990 on the imple-
mentation of future co-operation projects on 
verification. 
They prepared a report for ministers, the 
text of which was approved by the enlarged 
Council on lOth June. Ministers took note of the 
report and approved its proposals, as set out in 
point 6 of the Vianden communique (see Annex 
VI enclosed). · 
VII. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group 
(i) Over the period covered by this report, 
the Mediterranean Sub-Group met twice. 
In accordance with the mandate it had 
been given, the sub-group drew up an annotated 
list of the key principles likely to contribute to a 
resolution of security questions in the Mediter-
ranean. 
It kept itself regularly informed of 
progress with the plan for a Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean 
(CSCM). 
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It continued its exchange of information 
on regional situations affecting the security 
interests of member states in the Mediterranean 
region, i.e.: 
- tensions in Yugoslavia and the 
Balkans; 
- the Arab Maghreb Union; 
- the Sahara; 
-Cyprus. 
The sub-group embarked on a study of the 
military situation in the Maghreb. 
(ii) At their meeting in Vianden on 27th June, 
ministers took note of the activities of the sub-
group and asked it to continue them along the 
lines of the mandate that had been given on lOth 
December 1990. 
VIII. Activities of the ad hoc Sub-Group 
on Space 
During the period under review, the ad 
hoc Sub-Group on Space met four times in 
plenary session and, to discuss more technical 
aspects, twice at the level of experts. 
It formulated two draft ministerial deci-
sions, one setting up a WEU satellite centre and 
the other asking the sub-group to continue its 
studies on pOssible medium- and long-term 
co-operation on a European satellite observation 
system. 
The texts of the decisions reached by min-
isters in Vianden on 27th June are set out in 
point 6 of the communique (see Annex VI 
enclosed). 
IX. Activities of the WEU Institute 
for Security Studies 
(see also IV. 3 (iii) above) 
1. Documents intended for the Council and its working groups 
(i) The Institute produced several discussion 
papers on topical subjects for the Council and its 
working groups, such as " What future for 
European defence co-operation?" and "Arms 
control after 1992 ". 
(ii) It forwarded reports to the Council on the 
seminars it had arranged (see 2 below), as well as 
two quarterly reports on its activities from 
October to December 1990 and January to 
March 1991. 
2. SemiiUlrs 
The Institute submitted reports to the 
Council on the seminars it had organised during 
the first half of 1991, i.e.: 
- The future of European security, on 
14th-15th January; 
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- A new agenda for European security, on 
11th-12th March, bringing together 
senior officials responsible for politico-
military affairs from WEU member 
states and their counterparts from 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; 
- The implications of the Gulf crisis for 
European security co-operation, on 
8th-9th April; and 
- Soviet Union Task Force: this was a 
small task force of members of research 
institutes meeting for the first time at 
the Institute on 24th and 25th June. 
3. Institute rencontres 
This study group on European security 
consisting of official and non-official specialists 
resident in Paris held its first meeting on 13th 
February on the theme " Europe after the Gulf 
crisis". 
4. Meeting for members of the Council 
The Institute took advantage of the 
Assembly session in June 1991 to invite 
members of the Council to a seminar on the 
impressions gained by the members of the 
Institute team during their recent visit to Wash-
ington; a working lunch was given for the Per-
manent Representatives' deputies. 
5. Publications 
(i) Chail/ot Papers 
The first two Chaillot Papers were pub-
lished in March 1991: " European defence: why 
not the Twelve? " and " European security 
across the Mediterranean ". 
(ii) Quarterly newsletter 
The first issue came out in April 1991. 
6. library and documentation 
Since it was established in June 1990, the 
Institute has built up its own library. It has 
established a publications exchange arran-
gement with some thirty institutes. 
7. Fellowships and study awards 
(i) Visiting Research Fellow 
Sir David Gillmore, now Permanent 
Under-Secretary at the United Kingdom 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, was the 
Institute's first visiting fellow from January to 
March 1991. 
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(ii) Research fellowships 
Four fellowships were awarded in 1991. 
They were given to researchers at pre- or post-
doctoral level wishing to spend a period at the 
Institute conducting research which would com-
plement work already undertaken within the 
Institute. 
(iii) Study awards 
These were made to scholars from Central 
and Eastern Europe and were eo-funded by the 
Ford Foundation. One award was given during 
the first half of 1991. 
8. Other acti11ities 
(i) Visit to the United States 
The Director and four research fellows 
visited the United States in May 1991. 
(ii) The Director and research fellows were 
able to visit several other institutes and attend 
conferences. 
itors. 
They also received a large number of vis-
X. Relations with the Assembly 
(see also point IV, 9 above) 
1. Speeches made during the first part of the thirty-se11enth 
session of the Assembly, 3rd-6th June in Paris 
(i) Ministerial speeches by Council members 
followed by a debate 
Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister of State and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pierre Joxe, 
Minister for Defence, on behalf of the French 
Presidency of the Council, and Mr. Douglas 
Hurd, United Kingdom Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, spoke 
during this session and answered questions from 
parliamentarians. 
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(ii) The Secretary-General, Dr. Willem van 
Eekelen, addressed the session on the opening 
day and took part in the discussion that fol-
lowed. 
· 2. Meetings between the Council 
and Assembly representati11es 
(i) Briefing on the results of Ministerial 
Councils 
The Assembly Presidential Committee 
was briefed by the French Presidency of the 
Council and the Secretary-General on 18th 
January and 22nd February on the results of the 
extraordinary Ministerial Council meetings on 
17th January regarding the situation in the Gulf 
and 22nd February on WED's role and place in 
the new European security architecture. 
(ii) Meeting of the Assembly's Political Com-
mittee in Madrid on 5th March 1991 
This meeting was an opportunity for 
members of the committee to meet the Spanish 
foreign and defence ministers, as well as the 
Spanish Permanent Representative to the 
Council and the Secretary-General. 
(iii) Grouped meeting of committees, 26th-28th 
March 1991 in Palermo 
This meeting provided an opportunity for 
informal discussions attended by several Per-
manent Representatives to the Council or their 
deputies and the Secretary-General. 
3. Secretary-General's information letters to the President 
of the Assembly 
On 28th February and 22nd May 1991, 
the Secretary-General, Dr. Willem van Eekelen, 
forwarded to Mr. Robert Pontillon, President of 
the Assembly, information letters on the activ-
ities of WED's intergovernmental organs. 
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ANNEX I 
Communique of the extraordinary Ministerial Council on 
the situation in the Gulf held on 17th January 1991 in Paris 
1. The foreign and defence ministers of the member countries of WEU met in Paris on 17th 
January 1991, together with representatives of Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey who were 
attending as observers. 
They deplored the fact that Iraq has, right up to the deadline of 15th January 1991 set by Reso-
lution 678 of the Security Council, remained impervious to the repeated calls by the international com-
munity to comply with international law, as conveyed in the last instance by the United Nations Secre-
tary-General. Consequently they condemn the Iraqi authorities, who were responsible for opening 
hostilities. If Iraq and its people are now exposed to the ordeal of war, the responsibility lies with 
Saddam Hussein. 
They nevertheless expressed the hope that Saddam Hussein will finally see reason and withdraw 
his forces from Kuwaiti territory in order to bring the war to an end and to avoid further unnecessary 
suffering of his own people. 
They recalled the primacy of international law and consequently reaffirmed their determination 
to implement all the decisions of the Security Council, in particular Resolution 678. 
They pledged their full support for those amongst them, as well as for their other coalition 
partners who have quite legitimately resorted to armed force. They saluted the courage of the armed 
forces involved in these operations. They recalled that the objective is to restore the sovereignty and 
integrity of Kuwait and not to wage war on the Iraqi people. 
2. Whatever the subsequent developments in this crisis, they solemnly warned Iraq against any 
further violation of the law, in particular the international conventions applicable in the event of 
armed conflict. 
3. They decided to give practical expression to the solidarity which unites them and consequently 
to strengthen the co-ordination between. them, in concertation with the other countries which are com-
mitted to ensuring that the law is upheld. This applies in particular to the co-ordination of the naval 
forces of WEU countries participating in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 678, and 
to the co-ordination by WEU countries of logistic support for ground and air forces. · 
As far as naval co-ordination is concerned, they stressed the importance of the setting-up of a 
WEU co-ordination authority in theatre, to which the member countries present in the region will be 
able to assign a liaison officer. 
In the logistic field, they intend to provide a real-time response to the various requests made by 
the member countries. 
They are already studying what role the member countries may play after the war. They hope 
that the countries of the region may then, without delay, be able to develop security relationships 
which ensure long-term peace and stability. 
4. They expressed their solidarity with the countries of the region and resolved to continue their 
humanitarian aid, particularly to those countries most severely affected by the war. 
5. Ministers agreed to remain in constant contact during the new phase of the crisis which had just 
begun, and to meet again whenever the need arises. 
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ANNEX 11 
ANNEX 11 
Communique on the Gulf published at the extraordinary 
Ministerial Council of 22nd February 1991 in Paris 
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The ministers of the member countries of WEU have examined the recent developments in the 
Gulf crisis. 
They expressed their appreciation for the efforts made by President Gorbachev aimed at 
bringing about, without any further delay, the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi armed 
forces from Kuwait. 
They considered that certain elements which have emerged from the contacts between Iraq and 
the Soviet Union may represent a step in the right direction. But other key aspects remain imprecise or 
defective. They hope that the necessary clarifications and significant measures will open the way to a 
rapid cessation of hostilities. 
In particular, they reaffirmed their determination that all the relevant resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council be implemented. 
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ANNEX Ill 
Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, 
Paris, 22nd February 1991 
WEU's role and place in the new European security architecture 
Presidency's conclusions 
ANNEX Ill 
The foreign and defence ministers of Western European Union met in Paris on 22nd February 
1991 in extraordinary session to discuss WEU's role and place in the new European security archi-
tecture. 
The main basis for their discussions was a report on this question, which is annexed hereto and 
which it was decided to publish. 
- This document was originally prepared by the Secretary-General of WEU. 
- The text was discussed by the organisation's Special Working Group, chaired by the Secretary-
General, and resulted in a version on which all member states reached near concensus. 
- Given the nature of the subject, the report at this stage has not been formally agreed since a 
number of aspects have still to be discussed in greater depth within WEU and also in other 
forums (Intergovernmental Conference, North Atlantic Council). 
- Ministers confirmed that this report in general reflected their views and they decided that dis-
cussions should be pursued on this basis, particularly as regards the method of implementing 
the practical measures concerning the relationship between WEU and political union on the 
one hand, and between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance on the other. 
The future of European security and defence co-operation 
Security architecture in the 1990s 
1. The revolutionary changes which have taken place in Europe over the past year have made it 
possible to distinguish the three complementary levels around which Europe's security will be 
organised in the years to come: 
- a European level currently based on Western European Union and the Twelve of the Com-
munity; 
- an Atlantic level based on the Atlantic Alliance - the only organisation binding North 
America to the defence of Europe; 
- a pan-European level based on the CSCE bringing together all European countries as well as 
the United States and Canada. 
In addition there are other levels which are becoming increasingly relevant to European security, 
namely the Mediterranean and the Middle East, in which the human dimension and economic and 
security interests of the parties concerned should be taken into account to enhance stability in those 
regions in an appropriate manner, drawing on the experience of the CSCE process 1• 
2. At the pan-European level, the CSCE is becoming markedly more important since it is the only 
forum where each country's security interests and particularly those ofthe new democracies of Central 
and Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union, can be taken into account. As the decisions taken at 
the Paris summit demonstrate, the CSCE will have a crucial part to play in enhancing stability in 
Europe through its role as a forum for consultation and co-operation, conflict prevention, settlement of 
disputes and future arms control negotiations. On the other hand, its purpose is not to provide for all 
CSCE states the kind of firm defence guarantees which the Washington and Brussels Treaties provide 
for the member states of the Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union. 
l. Certain WEU countries have put forward proposals in this respect for a CSCM. 
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3. At the Atlantic and European levels, two processes are taking place which will have profound 
consequences for the future organisation of European security and defence co-operation: 
- the decision taken by the European Council in Dublin on 25th-26th June 1990 to convene an 
intergovernmental conference on political union and the conclusions of the European Council 
in Rome on 14th-15th December 1990 regarding the common foreign and security policy and 
role the political union might play with regard to defence questions; 
- the review of the tasks of the alliance and the adaptation of NATO strategy and structures 
which is taking place in the light of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the con-
clusion of the CFE Treaty and which will also take into account developments in the West, 
notably the process of European integration. 
4. One of the central objectives of both these exercises is how the identity of Europe in the field of 
security and defence can be developed. Indeed, European governments have been presented with a his-
toric opportunity in which it is possible to take an overall look at the three institutions directly affected 
-NATO, European Community, European political co-operation and Western European Union- and 
at the relationships between them in order to define their security requirements for the 1990s. 
The Atlantic dimension 
5. It is widely recognised that the Atlantic Alliance between North America and Western Europe 
with its arrangements for military co-operation has formed the indispensable backbone to defence 
- both European and western - over the past forty years. It has also been an important stabilising 
factor during the past year of change in Central and Eastern Europe. This alliance, with effective 
defence arrangements, linking North America and Europe will remain imperative in the years to come: 
(a) as the framework for the collective defence of all allies in the case of an attack on the ter-
ritory of one or more of them, 
(b) as a framework for broad political co-operation among the allies and as a forum where North 
America and Western Europe can discuss common security concerns, 
(c) as a stabilising factor on the continent of Europe where the Soviet Union retains the largest 
military capabilities including a major nuclear arsenal. 
6. However, this role for the alliance in the future in no way lessens the urgency for a reappraisal of 
its organisation and structures. This reappraisal must take into account the withdrawal by 1994 of all 
Soviet forces to within their own territory and the significantly more important part that European 
forces will play in the alliance's collective defence due to the reductions in North American forces in 
Europe. The outcome of this reappraisal must ensure that there is no weakening of the alliance com-
mitments on the part of either North America or Europe which could lead to a narrower national view 
of defence. This would involve, in particular, reaffirming the importance of retaining North American 
forces in Europe and ensuring that all allies refrain from taking unilateral, unco-ordinated decisions to 
reduce their defence effort. 
7. With regard to the NATO review, European countries must define how they intend to strengthen 
and make more coherent the European pillar within the alliance. In particular, it will be important to 
ensure the complementarity between two requirements: 
- for Europe to take on a greater degree of responsibility for its own defence will require an 
identifiable European component which will only be achieved if it is linked to the broader 
process of achieving a European union; 
- the need for effective arrangements for military co-operation which reflect the security 
interests of all members of the alliance. 
Political union and a European security and defence dimension 
8. The developments in Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, the impetus given 
towards economic and monetary union and more recently the Gulf conflict have all contributed to 
highlighting the desirability for the Community and its member states to improve their capacity for 
action internationally and to match the developments in the economic field with progress in the 
political field. The question of a common foreign and security policy is therefore now high on the 
agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. 
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9. In this context, the European Council in Rome on 14th-15th December 1990 has identified the 
issues in the security and defence field to which the IGC should give-particular attention 2• The Rome 
conclusions indicate that, whilst the first steps in a common security policy are taking shape, there is as 
yet no unanimity within the Twelve on the role the political union might, in the short term, play in 
defence. matters. A gradual approach therefore suggests itself which would take account of the position 
of certain member states of the Twelve, of the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance and would keep in 
mind the security interests of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is nevertheless clear that 
no hard and fast distinction can be made between broader security issues and defence policy even 
though defence has particular characteristics which may require specific arrangements. Due to its 
stated objective in The Hague platform and due to its existing structures, WEU can therefore play an 
important part in this gradual approach to develop a European security and defence identity. 
Role o/WEU 
10. In this context, WEU possesses a number of institutional advantages which would allow it to act 
as a bridge between the process of European integration and the Atlantic Alliance: 
(a) It is an organisation based on a treaty which affirms the member countries' intention pro-
gressively to achieve European integration. This objective was developed in the platform on 
European security interests of 27th October 1987 and subsequently confirmed in the pro-
tocol of accession of Portugal and Spain signed on 14th November 1988 which has been 
accepted, approved or ratified by all the parliaments of the Nine. These two documents 
moreover explicitly state that " the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incom-
plete as long as it does not include security and defence ". 
(b) It is the only European organisation based on a mutual defence commitment (Article V of 
the WEU Treaty). 
(c) It brings together both foreign and defence ministers. 
(d) Its treaty (Article VIII.3) places no geographical restrictions on its competences (which has 
enabled it to play a role co-ordinating military activities in the Gulf). 
(e) Its treaty contains a clause which, whilst requiring redefinition, commits the member coun-
tries to work in close co-operation with NATO. 
(f) It is backed by a permanent, international secretariat. 
(g) It is an organisation with a parliamentary dimension in the form of the WEU Assembly 
whose competence is treaty-based. 
11. The task is therefore to identify practical ways in which WEU can play in the present circum-
stances and without precluding future developments a more effective role in the context of both 
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political union and the Atlantic Alliance. The objective vis-a-vis political union should be to demon- f 
strate more visibly that WEU is an integral part of the European integration process. The·objective vis-
a-vis the alliance should be to achieve a strong, new transatlantic partnership by strengthening the 
European component, contributing to the alliance's evolution and enhancing transatlantic cohesion in 
a reinvigorated alliance. This approach should include the definition and introduction of WEU contri-
butions or positions into alliance debates. It will remain essential to ensure that all allies are willing to 
take account of each others' points of view before final positions are reached in alliance consulta-
tions. J 
12.d.b!"fl. oreo~11erb, the. more WEU can sufficce~sfully. ta~e on operational responfsibilities, the more its J ere 1 ttty wt e ratsed and the more e ecttvely tt wtll become the channel o co-operation between 1 
political union and NATO. Proposals should therefore now be developed to make co-operation within 1 
WEU more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, taking i 
account of what is stated in paragraphs 5 and 10 above. 
2. "As regards common security, the gradual extension of the union's role in this area should be considered, in particular with 
reference, initially, to issues debated in international organisations: arms control, disarmament and related issues; CSCE 
matters; certain questions debated in the United Nations, including peace-keeping operations; economic and technological 
co-operation in the armaments field; co-ordination of armaments export policy, and non-proliferation. 
Futhermore, the European Council emphasises that, with a view to the future, the prospect of a role for the union in defence 
matters should be considered without prejudice to member states' existing obligations in this area, bearing in mind the impor- f. 
tance of maintaining and strengthening the ties within the Atlantic Alliance and without prejudice to the traditional positions of 
other member states. The idea of a commitment by member stateS to provide mutual assistance, as well as proposals put forward J 
by some member states on the future of Western European Union, should also be addressed." J 
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Practical steps to be taken vis-a-Pis political union 
13. In order to develop an organic relationship between WEU and ,political union, make more 
visible the long-term commitment to a European union including a defence dimension and without 
prejudicing either the WEU structures or the structures of the Twelve, increased co-operation and 
co-ordination between the common foreign and security policy and WEU shall be sought by the fol-
lowing measures: 
(a) As part of political union, heads of state and government meeting in the European Council 
would be able to discuss all aspects of the common foreign and security policy, without there being any 
taboo subjects. The conclusions of the European Council on the principles and orientation of the 
common foreign and security policy would serve as a guideline for co-operation under the Brussels 
Treaty; in particular, where co-ordination in the defence field is necessary, this would be taken forward 
with WEU 3• 
(b) The dates and place of meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers should, when necessary, be 
synchronised with those ministerial-level meetings of the Council of the political union dealing with 
the common foreign and security policy. When necessary, meetings at official level of the Twelve and 
of the Nine should also be synchronised. 
(c) Close contacts should be maintained between the Presidencies of the Twelve and WEU. 
Harmonisation of the sequence and duration of the Presidencies of the Twelve and of WEU should be 
considered. 
(d) The EPC/Council Secretariats and the WEU Secretariat should maintain working contact and 
ensure a regular exchange of information on security matters. 
(e) Possible links between the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly should be 
examined. 
Practical steps to be taken Pis-a-vis the Atlantic Alliance 
14. In order to develop an organic relationship between WEU and the alliance and to enable WEU 
to play a more effective role in strengthening the European pillar within the alliance, the following 
steps shall be taken: 
(a) The country holding the WEU Presidency or, when appropriate, another WEU member country, 
should: 
- introduce joint WEU positions or contributions into the process of alliance consultation; 
- regularly brief the North Atlantic Council and other alliance bodies on WEU activities. 
(b) WEU concertation should when necessary take place at various levels, including at ministerial 
level and at the level of member states' Permanent Representatives to NATO, on those items on the 
alliance agenda which are of particular interest to WEU; this concertation should take place with the 
appropriate degree of transparency with regard to other allies, taking each others' views into consider-
ation. 
(c) Contacts should be maintained between NATO and the WEU Secretariat and their respective 
Secretaries-General, and a regular exchange of information ensured. 
Questions raised by the proposals above 
15. The first question concerns the relationship of WEU with the European member countries of the 
ECIEPC and Atlantic Alliance which are not members of WEU. Close co-operation between WEU 
member countries and all European partners and allies will remain essential. In the future, the modal-
ities of the relationships between WEU and these countries should reflect the nature of the relation-
ships which WEU itself will have with political union and the Atlantic Alliance. In this context, an 
enlargement of certain ministerial meetings to include other or all European partners and allies as 
observers could be considered. 
3. Several delegations wish to include an explicit reference to WEU being placed under the aegis of the European Council or 
even under its direct authority. 
One delegation does not wish to prejudge the discussions within the IGC on the institutional arrangements for the common 
foreign and security policy in the political union and therefore wishes to delete this sub-paragraph. 
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16. The second question concerns the location of WEU. The preceding paragraphs have begun to 
define the NATO-WEU-PU inter-relationship. In order to contribute to the effective functioning of 
WEU on the basis of the practical steps set out in paragraphs 13 and 14, the question of transferring the 
organisation to Brussels should be considered. A move to Brussels must ensure that WEU retains its 
own clear identity as outlined in the paragraphs above. This implies that, in order to ensure that the 
Council is able to exercise its functions continuously, some form of permanent representation and a 
permanent WEU Secretariat should be retained. It would be for each government to decide on the 
most appropriate arrangement for representation and liaison, drawing as necessary on member coun-
tries' delegations to NATO and the institutions of political union. Nevertheless, in terms of increasing 
the efficiency of WEU's work, it would be desirable for member countries to appoint comparable offi-
cials to the Permanent Council of WEU. 
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ANNEX IV 
Conclusions of the informal meeting of WEU ministers on 
the situation in the Middle East 
Luxembourg, 8th Apri/1991 
DOCUMENT 1282 
Ministers for foreign affairs of member states of WEU held a meeting in the margins of the 
European Council of 8th April. Several delegations clearly underlined the exceptional character of this 
meeting. 
Ministers took note of the guidelines defined by the heads of state and government of the 
European Community concerning the situation in the Middle East and the fate of the Kurdish popu-
lation of Iraq. 
They agreed that WEU should continue to play an important part in the post-war situation with 
a view to stability and peace in the Gulf region. As of now, they decided to put into effect the 
co-ordination of the humanitarian aid provided by the member states and the Community, in liaison 
with the Commission, for the Iraqi civilian population, in particular the Kurds, victims of repression 
in Iraq, and to examine ways and means for logistical support from WEU in this regard. 
They requested the ad hoc group to meet as from Tuesday, 9th April in Paris to specify the con-
crete contribution which WEU will make, in this spirit, to the implementation of Resolutions 687 and 
688 of the Security Council and to prepare the meeting of Chiefs of Staff of lOth April. 
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Press release on the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting 
on 1Oth April 1991 in Paris 
ANNEX V 
Invited by General Maurice Schmitt, French Chief of Defence Staff and representative of the 
country chairing Western European Union, the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the nine members of WEU 
met in Paris on 1Oth April 1991. 
The WEU Secretary-General, Mr. Willem van Eekelen was present at this meeting. 
This meeting enabled the Chiefs of Defence Staff to exchange their views informally, in par-
ticular on the development of European co-operation in the military fields, especially in the light of 
lessons drawn from the Iraqi conflict. 
In addition, at this occasion, the Chiefs of Defence Staff discussed military aspects of the contri-
butions of the WEU countries to the implementation of the Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688. 
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ANNEX VI 
Communique of the WEU Ministerial Council issued in Vianden on 27th June 1991 
Introduction 
At their meeting in Luxembourg on 27th June 1991, the foreign and defence ministers ofWEU 
member states reaffirmed the central position now occupied in the debate on the emergence of a 
European security and defence identity. 
Ministers reviewed the efforts being made to promote a security architecture to guarantee all 
European states the peace and security to which they aspire. They pointed to the complementary role 
of the three levels around which the security of their countries should be organised in the years to 
come: a European level: Western European Union and the Twelve; an Atlantic level: the Atlantic 
Alliance level; a pan-European level: the CSCE. 
1. Role and place of WEU in the security architecture 
Ministers recalled that the European security and defence identity was emerging within the 
Twelve and WEU. In this connection, ministers confirmed their desire that WEU be fully part of the 
process of European integration while enhancing its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
They stated that the role of WEU should be strengthened in the context of the European con-
struction process, which is leading the Twelve to a political union having a common foreign and 
security policy. They agreed that European political union implies a genuine European security and 
defence identity and thus greater European responsibility for defence matters. This is in accordance 
with The Hague platform which makes clear that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain 
incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. Ministers therefore agreed that WEU 
should be developed in this phase of the European integration process as its defence component. 
They also agreed that the development of a genuine European security and defence identity will 
be reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. This will reinforce 
the integrity and effectiveness of the alliance and will require, at each stage, appropriate practical 
arrangements to ensure transparency and complementarity. This will call for appropriate procedures 
for co-operation with other allies. 
Ministers noted the need for the European and Atlantic debates to proceed in parallel. 
2. CSCE and security negotiations in Europe 
Ministers underlined the importance of the recent CSCE ministerial meeting in Berlin. They 
stressed the significance of its conclusions, particularly as regards the complementarity and links 
existing between the various institutions of the European security architecture, of which WEU is a part. 
Ministers welcomed the recent initiatives by member countries aimed at relaunching the arms 
control process. They expressed their resolve to continue concertation among member states, in consul-
tation with other partners, in order to develop a joint approach which takes account of the interests of 
Europeans in every field of arms control. 
They welcomed the solution reached in resolving the questions regarding implementation of the 
CFE Treaty. They expressed the hope that the continuation of the negotiations on conventional armed 
forces would rapidly lead to an additional agreement aimed at strengthening stability in Europe, partic-
ularly through measures to limit and, where necessary, reduce manpower levels. 
They also hoped that the negotiations on security- and confidence-building measures would be 
used further to enhance transparency and confidence in Europe. With a view to the Helsinki con-
ference, they looked forward to beginning informal discussions in September among the Thirty-five on 
new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building within the CSCE 
framework. 
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WEU member states attach a high priority to the conclusion as soon as possible of an open skies 
agreement. They call upon the Soviet Union to respond positively to the ideas put forward by the 
western participants in the open skies talks and to join them in renewed negotiations with the aim of 
securing an open skies agreement by the time of the Helsinki follow-up meeting. 
3. Dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
The Charter of Paris marked the opening of a new era in Europe, based on confidence and 
co-operation, and it was in this spirit a year ago that ministers proposed to the new democracies that a 
dialogue be initiated; ministers now hoped that this dialogue could be given more depth and breadth. 
They viewed the preliminary exchanges as very positive and proposed the following mea-
sures: 
- to explore the possibilities of giving the dialogue a more political dimension, for example by 
organising ad hoc contacts at ministerial level on specific _subjects of common interest;_ 
- to establish information links between the embassies of the countries concerned and the 
Secretariat-General, and between the government of each of these countries and the embassy 
of the Presidency; 
- to intensify the exchanges of view among experts on subjects of common interest following, 
inter alia, the seminar orga~ised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies. 
In line with the activities already undertaken, it was also agreed that the WEU Institute for 
Security Studies should make a number of scholarships available to young researchers in the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Ministers also gave a favourable response to the invitations from Bulgaria and Romania to the 
Secretary-General of the organisation to undertake a fact-finding visit, together with a representative of 
the Presidency. They welcomed the interest shown by the Soviet Union in the activities of WEU. 
4. WEU action in the Gulf 
WEU member states expressed their satisfaction that the successful outcome of t.he coalition's 
co-ordinated action in the Gulf had ensured the respect for the primacy of international law. They were 
resolved to grasp this opportunity of promoting measures that should secure lasting peace and stability 
in the region. 
Ministers emphasised the major contribution made by WEU and its member states to the action 
of the coalition. They noted the measures for co-ordinating the action of member states in the Gulf 
region, particularly in enforcing the embargo. 
As far as naval activities were concerned, they noted with satisfaction the major part played by 
the navies ofWEU states in mine-clearance operations in the approaches to Kuwait, now nearing com-
pletion. 
Following an informal decision of WEU foreign ministers in Luxembourg on 8th April 1991, 
member states made a considerable contribution to the provision and co-ordination of humanitarian 
aid to Iraqi victims of repression, in particular the Kurds. 
5. Security in the Mediterranean 
Ministers underlined their attachment to security and stability in the Mediterranean. They took 
note of the work of the Mediterranean Sub-Group to identify the principles likely to contribute to a res-
olution of security questions in the region. They asked the sub-group to continue its activities in line 
with the mandate it had been given on 1Oth December last. 
6. Operational co-operation among member states 
In the field of space 
With the aim of intensifying space co-operation within WEU and giving concrete expression to 
that co-operation, ministers decided to: 
- set up a satellite data interpretation centre whose immediate task would be to train European 
experts in the photo-interpretation of satellite-derived data, to compile and process accessible 
data and to make those data available to member states, particularly within the framework of 
116 
i 
ANNEX VI DOCUMENT 1282 
the verification of arms control agreements, crisis monitoring and environmental monitoring. 
The activities of the centre will be reviewed no later than three years after it has entered into 
operation; 
- task the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space to pursue studies on the possibilities for medium- and 
long-term co-operation on a European satellite observation system. 
In the military field 
Ministers restated their resolve to give fresh impetus to programmes of co-operation among 
member states. 
The meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff in Paris on lOth April gave further impetus to the dis-
cussions under way on the possibilities of developing various forms of practical co-operation. 
Ministers mandated the Defence Representatives Group to spell out and assess, in liaison with 
the Special Working Group, proposals to make co-operation more operational both in the politico-
military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the require-
ments for co-ordination and planning structures. The results of this work will be submitted to ministers 
at their next meeting. 
In the freld of arms control verification 
Ministers decided to step up programmes of co-operation among member states on the verifi-
cation of arms control agreements. In this context, they underlined the link between space co-operation 
and arms control verification, including verification of the CFE Treaty. 
Ministers agreed on practical arrangements for co-operation within WEU concerning the imple-
mentation of the verification regime of the CFE Treaty. They also agreed to mandate verification 
experts to continue their study of the possibilities for practical co-operation on the implementation of a 
future open skies agreement. 
* 
* * 
Ministers expressed their warm appreciation to the outgoing French Presidency for the 
important part it had played in WEU's achievements during the last year. 
They welcomed the incoming German Presidency and expressed their best wishes to their col-
leagues from the Federal Republic of Germany for the coming twelve months which would be 
extremely important for the future of WEU and for the development of the European construction 
process. 
Ministers also warmly thanked the Government of Luxembourg for the hospitality it had 
extended during this ministerial session. 
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ANNEX VII 
Statement on Yugoslal'ia issued in Vianden on 27th June 1991 
The foreign ministers of Western European Union express their deep concern at the current turn 
of events in Yugoslavia. 
They regret all the recent unilateral decisions which make dialogue more difficult. 
They urgently appeal to all the political authorities in Yugoslavia to avoid all confrontation, to 
refrain from the use of force and to resume the dialogue with a view to securing the unity of the state. 
They hope that the election of the new head of the collegiate Presidency can take place without 
delay so as to ensure the normal functioning of the federal institutions. 
They call on all the CSCE participating states, in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter 
of Paris and their declaration of 19th June 1991, to encourage the efforts aimed at a negotiated 
solution among the parties concerned, having due regard to all the principles of the CSCE. 
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ANNEX VIII 
Fact-finding sheet on mine-clearance operations and on those 
relating to the enforcement of the naval embargo 
during the Middle East crisis 
1. Mines destroyed by all countries as at 18th June 1991 
Ships/Countries Mines destroyed 
Saggitaire .............................. 145 
Orion .................................. 40 
Pegase ................................. 2 
Aigle ................................... 10 
Pluton ................................. 2 
Total France ........................... 199 
Iris .................................... 116 
Myosotis ............................... 115 
Dianthus ............................... 46 
Zinnia ................................. 1 
Total Belgium .......................... 278 
Harlingen .............................. 16 
Zierikzee ............................... 21 
Haarlem ............................... -
Total Netherlands ....................... 37 
Three country total ..................... 514 (+ 4 bombs) 
Total Italy .............................. 69 
Total Germany ......................... 89 (+ 8 bombs) 
Total United Kingdom .................. + 170 
Total WEU ............................. 842 (+ 12 bombs) 
Total United States ..................... + 170 
Grand Total ............................ 1 012 (+ 12 bombs) 
2. State of the embargo as at 16th June 1991 
(all countries) 
Challenged Boarded Diverted Warning shot 
United States .............. 10088 800 78 10 
Other allies ................ 400 196 4 1 
Total non-WEU ............ 10488 996 82 11 
Total WEU ................ 22 670 632 18 3 
Grand Total ............... 33 158 1 628 100 14 
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3. State of the embargo as at 16th June 1991 
(WEU countries) 
Challenged Boarded Diverted 
France .................... 8 527 304 9 
Belgium ................... 3 168 28 0 
Spain ..................... 4954 254 7 
Italy ...................... 2 342 9 0 
Netherlands ............... 485 1 0 
United Kingdom ........... 3 194 36 2 
Total WEU ................ 22 670 632 18 
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The Assembly, 
Europe and the Yugoslav crisis 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee 2 
by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur 
Draft Recommendation 
on Europe and the Yugoslal' crisis 
15th October 1991 
(i) Deploring the constant worsening of the civil war that is tearing Yugoslavia apart; 
(ii) Considering that pursuit of the war is endangering peace throughout Europe; 
(iii) Considering that it is for WEU, under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
to help to restore peace in Yugoslavia to the best of its ability; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Community and member states have called on the WEU Council to 
implement the military aspects of the _policy defined by the Twelve; 
(v) Considering that the commitment of the European Community, in agreement with the CSCE 
and with the subsequent support of the Security Council, allowed the peace conference to be convened 
in The Hague in which all the parties to the conflict are taking part and which may lead to a political 
solution to the Yugoslav crisis; 
(vi) Deploring, however, that this co-ordination has not yet allowed a real, lasting cease-fire to be 
achieved as a prelude to a return to peace in Yugoslavia; 
(vii) Expressing the hope that the mission assigned to Lord Carrington will succeed in the near future; 
(viii) Gratified that the Council duly informed NATO and the CSCE of the results of its meetings but 
deploring the fact that it neglected to inform the Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Decide upon and implement without delay effective measures to ensure respect for the embargo 
on all supplies of arms to Yugoslavia decided upon in Security Council Resolution 713; 
2. Proceed immediately to prepare the possible implementation of each of the various options con-
sidered on 30th September to help to ensure respect for a cease-fire once it becomes effective; 
3. Strengthen its organisation and ability to intervene to ensure Europe's security and urge the 
Security Council and the CSCE to give a further mandate to WEU to facilitate a return to peace; 
4. Continue to associate any European countries that might make a contribution with all appro-
priate action to secure a cease-fire and eventual peace in Yugoslavia; 
5. Use all appropriate means to bring pressure to bear on the parties to the conflict to ensure the 
success of the conference in The Hague on peace in Yugoslavia; 
6. Continue to inform NATO and the CSCE of its decisions; 
7. Inform the Assembly without delay of the results of each of its ministerial meetings. 
l. Adopted in committee by 17 votes to 0 with 1 abstention. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stojfelen (Chairman); Sir Geojfrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, 
Beix, Brito, Candal (Alternate: Soares Costa), Caro, Collart, Cuatrecasas, De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann, Forni, Foschi, 
Goerens, Guizzi, Lord Kirkhil/, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martinez, Martino, Miiller, Pecriaux, 
Pieralli, de Puig, Reddemann, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton (Alternate: Rowe), Mr. Soe/1, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. 
Thyraud, Ward. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on WEU's external relations - the enlargement of WEU 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 make it necessary to 
re-examine the organisation of the security of Europe as a whole and in particular Western Europe; 
(ii) Noting that the role of WEU in the organisation of European security must be redefined in the 
context of the process of a Community policy and adapting NATO strategy to the new situation in 
Europe and the world; 
(iii) Considering that the accession of further countries to the modified Brussels Treaty should be 
considered after the role of WEU has been redefined; 
(iv) Noting that the nine member countries are unanimous in considering that the Atlantic Alliance 
is and must remain the essential framework of western defence in Europe; 
(v) Considering that NATO is not at present in a position to take direct action outside the area 
defined by the North Atlantic Treaty nor to respond effectively to certain threats to peace in Central or 
Eastern Europe, but recalling that it is essential that measures taken by WEU in such cases, in 
accordance with Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, should guarantee Euro-American cohesion, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Explore and set in motion the best possible machinery for co-operation with the European coun-
tries which so wish, while bearing in mind that, in present circumstances, it would not be wise to invite 
formally countries which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance to accede to the modified Brussels 
Treaty in application of its Article XI; 
2. Encourage the participation of European countries so wishing and fulfilling the necessary condi-
tions in those of WED's activities and institutions which, not involving the application of Articles IV 
and V of the treaty, concern the implementation of Article VIII; 
3. Invite any countries which would be capable of making a useful contribution - side by side with 
members of WEU - to diplomatic or military action designed to keep the peace in Europe and in the 
world to participate in an appropriate manner in Council meetings intended to prepare such action; 
4. Prior to any engagement of forces under the aegis of WEU, hold consultations with NATO to 
ensure the smooth running of the Atlantic Alliance. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submined by Sir Geoffrey Fiuberg, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The aim of the present report is to 
examine the implications for relations between 
WEU and non-member countries of the advice 
adopted without opposition by the Assembly's 
Presidential Committee in Palermo on 26th 
March 1991 on " The future of European co-
operation in security and defence questions ". 
This advice defined WEU's role as follows: 
" WEU must be at one and the same time 
the means of allowing Europe to make its 
voice heard in a Euro-American dialogue 
of which the Atlantic Alliance is the insti-
tutional framework and the instrument 
for making the most of the European con-
tribution to the defence of the West and to 
its own security." 
and went on to say: 
" In order better to fulfil its new tasks, 
WEU must envisage more favourably its 
enlargement and where appropriate act 
swiftly upon such requests for mem-
bership." 
2. Events since the advice was adopted, par-
ticularly in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 
emphasise its pertinence rather than detract 
from it and have led a number of countries to 
think about the possibility of joining WEU for 
various reasons. Our Assembly must therefore 
define the principles it believes should govern 
the way the Council should respond to possible 
candidatures and guide all the relations the 
various WEU organs can and should have with 
countries that are not signatories to the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. 
3. Furthermore, current negotiations between 
the Twelve in the context of the intergovern-
mental conference on external policy and 
security are making the countries concerned 
wonder about the role WEU will have to play in 
the Europe of tomorrow. In October, two series 
of proposals, one emanating from the United 
Kingdom and Italy and the other from France 
and Germany, guided the Twelve's thinking 
towards this question. Furthermore, at its 
November 1991 ministerial meeting, NATO 
aims to adopt the principles of a new strategy 
adapted to the new situation in Europe and its 
security requirements. As matters now stand, 
the WEU Assembly cannot therefore try to 
define rigid principles here and now. Never-
theless, in a necessarily provisional document, it 
seems useful for it to offer its opinion before the 
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governments reach final decisions. It will then 
be able to review its position in the light of the 
decisions taken by the Twelve at the Maastricht 
summit meeting from 9th to 12th December and 
by NATO. 
II. WEU and European security 
4. The dimensions of Europe, the number of 
different peoples living there and the small size 
of the component states mean that security in 
this part of the world forms a whole that can be 
ensured only by maintaining peace throughout 
the continent. Furthermore, the essential role of 
foreign trade in the economy of Western 
Europe, its dependence on energy and raw mate-
rials, its need for outlets for its industrial 
products and now for its agriculture too, and the 
worldwide dimension of many of its firms also 
make it very sensitive to events that might arise 
outside Europe, particularly in the Middle East. 
Europe can certainly not expect to ensure uni-
versal peace but it can make a contribution, 
especially by endeavouring to limit the spread of 
conflicts that may arise anywhere in the 
world. 
5. From 1948 to 1989, the international situ-
ation caused Europe's defence to be based on a 
single hypothesis: a possible massive attack by 
the Soviet Union and its allies of which Central 
Europe would have borne the brunt. NA TO's 
military and nuclear deployment was a response 
to this threat, which was very real at the start but 
subsequently less, and above all the aim was to 
deter the potential enemy. The purpose was to 
show that, thanks to their cohesion and means, 
the allies had the will and capability to retaliate 
in an appropriate manner to any form of 
aggression against any one of them. The goal of 
Western European Union was to create and 
maintain the conditions necessary for the partic-
ipation of its members in the joint defence 
effort, as specified in Article IV of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
6. Since 1989, it has been clear that the con-
ditions for maintaining peace in Europe have 
changed. The economic failure of the Soviet 
Union has become plain to all, thus provoking a 
a serious crisis in the ideology it had been trying 
to impose on the world. Its ability to pursue the 
military effort which ostensibly made it the 
world's leading military power was placed in 
doubt to such an extent that it had to make a 
radical revision of its external policy in Europe 
and the world. It has had to renounce its domi-
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nation of Central and Eastern Europe and its 
overseas ventures and seek guarantees of its 
security in agreements with the West on arms 
limitation, the establishment of a new European 
order and assistance in restructuring its 
economy. 
7. The West for its part has wisely been 
careful not to take advantage of the weakening 
of the Soviet Union to force it to capitulate. It 
has not tried to move its military deployment 
further east. It has let the Soviet Union evolve 
within its frontiers and, apart from the case of 
the Baltic republics whose annexation it had 
never recognised, it has done nothing to 
encourage the centrifugal forces which were 
developing on Soviet territory. Conversely, it 
has negotiated agreements to reduce both con-
ventional and nuclear arms. Thus, medium-
range nuclear weapons have been eliminated 
from the European continent. The November 
1990 CFE agreement allowed a progressive low-
ering of the level of conventional forces. Negoti-
ations are under way between the United States 
and the Soviet Union to reduce the number of 
intercontinental missiles. Finally, on 7th Sep-
tember 1991, Mr. Dick Cheney, Secretary of 
Defence, announced that NATO was preparing 
to propose to the Soviet Union negotiations to 
reduce drastically the number of short-range 
nuclear weapons in Europe. In view of the 
favourable answer from Mr. Gorbachev who, in 
turn, made major proposals for limiting arms, 
NATO decided on 16th October to reduce the 
number of its short-range weapons stationed in 
Europe by 80%. 
8. Furthermore, the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe has made consid-
erable progress. First, it managed to define the 
conditions in which a new European order 
might be established on the basis of a number of 
principles, accepted by all, in military matters 
with confidence-building measures and in 
external policy with the prevention of conflicts 
and the inviolability of frontiers, the devel-
opment of trade, the application of democratic 
principles and respect for human rights. It then 
set up a permanent structure in which the thirty-
eight independent European states (now that the 
Baltic republics have joined) could together 
examine all their common problems. 
9. However, the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, the potential break-up of Yugoslavia and 
the emergence of new sovereign republics carry 
dangers which must be met. One essential for 
international recognition of a new sovereign state 
must be its acceptance of all international and 
regional treaties, conventions and obligations 
entered into by the state of which it was for-
merly a component part. The conduct of certain 
Yugoslav and Soviet republics will oblige the inter-
national community to be particularly vigilant 
regarding the application of this condition. 
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10. Finally, the disappearance of the Soviet 
threat has led all the European countries to cut 
their defence budgets. Most of them have 
already done so and all are planning to do so in 
the next few years. This means reducing their 
force levels and delaying the modernisation of 
their weapons. They also have to re-examine the 
deployment of their forces and the conditions in 
which they might have to be used, in other 
words their strategy. The reunification of 
Germany and the Soviet undertaking to with-
draw the forces it still has on the territory of the 
former GDR will also lead to a very significant 
reduction in NATO forces deployed on German 
territory which are still by far the most 
important part of NATO's deployment. The 
decision taken by France and Germany on 16th 
October to set up a joint army corps that would 
not be under the NATO integrated military 
commands may further weaken NATO and give 
the United States the mistaken impression that 
Europe no longer trusts NATO to ensure its 
security. 
11. In order to consider a possible enlarge-
ment of WEU, it is therefore essential to try to 
define the kind of challenge to which the 
organisation of European security should now 
respond. Europe's security, while apparently no 
longer seriously threatened, should be viewed in 
terms of three separate risks. 
12. (a) In spite of the present very serious 
crisis now facing it, the Soviet Union or the sum 
of its republics is still a major military and 
nuclear power. While it has respected the letter 
of the CFE agreements, it did its utmost to 
evade the consequences either by shifting forces 
previously deployed in Europe to the other side 
of the Urals, or by assigning to the navy divi-
sions that had hitherto belonged to the army 
which alone is subject to the limits set out in the 
agreement. It would also appear that the 
destruction of weapons to which it was com-
mitted is proceeding far more slowly than 
planned and that the reconversion of Soviet 
arms industries is encountering serious diffi-
culties. Again, the attempted coup in the Soviet 
Union from 19th to 21st August 1991 showed 
that the country was in no way sheltered from 
events that might lead to major changes in its 
external policy and domestic affairs. Although 
most of the military leaders were dismissed after 
the failure of the coup d'etat, there is nothing to 
prevent the army from one day playing a crucial 
role in the restoration of a new state order and, 
consequently, exercising considerable power in 
the Soviet Union or in any states replacing it. 
The extreme weakness of the central state and 
affirmation of the authority of the republics are 
certainly not guarantees of stability and peace 
because the question-marks they raise for the 
future of such a heavily-armed country mean 
that the West's security cannot rely on the conti-
nuity and success of perestroika. 
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13. In particular, it should be borne in mind 
that the negotiation of a treaty of union between 
the republics whose autonomy would thereby be 
confirmed was the decisive factor in triggering 
off the putsch. Any victory by those nostalgic for 
the old regime would probably mean calling in 
question what Mr. Gorbachev's government is 
now relinquishing, be it the independence of the 
Baltic states, the end of Russian domination in 
Central Europe, the defence of world com-
munism or the security the army ensures for the 
Soviet Union. It should also be considered that 
the re-emergence of nationalism within the Soviet 
Union is already leading to clashes between 
republics or within some of them which might 
become worse in future years and neighbouring 
Asian and European countries might find it hard 
to remain aloof since practically nowhere do the 
union's frontiers correspond to ethnic borders. 
14. (b) Probably for quite some time, Central 
and Southern Europe will be facing an economic, 
ideological and political crisis whose outcome is 
uncertain. Events in Yugoslavia since June 1991 
testify to this. Practically none of the states in 
that part of Europe has frontiers that cannot be 
contested from the national standpoint. Several 
have large national minorities and there is a 
threat to the very existence as a state of at least 
one of them: Yugoslavia. Because of the Soviet 
military presence in Central Europe and a com-
munist dictatorship, the expression of national 
realities in that region had been stifled for a very 
long time. The return to freedom of expression 
now shows that this did nothing to attenuate 
them. On the contrary, the maintenance in some 
of those countries of the former communist state 
system, while others have acceded more quickly 
to democracy, merely accentuated antagonism 
in which the ideological factor was added to 
nationalism, thus arousing tension. 
15. The most serious case so far is in Yugo-
slavia. The country was created in the aftermath 
of the first world war to group the Slav peoples 
in the south of the Austro-Hungarian empire 
and Bulgaria with Serbia and Montenegro in a 
state dominated by the Serbs. This domination 
caused constant trouble until the start of Tito's 
communist dictatorship in 1945. Following his 
break with Moscow in 1948 and up to his death 
in 1980, Tito managed to maintain the unity of 
the state, which was given a federal-type 
structure under the 1974 constitution. Unre-
lenting tension in relations between Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union kept national rivalries at 
bay. However, international detente and the 
death of Tito were swiftly followed by unrest, 
starting in 1981 in the Serbian province of 
Kosovo, where 7 5% of the population is 
Albanian, and a progressive weakening of 
central power in favour of the republics. 
16. The disappearance of the Soviet threat 
and the triumph of democratic forces in most 
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Central European countries further weakened 
the federal authorities in Yugoslavia. As a result 
of more or less free elections, nationalist govern-
ments were set up in Slovenia and Croatia in 
spring 1991, while the former communist 
leaders remained in power in Serbia and the 
federal state. In this situation, the Serbs opposed 
the application of the federal constitution in 
order to keep in place the Serb element, which 
led to revolts in Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo. 
Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their indepen-
dence on 25th June 1991 but the federal army, 
consisting mainly of Serbs, intervened to restore 
federal authority. On 18th July, the collegial 
presidency of the federation announced the 
withdrawal of federal forces from Slovenia but 
the latter, either on their own initiative or with 
the complicity of at least part of the federal gov-
ernment, then launched an offensive in Croatia 
in order to recover territories occupied by a Serb 
minority constituting 15% of the population of 
the Croatian Republic. Since then, there has 
effectively been civil war in Yugoslavia between 
the federal army, assisted by Serb militia forces, 
and the army of the Croatian Republic. In the 
prevailing uncertainty about the fate of Yugo-
slavia, unrest has again broken out in Kosovo, 
and Macedonia in turn has proclaimed its inde-
pendence, followed, on 15th October, by Boznia-
Herzegovina. On 23rd September, the federal 
army occupied a large part of Croatia with Sla-
vonia, where the majority of the population is 
Serb. It also threatened the capital, Zagreb, and 
the Dalmatian coastal ports. The many 
cease-fire agreements signed by the Federal 
Government and the republics have been inef-
fective, making it clear that no democratic 
control, be it governmental or parliamentary, 
has been exercised or is even capable of being 
exercised over the armed forces. It is not certain 
that the republics can do much better. 
17. It now seems impossible to consider 
restoring a federal Yugoslav state. However, the 
ethnic problems would not be solved if the 
republics were to become independent since 
each one, and in particular Boznia and 
Herzegovina and Macedonia, contains large 
minorities who are afraid of being oppressed in 
national states where they would be deprived of 
the guarantees afforded by a federal state. 
Moreover, the break-up of Yugoslavia might 
lead to unrest in other countries where national 
minorities are also tending to claim the right to 
self-determination and break away from the 
states in which they live. Hence it is the entire 
political geography of Central Europe, the main-
tenance of which was one of the foundations of 
the CSCE's task of establishing a new peaceful 
order in Europe, that is being called in question 
by the Yugoslav crisis. 
18. On 19th September 1991, the European 
Council considered the Yugoslav problem but 
had to note that member countries were not pre-
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pared to make the considerable military effort 
necessary to form a buffer between the hostile 
parties. Moreover, the conditions necessary for 
such a buffer force, i. e. the existence of an 
effective cease-fire and the agreement of all 
those involved, had not been met. A fortiori, it 
was not possible to contemplate the tremendous 
military action that would have been necessary 
to bring hostilities to an end: international law 
precluded this and Europe, as embodied in the 
Twelve, did not have the necessary means. It 
was therefore wise to ask the United Nations 
Security Council to determine the juridical bases 
for European action in the Yugoslav crisis. 
19. These were the conditions in which the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, meeting in Strasbourg on 21st Sep-
tember 1991, adopted Resolution 969 on the 
crisis in Yugoslavia on a report by our colleague, 
Mr. Soares Costa, for the Political Affairs Com-
mittee, and an opinion by our colleague, Mr. 
Seitlinger, for the Committee on Relations with 
European Non-Member Countries. The reso-
lution reads as follows: 
" 1. The Assembly is deeply disturbed at 
the continuing tragic loss of life resulting 
from the conflict between the peoples in 
Yugoslavia, and calls upon all parties to 
respect the cease-fire agreed at Igalo on 
17th September 1991. 
2. Seriously concerned about the fate of 
the civil populations fleeing the conflict to 
settle in safer areas of Yugoslavia or in 
neighbouring countries, it fears that an 
aggravation of the crisis may cause a con-
siderable increase in the number of dis-
placed persons. 
3. It condemns the acts of war carried out 
by the Yugoslav Federal Army, acting 
outside the institutional control of the 
federal authorities, and also condemns the 
offensive action of the paramilitary 
forces. 
4. The Assembly fully supports the efforts 
made by the European Community to 
find a peaceful solution to the conflict 
such as the peace conference at The 
Hague, the mediation efforts of its 
Chairman Lord Carrington and the moni-
toring missions. 
5. It notes with concern the statements by 
the representatives of the Yugoslav 
Federal Assembly and of the parliaments 
of Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Slovenia but regrets that the 
parliaments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina 
and Kosovo, did not participate in the 
hearing held by its competent committees 
on 18th September 1991. 
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6. It notes the rights of the republics, 
under the Yugoslav constitution of 1974, 
to secede from the federation, and calls 
upon the Council of Europe member 
states to consider recognising those 
republics which have declared indepen-
dence. It stresses that any right to self-
determination must be accompanied by 
the full respect of human and minority 
rights, as well as the relevant international 
treaties. In this connection it welcomes 
the proposal adopted by the European 
Parliament (resolution of 11th September 
1991) that minority rights also should be 
protected according to definitions and 
procedures set out by the Council of 
Europe. 
7. It welcomes the solemn confirmation, 
at the CSCE meeting on national minor-
ities (Geneva, 1st-19th July 1991) of the 
principle that issues concerning national 
minorities are matters of legitimate inter-
national concern and do not constitute 
exclusively an internal affair of the 
respective state. It regrets, however, the 
failure of that meeting to agree on any 
practical means of protecting these 
rights. 
8. It considers that the continued massive 
use of violence in Yugoslavia wbich could 
easily spill over to neighbouring countries 
must be considered as a threat to interna-
tional peace and security within the 
meaning of Article 39 of the United 
Nations Charter. 
9. Consequently the Assembly calls upon 
the Council of Europe member states to 
ask the United Nations Security Council 
under the appJ;opriate articles to consider 
sending an effective military force to 
Yugoslavia in order to secure a cease-fire 
and a sensible solution to the future of 
Yugoslavia and its republics. 
10. It further calls upon the Council of 
Europe's Committee of Ministers to make 
available to the parties to the conflict all 
constitutional, legal and other expertise as 
may be required. " 
20. Furthermore, the WEU Assembly's Presi-
dential Committee held an emergency meeting 
in Strasbourg on 23rd September and adopted 
the following statement: 
" The Presidential Committee of the 
WEU Assembly meeting in emergency 
session called upon the Council of Min-
isters to invite the United Nations 
Security Council to set up an effective 
United Nations force to secure a 
cease-fire in Yugoslavia and stated that 
WEU stands ready to play its full part in 
any such proposal. " 
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This statement clarifies the Assembly's view on 
the way WEU may be called upon to act in this 
matter. 
21. On 25th September, the Security Council 
adopted a resolution, the operative text of which 
reads as follows: 
"The Security Council, 
1. Expresses its full support for the col-
lective efforts for peace and dialogue in 
Yugoslavia undertaken under the auspices 
of the member states of the European 
Community with the support of the states 
participating in the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe con-
sistent with the principles of that con-
ference; 
2. Supports fully all arrangements and 
measures resulting from such collective 
efforts as those described above, in par-
ticular of assistance and support to the 
cease-fire observers, to consolidate an 
effective end to hostilities in Yugoslavia 
and the smooth functioning of the process 
instituted within the framework of the 
conference on Yugoslavia; 
3. Invites to this end the Secretar-
y-General to offer his assistance without 
delay, in consultation with the Gov-
ernment of Yugoslavia and all those pro-
moting the efforts referred to above, and 
to report as soon as possible to the 
Security Council; 
4. Strongly urges all parties to abide 
strictly by the cease-fire agreements of 
17th September 1991 and 22nd Sep-
tember 1991; 
5. Appeals urgently to and encourages all 
parties to settle their differences peace-
fully and through negotiations at the con-
ference on Yugoslavia, including through 
the mechanisms set forth within it; 
6. Decides, under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, that all 
states shall, for the purposes of estab-
lishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, 
immediately implement a general and 
complete embargo on all deliveries of 
weapons and military equipment to Yugo-
slavia until the Security Council decides 
otherwise following consultation between 
the Secretary-General and the Gov-
ernment of Yugoslavia; 
7. Calls on all states to refrain from any 
action which might contribute to 
increasing tension and to impeding or 
delaying a peaceful and negotiated out-
come to the conflict in Yugoslavia, which 
would permit all Yugoslavs to decide 
upon and to construct their future in 
peace; 
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8. Decides to remain seized of the matter 
until a peaceful solution is achieved. " 
22. It is evident that such a resolution, 
although encouraging more active diplomatic or 
even economic action by twelve-power Europe, 
does not lay the necessary juridical basis for mil-
itary action. Nor was it able to have much 
influence on the continuation of fighting, any 
more than the Soviet Union was able to do by 
making the parties conclude a seventh cease-fire 
on 8th October which had as little effect and 
lasted no longer than previous ones. 
23. (c) Finally, the crisis caused by Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait on 2nd August 1990 again 
showed that Europe might be threatened, at 
least economically, by events in the Middle East 
and that it could not remain outside an interna-
tional operation designed to maintain peace and 
balance in that region. It must realise that the 
allied victory over Iraq is but the first step 
towards restoring true peace in the East which 
the conference on Palestine should pursue and 
extend to include the question which, for almost 
half a century, has been preventing the estab-
lishment of lasting peace in the region. 
24. WEU's responsibilities relate to the 
security of Western Europe and this governs its 
relations with the rest of the world. Present 
uncertainty about the requirements of European 
security raises the question of the possible 
enlargement of WEU. Some countries, such as 
Greece and Turkey, have officially applied for 
membership. Others are thinking of doing so. 
The purpose of this report is to examine the 
principles that should guide the reactions of 
member countries' governments at this new 
juncture and Europe's new security require-
ments. 
Ill. WEU's responsibilities 
25. The modified Brussels Treaty gave WEU 
very wide responsibilities, including economic, 
social and cultural matters. However, over the 
years the application of other treaties and 
the development of other institutions have 
restricted its activities to the application of the 
security- and defence-related provisions of the 
treaty. These measures, which follow the prin-
ciple that it is preferable, whenever possible, to 
use the organisation associating the largest 
number of countries, have not jeopardised 
WEU's re~ponsibilities but have merely trans-
ferred the exercise of these responsibilities to 
NATO, the Council of Europe and the European 
Community respectively. Those steps are not 
final, however, since, should results not be satis-
factory, there is nothing to prevent WEU 
resuming the exercise of these tasks. This fact is 
also important in the definition of relations 
between the Council and the Assembly since it is 
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the basis of the Assembly's right to ask the 
Council to account for the application of the 
treaty, even in cases where this is conducted 
outside the framework of WEU. For instance, it 
justifies the Council's communication to the 
Assembly, for the first time in 1991, of the 
annual report of the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group and also exchanges between the 
Assembly and NATO bodies. 
26. This naturally does not mean the 
Assembly has to concern itself at all times with 
the way the Council of Europe carries out the 
exercise of responsibilities in cultural and social 
matters that WEU transferred to it in 1960 nor 
how the Community exercises in practice 
WEU's de jure economic responsibilities. Other 
international assemblies are better placed to do 
this. Conversely, it is entitled to ask the Council 
to keep it duly informed of progress at the inter-
governmental conference which was opened at 
the beginning of the year at which the twelve 
Community member countries are examining 
how they are to develop a joint external policy 
from which security matters would not be 
excluded. In any event, this conference should 
lead to a clearer definition of the responsibilities 
of each European institution. The Anglo-Italian 
and Franco-German proposals of October 1991 
are useful contributions to this step. 
27. The wording of the preamble in which the 
high contracting parties undertake " to promote 
the unity and to encourage the progressive inte-
gration of Europe " must imply that WEU has 
responsibilities covering at one and the same 
time the programme of the intergovernmental 
conference and also the evolution of the entire 
European continent. This second logic must be 
borne in mind when considering: 
(a) the accession of new members to the 
modified Brussels Treaty and hence to 
WEU; 
(b) the association of non-member coun-
tries with a specific WEU activity as 
advocated in Recommendation 500 in 
relation to Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; 
(c) the possible use of WEU to help to 
maintain balance and peace in Europe 
either by setting up armed forces to 
implement international agreements 
requiring peace-keeping action, as the 
Council considered doing on 7th 
August 1991 in respect of Yugoslavia, 
although it was unable to take a 
decision in the absence of agreement 
between the parties concerned, or by 
affording guarantees to non-member 
countries if such guarantees might 
make it easier to safeguard peace; 
(d) the participation in the Assembly's 
work of parliamentary observers from 
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non-member countries, representa-
tives of international parliamentary 
assemblies, members of governments 
from outside countries and senior 
international officials. 
28. However, a distinction should be drawn 
between the case of the Assembly which may, at 
any time, invite whoever it wishes in response to 
topical concerns without involving the policy of 
member countries' governments and that of the 
Council and its dependent bodies since they 
commit governments and any approach to 
external powers may become more or less per-
manent. Thus, the Council's decision, after 
Greece and Turkey had applied for membership, 
to inform the representatives of those two coun-
tries about its discussions, are a form of associ-
ation between them and WEU, while the 
exchanges now held between the Assembly 
and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union 
have no legal consequences. The Council gave 
its approval, but this is merely moral and 
political. 
29. However, it should be recalled that the 
Assembly has always been discriminating in 
using its right to invite guest speakers or parlia-
mentary observers to take part in its work. In the 
case of the latter, it has based itself largely on 
decisions taken by the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe so as not to grant 
regimes in which the representativity of parlia-
mentary institutions was not guaranteed the 
benefit of what might, even wrongly, have been 
seen as recognition of their democratic nature. 
Nor has it wished to anticipate the recognition 
by member states of certain forms of dissidence, 
which is why, at the time of writing, it has not 
invited any Yugoslav observers to its December 
1991 session whereas the Yugoslav Federal Par-
liament was represented at previous sessions. 
Conversely, it does not intend to allow the 
Council to impose its views as to who it should 
invite or the circumstances in which this is 
done. 
30. Under Article IV of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, there must be close co-operation 
between WEU and NATO. In the past, such 
co-operation was mainly designed to dispel any 
doubts that might arise about member coun-
tries' armaments in order to ensure the cohesion 
of the alliance. Now, it is rather the too feeble 
effort of certain countries that might breach this 
cohesion. Article 11 of the draft treaty proposed 
by the Assembly in Recommendation 504 pro-
vides for co-operation that corresponds better to 
the new circumstances. 
31. Such co-operation is essential because, 
alone, the WEU countries almost certainly do 
not have the means of facing up to many of the 
challenges still inherent in the present state of 
international society. The Gulf crisis revealed 
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the limited means the WEU countries could 
mobilise in terms of observation, strategic 
transport and logistics. It even showed how few 
land and air forces Europe could deploy outside 
the NATO area. Although WEU was capable of 
equalling or even exceeding the United States 
naval deployment when a naval blockade had to 
be set in place against Iraq, it could not, on its 
own, consider conducting a far-reaching oper-
ation against that country, even by drawing 
on a large part of its forces earmarked for 
deployment in Central Europe. Although certain 
WEU countries were not acting in the Gulf in a 
NATO context, it was thanks to the experience 
of inter-allied co-operation in NATO that they 
were able to do so alongside the Americans. This 
means that any enlargement of WEU that drew 
it away from NATO would weaken Europe's 
ability to ensure its security. The Franco-
German proposal of 16th October recognises 
this, as does the Anglo-Italian proposal. 
32. Admittedly, on 27th June 1991 the WEU 
Council decided to set up a European satellite 
data interpretation centre which may eventually 
make Europe less dependent on the United 
States in this area. However, so far Europe has 
· no real means of acquiring satellite images. The 
Franco-German proposal to set up a strategic 
transport force is still just a thought. Cuts in 
defence budgets, significant in all WEU member 
countries, makes it unlikely that they will set up 
large-scale forces capable of acting overseas in 
the near future. This will probably not so for the 
army corps · that France and Germany are 
planning to set up jointly. Everything indicates 
therefore that, for some time to come, 
co-operation with the United States will be 
essential in any European operation outside the 
NATO area, and such military co-operation is 
possible only on the basis of a political under-
standing that the North Atlantic Council is still 
alone able to achieve. 
33. Similarly, in cases such as that of Yugo-
slavia, where the United States had decided to 
leave Europe to act alone without participating 
directly itself, political and military under-
standing between member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance is still indispensable if Europe 
is to avoid becoming involved in situations 
where it alone might have to face up to a major 
enemy. The Soviet Union's opposition on 6th 
August to any western interference in Yugoslav 
affairs on the grounds that this might then dete-
riorate into a pan-European conflict, according 
to the warning issued by Tass, shows that, even 
in this case, WEU could not claim to act except 
in concert with NATO. In fact, more recent 
events in the Soviet Union have shown a weak-
ening of Soviet positions in Europe and the 
world, but it is not in Europe's interest to create 
situations where it might have to face the Soviet 
Union without the prior certainty of American 
support. 
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34. Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty 
rules out the admission to WEU of countries 
that are not determined to play an active part in 
joint defence. It also bars the participation of 
countries to which WEU would not be able to 
afford effective assistance or to which member 
countries would not unanimously wish to afford 
such assistance in any circumstances if they 
were attacked. 
35. Article VIII provides for consultations in 
the event of a crisis occurring outside the NATO 
area and for subsidiary bodies to be set up for 
certain activities necessary for the strengthening 
of joint security. It leaves the door open for non-
signatory countries of the treaty to be associated 
with certain Council discussions, as in the case 
of the Gulf crisis, or with the activities of one or 
other of its subsidiary bodies, as is now the case 
for the WEU Institute for Security Studies. 
36. The creation of a WEU satellite centre 
on 27th June may also offer a forum for 
co-operation with non-member countries, in 
particular for everything relating to the verifi-
cation of international agreements on the limi-
tation of conventional forces in Europe. 
However, one will have to wait for this centre to 
be duly set up and for its capability to have been 
demonstrated before giving serious consider-
ation to the participation of countries which are 
not members of WEU in its activities. 
IV. The enlargement of WEU to include the 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
37. The most sensible and practical way to 
ensure the cohesion of European countries in the 
framework of NATO is to link membership of 
WEU with membership of NATO. This is the 
condition for the existence of a true European 
pillar in the alliance and the only way to avoid 
creating two categories of members of the 
alliance, some of whom might be left out of con-
sultations in WEU. This is the message that the 
Turkish authorities were anxious to convey to 
the Assembly, particularly_ in President ()zal's 
address on 5th June 1991. NATO leaders whom 
your Rapporteur consulted in 1990 spoke in the 
same vein as did the American authorities in 
those of their warnings to European countries in 
the first half of 1991 of which your Rapporteur 
is aware. 
38. Turkey's application for membership of 
WEU is based on a number of important consid-
erations: 
(a) In spite of the ups and downs of its 
internal policy, Turkey has constantly 
been a particularly faithful and 
important member of NATO. It 
should be underlined that, with an 
army more than 700 000 strong, it 
provides the largest contingent to the 
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NATO system. It has never raised any 
difficulties over the location of NATO 
bases on its territory. This has allowed 
NATO to set up observation bases 
close to the southern part of the Soviet 
Union and thus gather valuable data 
on the Soviet military system. 
(b) Turkey is the only NATO country, 
apart from Norway, to have a 
common frontier with the Soviet 
Union. This frontier crosses regions in 
which the same ethnic groups are rep-
resented on either side, thus making 
Turkey particularly sensitive to the 
present crises in the Soviet Union 
from the moment they spark off 
national reactions among the Turkish 
peoples of the union. More than ever, 
it needs support in view of the consid-
erable risk for its internal cohesion 
and frontiers. In order to face up to 
these risks, the Turkish Government 
must be able to rely on western soli-
darity. 
(c) In view of rising Islamic fundamen-
talism, Turkey needs the West to 
confirm that it believes Ataturk made 
the right choice when he decided to 
base the Turkish Republic on a liberal, 
democratic constitutional system, 
thus distinguishing it from most other 
countries in the region. 
(d) During the Gulf crisis, Turkey pro-
vided far more assistance to the West 
than it had to under the North 
Atlantic Treaty and thus facilitated 
air operations that allowed Iraq's 
defensive capability to be reduced. 
After the war, in spite of the risks for 
its own national cohesion, it allowed a 
large section of the Iraqi Kurdish 
community to take refuge on its ter-
ritory and opened its frontiers to 
international assistance for those ref-
ugees. 
39. It would be difficult to ignore these facts 
and to continue to postpone indefinitely 
Turkey's application to join WEU, to which 
Turkey says it attaches great importance. In par-
ticular, Turkey objected to the Franco-German 
proposal of 15th October 1991 addressed to the 
chairmanship-in-office of the Community which 
it accuses of calling for the immediate accession 
of the member countries of the Community to 
WEU, including Greece, but assigning to Turkey 
and other NATO member countries an a yet ill-
defined status of association. 
40. The accession of the European member 
countries of the alliance would have the 
advantage of aligning membership of WEU with 
that of the IEPG and Eurogroup (if France 
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agreed to join in) and, consequently, allow WEU 
to group these three complementary institutions, 
restore its activities in the production, 
standardisation and interoperability of arma-
ments, foster the development of joint pro-
duction of armaments at European level and, 
finally, exercise more effectively its rOle as the 
European pillar of NATO that is now ensured by 
Eurogroup. Such co-operation is of particular 
importance now that the general decline in 
defence budgets is making it increasingly dif-
ficult for European arms-producing firms to 
survive. 
41. One of the tasks that has been assigned to 
WEU since its reactivation is to organise a 
better sharing of burdens and responsibilities in 
the alliance. Here, the existence of a stronger 
and more firmly-established European pillar 
would be a decisive help now that the number of 
American forces stationed in Europe is being 
reduced. 
42. The modified Brussels Treaty and the 
North Atlantic Treaty are complementary 
insofar as Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty makes it compulsory, if a country so 
requests, to hold consultations on any threat to 
international peace even if it does not concern 
the area defined by the Washington Treaty. 
However, consultations between Europe and the 
United States are still essential, even in such 
cases, since the United States cannot accept 
involvement in a crisis having repercussions in 
Europe if it is not consulted about its allies' 
policy. 
43. Moreover, Europe needs close consulta-
tions with its North American allies for every-
thing relating to arms limitation negotiations 
because they concern its security, although the 
European members of the alliance do not take 
part in some of them, in particular START. If 
the European members of the alliance were the 
same as of WEU, this would strengthen WEU's 
influence in that area. 
44. Enlargement of WEU to include the 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
would therefore at one and the same time 
strengthen the cohesion of the alliance and 
Europe's role within the alliance. Conversely, 
admitting to WEU countries which are not 
members of the Atlantic Alliance would inevi-
tably result in WEU being disqualified as the 
United States' partner in NATO because the 
United States would not agree to countries not 
members of the alliance helping to define 
alliance policy in either military matters or arms 
limitation. Since the beginning of 1991, the 
United States has understandably warned its 
European allies several times about the pitfalls 
of such actions and it is a pity the WEU Council 
did not see fit to inform the Assembly of these 
important political facts. 
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45. For some time, it has been suggested that 
only member countries of the Community 
should be allowed to join WEU. This concept is 
based upon neither a treaty nor any joint decla-
ration by the countries concerned. It encounters 
very real practical difficulties since certain 
member countries of the Community are not 
members of the alliance or have little perception 
of threats to Europe's security. To bring pressure 
to bear on them to join WEU would, if such 
pressure were successful, result in WEU not 
expressing the will of Europe but echoing its ina-
bility to take decisions. It seems essential not to 
endorse such proposals. 
46. The former Secretary-General of WEU, 
Alfred Cahen, gave his name to a doctrine which 
made twofold membership of the Community 
and NATO the sine qua non condition of their 
accession to WEU. This doctrine, which would 
now mean that possible candidatures in the 
coming years would be confined to Denmark 
and Greece, has the disadvantage of presenting 
as a right - and the Greek authorities have not 
failed to interpret it in this way - what was only 
one condition among others. In any event, there 
can be no question of limiting the power given 
by Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty to 
member states to decide by common agreement 
to "invite any other state to accede to the 
present treaty on conditions to be agreed 
between them and the state so invited.". On the 
other hand, this article in no way restricts the 
Assembly's right to recommend that the Council 
take a given initiative, as it did at the appro-
priate time for enlargement to include Portugal 
and Spain, for the greater benefit of WEU, the 
Atlantic Alliance and European co-operation. 
V. WEU and the European 
Community countries 
4 7. Since the twelve-power summit meeting 
in Rome in December 1990, two intergovern-
mental conferences have been set up to advance 
the union of the Twelve, on the one hand 
towards a monetary union and on the other 
towards a political union including security. The 
outcome of these conferences, expected by 
December 1991, cannot be taken for granted. 
Nevertheless, where security and defence are 
concerned, the convergence between the United 
Kingdom and Italian proposals on the one hand 
and those of France and Germany on the other 
is sufficient, if not from the standpoint of major 
principles which, in point of fact, have little 
importance, at least from that of practical pro-
posals which are the only ones that count, to 
suggest that the Maastricht summit meeting will 
result, in this matter, in a compromise that gives 
WEU an important place in the organisation of 
European security. 
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48. Some would have liked the European 
Community to take over quite soon responsi-
bility for joint foreign policy and security in 
order to set up a real European super-state in the 
near future. Such plans now seem to have little 
chance of succeeding. However, the idea of asso-
ciating WEU and the Community under the 
authority of a single European council seems to 
be making headway. Like the first proposal, this 
one implies WEU and the Community being 
composed of the same states. In principle, this 
would raise a serious problem in the case of 
Ireland, which does not wish to renounce its 
policy of neutrality. However, it would also 
prevent the accession to WEU of certain coun-
tries which are not members of the Community 
and whose early membership cannot be guar-
anteed, such as Turkey and Norway, while 
Turkey has applied for membership on the 
grounds of the scale.of its participation in joint 
defence. 
49. Reality is even more complicated. In view 
of the policy pursued by Greece, although 
somewhat modified by the new Greek Gov-
ernment, the words of its leaders and its accusa-
tions against Turkey, everything indicates that if 
Greece accedes to WEU before Turkey it would 
mean Turkey's candidature being rejected indef-
initely and for some considerable time WEU 
would be unable to identify itself with a 
European pillar of the alliance so it is clear both 
would have to be admitted simultaneously. 
Experience in the European Community should 
remind us of the need for caution in this area. 
50. Several non-member countries of NATO 
have now applied for membership of the EEC, 
including Austria, which has neutral status, 
Sweden, which intends to pursue a policy of 
neutrality, Malta and Cyprus. Others are consid-
ering applying. The Community has not adopted 
a final position towards these candidatures and 
has deferred considering them until 1993. 
Should it give a positive response, any hope of 
WEU and the EEC having the same member 
states would be relegated to an even more 
distant and uncertain future. 
51. The crises in the Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia in summer 1991, Sweden's application to 
join the EEC following that of Austria, the new 
interest shown by Switzerland and Finland and 
the independence of the Baltic countries suggest 
that, as from 1991, the Community will have to 
make decisive choices for its future. If it accepts, 
even as associates, neutral countries or countries 
whose defence policy has not yet been clearly 
defined, the Community's hope of extending its 
activities to include foreign policy and security 
matters will very quickly recede. Yet it now 
seems quite unlikely that the Community will be 
able to delay for much longer the holding of 
negotiations with the EFT A countries, and the 
choice between " deepening ", implying a joint 
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security policy, and "enlargement" to include 
countries with permanent neutral status or 
which for more than forty years have had a 
policy of neutrality which has distanced them 
from NATO. It is certainly possible to envisage 
the evolution of these countries, of their external 
policy and even of their international status, but 
this would necessarily be a slow process whereas, 
economically, most of them, more than others, 
are capable of adapting themselves swiftly to the 
requirements of the Common Market. Their 
participation would also make the Community 
better able to face up to the problems that will 
be raised by any form of rapprochement with 
the Central European countries, since it is 
evident that Western Europe will have to do its 
utmost to promote the economic recovery of 
this region. 
52. The fact that the EEC member countries 
cannot join WEU en bloc is in no way an 
obstacle to the development of links between 
individual countries and WEU. Association 
might include provisions appropriate to the 
position, interests and views of each of them, in 
particular: 
(a) participation as observers in certain 
Council activities. This was the case of 
Denmark, Greece, Norway and 
Turkey at the ministerial meetings 
held to co-ordinate WEU's activities 
in the Gulf in 1990-91. The same 
countries, plus Ireland and Canada, 
took part in WEU Council meetings 
on Yugoslavia during summer 1991. If 
WEU is, as the Netherlands presi-
dency of the European Council 
requested on 16th August 1991, to 
organise peace-keeping operations in 
Yugoslavia, there is nothing to 
prevent it associating, on an ad hoc 
basis, countries prepared to partic-
ipate, whether they are members of 
the Community or not; 
(b) participation on a permanent or tem-
porary basis in the activities of the 
Council's subsidiary bodies such as the 
WEU Institute for Security Studies, 
which has already opened its doors to 
nationals of non-member countries. 
The creation of the WEU satellite 
centre might also allow co-operation 
beyond the framework of WEU 
members, particularly when the CFE 
agreements have to be verified. 
53. Your Rapporteur therefore believes that 
various forms of co-operation between WEU, on 
the one hand, and the European Council and the 
subsidiary bodies it will probably have following 
the intergovernmental conference, on the other, 
are both possible and desirable. He also believes 
that any member countries of the Community so 
wishing might be asked to participate in the 
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activities of WEU, as might non-member coun-
tries of the EEC. However, he does not consider 
it appropriate for the smooth running of an 
organisation whose essential aim is to ensure 
Europe's security that the right to accede to the 
modified Brussels Treaty be granted to any 
country just because it belongs to the Com-
munity or to any other organisation not having 
the same aims as WEU. Only membership of 
NATO seems a decisive criterion for joining 
WEU, although this does not mean it is suffi-
cient to establish a right. 
VI. The Eastern Europe~~n countries 
54. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has 
brought to an end a certain form of order in 
Central Europe and the countries in that region 
are afraid of finding themselves in a vacuum 
where security is concerned which might make 
them the battlefield for a possible European con-
flict. Each of those countries sees its security in 
terms of its internal development at the same 
time as the international situation. 
(a) The Soviet Union for its part has 
established exchanges with NATO 
and the EEC and has shown its 
interest in the activities of WEU. It 
has also signed bilateral treaties of 
friendship and co-operation with 
WEU member countries, but those 
treaties do not call in question their 
signatories' continued membership of 
WEU and NATO. The Assembly has 
established regular exchanges with the 
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. 
However, events since the attempted 
coup d'etat on 19th August 1991 raise 
the question of what will be the future 
external and defence policy of the 
Soviet Union and also what will be the 
ability of the union or each of the 
republics to ensure their security. 
(b) There is even greater uncertainty 
about the future of the Yugoslav state 
and there can be no question of con-
sidering any kind of accession by the 
federation, or by the republics which 
are or were part of it, to a collective 
security organisation such as WEU. 
Admittedly, action by WEU to 
promote peace in the country is now 
being considered, but that very action 
would mean WEU being impartial 
towards all the belligerents. The 
Assembly itself has had to refrain 
from inviting Yugoslav parliamentary 
observers to its next session. 
(c) Albania and Bulgaria have not yet 
clearly defined their intentions 
regarding their internal regime or secu-
DOCUMENT 1284 
rity policy. The Assembly has invited 
Bulgarian parliamentary observers to 
its recent sessions, but they have shed 
little light on their country's inten-
tions. The government formed after 
the elections on 13th October 1991 
will probably be better able to 
determine Bulgarian external policy. 
(d) Romania has signed a bilateral 
security pact with the Soviet Union. It 
has shown little interest in WEU. 
However, for the first time the 
Assembly invited Romanian parlia-
mentary observers to its June 1991 
session and they duly attended. 
(e) Finally, the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, after 
exploring the possibility of a rap-
prochement with NATO have 
. ' orgamsed exchanges with that 
organisation but the prospect of their 
joining has been ruled out. NATO no 
doubt did not wish to seem anxious to 
take advantage of the disbandment of 
the Warsaw Pact to spread into 
Central Europe, which might have 
appeared threatening to the Soviet 
Union. Moreover, it is not evident 
that the members of the alliance 
would have been unanimous in 
extending the guarantee afforded by 
~ATO to those countries in present 
circumstances. The new appeal by Mr. 
Walesa, Mr. Havel and Mr. Amtall on 
6th October 1991 following their 
meeting in Cracow seems likely to be 
no more successful. 
All three have applied to join the 
Community but, because of the state 
o_f their economies, it seems impos-
sible for them to accede in the near 
future. On the other hand, association 
seems likely and is being actively 
negotiated. 
S~mbolically,_ ~hey_ showed solidarity 
with.the coalition m the Gulf conflict 
and their intention to establish links 
with WEU. It would also appear that 
the crisis in Yugoslavia and the 
attempted putsch in the Soviet Union 
increased their feeling of insecurity. 
This might prompt them to ask for 
these links to be developed quickly or 
even for accession to WEU, on the 
one hand to draw them closer to the 
European Community and on the 
other to lay sounder foundations for 
their external - and perhaps in some 
cases internal- security. 
55. As matters now stand, only the last three 
countries raise a question for WEU. It seems out 
of the question for them to sign the modified 
Brussels Treaty because: 
(a) they are not members of NATO and 
consideration cannot be given to 
applying Article V in cases where 
there is no certainty of United States 
support; 
(b) extending WEU to include non-
member countries of NATO would 
disqualify WEU from becoming the 
European pillar of the alliance and 
might well lead the United States to 
withdraw its guarantee to Europe. 
56. However, it is necessary to give them 
assurances to prevent them from seeking else-
where the protection refused by the West. With 
this in mind, the Assembly adopted Recommen-
dation 500 asking the Council to associate them 
with any of its activities in which they could and 
wished to participate. 
57. In accordance with the wishes expressed 
by the Council, the Assembly for its part has 
started to encourage parliamentary observers 
from those three countries to take part in its 
work. It invited Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Poland, to address it in Lux-
e~b~urg on 22nd. March 1990, Mr. Jeszenszky, 
Mimster for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, on 7th 
· June 1990 and Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, has been invited to address it on 3rd 
Dec~mber. 199 .1. The Assembly has a continuing 
relationship With the Supreme Soviet and pro-
poses to organise a symposium in March 1992 in 
which nationals, including parliamentarians, of 
all the Central and Eastern European countries 
would take part. This is intended to develop 
exchanges between parliamentarians from all 
over Europe to allow better mutual under-
standing. It is not of a diplomatic nature and 
would not be binding on governments or be a 
substitute for positive action on their part. 
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VII. Conclusions 
58. The purpose of the modified Brussels 
Treaty is to ensure the security of Europe and 
the Atlantic Alliance is still the essential 
instrument of such security. Speculation either 
about the future of Community Europe or about 
the ~ssible establishment of an all-European 
secunty order should therefore in no event 
jeopardise the close link between WEU and 
NATO. The present period of uncertainty 
should, on the contrary, lead to this link being 
~trengthened, and the enlargement of WEU to 
mclude European countries members of the 
allia~ce might be a means of doing so and giving 
m~Imum strength to the European pillar of the 
alliance. Only when relative stabilisation of the 
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situation in Europe allows NATO to redefine its 
policy, strategy and means will it be possible to 
examine the conditions for its possible 
enlargement to include new European members. 
The question of those countries acceding to 
WEU will then, but only then, arise. 
59. Conversely, any enlargement to include 
non-member countries of the alliance would be 
dangerous for NATO and for Europe's security. 
Co-operation between WEU and countries not 
members of the alliance, whether members of 
the European Community or not, may develop 
and, becoming a real association, help to 
establish peace in Europe on firmer foundations. 
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It must not imply recourse to Article V or call in 
question the role of European pillar of the 
alliance that the nine member countries unani-
mously wish to attribute to WEU. 
60. As your Rapporteur said at the beginning 
of the present document, only provisional con-
clusions can be presented today. Only when 
Central and Eastern Europe find a new balance, 
the intergovernmental conference has managed 
to define the Community's security responsibil-
ities and its links with WEU and when NATO 
has defined its new strategy will it be possible to 
give realistic consideration to the prospects of 
enlarging WEU. 
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Amendment 1 
WEU's external relations - the enlargement of WEU 
AMENDMENT 1 I 
tabled by Mr. Pieralli 
2nd December 1991 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after " Atlantic Alliance " add " and of the 
European Community ". 
1. See 9th sitting, 2nd December 1991 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 2 
WEU's external relations - the enlargement of WEU 
AMENDMENT 2 I 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation prop~r and insert: 
2nd December 1991 
" 3. Prepare to invite other European countries to co-operate with members of WEU in diplo-
matic or military action designed to keep the peace in Europe; " 
1. See 9th sitting, 2nd December 1991 (amendment agreed to). 
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General report - activities of the WEU Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee 2 
by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the activities of the WEU Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. The French presidency 
Ill. The ministerial meeting in Vianden 
IV. The German presidency 
V. Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
VI. Conclusions 
1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions. 
6th November 1991 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, 
Beix (Alternate: Baumel), Brito, Candal, Caro, Collart, Cuatrecasas (Alternate: Ba"ionuevo), De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, 
Feldmann, Forni, Foschi, Goerens, Guizzi, Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: Speed), MM. Kitte1mann, Koehl, Lord Mackie, 
MM. Martinez, Martino, Muller, Pecriaux, Piera/li, de Puig, Reddemann, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton, Mr. Soe/1, 
Mrs. Stae1s-Dompas, MM. Thyraud, Ward. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the acti11ities of the WEU Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Satisfied that WEU has enabled Europe to play an active part in applying the measures decided 
upon by the Security Council for establishing a new, peaceful order in the Middle East; 
(ii) Noting with satisfaction that the Council has undertaken to provide the Community with the 
means they may require for possible action to promote peace in Yugoslavia; 
(iii) Noting with satisfaction that, during the year, the Council has developed the means available to 
governments for co-ordinating their action in areas within the purview of WEU; 
(iv) Considering that the various proposals concerning the future of European security that have 
been presented at the intergovernmental conference all assign a major role to WEU both as the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as the military organisation of the Twelve; 
(v) Welcoming the fact that the successive French and German presidencies made considerable 
progress in these areas; 
(vi) Welcoming the fact that, at its ministerial meeting in Vianden on 27th June 1991, the Council 
took useful decisions for adapting WEU to the new requirements of European security; 
(vii) Regretting however that the Council, at the level of the Permanent Council, applies only in a 
limited manner its commitments under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty and, in particular: 
(a) by sheltering behind formalist considerations so as not to answer the Assembly, as has fre-
quently been the case, and especially in its replies to Recommendations 4 79 and 490 and 
Written Question 288; 
(b) by taking liberties with the facts as was the case in several respects in its replies to Recom-
mendations 490 and 494 and in the first part of its thirty-seventh annual report; 
(c) by resorting to generalities and vague phrases as in its reply to Recommendation 492; 
(d) by breaking away from its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty as in its replies to 
Recommendations 490 and 491; 
(viii) Regretting further that the public is still insufficiently informed of the activities of WEU, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Examine without delay the adaptation of WEU that has become necessary due to the transfor-
mation of Europe, the development of the European Community's external and security policy and the 
reorganisation of NATO and inform the Assembly of its conclusions but not relinquish in favour of 
institutions other than WEU decisions concerning the application ofthe modified Brussels Treaty, as it 
appears to be envisaging in its reply to Recommendation 490; 
2. Set up the WEU satellite data interpretation centre without delay and quickly define the condi-
tions for developing Europe's observation satellite capability; 
3. In consultation with NATO, study attentively command structures allowing forces assigned to 
NATO or to national commands to be used for missions defined by WEU, taking into account the 
lessons learned from the Gulf crisis and the Yugoslav question; 
4. Study the disarmament proposals made by the United States and the Soviet Union in October 
1991 in order to ascertain Europe's security requirements and allow Europe to play a more active role 
in disarmament matters; 
5. Define areas in which consideration might be given to countries that are not members ofWEU, 
including Greece, Norway, Turkey and certain Central European countries, being associated with the 
activities of the Council or of its subsidiary organs; 
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6. Not neglect the application of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, which makes the 
Assembly an essential organ of WEU, and to this end: 
(a) Ensure that it replies pertinently to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions and 
in particular: 
(i) not take as a pretext for refusing to reply the fact that the Assembly, which it keeps inade-
quately informed, is not always able to word its texts in a manner it considers pertinent; 
(ii) ensure that it does not give credence to statements not very close to reality; 
(iii) ensure that the English and French texts of its replies correspond as accurately as possible; 
(iv) give sufficiently precise and detailed replies to precise and detailed recommendations; 
(v) respect the law embodied in the modified Brussels Treaty in its decisions and in its replies 
to the Assembly; 
(b) To allow a true dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, ensure that: 
(i) its replies to recommendations reach the Assembly in time for it to be able to study them 
before the sessions following their adoption, i.e. within three months of being communi-
cated to the Council; 
(ii) its replies to written questions reach the Assembly within a reasonable lapse of time; 
(iii) its half-yearly reports reach the Assembly within three months of the end of each half-year; 
(c) Transmit to the Assembly those of its discussion papers, reports and proposals which are not 
secret, as is normally done by the European Community authorities in the case of the European 
Parliament and as it did on 22nd February in the case of the working paper submitted to it by 
the Secretary-General; 
(d) Inform the Assembly of progress made with the study on Europe's development of a means of 
strategic, maritime and air transport; 
(e) Inform the Assembly of the nature and aim of the military group on Yugoslavia set up in Metz; 
(f) Apply its own decision of 13th November 1989 concerning the WEU Institute for Security 
Studies: 
(i) by communicating to the Assembly "the results of the Institute's unclassified work", 
including " discussion papers on topical subjects " and " reports ... on the seminars it had 
arranged"; 
(ii) by not opposing the Institute giving the Assembly opinions on topical questions; 
7. Implement as soon as possible the decision to which all the governments have agreed on moving 
the seat of the Permanent Council to Brussels and having that body formed ofthe permanent represen-
tatives of member countries to the European Community; 
8. Instruct the Secretariat-General to prepare and circulate to the press a periodical information 
bulletin on the activities of WEU. 
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ExplaiUltory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Under Article IX of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, the Assembly's first task is to approve 
the annual report of the Council. This duty 
devolved mainly from the application of the 
protocols establishing controls over the arma-
ments of member states. It meant the Council 
preparing a very detailed, comprehensive report 
on those activities and the Assembly making a 
very rigorous examination of the text communi-
cated to it. Although Article IX of the treaty has 
not been amended, the almost total disap-
pearance of arms controls, the enlargement of 
WEU to include Portugal and Spain and the 
development of WEU's activities in new direc-
tions according greater importance to its inter-
governmental organs while the tasks of its inter-
national administrative bodies have been 
considerably reduced have made the annual 
report of the Council far less important than in 
the past. The Council has developed new forms 
of relations with the Assembly, more appro-
priate to communicating information on the 
political aspects of its activities, but its work is 
described less systematically and is less detailed 
and, above all, the collegial nature of its message 
has diminished. Although the presidency and 
the Secretary-Gen~ral endeavour to express the 
view of the whole Council, they do so in their 
own way and this does not commit the nine 
member governments to the same extent as the 
annual report. 
2. For these reasons, the Political Com-
mittee decided not to restrict its report merely to 
answering the annual report of the Council but 
to present a general report at the second part of 
the Assembly's thirty-seventh session covering 
all the Council's political activities as may be 
understood from the many communications 
received in recent months without remaining 
within the chronological limits of the annual 
report. In view of the date on which the 
Assembly received the second part of the thirty-
sixth annual report (19th April 1991 ), only in 
December 1991 will it be able to examine on 
that basis the Council's activities during the 
second half of 1990. On the other hand, the first 
part of the thirty-seventh annual report reached 
the office of the Clerk of the Assembly on 14th 
October 1991, allowing your Rapporteur to deal 
with it in this report. Nevertheless, the nature of 
the annual report is now such that, if the 
Assembly examined that alone its work would 
be devoid of political interest. 
3. In fact, the part played by the presidency 
in the Council's activities in recent years means 
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that the history of WEU is henceforth marked 
by the succession of presidencies from 1st July 
of each year to 30th June of the next year. The 
Council's decision to issue its annual report in 
two half-yearly parts covering the calendar year 
allows this succession to be very largely taken 
into account. Consequently, the present report 
will deal with the Council's activities during the 
French presidency from 1st July 1990 to 30th 
June 1991 without neglecting matters tackled by 
the Council since 1st July 1991, i.e. at the start 
of the German presidency, which are principally 
the Yugoslav problem, the consequences of the 
failed coup d'etat in the Soviet Union and the 
progress of the twelve-power intergovernmental 
conference. 
II. The French presidency 
4. Account will have to be taken of a number 
of trump cards held by the French presidency as 
well as certain handicaps. It covered a period 
of political stability in France, the replacement 
of Mr. Rocard's government by that of Mrs. 
Cresson on 15th May 1991 not having produced 
any noticeable change in France's external 
policy. It was therefore marked by continuity of 
views and practice. It also coincided with the 
meeting of the European Council in Rome in 
December 1990, when it was decided to hold 
two intergovernmental conferences, one of 
which is to prepare the political union of twelve-
power Europe which is to be extended to 
security matters. This presidency lasted through-
out the Gulf affair and ended just when one 
could start thinking about the consequences for 
the organisation of European security. Finally, it 
witnessed the start of the Yugoslav crisis. In 
other words, France had an opportunity to make 
known its views on the future of political Europe 
and to guide WEU's action in a serious conflict 
of direct concern to the implementation of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. 
5. Conversely, for a quarter of a century, 
France's attitude towards the NATO integrated 
military commands has curried suspicion that, 
to a greater degree than most of its partners, it 
drew a distinction between European action and 
NATO action. This has inevitably made several 
of its allies reserved, or at least cautious, when 
French initiatives might have been interpreted 
as implying some degree of dissociation between 
WEU and NATO even if France has always 
asserted, as Mr. Joxe again told the Assembly on 
4th June, that it had no such intention. It should 
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be recalled that it was just when France was pro-
posing to consider the possible organisation of 
co-operation between WEU member countries' 
rapid action forces that its eight partners 
endorsed, in the framework of the NATO 
Defence Planning Committee, the proposal to 
set up a NATO rapid reaction force which might 
have seemed to be an alternative to the French 
proposal. Moreover, NATO had announced that 
the force would be European but would have the 
support of air units supplied by the United 
States. Exercise Certain Shield, held in Germany 
from lOth to 20th September, included a strong 
American force alongside Belgian, Dutch and 
British contingents. Furthermore, at the various 
stages in the European countries' participation 
in Gulf operations, it was clear that the govern-
ments of the WEU countries did not always 
present in the saine way the collective action in 
which they were taking part. Some insisted on 
their European nature and the importance of 
co-ordination in the framework of WEU and 
others on co-operation with the United States 
and the continuity of their action in the Gulf 
with their NATO commitment. There was cer-
tainly no contradiction between the two presen-
tations of the same fact, but the different 
descriptions meant that the situation was not 
perceived .. in an identical manner by the public 
in the various WEU countries and that, in 
general, it was insufficiently perceived. 
6. This handicap probably helped to 
paralyse the presidency when, early in 1991, the 
American authorities sent member countries a 
series of warnings against the intention 
attributed to them, probably not without reason, 
to assert a European identity in security matters. 
The American authorities feared that WEU's 
activities might jeopardise the cohesion of the 
Atlantic Alliance. These warnings came in the 
wake of the thanks the United States had con-
veyed to WEU in the last quarter of 1990 for the 
role it had played in the Gulf. Clearly the WEU 
Council should have drawn attention to the con-
tradiction between these two approaches, but 
none of the Council's communications has men-
tioned the American messages, or its reactions 
to them, or any possible answers, which suggests 
that Europe did not manage or did not wish to 
show its hand in this connection. 
7. It may be noted that the French presi-
dency tackled its term of office with a certain 
concept of the future of Europe, referred to 
several times by the President of the French 
Republic and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Roland Dumas. For them, it was a matter of 
progressing along the road to the future estab-
lishment of a federal Europe based on the 
European Community and embodying a Euro-
pean identity in external and defence policy 
matters. In view of prevailing uncertainty about 
the future of the European continent and the 
risk the European Community feared it was 
142 
running of this identity being diluted due to rapid 
enlargement, France wished a decisive step to be 
taken towards strengthening Community 
cohesion before the end of 1992, which corre-
sponded moreover to the concerns of most of its 
partners. However, for less explicit but never-
theless quite clear reasons, relating mainly to its 
nuclear independence and its relations with 
certain Mrican countries, France did not seem to 
think it either possible or desirable· for the Com-
munity proper to be given responsibility for 
defence matters at least in the immediate future. 
Describing his country's policy in the Gulf affair 
on 16th March 1991, Roland Dumas said: 
" Europe cannot be asked for what it cannot give. 
Conversely, it has given what it could. In the 
security and defence area, a single body exists 
and that is WEU." For the French presidency, it 
was thus a matter of asserting at one and the 
same time the link between WEU and the Com-
munity and the differences between the two 
organisations on the one hand and between WEU 
and NATO on the other. It did this in three areas: 
the legal area, with the tabling of the first Franco-
German proposal at the intergovernmental con-
ference, the area of administrative practice, by 
using the prerogatives of the presidency in a way 
that your Rapporteur will try to analyse, and the 
area of political action, through the initiatives it 
took, mainly in the Gulf but also in other connec-
tions, such as guiding WEU towards the military 
use of space, the regular meetings of chiefs of 
defence staff of member countries, the partici-
pation of non-member European countries in 
certain WEU activities and examining the possi-
bilities of WEU intervention in the Yugoslav 
crisis. 
8. Your Rapporteur will not dwell on the 
Franco-German proposal, which was set out by 
Mr. Charles Goerens, committee Rapporteur on 
" The revision of the modified Brussels Treaty ", 
in Document 1261 of 26th March 1991. The 
facts seem to confirm the impression then 
expressed by that Rapporteur, i.e. that the pro-
posal would be a decisive guide for the work of 
the Twelve on foreign policy and security, and 
the communique issued at the close of WEU's 
ministerial meeting in Vianden on 27th June 
1991 indicate that the Nine agreed on most of 
what was contained in that proposal. However, 
it should be noted that the French presidency 
did not invite the WEU Council to examine the 
organisation of European security from its own 
standpoint. The Council's argument, contained 
in the reply to Recommendation 490, was that, 
before doing so, it had to wait for the Twelve, on 
the one hand, and NATO, on the other, to 
redefine their prerogatives before thinking of 
revising the modified Brussels Treaty. Yet there 
is nothing to prevent parallel steps being taken 
by the three bodies, as proved by the decision 
taken by the Council at the request of the 
German presidency to hold an extraordinary 
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ministerial meeting on 29th October 1991, i.e. 
before the NATO meeting and also before the 
conclusion of the intergovernmental conference 
for the Maastricht summit meeting from 9th to 
11th December, to examine this matter, as 
Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher told the Assembly 
committees meeting at the Petersberg on 8th 
July 1991. 
9. Where political action is concerned, there 
is every indication that the French presidency 
sought to seize the opportunities afforded by cir-
cumstances to anticipate decisions that the 
Twelve had not yet taken by showing, in 
practice, that they were realistic and perhaps 
also inevitable. On the one hand, the presidency 
convened several ministerial meetings of the 
WEU Council, first of all to take military initia-
tives to allow Europe to follow up the decisions 
taken by the Twelve in the framework of 
political co-operation to ensure respect for 
Security Council resolutions on Iraq and sub-
sequently to make more permanent the intergov-
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the progress of all WEU's activities and, on the 
latter point, it should have the permanent 
assistance of the Secretariat-General. The 
Assembly, on the one hand, and the Institute for 
Security Studies, on the other, are now each 
issuing a periodical information bulletin. The 
Secretariat-General might usefully do likewise 
and even, in times of crisis, issue frequent infor-
mation bulletins so that the press will no longer 
be unaware of WEU's activities. The periodical 
letter from the Secretary-General to the Pres-
ident of the Assembly is written too long after 
the event to be able to play this role efectively 
vis-a-vis the press. 
11. In spite of this poor management of its 
communications, the Council was able to give 
tangible proof that: 
(a) the modified Brussels Treaty, and 
Article VIII in particular, allowed 
Europe to carry out significant mil-
itary operations outside the NATO 
ernmental bodies set up during the crisis, area; 
including the meetings ofWEU chiefs of defence (b) the intergovernmental character of 
staff. It attempted to give some publicity to the WEU did not necessarily lead to 
ministerial decisions and the activities of those paralysis but preserved the possibility 
bodies, and the Assembly benefited from that of co-operation between members, 
attitude since its Presidential Committee was even if they did not share the same 
asked to meet the presidency at the close of concept of the nature and scope of 
several ministerial meetings and the Defence their action; 
Committee was briefed by the French chief of 
defence staff on how military co-ordination was (c) the different membership of WEU 
working, while a delegation from the Assembly and the European Community did not 
was received by several naval units in the Gulf. prevent the former being able to act as 
an instrument for the latter. 10. However, it should be noted that, apart 
from confidential meetings with Assembly 12. On the other hand, WEU's action has 
organs, the Council did not give the press and encountered a number of obstacles which have 
public satisfactory information about the role stopped it from being continued on several occa-
played by WEU in the Gulf. It is now common sions. The land and air operations against Iraq 
practice to stress Europe's inexistence on that were not co-ordinated in WEU. It may be won-
occasion but this is a very unfair interpretation dered what is the basis for the contrary claim in 
of the role played by WEU. Little attention has the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council. 
been paid to the fact that the establishment of a Attempts by the presidency to revive meaningful 
co-ordinating authority was an unprecedented WEU co-ordination of humanitarian action for 
event in Europe's history. This is probably the Kurds when, after the military operation 
largely due to the procedure adopted by the against Iraq had stopped, the latter started a 
Council at its ministerial meetings: it adopts a campaign against its Kurdish population, 
brief communique defining positions adopted causing a massive exodus of Kurds towards Iran 
jointly in terms that are often not very explicit and Turkey, were very limited. The initiatives 
and then each individual minister receives rep- referred to by the Council in July 1991 to 
resentatives of the press, i.e., generally speaking, establish a buffer force to prevent armed clashes 
from his own country, to whom he says far more between the peoples of Yugoslavia came to 
about that country's specific role than about naught. These setbacks showed the limit of the 
WEU action. The result has been fragmented capabilities of WEU and of international 
information which could but provide grist for organisations in general if members are not 
general scepticism about Europe's ability to unanimous about the aims to be pursued or the 
assert itself in security matters, even in cases means to be used. The action carried out in the 
when such pessimism seems to have been unjus- WEU context during the French presidency thus 
tified. Your Rapporteur believes that, at the allows no final conclusions to be drawn about 
present juncture in WEU, it should be for the the role WEU can play in the future. However, it 
presidency to give far more systematic and seems clear that, if the governments manage to 
better organised information not only about the agree on the conditions which possible WEU 
decisions of the Council of Ministers but about action should meet, for instance the regions of 
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the world to which it might apply, which inter-
national bodies would be able to instigate it and 
the means that might be used, it would be easier 
for it to decide upon measures designed to apply 
these principles when the need arose and to 
present the initiatives it takes to the press more 
convincingly than the Council managed to do 
when it was succeeding in setting up relatively 
effective co-ordination in the Gulf. It should be 
noted that the Franco-German proposal at the 
intergovernmental conference on 11th October 
1991 contains several interesting suggestions 
that concord with your Rapporteur's wishes. 
13. Finally, where the functioning of WEU is 
concerned, the French presidency sought to 
assert the intergovernmental nature of WEU, 
going so far, apparently, as to hold a ministerial 
meeting in Luxembourg in April 1991 without 
the Secretary-General being present. This was 
the culminating point of a steady trend in the 
Council in recent years which, in certain ways, 
brings the procedures used in the framework of 
WEU closer to those practised in European 
political co-operation. The effect has been to 
transfer a number of prerogatives and initiatives 
from the Secretariat-General to the presidency 
with the assistance, in some cases, of representa-
tives of the previous and subsequent presidencies, 
the so-called troika system. However, the effect 
of these practices has been to limit the collegial 
nature of the Council, which is a handicap for its 
dialogue with the Assembly and is also detri-
mental to the continuity of its action since the 
succession of member countries holding the 
presidency leads to over-frequent and over-
important changes in the way it works. If, as has 
been considered in recent months, there were to 
be a switch from a yearly to a half-yearly presi-
dency, this drawback would be amplified if the 
role of the Secretariat-General is not restored, in 
particular with regard to the circulation of infor-
mation and the preparation of the Council's 
replies to Assembly recommendations and 
written questions put by parliamentarians. 
14. In spite of these disadvantages and also a 
certain degree of improvisation from which 
meetings between the presidency and the 
Assembly's Presidential Committee sometimes 
suffered, due to the will of the French presi-
dency to have WEU react rapidly to events 
threatening international peace which, after all, 
corresponds to the commitment imposed on 
member countries in Article VIII of the treaty to 
allow the Council to meet immediately if nec-
essary, the French presidency had two great 
merits: it gave definite substance to the reacti-
vation of WEU, which had hitherto been a 
subject of speeches and declarations without 
becoming an actual fact, and it showed relatively 
clearly the place of reactivated WEU in the 
establishment of a Europe built up round the 
Community. If, to this, one adds the success-
ful outcome, at the meeting in Vianden on 
144 
27th June 1991, of the first stage of a proposal 
actively supported by France for European 
space co-operation, the evolution ofWEU under 
the aegis of the French presidency can be con-
sidered very positive. 
Ill. The ministerial meeting in Vianden 
15. The ministerial meeting in Vianden on 
27th June 1991, concluding the French presi-
dency seems to have been a remarkable success 
for WEU in general and for its Assembly in par-
ticular, and the communique issued at the close 
was a welcome change from the brevity and 
vagueness of only too many Council communi-
cations. It set out a political programme for 
Europe very close to the one the Assembly had 
outlined in many of its recommendations in 
recent years. This convergence allows the role of 
the Assembly to be underlined since, once again, 
it has proved to be a useful inspiration for the 
governments. The Council might have referred 
to this. 
16. On the architecture of European security, 
the communique confines itself to general decla-
rations but contains two noteworthy indications 
whose interpretation now seems to be domi-
nating the negotiations at the intergovernmental 
conference: 
(a) " WEU should be developed in this 
phase of the European integration 
process as its defence component "; 
(b) " Ministers noted the need for the 
European and Atlantic debates to 
proceed in parallel. " 
17. Although the communique does not say 
so, several ministers have said that the Council 
has decided to meet at ministerial level for an 
extraordinary meeting prior to the November 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which is 
to decide the new policy, new structures and, 
above all, new strategy of the alliance, which 
meets a constant request of the Assembly, 
hitherto always set aside by the Council. This 
decision is in direct line with the establishment, 
in the framework of WEU, of a European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance. It should probably lead 
the Council to invite the other European 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to 
participate, at an appropriate level, in a meeting 
which will have a considerable impact so as to 
avoid WED's activities appearing to be a threat 
to the cohesion of the alliance, as the United 
States seems to fear. This practice, started by the 
French presidency during the Gulf crisis, con-
forms fully with Article VIII of the treaty, pro-
vided such invitations remain limited to dis-
cussion of a specific topic and do not lead to the 
fact that the existence of the Council is linked 
with the application of the treaty being over-
looked. According to British newspapers, one of 
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the aims of that meeting is to examine the conse-
quences for WEU of the creation of the NATO 
rapid reaction force at the meeting of the 
Defence Planning Committee in May 1991, 
which should encourage the Council to decide 
on the principle of a possible deployment of 
units assigned to the NATO force in peacetime 
in the framework of action decided upon by 
WEU. This meeting too will probably take place 
shortly before the intergovernmental conference 
completes its work. Hence the Council should by 
then be able to decide to resume its examination 
of the necessary revision of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
18. In regard to the CSCE, it should be noted 
that: 
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failure of the putsch made any such 
risks more remote, but the changes 
among military leaders imposed by 
the Soviet Government show this 
threat was real. As long as the Soviet 
Union has not recovered true stability 
this cannot be entirely ruled out. 
Moreover, initiatives by President 
Bush and President Gorbachev in 
October 1991 oblige Europe to work 
out a new doctrine of disarmament. 
19. Moreover, in the new situation created by 
the failure of the coup d'etat and calls for inde-
pendence in most of the Soviet republics, the 
question arises of the union's military and 
nuclear forces coming under the control of the 
republics. The division of the union would inev-
(a) The "statement" on Yugoslavia itably call in question the application of all the 
adopted by the Council in Vianden, agreements relating to the limitation of arma-
calling for full application of the prin- ments and this imparts particular importance to 
ciples of the CSCE, shows the role the Council's decision, even if the most recent 
WEU might have to play in making developments allow it to be hoped that a central 
these principles prevail. This vocation body will have sole control of Soviet nuclear 
is also shown in the Nine's strength. 
endorsement as a bloc of the request to 
convene a ministerial meeting of the 20. In regard to the dialogue with the Central 
CSCE to consider the situation in and Eastern European countries, the Council 
Yugoslavia which was decisive since, responds convincingly to the Assembly's recom-
according to the Berlin agreement, the mendation on creating a statute of " associated 
endorsement of thirteen states was country " by proposing " ad hoc contacts at min-
required for such a request to be fol- isterial level on specific subjects of common 
lowed up. It can thus be seen how interest " and " to intensify the exchanges of 
the action of a regional defence view among experts " on such subjects. It should 
organisation can help the functioning be noted that, in addition to Poland, Czechoslo-
ofthe CSCE, inter alia by allowing it to vakia and Hungary, contacts have also been 
take effective action in the event of a made with Romania, Bulgaria and, apparently, 
crisis and a threat to peace in Europe. the USSR. Finally, the proposal which France 
This role could have been still greater if and Germany addressed to the chairmanship-in-
the Council had been able to set up a office of the Community on 11th October 1991 
military buffer force, as the Twelve had about the organisation of security and defence in 
proposed at the beginning of July. Europe advocates developing the association of 
those countries with WEU's activities. 
(b) Notification of the will of the Council 21. The Assembly therefore welcomes the 
" to develop a joint approach which course followed by the Council which on the 
takes account of the interests of Euro-peans in every field of arms control ": whole corresponds to the direction it has itself 
this intention assumes new impor- taken, although as a parliamentary body the 
tance in the aftermath of the crisis in Assembly has to be more careful about estab-
the Soviet Union at the end of August, lishing relations with parliamentary organs 
following the failure of the coup by whose representativeness may seem ques-
conservative factions intended to tionable; It will note that the Council, in its 
overthrow Mr. Gorbachev. At the reply to Recommendation 490, approves the 
time of the coup d'etat, questions were steps taken by the Assembly to develop its rela-
tions with the Central and Eastern European 
raised about how far its instigators countries, as is normal, but the Assembly has 
would have been prepared to respect been unable to convince the Council of the 
the undertakings entered into by the weight of its financial burden due to the devel-
Soviet Union in recent years in the opment of its exchanges with many countries 
framework of the START agreements, which are not members ofWEU which limits its 
the agreement on the elimination of possibilities of taking action in this area. 
medium-range missiles, the CFE 
agreements or bilateral agreements 22. Furthermore, one may wonder whether 
with Germany and several Central the crises in July and August 1991 will not make 
European countries on the removal of WEU speed up the development of its relations 
Soviet forces from their territory. The with certain Central European countries. On the 
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one hand, the breaking-up of the Yugoslav fede-
ration is making several of those countries fear a 
resurgence of nationalism that might call in 
question their internal cohesion and the security 
of their frontiers. On the other hand, the 
Moscow putsch made them fear a sudden switch 
in Soviet policy, particularly in regard to the 
evacuation of forces stationed on their territory. 
They have seen that they had no firm guarantee 
against such threats and some believe that the 
only way to emerge from their security isolation 
is not just to participate in specific WEU activ-
ities but to accede to the modified Brussels 
Treaty and thus benefit from the application of 
Article V. There is thus already a question of 
whether it is not necessary to speed up the nego-
tiation of far ·more binding defence agreements 
than those considered at the last session of the 
Assembly and at the time Recommendation 500 
was adopted. 
23. In space matters, the creation of a satellite 
data interpretation centre corresponds to 
Assembly recommendations, but the Council 
wished to avoid the word" Agency", probably 
to indicate that the status of the centre will be 
different from that of the former WEU agencies 
and th~ Agency for the Control of Armaments. It 
is important to know to what extent the Council 
intends to reserve participation in the centre for 
WEU member countries or whether it intends to 
leave it open to non-member countries. The 
communique also says it will be used " particu-
larly within the framework of the verification of 
arms control agreements ", which means it 
might· be used for other purposes, including mil-
itary operations by member countries, whether 
co-ordinated or not. This would respond to what 
many observers have noticed and certain gov-
ernments stressed during the Gulf crisis, i.e. that 
Europe was lagging so far behind in developing 
its observation capability, which significantly 
limited its ability to act independently. 
24. In this connection, one should recall the 
major role played by the Assembly in preparing 
these decisions, not only through the reports it 
prepared and the recommendations it addressed 
to the Council, but also thanks to the 
organisation of the symposium on " Observation 
satellites - a European means of verifying dis-
armament", held in Rome on 27th and 28th 
March 1990, which provided the Council with a 
particularly detailed file on tl;le political, mil-
itary and technical aspects of .the question. It 
helped to alert public opinion to the importance 
of the decisions to be taken in this matter. The 
Assembly can but welcome the considerable 
support the French presidency gave to its pro-
posals and the fact that the French Minister of 
Defence, Mr. Pierre Joxe, used his address to the 
Assembly on 4th June to announce: 
" ... In the arms control and disarmament 
plan announced yesterday by France, the 
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French authorities stressed their will-
ingness to pass on any information they 
had to regional agencies in the interests of 
transparency, and that they were in favour 
of any European-he1d space-derived 
observations, in particular, being passed 
on to such regional agencies. " 
This approach gave effective substance to the 
future Council decision to set up a satellite data 
interpretation centre, the import of which 
Mr. Joxe spelled out: 
" As you know, France, Spain and Italy 
are involved in the Helios programme in 
which the objective is to have a first 
observation satellite in orbit in 1993. In 
the WEU context, we hope that at the 
next ministerial meeting it will be decided 
to set up a centre for interpreting satellite 
images to which Helios could con-
tribute." 
Finally, the decision "to pursue studies on the 
possibilities for... co-operation " in this field 
suggest that the governments are determined 
to embark upon more advanced space 
co-operation, as recommended by the Assembly. 
Here, too, Mr. Joxe specified the French Gov-
ernment's intentions as follows: 
" However, I hope that we can go even 
further. For Europe, the development of a 
space capability of strategic interest could 
represent a collective ambition in an area 
of high technology, essential for its future 
security. 
It would be a clear sign of our resolve to 
go ahead in the direction of a common 
security and defence policy. " 
25. However, it is most curious that the 
Council, in spite of the role played by the 
Assembly in preparing its decision, waited until 
9th September to communicate to it the text of 
the decision it took in Vianden on 27th June on 
the creation of the WEU satellite centre, 
although this decision was the subject of a 
" public document ", the text of which your 
Rapporteur managed to obtain. It will surprise 
no one if the Assembly persists in believing, in 
spite of the Council's denials, such as those in 
the reply to Recommendation 490, that the 
Council views in an off-hand and negligent 
manner its duty to keep the Assembly informed. 
26. Your Rapporteur draws attention to 
several important aspects of this decision. First, 
the WEU satellite centre actually is a subsidiary 
organ of WEU in accordance with Article VIII, 
paragraph 2, of the treaty, but, unlike the ACA, 
this does not give it its own legal entity. This 
demonstrates the flexibility of the relevant 
treaty provision which allows organs of very dif-
ferent kinds and with different statutes to be 
created. It should·also be underlined that para-
graphs 4 and 5 of the decision strongly confirm 
that it is an intergovernmental body. 
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27. Although not very large, the budget allo-
cated to the centre seems sufficient to suggest 
that the governments are quite firmly decided. It 
should be added that, in reply to a written 
question put by our colleague, Mr. Lagorce in 
the French National Assembly on 27th May 
1991, the French Minister of Defence said that 
in addition, a budget of 5 million ecus had bee~ 
granted to the Council for 1992 for studies to 
allow the requirements of WEU countries in 
observation and intelligence satellites to be 
determined. While the location of the centre is 
not given in the decision, your Rapporteur 
believes it might well be in Spain, which would 
have the advantage of providing WEU with 
better anchorage in the Iberian Peninsula, where 
the public still knows little of its activities. 
AccordiJ?-1; to ~r. Joxe's reply to Mr. Lagorce, 
the declSlon IS to be taken at the meeting 
planned for 18th November. 
28. In regard to operational co-operation 
betw~en member states in military matters, the 
wordmg of the Vianden communique is singu-
larly cryptic. It speaks of " programmes of 
co-operation ", which seems to refer to arma-
ments, but the reference to the meeting of chiefs 
of defence staff on 1Oth April, which " gave 
further impetus to the discussions under way on 
the possibilities of developing various forms of 
practical co-operation " and then to making 
" co-operation more operational both in the 
politico-military field as well as in the military 
field proper, covering among other things tasks 
and the requirements for co-ordination and 
planning structures " might suggest the Council 
has taken into account proposals such as those 
in Recommendation 492, presented by Mr. De 
Decker on behalf of the Political Committee in 
December 1990. It would thus mean that the 
creation of the rapid reaction force decided 
upon by NATO does not mean that WEU 
should not promote the creation of frameworks 
for the co-ordinated deployment of the forces of 
member countries whether or not they are inte-
grated in the NATO commands in peacetime 
and whether or not they are assigned to the 
rapid reaction force. The wording of the Anglo-
Italian proposal at the intergovernmental con-
ference on 4th October suggests that the two 
countries concerned would be in favour of this 
idea. On this point, the Council should give 
clearer and more precise information than it did 
in the Vianden communique. There is every 
reason to think that linguistic confusion is 
designed to conceal certain differences between 
the ministers in this connection. 
29. On Mediterranean questions, the 
Assembly can but note that the Council gives it 
no means of ascertaining the scope of the 
mandate given to the sub-group responsible for 
following these questions, the guidelines for its 
work, the report it submitted to the Council in 
Vianden or how it intends to follow these up. 
147 
DOCUMENT 1285 
This discretion gives a hint that little progress is 
being made in this area, which is under-
standable, moreover, just after the Gulf war. 
3.0. Although the Vianden communique gives 
nse to several reservations, including the fact 
that there was no reference to relations between 
the Council and the Assembly, in spite of the 
role played by the Assembly in the preparation 
of the decisions taken, it nevertheless testifies 
with the political trends it presents and the praC.: 
tical decisions it includes, to very real activity 
~~ ~he. part of the Co~ncil and, following on the 
mttlatlves taken dunng the Gulf crisis, it is a 
wholly satisfactory sign that the reactivation of 
WEU is at last becoming an established fact. 
IV. The Germa• presideacy 
31. The German presidency started on 1st 
July 1991 and had the merit of circulating, on 
that date, a document setting out its programme. 
On 8th July, Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, received the Presidential Committee 
and the Political and Defence Committees at the 
Petersberg and gave them details about how it 
intended to implement this programme. Inter 
alia, it announced its intention of convening an 
extraordinary meeting of the Council of Min-
isters on 29th October to examine WEU's place 
in the overall architecture of Europe. In July and 
August, the German presidency also had to face 
up to two crise~ which, in different ways, con-
cerned WEU, and it had to convene ministerial 
meetings on 19th and then 30th September 1991 
to consider the implementation of decisions 
concerning Yugoslavia taken the same day by 
the European Council. 
32. The communique, circulated by the 
German Embassy in London on 1st July 1991, 
after stating that " WEU has proved itself to be 
11:n important forum for consulting about ques-
tiOns of European security policy " and that " its 
efficiency has been shown, for instance, in 
co-ordinating the maritime activities of WEU 
member states in the Gulf and giving help to the 
Kurdish popufation" (although this last 
assertion is in point of fact an audacious one), 
asserts that: 
" WEU forms part of Europe's new 
political security architecture alongside 
NATO and CSCE. As an integral com-
ponent of the process of European unifi-
cation and the core of a European security 
and defence dimension it is constantly 
gaining new importance. WEU also con-
tributes towards closer co-operation with 
the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe in the security policy field. 
The presidency gives German foreign 
policy an important job to do. Our aim is 
DOCUMENT 1285 
to bring more clearly to the fore WEU's 
bridging function between the Atlantic 
Alliance and European political union. 
A political union having a common 
foreign and security policy implies a 
genuine European security and defence 
identity and thus greater European 
responsibility for defence matters. WEU 
should be developed in this phase of the 
European integration process as its 
defence component. 
At the meeting in Copenhagen on 6th 
and 7th June, NATO foreign ministers 
stressed the responsibility of the European 
allies for formulating a joint security and 
defence policy and that developing a 
European security identity will strengthen 
the Atlantic Alliance's effectiveness. At 
the 19th and 20th June Berlin CSCE con-
ference, too, the foreign ministers decided 
to create a link with WEU as one of the 
most important European institutions. 
At a time when important decisions have 
to be taken in discussions over NATO 
strategy and the intergovernmental con-
ference on political union, Germany will 
be co-ordinator inside WEU and in 
foreign relations WEU's representative to 
work towards realising the concepts for 
the union's future rOle in the European 
security structure and to make sure it is 
put to good use as a medium of consul-
tation in the security policy field. 
Besides determining the union's place in 
the European context the main aim of the 
German presidency will be seeking to 
define a more operational role for WEU, 
its relationships with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, disarmament 
issues and arms control as well as 
co-operation in space matters. " 
33. The communique also specifies that its 
next regular ministerial meeting will be held 
on 18th November 1991, which does not affect 
the date of the extraordinary meeting proposed 
by Mr. Genscher in Vianden, which it has been 
learned, moreover, might be held on 29th 
October. 
34. This text is interesting because of what it 
says and also because of what it does not say. No 
one will be surprised that it stresses, as the 
French presidency did, the relationship between 
WEU and the European union being prepared 
by the intergovernmental conference and that it 
stresses more than France did the Atlantic 
dimension of European security and the link 
between WEU and the CSCE. Moreover, at the 
meeting at the Petersberg on 8th July, Mr. 
Genscher mentioned other aspects of Germany's 
intentions, including that of advancing the 
Franco-German study on a strategic, maritime 
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and airborne means of transport. But it will also 
be noted that the communique says nothing 
about a possible role for WEU either inside or 
outside the NATO area or about any form of 
military co-ordination among the goals it sets 
for WEU. These differences probably demon-
strate the special way Germany on the one hand 
and France on the other view the future role of 
WEU and probably also the European union 
and they perhaps throw light on the way the two 
summer 1991 crises were tackled by the WEU 
Council. 
35. The Yugoslav crisis started well before the 
beginning of July 1991 but it was in the early 
days of that month that it took on new dimen-
sions when the armed clashes suddenly 
worsened and the Slovenian and Croatian 
Republics expressed their will for independence, 
which dramatically called in question the sur-
vival of a federal state that had long been 
threatened. The federal army carried out mil-
itary operations designed first of all to make the 
two contestants submit. Serbia for its part was 
trying, in case the Yugoslav state should dis-
appear, to ensure, with the assistance of the 
federal army, that it would have control of the 
territories of the Croatian Republic peopled 
with Serbs. The problem also became ideological 
because there was still communist leadership in 
Serbia, the federal state and its army and inter-
national because the Soviet Union, feeling its 
own cohesion threatened by the wish for inde-
pendence expressed by several of its component 
republics, did nothing to conceal its hostility 
towards any external intervention in Yugoslav 
affairs because this might have heralded claims 
to intervene in Soviet internal affairs. 
36. These were the conditions in which the 
ministers for foreign affairs of the Twelve met in 
The Hague on 6th August, after Serbia had 
refused the mediation of the European troika 
that they had proposed, to examine the French 
and German proposals intended to promote the 
restoration of peace in Yugoslavia. According to 
information in the press, France informed its 
partners that it intended to place the Yugoslav 
affair before the Security Council under Article 
39 of the United Nations Charter providing for 
the Security Council to meet in the event of a 
threat to peace. It is also reported to have asked 
the presidency to convene a meeting of the 
WEU Council to examine the possibility of 
setting up a European buffer force. Germany for 
its part endorsed the idea of placing the matter 
before the Security Council and proposed that 
the Community take economic sanctions against 
Serbia, responsible for the failure of the first 
attempts by the Twelve to achieve a cease-fire. 
The French proposal to instruct the WEU 
Council to examine the possibility of a WEU 
contribution with a view to enforcing the 
cease-fire in Yugoslavia led the German presi-
dency to convene the Permanent Council on 
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7th August, while a meeting of political directors 
of the CSCE ministries for foreign affairs was 
organised in Prague on 8th August. 
3 7. In fact, the meeting of the WEU Council 
produced no results. The " elements for responses 
to enquiries from the press " that it issued merely 
stated that " the Council agreed to continue to 
follow closely developments in the situation in 
Yugoslavia" which did not, however, prevent it, 
despite the acuteness of the crisis, from fixing its 
next meeting for 18th September. Furthermore, 
" member countries agreed to continue their 
reflections on possible concrete contributions they 
might make to the maintenance of an agreed 
cease-fire, taking into account the efforts made in 
other international fora, such as the European 
Community and the CSCE ". 
38. Clearly, Serbia's refusal of any form of 
buffer force and the participation of foreign mil-
itary personnel in the verification of successive 
cease-fire agreements that it accepted in prin-
ciple without any real determination to respect 
them meant that WEU could not be used to help 
to implement a policy defined by the Twelve, 
particularly as, on 7th August, the Soviet Union 
had warned the West about the risks to peace 
involved in any interference in Yugoslavia's 
internal affairs. Hence, nothing needs to be said 
about the results of the WEU Council 
meeting. 
39. The precedent of the Gulf crisis and the 
fact that the ministers for foreign affairs were 
meeting in The Hague on 6th August indicate 
that, if the ministers had wanted to take major 
decisions in the framework of WEU's responsi-
bilities, they could quite well have decided to 
meet in the context of WEU. It may indeed be 
wondered whether, even before the meeting on 
7th August, they were not well aware of their 
disagreement on two points: the expediency of 
European military participation in the crisis and 
the kind of political order that should be estab-
lished or maintained. Some countries had 
expressed a preference for giving priority to 
maintaining the federal Yugoslav state or to the 
independence of the Croatian and Slovenian 
Republics, although all agreed that the Yugoslav 
state should be profoundly transformed to give 
the republics far greater independence. A peace-
keeping intervention would to a certain extent 
have meant choosing between two possible 
orders, which led Europeans to confine them-
selves to action by the Twelve to foster a cease-
fire, inspected solely by civil observers. In view 
of the impact of the Yugoslav crisis in several 
Central and Eastern European countries and the 
prevailing uncertainty for more than a month 
now about the maintenance of the cease-fire and 
the ability of the parties involved to reach an 
understanding, it may be wondered whether the 
more energetic action that would have been pos-
sible if WEU had been used to serve the 
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European Council would not have been 
desirable. Recourse to such action has still not 
been ruled out, but to date the WEU Council 
seems to have given it no serious thought and, 
at the joint meeting on 8th July, Mr. Genscher, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, did not 
conceal his opposition to any WEU intervention 
in this matter. According to the International 
Herald Tribune of 5th September 1991, 
Mr. Genscher proposed the creation of a CSCE 
" blue helmets " force to play a rOle in Yugoslavia 
that, early in the summer, others had envisaged 
for WEU with the possible participation of non-
member countries and countries that were not 
neighbours of Yugoslavia such as Czechoslovakia 
and Canada. It may be wondered whether the 
thirty-eight members of the CSCE will be able to 
reach agreement on such a decision more easily 
than the nine members of WEU. Subsequent 
events showed this was not so. 
40. Your Rapporteur believes there is every 
reason to fear that the Yugoslav crisis will con-
tinue in a manner that cannot yet be foreseen. 
The situation might become extremely serious 
through an extension of and increase in interna-
tional struggles and the repercussions the 
Yugoslav conflicts may have in other countries 
either because they feel solidarity with certain 
minorities in Yugoslavia, which is the case of 
the Hungarians and Albanians, or because their 
own minorities may be tempted to follow the 
course set by the Slovenes and the Croats. It 
cannot be ruled out, therefore, that in the 
coming months Europe may have to contribute 
a military presence to help to maintain peace in 
Yugoslavia or on its outer frontiers and that 
WEU will be seen as the only organisation 
capable of setting up a European force, even if 
it were to include non-member countries, as 
seems to have been envisaged at the beginning 
of August. It is not certain that Serbia's oppo-
sition to a foreign military presence on Yugoslav 
territory will continue if the armed conflict 
assumes new dimensions, since such action can 
be contemplated only after an effective cease-
fire and with the agreement of all those con-
cerned. 
41. It was therefore normal for the Council on 
the one hand to study developments in Yugo-
slavia with a view to harmonising the views of 
its members and facilitating political decisions 
when the time is ripe and, on the other, to 
examine the military options which it might 
then have to take. It has been reported in the 
press that quite considerable progress has been 
made in this sense, military headquarters having 
been set up in Metz to prepare for possible mil-
itary action. The fact that it was impossible for 
the Council to take operational decisions on 7th 
August did not therefore make it postpone sine 
die its consultations on these two matters but, 
on the contrary, it continued them and it should 
be congratulated for this. 
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42. The Soviet crisis at the end of August was 
obviously not within WEU's area of responsi-
bility since, if the instigators of the unsuccessful 
coup d\~tat are to be believed, it did not call in 
question Soviet external policy nor, in par-
ticular, its intention to respect the agreements it 
had signed on arms limitation, evacuating its 
armed forces from the Central European coun-
tries and security and co-operation in Europe. 
One could well wonder about the determination 
and ability of those responsible for the putsch to 
keep their word but, in view of the fact that in 
less than three days their undertaking collapsed, 
the WEU Council cannot be reproached for not 
having reacted since it was in other forums, par-
ticularly that of the Twelve, that Europe con-
sidered the steps to be taken to help the sup-
porters of legality to thwart those attempting to 
revert to Soviet orthodoxy. 
43. This does not mean that the consequences 
of the crisis do not concern WEU because the 
undermining of the very foundations of the 
Soviet state may have considerable repercus-
sions on the security of Europe as a whole. The 
imbalance created by the disappearance of a 
Soviet power may encourage an increase in 
internal or even inter-state conflicts. The disin-
tegration of the Soviet state may cause clashes 
between nationalities. Its disappearance would 
raise the question of respect for treaties and the 
devolution of its armed - and particularly 
nuclear - forces. Its weakness gives rise to fears 
of further crises from which no one can predict 
what form of state organisation or external 
policy will emerge. 
44. These uncertainties should encourage 
Western Europe to exercise greater responsibil-
ities than in the past in maintaining interna-
tional order in Europe. The Twelve seem quite 
aware of this as testified by their efforts to ter-
minate the Yugoslav civil war. The link that 
already exists, that should be confirmed by the 
intergovernmental conference, between the 
Community, political co-operation and WEU 
should induce the WEU Council to specify 
the possibilities for action that it can place at the 
service of peace in Europe from the moment the 
common external policy of the Twelve raises the 
question of intervention with armed forces. Its 
steps in this sense in the aftermath of the Gulf 
war seem very slow and timid when compared 
with the magnitude and urgency of the chal-
lenges to be met. 
45. In the light of events in Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union, it would therefore appear that 
the task to be tackled by the German presidency 
goes much further than could have been 
imagined on 1st July. The programme presented 
by the German Ambassador in London on that 
date corresponded more or less satisfactorily to 
the situation on that date. In the circumstances 
facing Europe two months later, it seems very 
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inadequate and, at the extraordinary ministerial 
meeting planned for 21st October, the Council 
should consider the role of WEU in today's 
Europe in terms that are not confined to reaf-
firming its links with the Community, NATO 
and the CSCE. It should try to respond to the 
new requirements, in particular the need for sta-
bility and security guarantees felt by the Central 
and Eastern European countries which, having 
emerged from the Warsaw Pact system, will be 
unable to accomplish the immense task of 
internal recovery that faces them if they do not 
have the assurance of a peaceful, stable 
Europe. 
V. Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
46. Communications between the Council 
and the Assembly have been the subject of much 
discussion over the years and the Assembly 
notes that while, in its reply to Recommendation 
490 on 5th June 1991, the Council gave its views 
on the subject it cannot share these views in 
many respects. This reply calls .for comment 
because the Council, after affirming that it 
" ensures that the Assembly receives appropriate 
information about its work ", shows, in a series 
of statements of half-truths, that it does practi-
cally nothing of the sort: 
(a) In paragraph 1, it says that " for the 
first time, the presidency's Foreign 
Minister addressed a joint meeting of 
the Assembly's Political and Defence 
Committees ". A brief glance at its 
archives would have shown it that 
such meetings had already been held 
regularly since the reactivation of 
WEU. Previously, it received the two 
committees separately for joint 
meetings for which the Council itself 
had fixed the procedure in 1972. 
Moreover, it has never wished to 
apply its own proposal in spite of the 
Assembly's requests and the dialogue 
has been reduced to an informal 
exchange of views between the com-
mittees together and the Chairman-in-
Office. Hence there is no need for the 
Council to present as ·progress some-
thing which has in fact been a step 
backwards in the procedure for its dia-
logue with Assembly committees. 
(b) In the same paragraph, it says "the 
Secretary-General also appeared before 
these committees ", whereas in fact he 
only spoke to the Political Com-
mittee. 
(c) The Council says that in its replies to 
recommendations it " is at pains to 
arrive at precise positions on the ques-
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tions raised ", an assertion which, to 
say the least, does not generally corre-
spond to the impression of members 
of the Assembly. A few examples are 
given below of cases where the 
assertion seems ill-founded. 
(d) The Council goes on to say that " mi~­
isterial decisions ... alone are authon-
tative ", thus contradicting Article 
VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified 
Brussels Treaty which set up the Per-
manent Council to respond to urgent 
situations. If the Permanent Council's 
decisions are not authoritative, what 
is the point of them? Moreover, the 
English text differs noticeably from 
the French text since it refers to minis-
terial " decisions " and not " deli-
berations ", which obviously does not 
have the same significance. The 
Assembly does not know which 
version is the authoritative one. 
(e) In paragraph 2 of the same reply, the 
Council says " no new drafting of the 
treaty could be undertaken until the 
process to redefine Europe's role in 
security and defence matters has been 
completed ", which is stating the 
obvious. It is also obvious " that 
account will have to be taken of the 
developments taking place in the 
context of the intergovernmental con-
ference on political union and of the 
process of adapting NATO to the new 
situation in Europe ". However, these 
developments and this process are 
under way and, quite rightly, the 
Council does not say it is necessary to 
wait for their conclusion. One might, 
on the contrary, with the same logic, 
say the intergovernmental conference 
and the North Atlantic Council should 
take account of the prospects of 
revising the modified Brussels Treaty. 
This was the reason that justified the 
Assembly's approach in this sense 
and if the Council does not share its opi~ion, it should explain why. 
(f) The Council concludes that " it would 
therefore seem premature to contem-
plate drafting proposals such as those 
put forward by the honourable parlia-
mentarian ". This wording seems 
particularly unfortunate since the 
Council was not answering the 
opinion of a parliamentarian - it is to 
be assumed that it was thinking of the 
Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg -
but a recommendation adopted by the 
Assembly. Secondly, neither the 
Rapporteur, nor the committ~e, nor 
the Assembly was attemptmg to 
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replace the Council in drafting the text 
of a treaty article; they believed the 
recommendation they were addressing 
to the Council would carry even 
greater weight for being drafted in a 
more specific manner. It is for the 
Council to express its decisions, which 
it is not doing. It is desirable for the 
Assembly to express its opinion as 
precisely as possible and the Council 
should not criticise it for doing so and, 
above all, take shelter behind this 
formal consideration so as not to 
answer on the substance. Finally, the 
Council might perhaps have made it 
possible for the Assembly to give its 
views on other articles of the treaty in 
a different manner if it had made its 
reply known before 5th June 1991, by 
which date the Assembly had already 
met in session to adopt Recommen-
dation 504, presented by Mr. Charles 
Goerens on behalf of the Political 
Committee, in a similar form to the 
one proposed by Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg. The lateness of this reply 
prevented a true dialogue being held 
on an essential matter on which there 
was probably no serious opposition 
between the Assembly and the 
Council. The Council preferred to 
dismiss this matter with little expla-
nation on a date that made it impos-
sible for the Assembly to discuss it, 
thus probably allowing it to claim a 
precedent regarding the recommen-
dation adopted on Mr. Goerens's 
report that the Assembly will have 
been unable to challenge in time. This 
was a very regrettable way of eluding a 
dialogue between the two WEU 
organs to which the Council never-
theless says it is attached. 
(g) In its reply to Recommendation 494, 
the Council says that " the pre-
sidency's chief of defence staff ... per-
sonally briefed a joint meeting of the 
Political and Defence Committees on 
the co-ordination measures decided 
by the Council in the Gulf crisis ". It is 
not true that the Political Committee 
was invited to take part in such an 
exchange of views. Since this reply to 
a recommendation adopted in 
December 1990 arrived only on 20th 
June 1991, one might think that the 
Council had had time to verify such 
assertions, which, moreover, con-
tradict paragraph 1 of the reply to 
Recommendation 490 which, on this 
point, was accurate. 
(h) In its reply to Recommendation 491, 
the Council says " the working doe-
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ument on the role and place of WEU 
in the new European security archi-
tecture, made public by ministers ... 
on 22nd February 1991, reveals the 
aims espoused by member states and 
the new responsibilities they would 
like WEU to assume ". This is effec-
tively the sense of this document, pre-
pared by the Secetary-General. 
However, when making it public, the 
ministers revealed that they had not 
adopted it, which makes it difficult to 
claim later that it expresses their point 
of view. This procedure can but 
confirm the Assembly's impression 
that the Council is not being very rig-
orous in its replies to recommenda-
tions. 
(i) Recommendation 492 on Europe's 
security and the Gulf crisis set out the 
Assembly's views in great detail. 
These views had been discussed in 
depth both by the Political Com-
mittee and in plenary session. In par-
ticular, paragraph 7listed the matters 
on which the Assembly believed the 
organisation of a new peaceful order 
in the Middle East should be based: 
ban on ABC weapons, limiting con-
ventional weapons, application of 
Security Council resolutions relating 
to Palestine, restoration of Lebanese 
sovereignty and ensuring regular sup-
plies of oil. It would have wished the 
Council to give the views of the 
European governments on each of 
these points. To reply that "for 
several years now, the member states 
have been stepping up their initia-
tives to find ways of settling the 
many conflicts" and underline "the 
urgency to address the manifold 
problems of the region in order that 
fair and lasting solutions can be 
worked out " is treating the work of 
the Assembly in a very off-handed 
manner. The replies to several other 
paragraphs of this recommendation, 
communicated to the Assembly on 
5th June, i.e. six months after the 
recommendation was adopted, reveal 
the same attitude. 
47. Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, received the Presidential Committee 
and certain rapporteurs of the Assembly in Bonn 
on 30th October after the extraordinary minis-
terial meeting of the Council to inform them of 
the activities of the ministers since July. The 
Assembly welcomes such contacts. In fact, this 
extraordinary meeting was not devoted exclu-
sively to the new architecture of European 
security as had been announced in July, but 
touched upon four questions: 
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(i) Conventional disarmament, regarding 
which the WEU countries noted the 
American and Soviet delay in rati-
fying the CFE agreement. Mr. 
Genscher also emphasised the risks 
of proliferation stemming from the 
dislocation of the Soviet state and the 
prevailing uncertainty about the pos-
sibility of the republics taking over 
short-range nuclear weapons. 
(ii) The Council has received the report 
of the ad hoc group on the mainte-
nance of peace in Yugoslavia which 
shows that WEU is prepared to act 
from the moment the preliminary 
conditions are met. 
(iii) The Permanent Council has been 
instructed to present to the minis-
terial meeting on 18th November 
firm proposals regarding the relations 
WEU intends to develop with the 
countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, including the Baltic coun-
tries and the USSR. 
(iv) The Council has examined a report 
by the Secretary-General on WEU's 
place in the future European archi-
tecture. Points of convergence between 
the various proposals were noted. 
Europe has to set as its goal the con-
stitution of a European identity in 
security questions and access to 
greater responsibilities in defence 
matters. To that end, WEU should be 
an integral part of the process of 
European unification at one and the 
same time as the defence wing of 
the union and European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance. Significant diver-
gences remain, however, which will 
be re-examined on 18th November. 
These questions appear to concern 
mainly the nature of the links 
between WEU, the European union 
and NATO, the possible enlargement 
of WEU and the definition of WEU's 
military role. 
The ministers also decided to meet 
" in conclave " before the Maastricht 
summit meeting in order to allow 
themselves every possibility of 
achieving important results. The min-
ister specified that in this matter the 
Council did not consider the Maas-
tricht summit as an end but as a point 
of departure for new thinking on the 
future role of WEU that it had 
decided to undertake. 
48. This meeting confirmed your Rap-
porteur's impression that the German presi-
dency was determined to do its utmost to make 
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WEU advance in these various matters. It has 
certainly managed to bring viewpoints much 
closer together but, so far, it cannot be said that 
it has managed to obtain decisive results. The 
Assembly can but encourage it to persevere. 
49. Even more deplorable are the replies to 
Written Questions 288 and 289 because they 
relate to the international law established by the 
modified Brussels Treaty. The questions had 
been put by the former President of the 
Assembly, Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur of the 
Political Committee, on 11th January and were 
quite obviously intended to help him to prepare 
his report. As the replies did not arrive until 
29th May, they were of no use for this purpose. 
50. Question 289 related to a statement by the 
Council in its reply to Recommendation 479 
that the modified Brussels Treaty provides no 
legal basis for the presence of the forces of one 
member state in the territory of other WEU 
states. The question was whether Article VI of 
Protocol No. 11 was no longer in force. This 
article reads as follows: 
"Her Majesty the Queen of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland will continue to maintain on the 
mainland of Europe, including Germany, 
the effective strength of the United 
Kingdom forces which are now assigned 
to the Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe, that is to say four divisions and 
the Second Tactical Air Force, or such 
other forces as the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe, regards as having equiv-
alent fighting capacity. She undertakes 
not to withdraw these forces against the 
wishes of the majority of the High Con-
tracting Parties who should take their 
decision in the knowledge of the views of 
the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. 
This undertaking shall not, however, bind 
her in the event of an acute overseas 
emergency ... " 
51. It is evident that sending British forces 
stationed in Germany to join the allied oper-
ation against Iraq was a perfectly satisfactory 
justification of the withdrawals effected and, on 
the other hand, the general situation in Europe 
leads logically to a reduction in British troop 
levels in Germany. Even then, as long as Pro-
tocol No. 11 remains in force, the procedure pro-
vided for in Article VI (majority vote and 
opinion of SACEUR) must be respected. 
Replying that Protocol No. 11 " is not the legal 
basis for the military presence of member states 
on the territory of other states that are parties to 
the modified Brussels Treaty " is juggling with 
words since the " maintenance " of that force is 
a treaty provision. However, that allows the 
Council not to reply to the substance whereas 
the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report 
tells us that this matter has effectively been 
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raised by the United Kingdom Government and 
claims - falsely - that the Assembly was 
informed. 
52. Question 288 asked the Council " on what 
basis some governments have declared that 
1998 is the date as from which each signatory 
country would be entitled to cease to be a party 
to the treaty ". The Council replied as follows: 
" Protocol No. I, under the terms of 
Article I, amended and completed the 
Brussels Treaty. Accordingly, it did not 
create a new treaty that would have 
caused all the clauses of the original treaty 
to be null and void. Those provisions of 
the original treaty that it did not amend 
are still in force. A change in the num-
bering of an article does not constitute 
grounds for considering this to be a new 
provision. This is particularly the case of 
Article XII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, formally Article X of the treaty 
signed in Brussels on 17th March 1948. 
This means that the period of 50 years 
specified in this article runs from the date 
on which the Brussels Treaty came into 
force, i.e. 25th August 1948. " 
53. Clearly this reply cannot be taken seri-
ously, not only because the English text does not 
correspond to the French, which refers to Article 
XI as " formerly " Article X and not " for-
mally ", but above all because it is based on spe-
cious reasoning. The four protocols form a 
whole which came into force in 1955, the date 
on which the period of fifty years specified in 
Article XII of the modified treaty starts. The 
Council's reply is tantamount to saying that Pro-
tocol No. I would expire in 1998 whereas the 
other protocols would remain valid until 2005, 
which is legal nonsense. Moreover, the final act 
of the 1954 London conference shows perfectly 
clearly that the signatory countries had no 
intention of merely enlarging the 1948 treaty but 
that, in a quite different political context, they 
were anxious to strengthen and extend the treaty 
" to make it a more effective focus of European 
integration ". The former treaty was therefore 
merely raw material for the authors of Protocol 
No. I. It facilitated the drafting of the new treaty 
but the latter was therefore not simply a 
"revised" treaty. It is not by chance that the 
word " modified " was preferred to " revised ". 
54. The weakness of the Council's reasoning 
conceals one fact: each of the signatory countries 
will individually be able to denounce the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty in 1998 because, in 1990, 
the Council so decided for reasons that are 
political and have little to do with law. One may 
wonder what these political reasons are. Every-
thing indicates that they are not the same for all 
nine governments: 
(a) some, including Italy, have quite 
recently announced their intention of 
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ensuring as soon as possible that what 
they considef' to be essential in the 
modified Brussels Treaty is integrated 
into the Rome Treaty; 
(b) some governments are perhaps 
anxious to underscore a certain degree 
of continuity between WEU and the 
former Western Union, which was set 
up by the 1948 treaty and hence 
before the Atlantic Alliance and pro-
viding Europe with an integrated mil-
itary force that was assigned to NATO 
command in 1950, in anticipation of 
the possible revival of such a force; 
(c) events in Eastern Europe are no doubt 
making several countries rethink their 
security policy in new terms, be it 
closer relations with the United States 
or a more independent policy inside 
or outside Europe; . 
(d) some may fear that the importance 
given to Article VIII by the Gulf crisis 
will involve them in commitments to 
which they do not wish to subscribe; 
(e) others, like France, know that they are 
not applying one or other provision of 
the modified Brussels Treaty (in the 
case of France, Article Ill of Protocol 
No. Ill) and wish to escape from this 
uncomfortable position. 
55. If these considerations are accurate, they 
seem very short-sighted in view of the fact that 
the modified Brussels Treaty is to be revised, 
which will probably involve the disappearance 
of Protocol No. Ill; there is nothing to prevent it 
being merged with the Rome Treaty when the 
governments concerned so agree and Article 
VIII contains no obligations apart from consul-
tation. Similarly, it is not under the 1948 treaty 
that a WEU military force can be set up: in any 
event, a unanimous Council decision will be 
required for this. Conversely, the levity with 
which the Council deals with the commitments 
incumbent upon all the signatories has major 
political drawbacks, in particular that of weak-
ening the deterrent capability of Article V by 
showing that the member countries attach only 
relative importance to the texts they signed. It 
also weakens the decisions taken by the Council, 
for instance the decision to set up a WEU sat-
ellite centre, because it shows the governments 
are determined at all cost to shorten the period 
of their commitments. 
had frequently fulfilled their international com-
mitments. The Assembly has constantly used its 
prerogatives to denounce the Council's laxism in 
this respect. It has no powers to do more. 
57. These various examples, taken solely 
from replies to recommendations presented to 
the Assembly by the Political Committee or to 
related written questions, make it possible to 
contradict the Council's claim that it replies 
adequately to Assembly recommendations or 
written questions put by its members. One may 
wonder whether the deterioration - notable for 
several years - in the standard of the replies to 
recommendations is not due to the fact that 
they are now rarely prepared by the Secretariat-
General but by the presidency, which is 
paralysed by the often very slow procedure 
inherent in the hierarchy of member countries' 
ministries for foreign affairs. They are conse-
quently very late in reaching the other delega-
tions which then make a hasty examination of 
the texts proposed without the authorities 
responsible for the quality of the dialogue 
between the Council and the Assembly having 
time to intervene to ensure that the Assembly's 
prerogatives are correctly respected. It may also 
be wondered whether the Secretariat-General is 
able, in such circumstances, to fulfil its due role 
in reminding the Council, in regard to the text 
of these replies, of its duty, in the interests of 
the smooth running of WEU as a whole, to 
work out a joint reply to Assembly recommen-
dations, or even to questions put by parliamen-
tarians, as precisely and fully as possible. Inevi-
tably, government officials are in many cases 
not sufficiently knowledgeable about certain 
aspects of WEU's activities. It is natural for 
them to seek to overcome the Council's diffi-
culty in working out collegial replies by taking 
the easy way out and preparing vague, inade-
quate or dilatory replies. It is for the 
Secretariat-General to supply the necessary 
information in such cases and, above all, faced 
with the particular interest of a government or 
of the Council, to insist on the general interests 
of the institution, which is to give as much sub-
stance as possible to the dialogue between the 
Council and the Assembly. 
58. No doubt the Secretariat-General is aware 
of this general interest and proves it by playing 
an essential role in keeping the Assembly 
informed thanks inter alia to the Secretary-
General's regular letters to the President of the 
Assembly. These are an inestimable contri-
bution to exchanges between the two WEU 
organs. The half-yearly meetings that the 
56. If Article V of Protocol No. I set up a Political Committee has been able to have with 
WEU parliamentary assembly, in itself already a the Secretary-General have been particularly 
major modification of the initial treaty, it is interesting and the dialogue has been improved. 
because the signatories wished to make appli- The Assembly welcomes this, but it also 
cation of the modified treaty subject to parlia- wonders whether this is truly a dialogue with the 
mentary control, no doubt because they well Council, i.e. to what extent the governments 
knew how airily governments in recent history really commit themselves at such meetings or 
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whether they do not find it more convenient to 
leave it to the Secretary-General, under his own 
responsibility, to answer questions put by the 
parliamentarians. 
59. Similarly, after ministerial meetings, suc-
cessive chairmen-in-office of the Council have 
regularly agreed to inform either the Presi-
dential Committee alone or the committees of 
what happened at the meetings but, in the 
ensuing exchanges of views, they seem to have 
steadfastly described their own country's policy 
rather than reflect the collegial side of the 
Council. This is perfectly normal, but means 
that official communications from the Council 
to the Assembly retain their full importance. 
60. All these remarks lead to the same con-
clusion: now that Western Europe's responsibil-
ities in security and defence matters are 
increasing considerably and it is trying to set up 
a real political union in which WEU will have a 
place, the WEU Council is paying less and less 
attention to seeking a collegial expression of 
European policy. Yet it would seem logical for 
what is being done in the framework of the 
intergovernmental conference to be accom-
panied by practice in the framework of WEU 
drawing WEU closer to the Twelve at intergov-
ernmental level. In particular, there is no doubt 
that, in regard to humanitarian assistance to the 
Kurds, the governments did not manage to take 
decisions in WEU on the organisation of air 
transport which would have been the logical, 
essential complement to decisions taken by the 
Twelve on the assistance itself. One may 
therefore wonder about Europe's ability to 
translate into an energetic, coherent policy the 
provisions decided upon by the European 
Council from the moment they leave the specific 
area of the European Economic Community's 
responsibilities and, consequently, about the 
merits of the steps being taken by the intergov-
ernmental conference. 
61. In regard to relations between the Council 
and the Assembly, it emerges from the thirty-
sixth annual report of the Council that the con-
cerns of the two WEU organs are remarkably 
similar, at least for all that relates to political 
and space matters, whereas there is no mech-
anism for organising or making compulsory the 
co-ordination of their activities other than 
through replies to recommendations. Admit-
tedly, most of these topics were imposed by 
current events. It should also be noted that there 
is a real parallel between the Council's political 
conclusions and those of the Assembly, even if 
they are not identical. These are rather 
remarkable results and hearings of the Secretary-
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bodies, should make the Council pay greater 
attention to the standard of its communications 
to the Assembly. It should also make the 
Council keep the Assembly better informed of 
matters that it intends to tackle, just as the 
Assembly does by communicating the agenda of 
its next session to it six months in advance in 
order to maintain and strengthen the parallelism 
which the first part of the thirty-seventh annual 
report welcomes. 
62. The first part of the thirty-seventh annual 
report of the Council is unlikely to change the 
Assembly's opinion about how seriously the 
Council approaches the dialogue with it. On 
16th October, your Rapporteur put four written 
questions to the Council asking for details 
because he had noted that: 
(i) contrary to the claim in the annual 
report, the Council did not inform 
the Assembly of its decision of 11th 
July 1991 concerning United 
Kingdom forces stationed on the 
mainland of Europe, i.e. concerning 
the withdrawal of some of these 
forces (Written Question 292). In 
fact, the Council's replies to Recom-
mendation 479 and Written 
Question 289 show that the Council 
did not wish to give the Assembly 
any information on this point; 
(ii) the Council asserted in this annual 
report that WEU co-ordination in the 
Gulf had covered " land and air 
deployments and action ", which 
hardly seems to concord with the 
truth (Written Question 293); 
(iii) the Council approved a proposed 
reform of co-ordination between the 
western international organisations 
without informing the Assembly of 
the nature of that reform, although it 
concerns the staff of the Office of the 
Clerk (Written Question 290); 
(iv) the Council " welcomed the fact that 
the points raised by the Assembly " in 
Palermo on 26th March 1991 " on the 
future of European co-operation in 
security and defence questions " ... 
" had been taken into account in the 
debate which it was itself currently 
conducting on tl;le role of WEU in 
the new European security archi-
tecture ", which contradicts its reply 
to Recommendation 490 (Written 
Question 291). 
General at committee meetings have made a 63. Over and above this contradiction, it is 
major contribution to establishing a link above all clear from a report that is of a purely 
between the thinking of each side. This fact, administrative nature that the Council, which 
which certainly distinguishes the WEU extended its area of activity considerably in the 
Assembly from other European parliamentary first six months of 1991, is pursuing a more 
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restrictive policy than ever in regard to the 
information it gives the Assembly, even about 
matters which are in no way military. Thus, the 
report apparently refers to at least twelve docu-
ments that it has examined without transmitting 
them to the Assembly, including: 
- two directives concerning the co-
ordination of naval forces in the Gulf; 
- a report by the presidency on WEU 
co-ordination during the Gulf crisis; 
- a working paper prepared by the French 
presidency on lessons to be learned 
from the Gulf crisis; 
- a document by the presidency and a 
Spanish document on the role and place 
of WEU in the new European archi-
tecture. The Assembly would also have 
liked to know the conclusions drawn by 
the presidency and the Secretary-
General from their joint visit to Wash-
ington on the same subject. Only in the 
press did it learn of American 
approaches in this connection in the 
early months of 1991; 
- a report on the dialogue with the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe 
approved by the enlarged Council on 
lOth June; 
- proposals made by a United Kingdom 
Minister in application of Article VI of 
Protocol No. 11, not to speak of the 
Council decision of 26th June that the 
Council claims to have transmitted to 
the Assembly; 
- the exchange of letters between the 
presidency and the Greek and Nor-
wegian Governments on relations 
between those two countries and 
WEU; 
- the proposed reform of co-ordination; 
- the draft ministerial mandate prepared 
by the Defence Representatives Group; 
- the report by the verification experts on 
implementation of future co-operation 
in verification. 
64. To this list should be added the Institute's 
communications to the Council. It should above 
all be noted that the Assembly learned only from 
the press and Yugoslav sources of the creation 
under the aegis of WEU of a military head-
qu~rters set up in Metz to prepare possible 
action by WEU forces in Yugoslavia (if such 
sources are reliable). The most detailed infor-
mation on the subject was given in a dispatch 
from the Agence France-Presse (Paris, 21st 
October 1991) which, in the absence of a more 
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official communication from the Council, your 
Rapporteur will quote in full: 
"Military representatives from the head-
quarters of the various Western European 
Union (WEU) countries are now working 
in Metz (Moselle) on the formation of a 
force which might possibly be sent to 
Yugoslavia, it was learned on Monday 
from a well-informed source. 
These representatives are studying 
various possibilities for forces that might 
be sent to Yugoslav territory once all the 
conditions are met, in particular the 
agreement of the belligerents, said the 
same source. 
This 'WEU military cell' recalls the one 
set up in Paris at the Naval Ministry 
during the Gulf crisis and subsequently 
the war. At the time, the military head-
quarters of WEU - an organisation which 
groups the twelve countries of the EEC 
minus Greece, Ireland and Denmark -
had co-ordinated the deployment of their 
ships in the Gulf, the Red Sea and the 
Indian Ocean in order to enforce to the 
best of its ability the embargo decreed by 
the United Nations embargo against 
Iraq." 
65. So the Council may well welcome the 
divergence between its concerns and those ofthe 
Assembly! It is reall.Y not its fault but it has, on 
the contrary, done Its utmost for the Assembly 
to receive only a minimum of information on its 
activities. This attitude contrasts with that of the 
same ministers in the framework of the Twelve 
since, for instance, most of the texts relating to 
the intergovernmental conference on external 
policy and security were released immediately to 
the public. Naturally, the Assembly can under-
stand that certain texts may be covered by the 
secrecy that is necessary in defence matters, at 
least for a time. Does this still apply to texts con-
cerning WEU co-operation in the Gulf? In any 
event, it does not apply to most of the texts 
referred to in the annual report. 
66. There is no point in saying that much of 
the value of the Assembly's work, which is 
serious and to which the Council occasionally 
feels it should pay tribute, is lost because of the 
Council's policy which is a de facto violation of 
Article IX of the treaty. It sets the dialogue 
b~t.ween the Coun?il and the Assembly at a 
pitiful level and this also explains the public's 
lack of knowledge and indifference vis-a-vis 
WEU just when the intergovernmental con-
ference is starting to assign a more important 
role to it in the European defence system. 
67. . These a~e not new grievances but they are 
growmg steadily worse as WEU's intergovern-
mental activities increase, and they are opening 
a deep chasm between the two organs of WEU. 
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There has been no response to the Assembly's 
warnings about the deterioration of its official 
exchanges with the Council and the Assembly is 
powerless in face of the Council's constant, 
deliberate policy in this connection. 
68. It is hard to subscribe to the argument 
that distributing documents that have not been 
approved by the Council would deprive the 
expression of WED's identity of its collegial 
aspects. On the one hand, the Council shows 
little concern for this collegial expression, partic-
ularly when ministers hold simultaneous, indi-
vidual press conferences at the close of minis-
terial meetings. On the other hand, in order to 
exercise its scrutiny of the annual report on the 
activities of the Council in accordance with 
Article IX of the treaty, the Assembly needs to 
know as much as possible about the conditions 
in which decisions are taken. In the absence of 
other information, mere examination of an 
administrative text such as the annual report 
would be pointless. 
69. The Political Committee has examined 
the reasons for this absence of communication. 
It could but attribute responsibility to the Per-
manent Council since it has noted that it did not 
correspond to the policy pursued by the govern-
ments in other institutions or even in WEU, 
where the ministers or the Secretary-General 
have frequently shown their readiness to hold a 
dialogue. It considered that the composition of 
the Permanent Council made it an obstacle and 
a screen between the other WEU organs and the 
Assembly which has expressed the wish that the 
Permanent Council henceforth be composed of 
permanent representatives capable of following 
closely all WED's activities, which the ambas-
sadors in London cannot do. The Political Com-
mittee believes that moving the seat of the 
Council to Brussels, to which all the govern-
ments have now agreed, should provide an 
opportunity to effect this change in the attitude 
of the Council which is essential if a true dia-
logue is to be established between the Council 
and the Assembly. 
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what extent they engage the responsibility of the 
Institute and WEU. 
71. Your Rapporteur believes it would be 
desirable for the Assembly to be better informed 
about the activities of the Institute than it is 
through the Council's annual report, which 
comes late and is very brief and administrative. 
It would even be possible to consider members 
of the Assembly playing a greater role and more 
frequently in the work of the Institute. In par-
ticular, a request might be made that Assembly 
rapporteurs be systematically invited to attend 
meetings or receive documents concerning 
matters they have to handle. However, only the 
Institute itself or the Council can take the initi-
ative. On the other hand, the Institute has no 
need for an Assembly initiative in order to know 
about its work and it is a pity that the editorial 
on security in Eastern Europe in the Institute's 
July 1991 issue of its quarterly bulletin ignores 
the proposals made by the Assembly in Recom-
mendation 500 and the accompanying report by 
our colleague, Mr. Caro, which had been a 
public document since 27th March. 
72. Ambiguity about the status of the Institute 
and the way the Council interprets it was con-
firmed by an incident between the Assembly and 
the Council at the beginning of October. At its 
meeting in Strasbourg on 15th September, the 
Presidential Committee decided to invite the 
chairmanship-in-office to brief the Political and 
Defence Committees on the Council's reactions 
to the Yugoslav crisis. It was also decided to 
invite the Institute and experts from the French 
and United Kingdom Ministries of Defence to 
give their opinion "on the military aspects of 
that situation and on the technical requirements 
of the various actions for which WEU might pos-
sibly be made responsible ", to quote the words 
of the letter of 24th September 1991 in which the 
President of the Assembly asked the Secretary-
General to have the Council authorise a briefing 
by a representative of the Institute. This 
approach was based on the ministerial decision 
of 13th November 1989 according to which " the 
Assembly may, with the Council's approval, 
70. The smooth running of WEU should also assign to the Institute studies relating to the 
result in the establishment of co-operation Assembly's own activities". Since the same 
between the Assembly and the WEU Institute for decision specifies that the Institute's "research 
Security Studies. Co-operation is not facilitated will be carried out independently ", the Assembly 
by a degree of ambiguity about the status of the could not expect to receive any information from 
Institute, the nature of whose relations with the it on the Council's activities. Nevertheless, the 
Council is far from clear. It will be noted that answer received from the Deputy Secretary-
the Council refused to allow the Assembly any General, after the Permanent Council had dis-
band in guiding the work of the Institute cussed the matter, turned down this request 
although its Director, according to the annual because" in this case it [the Council] believed the 
report, attends - in certain conditions - German presidency was probably better placed to 
meetings of the Permanent Council, reports on give an opinion on the problems raised by the 
its activities to the Council and prepares studies present Yugoslav crisis". 
for it which have not yet been communicated to 
the Assembly. On the other hand, it has pub- 73. The Assembly cannot accept this answer 
lished at least two studies under the name of for two reasons: (a) It cannot allow the Council 
their authors, but it is not easy to ascertain to to replace it in determining who would be best 
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placed to give it an opinion inasmuch as this 
opinion does not relate directly to the activities 
of the Council. (b) The Council makes an 
opinion given " independently " equivalent to a 
communication by the presidency, which should 
express the collegial views of the Council. 
7 4. Furthermore, the Council was also 
opposed to the French and United Kingdom 
Ministries of Defence sending experts to brief 
Assembly committees on 15th October. Ambas-
sador Klaiber, representing the presidency, was 
therefore the only speaker at that meeting and 
expressed with competence and authority the 
view of the presidency which, it is to be hoped, 
was also that of the Council. However, asked 
about the Council's refusal to allow a briefing by 
the Institute, he said he knew nothing at all 
about the matter, thus throwing light on the role 
played by the Permanent Council to the det-
riment of the information conveyed to the 
Assembly. Instead of trying to achieve a collegial 
expression of the governments' views, the Per-
manent Council is endeavouring, not without 
success, to erect a screen between the Assembly 
and the Council proper. The Assembly can but 
protest strongly at such behaviour. 
75. Where the Institute is concerned, it must 
also recall that the ministerial decision of 13th 
November 1989 specifies that " the Assembly 
shall have access to the results of the Institute's 
unclassified work". However, paragraph 1 of 
Chapter IX of the first part of the thirty-seventh 
annual report of the Council indicates that " the 
Institute produced several discussion papers on 
topical subjects for the Council and its working 
groups ", such as " What future for European 
defence co-operation?" and" Arms control after 
1992 ". Are these studies really classified and if 
so is classification justified by reasons other 
than the Council's determination to keep tlie 
Assembly at a distance from the Institute's 
activities? The same is true for the summary 
records of seminars organised by the Institute in 
which representatives of countries not members 
of WEU have participated but of which the 
Assembly is not informed, and also for the quar-
terly reports on the activities of the Institute. 
76. If one recalls the role the Assembly played 
in promoting the creation of the Institute, it has 
to be noted that the Council, violating the com-
mitments it entered into in November 1989, has 
made the Institute its own instrument without 
there even being any guarantee that it really 
gains much from the work submitted to it by the 
Institute. 
which asks that the Security and Disarmament 
Subcommittee of the European Parliament be 
invited, together with members of the WEU 
Assembly, to take part in a consultative com-
mittee which would help the [WEU] Institute for 
Security Studies to plan its activities. This 
report proposes a programme of work for the 
Institute which would include studies of: 
- the concept of a European security 
identity; 
- new European security structures and 
the specific position of Central and 
Eastern European countries; 
- matters relating to the defence of 
Western Europe; 
- the economic aspects of European 
security; 
- the North-South dimensions of Euro-
pean security. 
78. It will be most interesting to examine the 
answer the governments, and in particular the 
governments of WEU countries, will give to 
these proposals after the way the WEU 
Assembly was dismissed when it reminded the 
Council of the implications of the decision of 
13th November 1989. 
79. The thirty-sixth annual report mentions 
the Council's intention of continuing the expe-
rience of European sessions of advanced defence 
studies, but no new session is announced. The 
Assembly would obviously be very happy to 
have a more precise knowledge of the conclu-
sions the Council has drawn from earlier ses-
sions. It notes that the first part of the thirty-
seventh annual report indicates that no sessions 
were organised in 1991 and that- the next one 
will be held in Germany only in 1992. 
VI. Conclusiou 
80. An overall assessment of the Council's 
activities since mid-1990 must quite obviously 
be tempered. It is evident that, during the Gulf 
crisis, the Council was unusually active and 
WEU thus appeared to be the instrument by 
means of which twelve-power Europe could 
assume a new dimension, if not by acquiring the 
means of a joint defence policy, at least by 
setting up, to quote the annual report, " unprece-
dented political and military co-ordination 
arrangements... with the participation of every 
member country, each according to its own pro-
cedures. Although limited, this action demon-
77. The matter becomes even more strange in strated the Europeans' will to act as one". 
that the European Parliament, after asking, Unfortunately, this will was subsequently not 
apparently in vain, for a Community institute demonstrated with such intensity, be it in 
for security studies to be set up, is now calling affording humanitarian assistance to the Kurds, 
for direct relations with the WEU Institute. This or in the Yugoslav problem, unless importance 
is the subject of a report submitted to that par- should be attributed to the establishment, if con-
liament by Mr. McMillan-Scott on 23rd October firmed, of a military headquarters to plan WEU 
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action in Yugoslavia. However, the Assembly 
has not been informed about this. Nor was this 
will shown in " the launching of a process of fun-
damental change in WEU, where the aim has 
been to give the organisation a substantive oper-
ational role of its own within the Atlantic 
Alliance linked with the creation of political 
union ". It is necessary to wait for the extraor-
dinary ministerial meeting on 29th October to 
know whether the WEU Council intends to act 
or whether it has to wait, in order to assess the 
changes, for NATO and the intergovernmental 
conference to define the limits of their area of 
activity before, in turn, studying the area left 
free. 
81. The only Council initiatives that, to a 
certain extent, commit the future of the 
organisation are: 
(a) the meeting of chiefs of defence staff 
" to undertake a military appraisal of 
the challenges to European security 
and of co-operation programmes 
among member states ", about which 
the Assembly has received only the 
minimum information; 
(b) the twofold Vianden decision relating 
to the creation of a satellite data inter-
pretation centre and a study of a pro-
gramme for the military use of 
space; 
(c) the announced intention of intensi-
fying contacts with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the 
development of the Council's rela-
tions with Denmark, Greece and 
Turkey; 
(d) the announced development of the 
study of Mediterranean problems, be 
it the settlement of conflicts or the 
proposed CSCM. However, the 
meagre information given to the 
Assembly on these two points suggests 
that little progress has been made; 
(e) the same is true of the German 
proposal for strategic means of 
transport. 
82. Conversely, it must be borne in mind that 
it was in the framework of the Twelve that 
several governments made important proposals 
that essentially concerned the future of WEU 
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and that it is at the Maastricht summit meeting, 
outside the WEU Council, that the real deci-
sions relating to the definition of a European 
defence policy are to be taken. It is gratifying to 
note, however, that on 29th October 1991, the 
German presidency decided to tackle this 
question in the framework of WEU. 
83. Furthermore, the Assembly has to note 
that, while the presidency has made serious 
efforts to inform the press and public of the 
Council's initiatives in the Gulf affair, the 
results were limited and, on the whole, the 
importance ofWEU's action in this area was not 
clearly perceived. Nor have the continuity of 
WEU's activities or the nature of the questions 
raised by its relations with NATO, the EEC and 
the CSCE been explained satisfactorily. 
84. However, the Assembly must above all 
emphasise that the Council has not used the pos-
sibilities offered by the institutional dialogue 
that the treaty obliges it to hold with the 
Assembly for WEU's activities to be made 
known to the public. Although, at meetings held 
in camera, the ministers or the Secretary-
General show a real will for dialogue, the institu-
tional instruments for these statutory exchanges 
are deliberately neglected as if, in the framework 
of WEU, the parliamentary institution was also 
considered as an obstacle to the smooth running 
of the organisation. The interesting and cordial 
dialogues that have been held between the Presi-
dential or other committees and the presidency 
or the Secretary-General sometimes seem 
intended more to calm any discontent shown by 
the Assembly than to ensure the openness that 
each of the governments claims to wish to 
introduce into WEU's activities. Yet, in many 
cases, the Assembly has proved to be a useful 
partner for the Council's action and it has 
helped to make known and have accepted by the 
public the role played by WEU and its possible 
importance. It is paradoxical that, just when the 
governments seem to agree about giving WEU 
an important place in the European archi-
tecture, the Council is showing so little will-
ingness to place its exchanges with the Assembly 
at a suitable level. It is also paradoxical that just 
when the Assembly can at last welcome 
important action by WEU which responds to the 
new requirements of security in Europe, the 
Council continues to provide the Assembly 
- and through it, the European public - with so 
little and such poor information. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
General report - actirities of the WEU Council 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
2nd December 1991 
1. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after " WEU " insert " where this is 
approved by national governments ". 
2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out" allow Europe to play a more 
active role in disarmament matters " and insert " make it possible for Europe to play a much more 
active role in disarmament matters". 
Signed: Hardy 
I. See lOth sitting, 3rd December 1991 (amendment I negatived; amendment 2 agreed to). 
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The evolution of WEU's public relations 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relation 2 
by Mr. Ewing, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the evolution of WEU's public relation 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Ewing, Chairman and Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. WEU, once Sleeping Beauty, then Cinderella, now bone of contention? 
Ill. Action taken on Assembly Recommendation 494 
IV. The Assembly contribution to enhancing WEU's public relations - possibilities and 
limits 
V. Conclusions 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ewing (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Mr. Mii/ler), Sir William Shelton (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Biihler (Alternate: Junghanns), Caccia, De Bondt, Esteves, Eversdijk, Fiandrotti, Mrs. Frias, MM. 
Gouteyron, Greco, Sir John Hunt, Sir Russe/1 Johnston, MM. Kempinaire, Kollwelter, Lemoine, Lopez Henares, Nufiez, Pfuhl, 
Reimann, Seitlinger (Alternate: Forni), Stegagnini (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Tummers (Alternate: Dees), Vial-Massat. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the evolution of WEU's public rellltions 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the public's interest in WEU's future role and function has never been so high 
as in the second half of 1991; 
(ii) Deploring that neither the Council nor member governments have so far been able to explain 
adequately in public the organisation's achievements and contributions, particularly during the Gulf 
crisis, in order to avoid misunderstanding among the European and American public; 
(iii) Considering that the Council's reply to Recommendation 494 is insufficient; 
(iv) Noticing that the two parts of the thirty-sixth annual report and the first part of the thirty-
seventh annual report of the Council contain no mention of the Council's public relations activities, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Consider again the Assembly's proposals made in Mr. Pontillon's Written Question 285 and in 
Recommendation 494 and in particular: 
- publish basic information documents for widespread circulation in all member countries and 
in North America; 
- create a WEU periodical in the official languages of the member countries; 
- urge member governments to release more information about the activities of the various 
WEU bodies; 
2. By implementing an effective communications campaign, provide a clear public explanation of 
WEU's position in the present international debate on its future role and place in the European and 
Atlantic framework; 
3. Instruct the Secretary-General to implement his reported plan to circulate a booklet on WEU in 
the languages of all member countries for the use of pupils in the senior classes of secondary schools; 
4. Study the possibility of circulating other information documents with the assistance of the WEU 
Institute for Security Studies; 
5. Resume its information to the Assembly on its public relations activities in its annual reports as 
used to be the practice; 
6. Earmark sufficient funds for a study of a general communications strategy and the wherewithal 
to implement it. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Ewing, Chairman IUid Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Nobody would have expected this some 
years ago, but it is true: Western European Union 
is on the front pages of the international press 
and continues to be there. Over decades it 
seemed first and foremost to be the concern of 
the Assembly to convince public opinion that the 
organisation still existed and did useful work. 
Now the interest of the public and of the press in 
the role of WEU has grown to the point that, at 
the beginning of 1991, the Permanent Council 
instructed the Secretariat-General to produce 
summaries of the coverage of WEU activities by 
the international press and the debate on its 
future. 
2. Such press reviews might be useful if the 
Council used them as a basis to work out a solid 
and co-ordinated information policy in order to 
avoid public misunderstanding or misleading or 
wrong press reports. But we are far from that. 
One example might stand for many others: at the 
end of the extraordinary ministerial meeting on 
Yugoslavia in The Hague on 19th September 
1991, ministers decided not to publish any decla-
ration but several of them gave separate press 
conferences in which journalists could find little 
unity but many differences. 
3. Of course it is not possible to demonstrate 
a united position in public if there is no con-
sensus. But more serious is the fact that the 
Council has even been unable to present in an 
effective way to the public what WEU was able to 
achieve in recent times. 
4. ~ost member governments and the 
Council itself still do not pay enough attention to 
public information policy or, if they recognise its 
importance, they do not act accordingly. The 
interested public therefore continues to rely on 
the electronic media and the press which them-
selves have difficulties in obtaining correct infor-
mation and which, again, do not pay much 
attention to information on WEU since they 
know little about its activities. 
II. WEU, once Sleeping Beauty, then Cinderella, 
now bone of contention? 
5. During the Gulf conflict, the United 
States Government and its military command 
did their utmost to inform American and inter-
national opinion regularly about what was hap-
pening and their actions in the area. It was 
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impressive to see how the American Gov-
ernment made use of all the means of communi-
cation at its disposal including daily press 
briefings, interviews and written information. 
This was due to longstanding experience proving 
that, to be successful, political and military 
action must have the firm backing of the public. 
Such procedure was automatic in a continent 
where the importance of public relations in 
political life has a longstanding tradition. 
6. And the European contribution? The 
main impression transmitted to the public and 
repeated incessantly was that Europe was absent 
from the Gulf conflict, there being merely con-
tributions from certain European countries on a 
strictly national basis. 
7. The general public is still unaware that 
WEU made a major contribution to imple-
menting the naval embargo on Iraq decided 
upon by the United Nations Security Council in 
co-ordinating the naval forces of WEU member 
countries which were present in the Gulf with 
more than thirty-five vessels; that WEU asked 
the United Nations Security Council to extend 
the embargo to air traffic; that WEU convened 
for the first time in its history a meeting of the 
chiefs-of-staff in order to examine military pro-
visions and means of co-ordination in the area; 
that WEU co-ordinated logistic support for 
ground and air forces; that WEU co-ordinated 
humanitarian aid for the Iraqi civilian popu-
lation, in particular the Kurds, victims of 
repression in Iraq, and that WEU carried out the 
major task of mine-sweeping in the area by 
sending a mine-hunting force composed of naval 
units of WEU member countries for operation 
" cleansweep ". 
8. The communiques issued at the close of 
the ministerial meetings of the Council on 21st 
August and 18th September, lOth December 
1990, 17th January, 22nd February and 8th 
April 1991 were too general and vague to give a 
clear picture of what the organisation really did 
in this conflict. 
9. It is obvious that some member govern-
ments - for different reasons - did not want 
their participation in the Gulf conflict to be pre-
sented under the WEU flag. Thus a unique 
chance for improving WED's public image was 
missed. The first part of the thirty-seventh 
annual report of the Council, which reached the 
Assembly on 14th October 1991, contains a fact 
sheet on mine clearance and the enforcement of 
the naval embargo during the Gulf crisis, but 
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this was too late for communication to the 
public for information purposes. 
10. Another missed chance was on 27th June 
1991 when the Ministerial Council - following 
steady pressure from the Assembly - decided to 
set up a satellite data interpretation centre. This 
decision was announced in paragraph 6 of the 
communique issued at the close of the Vianden 
meeting. This meeting was overshadowed by 
other current political events and particularly by 
the start of the crisis in Yugoslavia. Without 
special information on this important decision, 
with few exceptions even most of the specialised 
press were still not aware of this two weeks later. 
11. Apart from the abovementioned com-
munique, the Council had issued a " public doc-
ument " on the decision setting up a WEU sat-
ellite centre. In this document it was explained 
that the centre will be a subsidiary body ofWEU 
in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 2, of 
the modified Brussels Treaty, and further 
important details were communicated in that 
document. 
12. The document was not sent officially to 
the Assembly until more than two months after 
the decision was taken. It is not known if and 
how the Council used it for press information 
but its public impact was practically nil. (Only 
on 16th September 1991 did a major article on 
this issue appear in Defence News). This poor 
result is the more regrettable the more it 
becomes evident that the Council's decision 
might have major political and practical conse-: 
quences with regard to Europe's independence 
in earth observation. 
13. On 27th June 1991, the WEU Council of 
Ministers issued a special public statement on 
Yugoslavia which was echoed by a large number 
of European and American newspapers. The 
interest of the international press was again 
aroused at the beginning of August when France 
requested the convocation of an extraordinary 
meeting of the WEU Council in order to 
examine the situation in Yugoslavia. This was 
held on 7th August at the level of the permanent 
representatives. The Permanent Council 
decided not to issue a communique but to 
release elements for responses to enquiries from 
the press. 
14. WEU's real public breakthrough was on 
17th September and the following week when it 
was made known that the Netherlands had 
requested an extraordinary meeting of the WEU 
Council of Ministers in order to examine the 
possibilities of sending a European peace-
keeping force to Yugoslavia. For more than a 
week thereafter, the role of WEU in settling the 
crisis was topical in the major European news-
papers. Never before had WEU thus been the 
centre of public interest. 
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15. However, there has since been neither 
communiques nor agreed guidelines for 
informing the public and the press has been left 
alone to assess the situation before and after the 
extraordinary meeting of WEU ministers which 
was held on 19th September. On the other hand, 
the twelve foreign ministers of European poli-
tical co-operation held their meeting just before 
the WEU meeting and issued a public decla-
ration which is important for several reasons. 
16. First the Twelve (and not the WEU min-
isters) declared that no military intervention in 
Yugoslavia was contemplated, secondly that the 
European Community gave a mandate to WEU 
to explore ways in which it could protect the 
activities of the monitors and thirdly that the 
European Community wished to endorse any 
conclusion of a WEU study in this direction. 
17. This declaration and the absence of any 
public statement from the WEU Council (apart 
from a press conference given by the German 
Chairman-in-Office and several separate press 
conferences by other ministers) gave the public 
the clear impression that WEU is totally 
dependent on the Community and has no 
mandate of its own in security matters. Since 
this is a totally new interpretation of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, the Council should explain 
it more explicitly in public. But again no 
communique was issued after the extraordinary 
meeting of the WEU Council in Brussels on 30th 
September 1991. 
18. Clearer public explanations are also nec-
essary in a more general way with regard to 
WEU's future role and functions in the new 
European and Atlantic security architecture. At 
the close of its extraordinary meeting in Paris on 
22nd February 1991, which was devoted just to 
these problems, the Council issued a public doc-
ument on WEU's role and place in the new 
European security architecture based on a paper 
prepared by the Secretary-General. The presi-
dency however stressed that "given the nature 
of the subject ", the document at this stage had 
not been formally agreed. It therefore may serve 
for discussion but not as a basis for information 
to the wider public. 
19. Furthermore, its message is difficult to 
understand without further explanation for a 
public which is not familiar with the rela-
tionship between the numerous international 
organisations. With regard to WEU's future role, 
the document states that " WEU possesses a 
number of institutional advantages which could 
allow it to act as a bridge between the process of 
European integration and the Atlantic Alliance " 
(paragraph 10 of the document). The notion of 
" bridge " has been repeated several times by 
WEU ministers and officials, but the question is 
how can this be explained tangibly in a public 
discussion? 
20. The Vianden communique on 27th June 
1991 devotes the first chapter to the " role and 
place of WEU in the security architecture " in 
which it expresses the desire " that WEU be fully 
part of the process of European integration 
while enhancing its contribution to solidarity 
within the Atlantic Alliance ". The international 
press showed considerable interest in the 
outcome of the Vianden meeting and the 
numerous press commentaries reflected their 
uncertainty in drawing firm conclusions about 
WEU's future. 
21. The Guardian for instance stated on 28th 
June that WEU was lying " uneasily between the 
European Community and NATO ". Fur-
thermore it went on: " The WEU communique 
did not make explicit reference to a possible 
future rapid deployment force ... " In fact, this 
question was of topical public interest. 
According to the Guardian, officials said that 
the reference in the communique to making 
co-operation among WEU governments " more 
operational both in the politico-military field as 
well as in the military field proper " clearly 
implied a possible force in future. 
22. The question remains open, as do many 
others such as WEU's future relations with the 
Eastern European states and the former Soviet 
Union mentioned in paragraph 3 of the 
communique. In the public debate on WEU, the 
confusion has been increased by recent bilateral 
meetings and communiques issued by the 
United Kingdom and Italy, by France and 
Germany, together with public statements by 
representatives of the Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Community. But where is the voice of 
Western European Union itself? So far only the 
President of the Assembly issued a press release 
on 17th October 1991 welcoming the latest 
Franco-German initiative and calling for deci-
sions by the WEU Council. 
23. When the German Government took over 
the presidency of Western European Union for 
one year as from 1st July 1991, its London 
Embassy issued a press release in which the new 
presidency announced its intention " to bring 
more clearly to the fore WEU's bridging 
function between the Atlantic Alliance and 
European political union... Germany will be 
co-ordinator inside WEU and in foreign rela-
tions WEU's representative to work towards 
realising the concepts for the union's future role 
in the European security structure... German 
presidency will be seeking to define a more oper-
ational role for WEU, its relationships with the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, dis-
armament issues and arms control as well as co-
operation in space matters ". 
24. The new presidency thus summarised a 
complicated future programme of work for 
WEU which is not only difficult to achieve but 
also to explain in public. The second task is as 
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important as the first. If the gap between the 
activities and the achievements of an organ-
isation such as WEU and the public awareness 
of them becomes too great, it may have very 
negative repercussions on the international credit 
of the organisation and its future prospects. One 
should not minimise the influence the press has 
on public opinion and on politicians, ministers, 
officials and members of parliament... 
25. In present circumstances, this gap still 
exists. According to the introduction of the first 
part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the 
Council " during the first half of 1991, the 
Council's activities were particularly intense". 
But one should not be surprised to read in the 
press words such as" Western European Union, 
the obscure defence group ... whose membership 
even political specialists have difficulty 
identifying " 1, " WEU, not even a paper tiger 
but a paper butterfly" 2, "Embryonic defence 
grouping" 3, "WEU, Europe's teetering pillar", 
"Die WEU, ein Holzweg" 4 (WEU, the wrong 
tack), " WEU im politischen Dammer-
zustand " 5 (WEU in a political twilight); 
"Western European UniOI).; a largely dormant 
group" 6, "Die in der Offentlichkeit kaum 
bekannte WEU " (WEU hardly known by the 
public) 7, "The obscure Western European 
Union" 8, etc. Furthermore, a number of news-
papers deem it necessary to introduce WEU in a 
special way presuming that the readers have no 
idea of it. For instance: "Western European 
Union, a regional defence body ... has tradi-
tionally been overshadowed by NATO" 9, or" a 
regional military body called Western European 
Union" 10• So, shall this organisation be con-
demned to play the role of Cinderella within the 
international organisations or it is now a bone of 
contention between them? 
Ill. Action taken 
on Assembly Recommendation 494 
26. It took about half a year for the WEU 
Council to be able to transmit its reply to Rec-
ommendation 494 on enhancing WEU's public 
relations adopted by the Assembly on 5th 
December 1990 on the basis of the report tabled 
by Mr. Roman on behalf of the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations 11 • This rec-
l. Los Angeles Times, 2nd July 1991. 
2. Armed forces Journal international, 9th July 1991. 
3. The Daily Telegraph, 8th June 1991. 
4. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
5. Die Zeit, 9th June 1991. 
6. International Herald Tribune, 20th September 1991. 
7. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20th September 1991. 
8. The Washington Post, 22nd October 1991. 
· 9. International Herald Tribune, 17th September 1991. 
10. International Herald Tribune, 18th September 1991. 
11. Document 1246. 
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ommendation referred particularly to Question 
285 put by Mr. Pontillon on 16th January 
1990 12 to which the Council had not yet replied 
when Mr. Roman presented his report. This 
reply arrived only on 30th November 1990, just 
before the Assembly's December session. As the 
Council's reply to Recommendation 494 refers 
mainly to its reply to Question 285, the latter 
should be examined first. 
27. The Council confirmed that it "shares 
the ... concern that public opinion should be kept 
fully informed of WEU activities ". It even con-
siders " that the momentum generated by WEU 
reactivation must be reflected in an active 
public relations policy". 
28. Regarding the concrete proposals, 
however, contained in Mr. Pontillon's written 
question, the Council took action only on pro-
posal 3 (a) in issuing press communiques at the 
close of meetings of the Permanent Council. 
Regarding proposals 3 (g) and (h), (strengthening 
co-operation with groups, associations, private 
institutes, industrial associations, trades unions, 
cultural associations, educational establishments 
and universities) the Council referred to the 
activities of the new WEU. Institute for Security 
Studies. (See paragraph 36 below). 
29. The Council gave no specific reply to pro-
posal3 (d) to establish WEU information offices 
in the European member countries of the 
alliance and in particular in the United States 
and Canada. It said only in general " that... 
action should be conducted in a variety of ways 
through WEU bodies, each adapting its own par-
ticular approach rather than through the setting 
up of specific new communications structures ". 
30. When the Assembly recommended 
working out a communication strategy both in 
Europe and in North America, the Council 
referred to the Secretary-General's recent con-
tacts and those of the Institute with authorities 
on the other side of the Atlantic. It is obvious 
that these ad hoc activities fall well short of what 
is necessary for providing public opinion in the 
United States with an improved image ofWEU. 
The Institute itself stressed in the second edition 
of its new quarterly news letter the need for a 
continuing dialogue between WEU and the 
United States. 
31. The Council made absolutely no 
comment on the proposals in paragraph 3: 
- to publish basic information documents 
for widespread circulation in all 
member countries (b); 
12. Document 1254. 
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- to create a WEU periodical in the 
official languages of all member coun-
tries (c); 
- to invite member governments to 
release more information about WEU 
(e); 
- to define methods of organising 
opinion polls at European level {/); 
- to use television as a mean of pre-
senting WEU (i), 
and in paragraph 4: 
- to grant the financial means WEU 
needs to pursue a public information 
policy. 
32. Nevertheless, when Mr. Kempinaire put a 
question on Recommendation 494 in the 
Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 19th 
February 1991, the Belgian Government issued 
the following good news: 
" ... I would point out an initiative by the 
Secretary-General who, under his own 
responsibility, will in the near future be 
circulating a booklet on WEU in the lan-
guages of all member countries for the use 
of pupils in the .senior classes of secondary 
schools." 
When will the pupils have a chance to see and 
read such a booklet? 
33. According to the reply to Question 285, 
the Council attributes different responsibilities 
in public relation matters to the Presidency, the 
Secretary-General, the Institute and the 
Assembly. The Council says that" as a part of its 
role to stimulate debate, it is for the Presidency 
to assume responsibility for political infor-
mation. It fulfils that responsibility towards the 
Assembly, to which the country holding the 
presidency regularly presents a report on the 
Council's role". In its reply to Recommendation 
494, the Council reiterates that the effort to 
inform public opinion on WEU activities has 
continued... particularly as regards the 
Assembly ". 
34. Thus the Council repeats its longstanding 
position according to which its relations with 
the Assembly are considered mainly as " public 
relations ". This is unacceptable. According to 
the treaty, the Assembly forms an integral part 
of the organisation as a whole and cannot be 
handled as if it were only a branch of the general 
public. The dialogue between the Council and 
the Assembly has special significance based on 
the modified Brussels Treaty. Unfortunately this 
dialogue with the Assembly is so far not 
intensive, regular and substantial enough to 
stimulate a meaningful public debate. The 
Chairman-in-Office with his strong position in 
the organisation's structure can be assured that 
he would be in the centre of public interest if he 
made greater use of the important public rela-
tions means a government has at its disposal in 
order to promote what may be described as " an 
active public relations policy ". 
35. The Council underlines that "the WEU 
Secretary-General also has an important task in 
the area of public relations and contact with the 
press ". His relevant activities in fact have 
always been welcomed and appreciated by the 
Assembly. Nevertheless, he often cannot speak 
for the Council but only under his own responsi-
bility, and his personal abilities and technical 
and financial means have their limits. The 
Assembly, however, notes with interest the news 
that "the Secretariat-General also issues press 
releases, information and leaflets and is cur-
rently increasing its efforts in this direction ". 
What specific results have been achieved? What 
kind of information is issued, to whom and what 
leaflets have been published? 
36. Furthermore, the Council assures that 
" the creation of the WEU Institute for Security 
Studies ... is in a sense also a response to the need 
for information. One of the Institute's missions 
is to stimulate the public debate ". It then refers 
to the Institute organising various seminars and 
contacts with study and research centres, leading 
academics, industrialists, journalists and parlia-
mentarians. 
37. Since most of these meetings take place in 
camera and are not supposed to be reported in 
public in order to facilitate free speaking, the 
work of the Institute and even its existence is 
not generally well known. It is therefore to be 
welcomed that in spring 1991 the Institute 
started publishing a "Quarterly Newsletter" in 
which its current activities are summarised. For 
instance, recent newsletters reported the intro-
duction of two study awards, one for academics 
or officials of WEU countries and the other for 
young people from Eastern and Central Europe 
working on international security questions. 
38. Furthermore, this year the Institute 
started publishing the " Chaillot Papers " based 
on work carried out by or on behalf of the 
Institute. Every Assembly representative has the 
possibility of obtaining these papers on request. 
So far, two papers have been published, one on 
" European defence, why not the Twelve " and 
another on " European security across the Medi-
terranean ". At the end of the year, the Institute 
plans to issue a first major publication on 
" European integration and the Gulf crisis " 
based on a project for collective work in order to 
compare various national experiences and the 
immediate lessons that each WEU country has 
learnt from its specific involvement in each 
stage of the Gulf crisis. According to the third 
Quarterly Newsletter of the Institute, another 
paper on " European Security Integration in the 
1990s" is to be published shortly. 
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39. By its very nature as a research centre, 
one cannot expect that the public impact of its 
work will be very great. This does not diminish 
the importance of its work. Unfortunately, there 
is no indication that the Council has followed up 
the Assembly's recommendation that the 
Institute help in elaborating a comprehensive 
communications strategy nor that the Institute 
itself has devoted a branch of its activities to 
studying how the organisation could develop its 
public relations. 
40. Finally, the Council's answer to Mr. 
Pontillon's written question contains no indi-
cation that the Council has asked member gov-
ernments to release more information about 
WEU. This is regrettable since most govern-
ments are reluctant in this regard, although 
some of them spend vast sums of money on 
informing their own public about various other 
activities. The German Government, for 
instance, answering a question put by Mr. 
Antretter on 7th March 1991, repeated that it 
would only consider " publishing an information 
booklet on Western European Union" when 
" more was known about the future role of WEU 
in an evolving European environment... In par-
ticular, the results of the intergovernmental con-
ference on political union now being held must 
be awaited " 13• Thus, the fulfilment of a firm 
promise made by this government already in 
October 1988, has been postponed yet again. 
41. Summarising the Council's reaction to 
Written Question 285 and Recommendation 
494 as well as the concrete follow up action it 
has taken, the result is rather depressing. Only 
the Belgian Government, answering a question 
put by Mr. Kempinaire in the Chamber of Rep-
resentatives on 19th March 1991, said that it 
went without saying that the Belgian Gov-
ernment would follow up Recommendation 
494. 
IV. The Assembly's contribution to enhancing 
WEU's public relations 
- possibilities and limits 
42. At the end of its answer to Written 
Question 285, the Council "welcomes the 
impetus given by the Assembly in informing 
public opinion; its members can, in the 
respective parliaments, play a useful role in 
mobilising opinion on European security, and 
more particularly on WEU's efforts in the new 
European context". Furthermore, in its reply to 
Recommendation 494, " the Council welcomes 
the activities conducted by the Assembly, such 
as the joint meeting of its committees in 
Palermo on 24th to 26th March 1991 and the 
visit of a delegation to Egypt on 28th April to 
13. Collected Texts No. 53, page 25. 
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2nd May 1991, a useful contribution towards 
enhancing international awareness of WEU ". 
43. These reactions are remarkable for several 
reasons. First, the Assembly is delighted that the 
Council pays tribute to its activities and above-
mentioned meetings and hopes that this is an 
indication that the Council's recent difficulties 
in providing the Assembly in reasonable time 
with an operational budget will belong to the 
past. Secondly, as demonstrated particularly in 
the first half of 1991, WEU representatives have 
made a greater .effort in their home parliaments 
to instigate the public debate on security 
matters. 
44. Regarding the wish to propagate WEU's 
efforts in the new European context however, 
Assembly members cannot do more than ask the 
Council and member governments to give more 
information about these efforts and WEU's 
future role. The replies they receive however are 
in most cases far from satisfactory. 
45. As a result, the lasting impression among 
the public is that there is neither a consensus 
within member countries nor a firm determi-
nation to reach such a consensus. There is rather 
a tendency to wait for results in other forums 
such as the intergovernmental conference on 
European political union. As it was stated 
already in Recommendation 494, the Council 
cannot transfer the burden of information 
responsibilities to members of the Assembly. 
46. Conversely the Assembly considers it as 
one of its responsibilities to use the impact a 
public debate can have to urge the Council and 
member governments to reach a consensus in 
order to overcome difficulties and deadlocks. It 
has increased considerably the number of those 
who receive regularly the texts of recommenda-
tions adopted by the Assembly. Starting in 1989, 
the transmission of Assembly reports and other 
documents to external recipients (journalists, 
embassies, institutes, ministries, libraries, par-
liaments, political parties, individuals, etc.) has 
increased by about 400% in comparison with 
1988. Nevertheless, there is no slackening in 
requests for information emanating from the 
public. However, with its present means and 
personnel the Assembly's ability to spread infor-
mation has reached its limits. 
47. Up to September 1991, the Assembly 
issued more than thirty-six press releases on 
topical security questions (compared with 
twenty-seven for the whole year in 1990 and 
twenty-three in 1989). Most of them were pub-
lished by the Assembly's President and Presi-
dential Committee, but some were also issued 
by committees and political groups. 
48. Furthermore, the Assembly's press 
department circulated in the form of press 
releases, summaries of a number of conferences 
held by members of the WEU Ministerial Coun-
168 
cil (for instance those given by MM. Hurd, 
Dumas and J oxe) as well a summary of the 
Secretary-General's speech to the Assembly in 
June 1991. The Assembly's efforts to enhance its 
public information service are not intended to 
compete with those of the Council but to serve 
the interests of the organisation as a whole. 
49. The Assembly shares the opinion that all 
WEU organs have a collective responsibility to 
make the organisation known to the public. The 
growing number of articles published and inter-
views given by the President of the Assembly 
and by members of the Presidential Committee 
is only one example of how members of the 
Assembly are aware of their responsibilities. 
50. The permanent efforts of the Committee 
for Parliamentary and Public Relations to 
instigate and co-ordinate follow-up action in 
member parliaments based on the adopted texts 
remain a difficult task of varying success 
depending on the particular situation in each 
member country. Working relations with the 
Portuguese and the Spanish Parliaments should 
be enhanced. The committee and its members 
should not hesitate to use the assistance of dele-
gation secretaries who officially take part in its 
meetings and activities. 
51. The important role of national delega-
tions has been underlined in the past, particu-
larly in Resolution 82 based on the report on the 
new role of national delegations in the activities 
of WEU tabled by Sir John Hunt 14 on behalf of 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations. It is welcome news that - as Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg informed the President of the 
Assembly and the Assembly's secretariat by 
letter dated 3rd July 1991 - the United 
Kingdom Delegation has started issuing a 
regular information bulletin on the activities of 
this delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe and the WEU Assembly, 
the first number covering the period June 1990 
- March 1991. The document was primarily pre-
pared for the information of parliamentary col-
leagues but a copy was also sent to the Prime 
Minister. 
52. Thus the United Kingdom Delegation has 
followed the initiative taken by the French Dele-
gation at the beginning of 1990. In order to 
inform the other delegations about this new and 
useful initiative and to give them some incentive 
for considering similar action (particularly in 
the new Spanish and Portuguese Delegations) 
the United Kingdom information bulletin has 
been transmitted to all member delegations. 
53. The Belgian Delegation has recently 
announced that, starting with the Assembly's 
next session, it intends to include a brief 
14. Document 1227. 
summary of Assembly reports in the weekly 
information bulletin published by the Chamber 
of Representatives. This bulletin is sent, among 
others, to journalists accredited to the Chamber, 
ministers and secretaries-general of ministerial 
departments, the Belgian members of the 
European Parliament, leaders of political 
parties, certain institutions (universities, etc.) 
and anyone requesting it. 
54. Furthermore it should be repeated that 
the German Government is still the only WEU 
member government to transmit half yearly 
reports to parliament on the activities of 
Western European Union. The public impact of 
this document however is diminished by the fact 
that it is destined only for the information of 
members of the Bundestag and not debated in 
plenary session. 
55. Last but not least, in order to enhance the 
public impact of its new logo, the Assembly has 
recently ordered a number of" pins" showing 
the Assembly logo which will soon be available. 
One should not underestimate the importance of 
such means in making WEU more visible to the 
public eye, particularly at a time when pin col-
lecting has become so popular. There are cer-
tainly various other means of enhancing WED's 
image. For instance, many national postal min-
istries pay tribute to the work of most of the 
existing international organisations by issuing 
special postage stamps. This has not been done 
for WEU, however. It will have its fortieth anni-
versary in 1994. Why not create a WEU postage 
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stamp to mark this occasion in all member 
countries? 
V. Conclusions 
56. Neither the two parts of the thirty-sixth 
annual report of the Council to the Assembly 
nor the first part of the thirty-seventh annual 
report covering the period from 1st January to 
30th June 1991, contains any chapter on rela-
tions with the public. This certainly cannot be 
regarded as an indication that the Council takes 
the problem of information policy really seri-
ously. The impression is that the Council and 
member governments believe it is enough for 
the Secretary-General to travel around and give 
speeches and briefings in various conferences 
and expert cercles. But this is only a drop in the 
ocean and cannot be regarded as the expression 
of a general communication strategy recom-
mended by the Assembly. 
57. So, at a time when the interest of the 
international press and the public in knowing 
more about the activities and role of Western 
European Union is reaching a higher degree 
than ever before, and when all sorts of bilateral 
initiatives and discussion papers are flooding 
the international debate on European security, 
the public has still too little assistance from the 
Council and member governments in increasing 
its knowledge of WED's achievements and dis-
pelling uncertainty and public confusion about 
its future role and place. 
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(i) Convinced that the establishment of a regular dialogue between the WEU Assembly, on the one 
hand, and the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament, on the other, is necessary and in the 
interests of all; 
(ii) Regretting that the invitations sent by the WEU Assembly regularly since 1988 to the United 
States Congress and the Canadian Parliament to send observers to its sessions have so far not been 
taken up; 
(iii) Concerned that incomplete information available to Congress and the American public on the 
thinking and positions of Europeans may aggravate existing and create further misunderstanding on 
the other shore of the North Atlantic; 
(v) Convinced that parliaments in Europe and North America might and should help and consult 
each other more with a view to strengthening their parliamentary rights and powers vis-a-vis the exec-
utive in foreign policy and security, 
REQUESTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE 
To contact the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament in order to: 
(a) encourage their committees and sub-committees whose responsibilities include questions 
dealt with by the WEU Assembly to take a closer interest in the activities of WEU and its 
Assembly; 
(b) promote the formation of American and Canadian parliamentary groups responsible for 
establishing relations with the WEU Assembly; 
(c) promote meetings between representatives of the United States Congress and of the 
Canadian Parliament and members of the WEU Assembly to establish a regular system of 
parliamentary co-operation and con\munication. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submined by Mr. Lopez HeiUJI'U, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The title of the present report may be con-
sidered somewhat audacious for several reasons. 
Audacious because, by taking the initi~tiye <?f 
examining this matter closely, the com~ISSion IS 
venturing on to new ground. Audacious, too, 
because neither the committee nor your 
Rapporteur has yet been able to pay the plann~d 
visit to the United States and Canada to obtam 
on-the-spot information. and tc:> establ~sh con-
tacts and working relations with parliaments, 
their members and institutions across the 
Atlantic. Audacious, finally, because concepts 
about the shape of transatlantic inter-
parliamentary relations may not be ide~tical in 
all the parliaments concerned and their devel-
opment does not arouse the same interest in the 
United States as in Europe. 
2. In spite of all these uncertainties, th~re 
nevertheless seem to be grounds for conductmg 
such a study, whose importance can but increase 
at a juncture when definition of the Euro-
pean security architectur~ calls for . a broa.d 
redefinition of transatlantic co-operation. This 
report therefore proposes to examine the parlia-
mentary aspect. Since this is quite new ground, 
it cannot hope to offer final solutions but will 
endeavour to circumscribe the problem, throw 
light on its various aspects and provide the basis 
for a debate on what must be done and what is 
wanted and can be done in this area. The 
present report was discussed in depth. by the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions on 4th November 1991; some members 
were sceptical about the chances of attaini~g t~is 
aim by creating new structures for establishmg 
contacts. No one, however, contested the main 
opinions set out in the report. 
II. The present situation 
3. Transatlantic parliamentary relations in 
the field which concerns us are established 
either at bilateral level between the various par-
liaments and political parties in Europe on the 
one hand and those of the United States Con-
gress and of the Canadian Parliament on the 
other or at the level of international parlia-ment~ry assemblies with responsibilities in 
defence questions and security. There is also, 
however, a multilateral aspect to bilateral rela-
tions between the various parliaments of Europe 
and their opposite-numbers across the Atlantic 
as was seen, inter alia, at the international con-
ference on parliamentary democracy and inter-
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national security policy held in The Hague on 
22nd and 23rd May 1991 at the initiative of the 
Netherlands Atlantic Commission. 
4. One of the main concerns of parliaments 
in all democratic countries is their supervision 
of the executive bodies and the dialogue with 
them particularly in matters concerning the 
armed forces the application of the defence 
budget and, 'more generally, security poli~y. 
Problems and differences between legislative 
and executive bodies are sometimes similar in 
the various countries and it was consequently 
very appropriate that the Netherlands Mi~ist~r 
for Foreign Affairs, Mr. van den Br~k, m his 
inaugural address at the abovementioned con-
ference raised the question of whether there was 
a mean~ of arranging for the parliaments to help 
each other in their tasks of supervising govern-
ments. He also broached the idea that the future 
parliamentary assembly of the CSCE might be 
an appropriate framework for debates and 
exchanges of information in this respect, for 
instance on the question of improving the com-
parability and transparency of national defence 
budgets or the rights of parliaments to be 
informed more generally. It is clear that all these 
considerations concern the WEU Assembly. 
5. Furthermore, during the conference, a 
number of other interesting subjects were 
tackled and were the subject of an exchange of 
interparliamentary information from which it 
emerged that the experien~e ~d role of the 
United States Congress with Its very broad 
responsibilities allowing a true b~ance between 
the authorities governing the Umted States are 
worthy of special attention. However, this con-
ference revealed a practical problem which often 
emerges when one wishes to b~ng tog~ther 
United States and European parliamentanans: 
of the some 200 participants, there was not one 
member of the United States Congress. (The 
latter was represented, however, by an official of 
the research service and a member of the secre-
tariat of the Senate). Nevertheless, the con-
ference was very useful because it allowed light 
to be thrown on the fact that the exchange of 
information between parliamentarians on 
defence and security questions is still in ges-
tation and a study should be made of the extent, 
aims and framework of future mutual assistance 
and transatlantic co-operation. 
6. The situation is somewhat different if one 
considers international assemblies. The North 
Atlantic Assembly is at present the only 
interparliamentary institution attended by a 
thirty-six member delegation from the United 
States Congress and a twelve member delegation 
from the Canadian Parliament. In this assembly, 
Europeans and Americans sit side-by-side and 
meet to adopt joint positions, which is the most 
developed form of co-operation, even if one con-
siders that the impact of its recommendations 
and resolutions is still limited since there is no 
commitment on the part of the governments to 
follow them up or even to reply to them. It is 
certainly not for the WEU Assembly to give an 
opinion on the effect that Euro-American co-
operation in the framework of the North 
Atlantic Assembly may have on the executive, 
Congress and public opinion in the United 
States and particularly to what extent specifi-
cally European preoccupations are voiced and 
understood in that forum. Since the thirty-six 
members of the delegation of the United States 
Congress represent primarily the interests of 
their country, it is for their European counter-
parts to interest them as much as possible in the 
positions and problems of Europeans. 
7. The more the WEU Assembly develops its 
relations with the North Atlantic Assembly, the 
more it will be able to take advantage of the 
presence of North American parliamentarians to 
inform them of European concerns. For some 
years now, the Defence Committee of the WEU 
Assembly has been meeting from time to time 
with the Defence and Security Committee of the 
North Atlantic Assembly. These relations were 
recently intensified: 
- the Defence Committee of the WEU 
Assembly was invited to attend the 
autumn session of the North Atlantic 
Assembly in Madrid from 17th to 22nd 
October 1991 and accepted this invi-
tation; 
- the two committees expressed their 
intention to exchange views on rela-
tions with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the CSCE 
Assembly. 
8. For the United States members of the 
North Atlantic Assembly in particular to be able 
to be associated with this type of co-operation, 
they must attend meetings, which is still far 
from always being the case. 
9. The creation of a parliamentary assembly 
for the CSCE which is to meet for the first time 
in 1992 has opened a new area of co-operation 
between the United States and Europe, the 
extent of which cannot be foreseen, but the 
WEU Assembly and its committees should have 
every interest in establishing a close working 
relationship with this new assembly and particu-
larly with its United States and Canadian repre-
sentatives. 
10. The WEU Assembly has a special place in 
transatlantic relations. It is the only interna-
tional assembly with treaty responsibilities in 
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defence and security matters. It is composed 
exclusively of parliamentarians of Western 
Europe. Nevertheless,. in accordance with the 
spirit of the modified Brussels Treaty, Article IV 
of which provides for close co-operation 
between Western European Union and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the WEU 
Assembly has always devoted an important part 
of its work to the problems of co-operation 
between Europe and the United States and 
Canada in defence and security matters. 
11. The Assembly attaches great importance 
to establishing regular contacts with the United 
States Congress and the Canadian Parliament 
within the limits of its budgetary constraints. 
Each year, one of its three committees with a 
political vocation organises, in turn, a visit to 
the parliaments, governmental authorities and 
various bodies in these two countries, even 
though this modest action raises budgetary 
problems. 
12. These committees have had to note, 
however, that in general the two parts of Con-
gress are less prepared to develop contacts with 
the Assembly than those in Canada and it is rel-
atively difficult to interest the United States 
Congress in the activities of the WEU 
Assembly. 
13. Proof of this are the Assembly's steadfast 
attempts to invite observers from the United 
States Congress and the Canadian Parliament to 
attend ordinary and extraordinary sessions of 
the Assembly. Already in 1977, the Presidential 
Committee made a preliminary review of the 
problem, noting that certain parliaments, in par-
ticular the United States Congress, had been 
invited fairly regularly to be represented at ses-
sions, but had not always been in position to 
respond to such invitations. Only in 1974, 1975 
and 1976 did United States and Canadian par-
liamentary observers attend debates of the 
Assembly. 
14. As from April 1988, the Assembly 
resumed the initiative and has since invited reg-
ularly United States and Canadian observers to 
attend its sessions, but, unfortunately, so far 
without success. Consequently, parliamen-
tarians from the other side of the Atlantic have 
not yet taken advantage of the possibility for 
observers to speak in the Chamber in Paris. 
15. In the framework of its political work, our 
Assembly has, from time to time, turned directly 
to the United States Congress, in particular with 
Resolution 77 on the INF Treaty adopted on 
2nd December 1987 1, urging the Senate of the 
United States to give its consent to the United 
States-Soviet treaty on intermediate-range 
nuclear forces. During the second Gulf war, 
after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the President of the 
l. See Document 1116, Addendum. 
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WEU Assembly sent a letter dated 31st October 
1990 to all members of the Armed Services 
Committee of "the United States Congress 
informing them of the contribution made by 
WEU and its member countries to applying the 
embargo imposed by the United Nations on 
Iraq, since media reporting in the United States 
had given the impression that the European 
effort in the Gulf had not been fully understood 
by American public opinion. 
16. Yet these isolated initiatives only show 
that there is so far no systematic or regular dia-
logue with the parliamentary institutions of 
North America and a fortiori no reciprocity in 
relations. 
Ill. Aims of better co-operation 
1 7. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation 
may have different aims, depending on whether 
one considers problems of general interest for all 
the parliaments concerned or those of special 
interest to the Assembly of WEU in conducting 
its work. 
18. In the first case, which may also be 
applied to our Assembly, the aim of transat-
lantic co-operation would primarily be to 
strengthen the positions and supervisory and 
eo-decision rights of the parliaments concerned 
in the elaboration of foreign and defence policy 
in their respective countries and perhaps the 
joint definition of the minimum principles 
required in these matters. 
19. At the conference in The Hague on parlia-
mentary democracy and international security 
policy, the following principles were proposed: 
- the right of parliaments to scrutinise 
the defence budget in detail at a stage 
when proposals for new expenditure 
were still in preparation in the govern-
ments. Here, the powers of the United 
States Congress are particularly broad; 
- the right of parliaments to examine 
draft international treaties before they 
are signed, particularly those dealing 
with international co-operation in 
armaments; 
- a clear and specific definition of the 
rights and powers of defence and 
foreign affairs committees, particularly 
with regard to their right to be 
informed by government officials; 
- definition of the type of information a 
government should be obliged to 
provide to parliament; for this, an 
example is the Freedom of Information 
Act which defines the type of infor-
mation that should be provided to the 
United States Congress; 
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- the establishment of an efficient 
research and documentation service 
and better possibilities for parliamen-
tarians to obtain the information to 
supervise the government by means 
and staff independent of the gov-
ernment and through access to a second 
source of information; in this field too 
it might be useful to draw on the expe-
rience of the United States Congress 
which has a very well-developed con-
gressional research service. 
20. The abovementioned examples show that 
better knowledge of the rOle, powers, structure 
and operation of the United States Congress in 
foreign policy and security matters might be 
useful to everyone interested in strengthening 
parliamentary powers. The balance of political 
powers in the United States gives Congress 
greater weight than many European national 
parliaments and, a fortiori, international assem-
blies. 
21. Moreover, it is the United States Senate 
alone that has the authority, on behalf of Con-
gress, to participate in elaborating the foreign 
policy of the United States. In theory, the Senate 
may intervene on three occasions. It can be 
required to ratify the nomination of treaty nego-
tiators, but this practice has fallen into disuse. 
The Senate may also give instructions to the 
negotiators, but the executive does not much 
appreciate this practice and consequently it is 
not often invoked. 
22. The main powers are therefore exercised 
at the time of ratifying treaties signed by the 
executive which requires a two-thirds majority 
of the senators. This majority is necessary, 
however, only for the final vote, all other deci-
sions being taken by simple majority. In security 
matters, the constitution lays down that only 
Congress can declare war and the War Powers 
Act of 1973 obliges the President of the United 
States to inform Congress of any military inter-
vention abroad within 48 hours. With effect 
from this declaration, Congress has 60 days to 
decide to stop or to prolong it. 
23. The broad powers of Congress in budg-
etary matters are also exercised in the area of 
security and defence policy and allow the justifi-
cation of expenditure to be verified and also the 
specific attribution and breakdown of expend-
iture between the various programmes proposed 
by the administration. Several special com-
mittees on appropriation have been created to 
this end. 
24. A detailed framework of Congress and its 
committees is appended to this report. It should 
be noted that the number of representatives in 
the two parts of Congress, i.e., 100 senators and 
435 representatives for a population of about 
226 million is very small compared with the 
number of parliamentarians in most European 
countries and in Canada where the parliament is 
composed of 399 members (104 senators and 
295 representatives) for a population of about 
24 million. 
25. The 100 United States senators who alone 
have true power in foreign affairs and security 
matters have special responsibilities in addition 
to considerable influence. All senators have the 
problem of obtaining adequate knowledge of 
varied and complicated matters in order to 
supervise the executive. The practice of having a 
staff for each parliamentarian and also for the 
committees is therefore widely developed. The 
senators cannot always carry out alone the vast 
spectrum of tasks incumbent upon them; they 
cannot attend all the meetings. The system 
therefore allows each senator to employ a large 
number of personal assistants who even have the 
right to take part in working meetings of 
committees. Furthermore, the Congressional 
Research Service provides United States parlia-
mentarians with an independent source of infor-
mation and research which is very sophisti-
cated. 
26. The example of the United States Con-
gress therefore might certainly provide inter-
esting ideas for defining the minimum powers 
that should be attributed to democratic parlia-
ments. While parliaments in Europe may find 
advantage in examining what they can gain from 
American experience, the specific interest for 
the WEU Assembly in strengthening transat-
lantic relations is quite different. 
27. It is first a matter of sounding and 
explaining Europe's voice, and particularly that 
ofWEU, on the other side of the North Atlantic. 
The WEU Assembly is asserting itself increas-
ingly as the main European parliamentary 
assembly in a position to co-ordinate and elab-
orate the parliamentary positions of Western 
Europe in the new international security archi-
tecture. Americans and Europeans meet in the 
Atlantic Alliance, but the North Atlantic Treaty 
does not create an official parliamentary section 
for NATO. The interparliamentary dialogue is 
therefore limited to the North Atlantic 
Assembly, the European part of which is cer-
tainly preponderant. However, the Euro-
American co-operation thus established in this 
framework and similarly between the member 
governments of the alliance has not prevented a 
large section of the United States Congress and 
of public opinion in the United States from 
having less knowledge than ever of the problems 
of Europeans, their contributions to joint 
security and their concerns and thoughts. 
28. Furthermore, it seems increasingly clear 
that greater divergences than in the past are to 
be anticipated in the way of perceiving and 
assessing security problems which concern both 
Europeans and Americans. Lack of information 
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has already led to erroneous conclusions as a 
result of which Europeans have been the target 
of criticism from the United States Congress 
and press concerning a number of questions of 
concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Such crit-
icism is not limited to the alliance itself as the 
continuing debate on burden-sharing has shown; 
it also extends to all out-of-area questions for 
which the alliance is not competent, but in 
which Euro-American understanding and co-
operation are necessary. 
29. The public debate in the United States on 
the role and contribution of the European allies 
in the Gulf war is an example of this, but it is to 
be expected that the problems for Western Euro-
peans regarding the settlement of the Yugoslav 
crisis and, more generally, future relations with 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 
with the former Soviet Union also have every 
chance of being misunderstood by American 
opinion for lack of adequate information. 
30. It is therefore necessary to improve 
interparliamentary information, but how? Infor-
mation is pointless if it fails to arouse sufficient 
interest. American parliamentarians must there-
fore be encouraged to wish to improve their 
understanding of European concerns; at the 
same time, they must be given the opportunity 
to explain their own positions. This will only be 
possible if our American colleagues can perceive 
an interest in such an exchange. The problem 
does not arise in the same way, however, in rela-
tions with the Canadian Parliament. 
IV. How to achie'Pe such co-operation? 
31. First and foremost, it is necessary to take 
advantage of all the structures for developing 
and strengthening the Euro-American dialogue 
which now exist in transatlantic parliamentary 
institutions. Only the Senate answered a ques-
tionnaire sent to the secretariat of the two 
houses asking whether there were permanent 
structures, ad hoc relations, or exchanges of 
information with European parliamentary com-
mittees on foreign policy and security questions. 
The answer was that there was only the British-
American parliamentary group. In Congress, all 
committees and sub-committees have specific 
responsibilities which are listed. Scrutiny of the 
responsibilities of the main committees shows 
that there is no specific reference to relations 
with Europe or with international defence 
organisations such as NATO or WEU. 
32. Among the sub-committees of the Senate 
and of the House of Representatives, there are 
several working units that might be able to 
co-ordinate with the WEU Assembly. For 
instance, a sub-committee of the Senate Appro-
priations Committee is responsible for opera-
tions abroad and has responsibility in regard to 
international organisations and programmes. 
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The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate 
has instituted, inter alia, a sub-committee for 
European affairs. Again, the Senate has formed 
a bipartite group of observers for the control of 
armaments composed of 20 senators who act as 
official observers for negotiations in which the 
United States is a party on the reduction of 
nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons. 
33. In the House of Representatives, there is 
also a sub-committee of the Appropriations 
Committee for operations abroad which super-
vises appropriations for international organ-
isations. The many sub-committees of the 
Armed Services Committee include a panel for 
the North Atlantic Assembly responsible for: 
- " organising the preparation of the 
committee's input to NATO's par-
liament the North Atlantic 
Assembly "; and 
- serving as a focal point for the commit-
tee's involvement in North Atlantic 
Assembly meetings and in any broader, 
pan-European successor or coun-
terpart. 
The description of the nine-member panel's 
responsibilities shows that it might also be a 
valuable contact for our Assembly. 
34. Among the sub-committees of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, the activities of the Sub-
committee on Ani:ls Control, International 
Security and Science should be of interest to the 
Assembly, together with those of the Sub-
committee on Europe and the Middle East 
responsible, inter alia, for reporting on interna-
tional parliamentary conferences. Conferences 
and parliamentary exchanges also appear among 
the responsibilities of the Sub-committee for 
International Operations. 
35. Finally, one should not overlook the few 
bicameral organisations of the United States 
Congress, such as, for instance, the Commission 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 
Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus and 
the National Security Caucus. 
36. If more regular contacts are to be estab-
lished, it is first essential to have a better under-
standing of the structures and methods of work 
of Congress in order to determine how to 
increase its interest in the activities of our 
Assembly and WEU as a whole. The Assembly's 
proposal to establish WEU information bureaux 
in the United States and Canada in accordance 
with Recommendation 494 was not endorsed by 
the Council. Again, the Assembly's own means 
of intensifying the transatlantic dialogue are too 
limited. For this reason, the Assembly should be 
able to draw on the services of a well-established 
relay of opinion in Washington and have the 
necessary funds for this purpose. 
37. In the framework of renewing contacts, it 
is also necessary to tackle the question of 
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whether Congress would be prepared to start a 
regular dialogue with the Presidential Com-
mittee and other committees as is done with the 
Supreme Soviet. However, when thinking about 
establishing a dialogue "between the WEU 
Assembly and the United States Congress, the 
situation on the American side must be borne in 
mind: the American internal political system is 
such that every parliamentarian is practically 
always in the throes of an electoral campaign. 
Relations have already been established with 
Europe through the intermediary of various 
institutions such as national parliaments, the 
North Atlantic Assembly, the CSCE Assembly 
and the European Parliament. It will therefore 
be difficult to interest the Americans in creating 
a new means of contact. It is therefore crucial to 
convince them that a dialogue with the 
Assembly will be more than just a repetition of 
contacts that already exist in other parlia-
mentary frameworks. However, until this dia-
logue is established, the WEU Assembly's 
national delegations should be encouraged to 
improve the co-ordination of their positions 
with those of the North Atlantic Assembly, the 
parliamentary assembly of the CSCE and any 
other parliamentary institutions that include 
American parliamentarians in order to make 
WEU's voice heard in the Euro-American dia-
logue. 
38. In view of the large staff in Congress, 
which exercises remarkable influence on sen-
ators and·· representatives, closer co-operation 
between secretariats would be useful. Documen-
tation raises a special problem. Working rela-
tionships should be established, in particular for 
the exchange of documents and information on 
a reciprocal basis between secretariats and the 
appropriate organs of North American parlia-
mentary institutions and the secretariat of the 
WEU Assembly. 
39. Regarding relations with the Canadian 
Parliament, it is gratifying that the two 
Chambers have clearly shown their interest in 
European affairs and the activities of WEU, 
although Canadians also have difficulties in 
travelling to Europe. 
40. In the Canadian Parliament, there is a 
Canada-Europe parliamentary association, 
which sends delegations to the Council of 
Europe and co-operates with the European Par-
liament, but so far it has established no special 
links with the Assembly of WEU. Conversely, 
there is a Canadian parliamentary association of 
NATO, composed of 44 senators and 119 repre-
sentatives. On a bilateral level, there are 
Canada-France parliamentary associations and 
Canada-Italy and Canada-Germany friendship 
groups. 
41. According to the Canadian Parliament's 
answer to a questionnaire on its relations with 
Europe, there are no formal relations between 
the committees of this parliament and those of 
European parliaments, nor with the European 
assemblies, but the institution of such contacts 
has already been propos~d. It would therefore be 
useful for the WEU Assembly to invite 
Canadian parliamentary authorities to appoint a 
parliamentary delegation with the specific task 
of following the Assembly's activities and estab-
lishing a dialogue with it. 
V. Conclusions 
42. As matters now stand, one has to note 
that relations between the WEU Assembly on 
the one hand and the United States Congress on 
the other are too meagre to justify talking about 
a dialogue. The establishment of transatlantic 
parliamentary co-operation in security and 
defence questions is therefore a goal and a pro-
gramme to be achieved. The first step is to 
improve reciprocal information and develop 
exchanges of views on a more regular basis, as 
our Assembly has been advocating for several 
years. 
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43. The achievement of this goal must 
overcome a number of political and budgetary 
obstacles plus the constraints of the time 
available to all the parliamentarians concerned. 
But the most important task is to arouse the 
interest of the United States Congress in estab-
lishing the dialogue and to convince it that it 
has something to gain in this, which seems less 
difficult in the case of the Canadian Par-
liament. 
44. If our Assembly fails to strengthen and 
improve considerably the transatlantic dialogue 
and the information communicated to the 
United States on its role and activities and on 
WEU as a whole, it is to be feared that the mis-
understanding in Congress and American public 
opinion about the policy of Europeans will be 
further heightened. Conversely, if Europeans 
had a better knowledge of the working and 
powers of the United States Congress in the defi-
nition of foreign policy and security in the 
United States, they might draw useful guidance 
from it and help all democratic parliaments in 
their efforts to consolidate their rights and their 
powers in such matters vis-a-vis the executive. 
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RECOMMENDATION 480 1 
on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance 2 
(Extracts) 
1. THE AssEMBLY recalls that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty closely associates WEU's 
activities with those of NATO and that NATO is still the essential guarantee of Europe's security 
because it is the only framework in which the deterrent power of the United States can be used for the 
benefit of Europe. 
It considers that the security situation in Europe has been fundamentally changed through the 
democratisation processes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and the opening of 
borders .... 
It wishes the CFE negotiations to be concluded rapidly, a new mandate to be drawn up by the 
CSCE for a subsequent reduction in the level of armaments, exclusively defensive military systems to 
be established and negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons to be started immediately. 
It welcomes the development of the CSCE and the efforts made in that framework to establish a 
new peaceful order in Europe. 
It considers that in the context of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures, 
the Vienna negotiations and other forums significant steps are being taken to improve the security situ-
ation in Europe. 
It considers that, with the increasing pace of European developments and the changing nature of 
security problems, planning for European security co-operation must be accelerated. 
It considers that, in the new circumstances, Western European countries will have to play a 
larger role in this planning process, which will require closer co-operation between WEU member 
states. 
It therefore REcoMMENDS that the Council do its utmost to facilitate the United States Govern-
ment's action to maintain and strengthen the association of the United States with the organisation of 
European security by: 
(a) asserting itself as the European pillar of the alliance, inter alia by moving the seat of its min-
isterial organs closer to that of NATO; 
(b) asking those of its members which do not participate in the NATO integrated commands to 
examine to what extent the new situation and the new role to be played by NATO allow them 
to associate their armed forces more closely with joint deployment; 
(c) keeping the Assembly constantly informed of the discussion that is to be held on the 
reorganisation, role and future of NATO in the context of the transformation of the military 
pacts into political alliances following arms reduction agreements; 
(d) tightening its links with the European members of the Atlantic Alliance which are not at 
present members of WEU; 
(e) ensuring that member countries make a military effort sufficient to guarantee a balance of 
conventional forces between the West and the Soviet Union; 
(f) for this purpose, fixing the troop levels that each of them undertakes to place at the service of 
joint defence and providing for these undertakings to be revised in conformity with future 
CFE agreements; 
(g) ensuring maximum security in Western Europe with a minimum deployment of forces and 
urgently studying the conditions in which multinational units might be set up; 
l. Adopted on 6th June 1990. 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 
1225). 
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2. 
(h) organising, in the framework of a general reduction in military expenditure and the level of 
armaments, fair burden- and responsibility-sharing in the alliance and between WEU 
member countries. 
3. THE AssEMBLY considers that recent developments in certain non-European countries, particu-
larly in the Near and Middle East, are a new danger to international peace and the security of Europe. 
It notes that the Atlantic Alliance is making no provision for the necessary guarantees against such 
threats but that any initiatives Europe may take to counter them help to strengthen American confi-
dence that the alliance is operating correctly. 
It therefore REcoMMENDS that the Council make regular assessments of all possible threats to 
European security and inform the public of the results of its work on security in the Mediter-
ranean. 
4. THE AssEMBLY ... welcomes the steps taken by the Council to co-ordinate member countries' 
action for applying an open-skies agreement and for ensuring the effectiveness of verification opera-
tions. 
It REcoMMENDS that the Council contribute to the success of the disarmament negotiations and 
enable member countries to play an active part in verifying and implementing future agreements by: 
(a) taking an early decision on the joint production and use of observation satellites; 
(b) widening the decision taken in Brussels on 23rd April in order to organise a permanent 
exchange of information between its members on the results of each one's verification opera-
tions; 
(c) organising co-operation between member countries and, possibly, other European members 
of NATO for training the staff necessary for carrying out these operations. 
5. THE AssEMBLY notes that Western European security continues to be guaranteed through imple-
mentation of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
It therefore REcoMMENDS that the Council fulfil that guarantee by ensuring that member states 
make an effort to facilitate the rapid conclusion of the first phase of the Vienna negotiations on con-
ventional disarmament and urge the immediate commencement of Vienna 11 negotiations. 
6. THE AssEMBLY notes that the limitation of forces and armaments in Europe will lead to a 
reduction in arms production and troop levels in national armies. 
It therefore REcoMMENDS that the Council exercise its mandate and at last give the necessary 
impetus to the establishment of interoperability of armaments used by NATO and the standardisation 
and joint production of armaments by member countries by: 
(a) assessing the requirements of European security in this area during the period of implemen-
tation of the CFE agreement; 
(b) fostering understanding between arms-producing firms in member countries, inter alia 
through harmonisation of relevant national legislation, as suggested in the study conducted 
by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee in April 1982; 
(c) having the WEU Institute for Security Studies give priority to studying the economic and 
social consequences of a potential reduction in the activities of the arms industries and the 
number of persons employed on defence work. 
It REcoMMENDS that the Council take steps to prepare for changing military strategies and doc-
trines and to adjust to the new situation in Europe: whilst retaining defensive capabilities, the present 
strategy of forward defence and flexible response in Europe will have to be re-examined and in this 
context the deployment of the armed forces may have to be changed. 
It welcomes the decision of President Bush and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to terminate 
the follow-on to Lance programme and to cancel any further modernisation of United States nuclear 
artillery shells deployed in Europe which indicates the willingness and ability of the alliance to take the 
initiative in a rapidly changing situation. 
7. THE AssEMBLY welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies are now open to exchanges 
of views and information with the West on defence and security matters. 
It therefore REcoMMENDS that the Council help to restore mutual confidence between Eastern 
and Central European countries and Western European countries by holding, together with the WEU 
Institute for Security Studies, exchanges of information with appropriate bodies in the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern and Central European countries on matters relating to security, disarmament and veri-
fication, as decided on 23rd April 1990. 
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8. THE AssEMBLY welcomes the Council's efforts to help to inform the public about its work. It notes 
with satisfaction that, for the first time, the Council has given it a document in which the IEPG gives it 
information about its activities. It considers, however, that this policy of openness is still inadequate, 
which is detrimental to the cohesion of NATO. 
It therefore REcoMMENDS that the Council provide the public more information about the work 
of its dependent organs and the results they obtain. It also recommends that it ask the presidency of the 
IEPG to report regularly and directly to the Assembly on its activites. 
9. THE AssEMBLY notes that the decisions taken by the Council on the abolition of arms control and 
of the Standing Armaments Committee have in fact impaired the WEU ministerial organs' relations 
with NATO. It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to develop other forms of contact. 
However, it REcoMMENDS that the Council resume the practice of asking the NATO authorities 
for an opinion on matters within their purview raised by Assembly recommendations or written ques-
tions from members of the Assembly. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Working units of the United States Congress 
with responsibilities in foreign policy and security 
I. Senate 
Committee on Appropriations 
S-128 Capitol Building 
Washington, DC 20510-6025 
Jurisdiction: 
1) Appropriation of the revenue for the 
support of the government; 2) rescission 
of appropriations; 3) the amount of new 
spending authority; 4) new spending 
authority. 
Sub-committees of the Committee 
on Appropriations 
Defence 
SD-137 Dirksen Senate Office Building 
Washington, DC 20510 
Jurisdiction: 
1) Department of Defence - military: 
Departments of Army, Navy (including 
Marine Corps), Air Force, and Office of 
Secretary of Defence (except Military 
Construction); 2) the Central Intelligence 
Agency; 3) Intelligence Community Over-
sight-
Foreign Operations 
SD-137 Dirksen Senate Office Building 
Washington, DC 20510 
Jurisdiction: 
5) Department of State 6) anti-terrorism 
assistance; 1 0) foreign and military credit 
sales; 17) international military education 
and training; 19) international organ-
isations and programmes; 20) military 
assistance programme; 22) Peace Corps; 
23) special defence acquisition fund; 
(etc.). 
Committee on Armed Services 
SR-228 Russel/ Senate Building 
Washington, DC 20510-6050 
Jurisdiction: 
1) Aeronautical and space activities 
peculiar to or primarily associated with 
the development of weapons systems or 
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military operations; 2) the common 
defence; 3) the Department of Defence, 
the Department of the Army, the 
Department of the Navy and the 
Department of the Air Force, generally; 4) 
maintenance and operation of the 
Panama Canal, including administration, 
sanitation and government of the canal 
zone; 5) military research and devel-
opment; 6) national security aspects of 
nuclear energy; 7) navy petroleum 
reserves, except those in Alaska; 8) pay, 
promotion, retirement and other benefits 
and privileges of members of the armed 
forces, including overseas education of 
civilian and military dependants; 9) 
selective service system; 10) stragegic and 
critical materials necessary for the 
common defence. In addition, the com-
mittee is mandated to study and review, 
on a comprehensive basis, matters 
relating to the common defence policy of 
the United States and to report on them 
from time to time. 
Sub-committees of the Armed 
Services Committee 
Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence 
Jurisdiction: 
United States nuclear forces, research and 
development and procurement-
Conventional Forces and Alliance Defence 
Jurisdiction: 
Land combat forces, tactical air and 
naval, procurement and research and 
development for those items. 
Projection Forces and Regional Defence 
Jurisdiction: 
Shipbuilding, procurement and research 
and development for naval forces 
(excluding naval aviation), Marine Corps, 
airlift and sealift-
Defence Induatry and Technology 
Jurisdiction: 
Defence acquisition policy, industrial 
base, technological base, defence stockpile 
and defence laboratories. 
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Readiness, Sustainability and Support 
Jurisdiction: 
To provide to the full committee general 
oversight of readiness and sustainability 
in support of our military forces, 
including military construction pro-
grammes. 
Manpower and Personnel 
Jurisdiction: 
Designated by title. 
Committee on Foreign Relations 
SD-446 Dirksen Senate Office Building 
Washington, DC 20510-6225 
Jurisdiction: 
1) Relations of the United States with 
foreign nations generally; 2) treaties and 
executive agreements, except reciprocal 
trade agreements; 3) boundaries of the 
United States; 4) protection of United 
States citizens abroad and expatriation; 5) 
intervention abroad and declarations of 
war; 6) foreign economic, military, tech-
nical and humanitarian assistance; 7) 
United Nations and its affiliated 
organisations; 8) international confer-
ences and congresses; 9) diplomatic 
service; 1 0) international law as it relates 
to foreign policy; 11) oceans and interna-
tional environmental and scientific affairs 
as they relate to foreign policy; 12) inter-
national activities of the American 
National Red Cross and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross; 13) interna-
tional aspects of nuclear energy, including 
nuclear transfer policy; 14) foreign loans; 
15) measures to foster commercial inter-
course with foreign nations and to safe-
guard American business interests abroad; 
16) the World Bank group, the regional 
development banks and other interna-
tional organisations established primarily 
for develop~ent assistance purposes; 1 7) 
the InternatiOnal Monetary Fund and 
other international organisations estab-
lished primarily for international mon-
etary purposes (except that, at the request 
of the Committee on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, any proposed legis-
lation relating to such subjects reported 
by the Committee on Foreign Relations 
shall be referred to the Committee on 
Ban~i~~· Housing and Urban Affairs); 18) 
acqulSltiOn of land and buildings for 
embassies and legations in foreign coun-
tries; 19) national security and interna-
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tional aspects of trusteeships of the 
United States. In addition, the committee 
is mandated to study and review matters 
relating to the national security policy, 
foreign policy and international economic 
policy as it relates to foreign policy of the 
United States and matters relating to 
food, hunger and nutrition in foreign 
countries, and to report on these matters 
periodically. 
Sub-committees of the Foreign 
Relations Committee 
European Affairs 
Jurisdiction: 
Matters concerning: (i) the continent of 
Europe, including the Soviet Union, 
Greece and Turkey; (ii) the United 
Kingdom, Greenland, Iceland and the 
north polar region. 
East Asian and Pacifo: Affairs 
Jurisdiction: 
1) Matters extending geographically from 
China and Korea to Burma, inclusive, on 
the mainland of Asia; and to Hong Kong, 
Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indo-
nesia, Australia and New Zealand, 
Oceania and the South Pacific Islands; 2) 
trusteeship matters in the Pacific region. 
Westem Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs 
Jurisdiction: 
1) Matters extending geographically from 
the Arctic Ocean to Tierra del Fuego, 
including the Caribbean. Problems which 
are of concern to the sub-committee 
include relations between the American 
nations, United States-Canadian affairs, 
boundary matters, the implementation of 
various treaties and conventions, eco-
nomic relations and security matters 
affecting the western hemisphere and the 
Organisation. of American States; 2) 
general overstght over all of the activities 
and programmes of the Peace Corps. 
Terrorism, Narcotics and Intemational Operations 
Jurisdiction: 
All matters, problems and policies 
involving international operations, ter-
rorism and the international flow of illegal 
drugs, including: 1) the oversight of all 
United States foreign policy, programmes 
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and international co-operative efforts to 
combat international terrorism; 2) the 
oversight of all United States foreign 
policy, programmes and international 
co-operative efforts to combat the flow of 
illegal drugs or substances; 3) the general 
oversight responsibility for the Depart-
ment of State, the United States Infor-
mation Agency, the Foreign Service, inter-
national educational and cultural affairs, 
foreign broadcasting activities, foreign 
buildings, United States participation in 
the United Nations and other interna-
tional organisations not under the juris-
diction of other sub-committees. In 
addition, the sub-committee has juris-
diction over general matters of interna-
tional law. 
African Affairs 
Jurisdication: 
1) Geographic responsibilities corre-
sponding to those of the Bureau of 
African Affairs in the Department of 
State; 2) all matters and problems relating 
to all of Mrica, with the exception of the 
countries bordering on the Mediterranean 
Sea from Egypt to Morocco, which are 
under the purview of the Sub-committee 
on Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs. 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
Jurisdiction: 
Matters extending geographically from: 1) 
Bhutan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, 
Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka across 
North Africa to Morocco and Algeria; 2) 
the Arab states and Israel; 3) South Asia, 
the Middle East; 4) the relationships 
between Israel and the Arab states; 5) eco-
nomic development and general security 
in the Middle East, South Asia, the 
Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. 
Senate Arms Control Observer Group 
SH-637B Hart Senate Office Building 
Washington, DC 20510 
The Senate Arms Control Observer 
Group is a bipartisan group of 20 senators who 
act as official observers to any formal negotia-
tions to which the United States is a party on the 
reduction of nuclear, conventional or chemical 
arms. 
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11. House of Representatives 
Committee on Appropriations 
Jurisdiction: 
H-218 Capitol Building 
Washington, DC 20515-6015 
1) Appropriation of the revenue for the 
support of the government; 2) rescissions 
of appropriations contained in appropri-
ation acts; 3) transfers of unexpended bal-
ances; 4) the amount of new spending 
authority which is to be effective for a 
fiscal year, including bills and resolutions 
(reported by other committees) which 
provide new spending authority; (etc.). 
Sub-committees of the Appropriations 
Committee 
Jurisdiction: 
Defence 
H-144 Capitol Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
1) Department of Defence-Military: 
Departments of Army, Navy (including 
Marine Corps), Air Force; 2) Office of 
Secretary of Defence (except military con-
struction); 3) Central Intelligence Agency; 
4) Intelligence Community staff. 
Foreign Operations, Export Financing 
and Related Programmes 
Jurisdiction: 
H-307 Capitol Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
5) Department of State; 9) foreign mil-
itary financing programme; 18) interna-
tional military education and training; 20) 
international organisations and pro-
grammes; 21) military assistance pro-
gramme; 24) Peace Corps; 25) peace-
keeping operations; 26) Presidential 
contingency fund; 27) special defence 
acquisition fund. 
Military Construction 
BJOO Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
1) Military construction: Army, Navy 
(including Marine Corps), Air Force and 
defence agencies and reserve forces; 2) 
military family housing 3) DOD base 
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closure account; 4) homeowners 
assistance fund; 5) NATO infrastructure. 
Committee on Armed Se,.,ices 
2120 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515-6035 
Jurisdiction: 
1) Common defence generally; 2) the 
Department of Defence generally, 
including the Departments of the Army, 
Navy and Air Force generally; 3) ammu-
nition depots; forts; arsenals; Army, Navy 
and Air Force reservations and establish-
ments; 4) conservation, development and 
use of naval petroleum and oil shale 
reserves; 5) pay, promotion, retirement 
and other benefits and privileges of 
members of the armed services; 6) scien-
tific research and development in support 
of the armed services; 7) selective service; 
8) size and composition of the Army, 
Navy and Air Force; 9) soldiers' and 
sailors' homes; 1 0) strategic and critical 
materials necessary for the common 
defence; 11) military applications of 
nuclear energy. In addition, the com-
mittee has the special oversight function 
with respect to international arms control 
and disarmament and military depen-
dants' education. 
Sub-committees of the Armed 
se,.,ices Committee 
Procurement tmd Military Nuclear Systems 
2343 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
Legislative jurisdiction over: 1) the annual 
authorisation for procurement of mili-
tary weapons systems and components 
thereof, including systems transition, and 
those portions in the procurement cat-
egory, other procurement not assigned to 
the Seapower and Strategic and Critical 
Materials Sub-committee; 2) military 
application of nuclear energy, including 
research and development related thereto; 
3) intelligence matters related to national 
security and related legislative oversight; 4) 
oversight responsibilities with regard to 
international arms control and disarm-
ament. 
Seapower and Strategic tmd Critical Materials 
2343 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
Legislative jurisdiction over: 1) pro-
curement and construction of naval 
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vessels; 2) torpedoes and other weapons 
portion of navy weapons; 3) ship-related 
items in navy other procurement; 4) 
sealift; 5) anti- submarine warfare; 6) dis-
posal of naval vessels; 7) strategic and 
critical materials necessary for the 
national defence; 8) related legislative 
oversight. 
Research tmd Dnelopment 
2120 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
1) Annual authorisation for research and 
development; 2) airlift; 3) related over-
sight. 
Military Installations tmd Facilities 
2120 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
Legislative oversight over: 1) military con-
struction; 2) real estate acquisitions and 
disposals; 3) housing and support facil-
ities; 4) base closures; 5) real estate gen-
erally; 6) civil defence; 7) defence 
burdensharing; 8) base maintenance and 
repair funding; 9) related legislative over-
sight. 
Military Perso11nel tmd Compensation 
2343 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
Legislative jurisdiction over: 1) autho-
rised strengths; 2) active-duty and reserve 
training; 3) recruiting; 4) reserve officers' 
training corps; 5) selective service system; 
6) military justice; 7) enlistments and sep-
arations; 8) awards; 9) academies; 10) 
human relations; 11) medical care 
delivery and funding; 12) pay and allow-
ances; 13) promotion; 14) retirement; 15) 
related legislative oversight. 
In11estigations 
2343 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
Legislative jurisdiction over: 1) defence 
acquisition regulations and related pro-
curement matters; 2) organisation of the 
Department of Defence, including pro-
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posed reorganisations; 3) naval petroleum 
reserves; 4) related legislative oversight; 5) 
investigative authority in relation to the 
committee's general oversight responsibil-
ities. 
Readiness 
2339 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
Legislative jurisdiction over: 1) the annual 
authorisation for operation and mainte-
nance; 2) the current readiness and pre-
paredness requirements of the defence 
establishment, including the supporting 
defence industrial base; 3) special opera-
tions forces oversight; 4) commissaries 
and exchanges, clubs and related non-
appropriated funds activities of the 
Armed Forces; 5) related legislative over-
sight. 
Defence Policy Panel 
Purpose: 
To consider matters related to Depart-
ment of Defence policy generally and the 
impact of such policy matters on defence 
resources. 
Military Education Panel 
Purpose: 
1) To review Department of Defence 
plans for implementing the joint profes-
sional military eduction requirements of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act with a view 
toward assuring that the phases of mil- . 
itary officer education provide the proper 
linkage between the service-competent 
officer and the competent joint officer; 2) 
to assess the ability of the current 
Department of Defence military edu-
cation system to develop professional mil-
itary strategists, joint warfighters and tac-
ticians. 
Purpose: 
Structure of United States Defence 
Industrial Base Panel 
1) To examine the current structure of the 
United States defence industrial base, 
how it has changed and its responsiveness 
to the new military and economic condi-
tions of the post-cold war era; 2) to review 
the implications of financial viability of 
defence suppliers; and related issues. 
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Future uses of Defence Manufacturing 
and Technology Resources Panel 
To explore ways in which the current 
manufacturing and technology capabil-
ities of the Department of Defence and 
DOD-controlled assets might be available 
to civilian enterprises while preserving 
defence manufacturing capacity and 
avoiding costly and inefficient " moth-
balling " of key defence industries. 
North Atlantic Assembly Panel 
Purpose: 
1) To organise the preparation of the com-
mittee's input to NATO's parliament -
the North Atlantic Assembly; 2) to serve 
as a focal point for the committee's 
involvement in North Atlantic Assembly 
meetings and in any broader, pan-
European successor or counterpart. 
Environmental Restoration Panel 
Purpose: 
1) Review and report on Department of 
Defence compliance with applicable envi-
ronmental statutes; 2) make recommenda-
tions to streamline and improve 
Department of Defence environmental 
programmes; 3) recommend funding and 
personnel resource levels necessary to 
meet environmental requirements; 4) 
monitor and report on the evolution of 
environmental issues as they relate to 
national security matters. 
Purpose: 
Department of Energy Defence 
Nuclear Facilities Panel 
To review issues related to the military 
application of nuclear energy - includi_ng, 
but not limited to - the modernisation 
and maintenance of defence nuclear facil-
ities to support national security require-
ments, nuclear reactor safety and environ-
mental issues. 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 
2170, Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515-6128 
Jurisdication: 
1) Relations of the United States with 
foreign nations generally; 2) acquisition of 
land and buildings for embassies and lega-
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tions in foreign countries; 3) estab-
lishment of boundary lines between the 
United States and foreign nations; 4) 
foreign loans; 5) international conferences 
and congresses; 6) intervention abroad 
and declarations of war; 7) measures 
relating to the diplomatic service; 8) mea-
sures to foster commercial intercourse 
with foreign nations and to safeguard 
American business interests abroad; 9) 
neutrality; 1 0) protection of American cit-
izens abroad and expatriation; 11) the 
American National Red Cross; 12) United 
Nations organisations; 13) measures 
relating to international economic policy; 
14) export controls, including 
non-proliferation of nuclear technology 
and nuclear hardware; 15) international 
commodity agreements (other than those 
involving sugar), including all agreements 
for co-operation in the export of nuclear 
technology and nuclear hardware; 16) 
trading with the enemy; 17) international 
education. 
Sub-committees of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 
Arms Control, International Security and Science 
2401A Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
1) National security and scientific devel-
opments affecting foreign policy; 2) stra-
tegic planning and agreements; 3) war 
powers and executive agreements legis-
lation; 4) arms control and disarmament 
agency and all aspects of arms control and 
disarmament, with particular emphasis on 
the investigation and evaluation of arms 
control and disarmament proposals and 
concepts; 5) security aspects of nuclear 
technology and materials; 6) international 
terrorism, with special focus on the 
United States Government's policies and 
programmes for combatting international 
terrorist movements and actions; 7) over-
sight of military aspects of foreign policy 
and foreign intelligence; 8) oversight of 
state and Defence Department activities 
involving arms transfers, arms export 
licences, administration of security assis-
tance, arms sales, foreign military training 
and advisory programmes and conven-
tional arms control. 
Europe and the Middle East 
B359 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
HuiiUlll Rights and International Organisations 
B358 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
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Asian and Pacifrc Affairs 
707 O'Nei/1 House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Africa 
816 O'Nei/1 House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
Oversight of matters relating to parlia-
mentary conferences and exchanges 
involving the region; (etc.). 
Western Hemisphere Affairs 
705 O'Neil/ House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
International Operotions 
709 O'Neil/ House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Jurisdiction: 
1) Department of State and United States 
Information Agency operations and legis-
lation; 2) the diplomatic service; 3) inter-
national education and cultural affairs; 4) 
foreign buildings; 5) international ter-
rorism, with special emphasi~ on policies 
and programmes relating to the 
enhancement of embassy security and the 
protection of United States personnel 
and institutions abroad; 6) parliamentary 
conferences and exchanges; 7) protection 
of American citizens abroad; 8) interna-
tional broadcasting· and international 
communication and information policy. 
Committee on Science, Space and Technology 
2320 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515-6301 
Sub-committees of the Committee on Science, 
Space and Technology 
Technology and CompetitiPeness 
B374 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Space 
2320 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
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House informal organisations 
Export Task Force 
337 Ford House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
The Export Task Force, an ISO, is a bipar-
tisan group with approximately 65 members 
representing almost every geographic region in 
the United States and a variety of economic 
interests and philosophical viewpoints. It is the 
primary vehicle that serves to inform members 
on export issues; to co-ordinate efforts on trade-
related legislative proposals, both within Con-
gress and the business community; and to 
advocate trade legislation that aids and supports 
American business and promotes American 
export trade. 
Congressional Caucus for Science 
and Technology 
1717 Longworth House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
The caucus, a bipartisan Legislative 
Service organisation, is composed of members 
of Congress and was created to promote better 
understanding throughout the Congress of issues 
that affect or are affected by science and tech-
nology. The caucus' aim is to help the Congress 
become well-informed about the extremely 
complex scientific and technological issues on 
which it is increasingly called to make critical 
decisions. 
Congressional Space Caucus 
2188 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
The Congressional Space Caucus, an LSO, 
is a bipartisan group of representatives whose 
common goal is the revitalisation of America's 
space programme. Toward that end, it provides 
legislative support on space issues and serves as 
a clearing-house on space information. 
Army Caucus 
2344 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
Founded in 1987, the Army Caucus is an 
informal, bipartisan group of members of Con-
gress that works with the army to raise the visi-
bility of the army's needs, inform members of 
the importance of the nation's conventional 
capability and assist the army in presenting pro-
grammes to the Congress. 
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House leadership and party organisations 
House Republican Research Commi"ee 
1622 Longworth House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
The Republican Research Committee is 
the official research arm of the House Repub-
lican Conference. 
Task Forces 
Arms Control 
Foreign Policy and Western Alliance 
Space Exploration 
Strategic Defence Initiative 
Technology and Policy 
Technology Transfer 
Terrorism/Unconventional Warfare 
Ill. United States Congressional 
Bicameral Organisations 
Commission on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe 
237 Ford House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
The Commission on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (the Helsinki Com-
mission) was enacted into law in 1976 to 
monitor and promote compliance with the 
human rights and other provisions of the inter-
national Helsinki Accords of 197 5 and to 
monitor and encourage United States govern-
mental and private programmes seeking to 
expand East-West economic and cultural 
co-operation. The commission is composed of 
18 members of Congress and 3 executive branch 
representatives. 
3 members appointed by the President 
7 members appointed by the Senate 
8 members appointed by the House. 
Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus 
501 Ford House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
The Arms Control and Foreign Policy 
Caucus, an LSO, is a bipartisan caucus of Senate 
and House members concerned with foreign and 
military policy. It is open to any member of 
Congress who subscribes to its general purposes 
of co-ordinating congressional concern for world 
peace into specific action for the development of 
international co-operation, a strengthened 
United Nations and arms control and disarm-
ament. 
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The Congressiolllll Milittii'J' Reform Caucus 
The Congressional Military Reform 
Caucus is a bipartisan, bicameral group of 
members whose goal is to support the work of 
relevant committees for a stronger, more cost-
effective national defence. Its agenda includes: 
1) acquisition process reform, including the cre-
ation of a unified acquisition corps for the 
Department of Defence; 2) improved weapons 
testing; 3) and oversight of defence acquisition 
legislation enacted by Congress. 
Congressional Budget Office 
Ford House Office Building, Fourth Floor 
Washington, DC 20515 
The Congressional Budget Office, estab-
lished pursuant to the Congressional Budget Act 
of 197 4, is a non-partisan organisation which 
provides to the United States Congress budget-
related information and analyses of alternative 
fiscal, budgetary and programmatic issues. 
Natiolllll Security Division 
Programme analysis in the area of 
national defence. 
General Accounting Office 
441 G Street, N. W., 
Washington, DC 20548 
The United States General Accounting 
Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Con-
gress, was created in 1921 to aid Congress in 
meeting its oversight responsibilities. The head 
of the agency, the Comptroller General of the 
United States, is appointed by the President, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to a 
non-renewable 15-year term of office. 
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InfontUltion Mflllllgement IUfd Teellnology Division 
Defence and security information systems 
(etc.). 
Natiolllll Security IUfd International 
Affairs Division 
Communications, command, control and 
intelligence issues; Air Force issues; Army 
issues; Navy issues; logistics issues; NASA 
issues; research, development, acquisition and 
procurement issues; security and international 
relations issues (etc.). 
Office of Technology Assessment 
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E., 
Washington, DC 20003 
Established by statute (P.L. 92-484) in 
1972, the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) is a non-partisan analytical support 
agency which serves the United States Congress. 
Its purpose is to help Congress cope with new 
and unique kinds of issues that confront our 
increasingly complex, interdependent, high-
technology society. 
OTA's task is to provide early warnings 
and analyses of emerging, difficult and often 
highly technical issues, clarifying for Congress 
both the range of policy options and the 
potential impacts of adopting each of these 
options. 
National Security Caucus 
133 Cannon House Office Building 
Washington, DC 20515 
The National Security Caucus is com-
posed of 40 senators and 153 representatives. 
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Amendment 1 
2nd December 1991 
Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
1. In the draft order, at the end add "on a basis of equality". 
l. See 11th sitting, 3rd December 1991 (amendment negatived). 
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Arms control negotiations - further initiatives for WEU 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee 2 
by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
RAPPORTEUR'S PREFACE 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on arms control negotiations - further initiatives for WEU 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. Nuclear disarmament 
(i) The START agreement 
(ii) American disarmament proposals 
(iii) The Soviet response 
(iv) The Bush and Gorbachev nuclear initiatives 
(v) NATO's latest decisions 
(vi) Nuclear perspectives 
Ill. Conventional disarmament 
(i) The CFE Treaty 
(ii) Verification 
(iii) Conventional and unconventional perspectives 
IV. Open skies 
V. Chemical disarmament 
VI. Biological disarmament 
VII. The WEU role 
APPENDICES 
I. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 
11. United States and Soviet nuclear proposals 
Ill. A CFE chronology 
IV. Glossary of arms control 
1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions. 
7th November 1991 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (Alternate: Tummers), Mr. Uyttendaele 
(Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Cariglia, Chevalier, Cox, De Decker, Dees, Ewing, Fernandes Marques, 
Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret, Fourre, Inner, Jung, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden (Alternate: De Hoop Sche./Jer), Marten, 
Mota Torres, Moya, Pecchioli, Perinat, Scheer, Sinesio, Speed, Steiner, Sir John Stokes (Alternate: Sir Russell Johnston), 
MM. Vazques (Alternate: de Puig), Vieira Mesquita, Zierer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Rapporteur's Preface 
In preparation for this report, the committee as a whole was addressed by the following at the 
Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, on 11th and 12th June 1991: 
H.E. Mr. Gerard Errera, Ambassador, France; 
H.E. Miss Tessa Solesby, Ambassador, United Kingdom; 
H.E. Mr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner, Ambassador, Germany; 
H.E. Mr. Ledogar, Ambassador, United States; 
H.E. Mr. Chadha, Ambassador, India; 
H.E. Mr. Garcia-Moritan, Ambassador, Argentina; 
H.E. Mr. Batsanov, Ambassador, USSR; 
H.E. Mr. Hou, Ambassador, China; 
H.E. Mr. Komatina, Ambassador, Yugoslavia; 
H.E. Mr. Marcel Houllez, Ambassador, Belgium; 
H.E. Mr. Andrea Negrotto Cambiaso, Ambassador, Italy; 
H.E. Mr. Julien Alex, Ambassador, Luxembourg; 
H.E. Mr. Hendrik Wagenmakers, Ambassador, Netherlands; 
H.E. Mr. Luis Roma de Albuquerque, Ambassador, Portugal; 
H.E. Mr. Don Joaquin Perez-Villanueva, Ambassador, Spain. 
Interviews with the following were conducted on behalf of the Rapporteur in London on 26th and 
27th September 1991: 
Mr. Ian Dawson, Assistant Under Secretary of State (Policy), Ministry of Defence; 
Mr. Edgar Buckley, Head of the Defence Arms Control Unit, Ministry of Defence; 
Mr. Andrew Barlow, Foreign Office Arms Control Research Department; 
Mr. Michael Clarke, Director, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London Uni-
versity. 
The Rapporteur met the following at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 7th October 1991: 
H.E. Ambassador Carlos Miranda (SP) Permanent Representative of Spain on the North 
Atlantic Council; 
Mr. M. Jochems (NL), Head of Defence Policy Section; 
Colonel R. Yolk (D), Nuclear Planning Branch; 
Mr. L. Zannier (D), Head of Disarmament and Arms Control Section; 
Mr. N. Nedimoglu (TU), Head of Verification Support Staff; 
SACEUR Headquarters, Mons, Belgium, on 8th October 1991: 
Minister Kent Brown (US), Special Assistant to SACEUR for International Affairs; 
Brigadier General Javier Pardo de Santayana (SP), Chief, Spanish Military Mission; 
Mr. Harry Brown (GB), Special Assistant for Global and Strategic Events; 
Air Commodore Willie Rae (RAF) (GB), Chief Special Weapons Branch; 
Colonel Graham Messervy-Whiting (GB), SHAPE Special Briefer; 
Group Captain Andrew Valiance (GB), Arms Control Branch; 
and at the NATO School, Oberammergau, on 9th October 1991: 
Colonel Lance Smith (USAF), Commandant; 
Colonel John Beasley (US), Director, Academics/Operations; 
Commander Niels Borck (DA), Orientation Department; 
Major James Sohl (US), Verification Section. 
In addition, the Rapporteur met Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office ofthe WEU Council, in Bonn on 8th July and 30th October 
1991. 
The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, ambassadors, officials 
and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions. 
The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the com-
mittee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on arms control negotiations - further initiatives for WEU 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the changes affecting peace and security which have occurred in recent years in Europe 
resulting in major progress in disarmament agreements and offering henceforth unprecedented possi-
bilities for greater reductions in all types of armaments; 
(ii) Noting the importance of the agreements achieved so far for the reduction of conventional and 
nuclear armaments and the monitoring and verification of the ban on certain weapons of mass destruction; 
(iii) Welcoming the proposals for radical reductions in nuclear weapons recently made by President 
Bush and President Gorbachev which represent a major step forward in this area in both qualitative 
and quantitative terms; 
(iv) Welcoming the reduction in nuclear armaments agreed by NATO at its recent meeting in Taormina; 
(v) Convinced, however, that the principles reiterated in The Hague platform remain a mainstay of 
European defence; 
(vi) Convinced that the CFE Treaty will be a milestone in the limitation of these armaments and 
expressing the wish that this treaty be ratified without delay by all countries; 
(vii) Considering that there are new prospects of developing conventional disarmament in the 
framework of the CSCE and of the Atlantic Alliance; 
(viii) Recognising the efforts made in the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference for a 
total ban on chemical and biological weapons; 
(ix) Aware that WEU has an important role to play in backing the process of disarmament and in 
taking initiatives for its achievement in practice; 
(x) Determined for its part to maintain a permanent debate on arms control matters in 
co-ordination with all appropriate forums, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Contribute by its action to the advancement of all initiatives for peace and detente now being 
taken, in particular by endorsing disarmament and arms control proposals; 
2. Act continuously to promote a consensus between member countries on disarmament in order to 
draw positions closer together, harmonise legislation and take joint measures to reduce and control 
armaments, including the regulation and transparency of arms sales; 
3. Ensure that the organisation of peace at European and national level concords increasingly with 
quantitative and qualitative criteria in defence matters to achieve reasonable minima; 
4. Actively support the Bush-Gorbachev proposals to reduce nuclear weapons and efforts to avoid 
their proliferation, in accordance with the terms set out in the non-proliferation treaty and to obtain a 
ban on nuclear testing; 
5. Elaborate and subscribe to a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence which takes account of 
recent changes but which safeguards European interests; 
6. Continue to press for the banning of the production, deployment and sale of chemical and bio-
logical weapons; 
7. Resolutely endorse the CFE Treaty by urging member states to ratify it without delay, thus 
ensuring that WEU sets an example in this respect; 
8. Give impetus to the verification agreements so as to be able to establish verification systems and 
programmes acceptable to all member states; 
l 
! 
l 
! 
9. Ensure that the satellite data interpretation centre is integrated into the verification process to be 1 
instituted; ~ 
10. Implement the necessary procedure for WEU to participate in a co-ordinated manner, in par-
ticular with the Atlantic Alliance and with other responsible bodies in the necessary exchange of infor-
mation and elaboration of disarmament proposals. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. At the time of writing, your Rappor-
teur, like the rest of his colleagues, is awaiting 
the results of three momentous meetings 
arranged between now and the date when the 
present report is to be debated: Rome (NATO), 
Bonn (WEU) and Maastricht (EC). For the 
moment, various participants are still manoeu-
vring, positions changing, sometimes daily. For 
some, these shifts represent totally different 
approaches now compared with only a year ago, 
for others it is a question of having come nearly 
full circle compared with almost thirty years 
ago, for example: 
" We quite accept that the European poli-
tical union if it is to be effective, will have 
a common concern of defence problems, 
and that a European point of view on 
defence would emerge " 1• 
2. The Assembly's position has been strongly 
in favour of a continuing role for NATO, the EC 
and WEU, each in its particular context. It is 
hoped that this solution will be adopted by our 
ministers and their colleagues from non-member 
countries when the moment is judged right and 
formal structures established to link the three 
bodies cited. 
3. The result of such an arrangement could 
well be an added impetus for arms control, 
whether on short- or longer-range (tactical 
and/or strategic) weapons. WEU initiatives 
hitherto, especially concerning verification, 
have focused particularly on conventional wea-
ponry. With some of the latest ideas from 
various quarters highlighting nuclear issues, the 
time has come for WEU to involve itself more 
closely in what was until comparatively recently 
the " domaine reserve .. of the superpowers. 
4. To this end, we should ensure that the 
European voice and opinion are clearly 
expressed and clearly heard, even if not fully 
appreciated by third parties. 
5. The aim of the present report is to update 
colleagues on the implications for WEU of a 
series of contemporary discussions and to 
identify just where further WEU initiatives may 
be directed. 
6. Current negotiations range across a broad 
spectrum of specific subjects, usually neatly com-
partimentalised. These include the purely bila-
teral talks (such as START, see below) between 
l. United Kingdom statement to the WEU Council, lOth 
April 1962. 
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the United States and Soviet authorities. Take 
away the nuclear element, add in the NATO 
allies and the erstwhile Warsaw Pact Organ-
isation and one finds the trickiest ground to 
cover - the CFE talks in Vienna which, although 
still enjoying the reflected kudos of a success-
fully concluded treaty, have to be pursued in an 
attempt to focus also on issues concerning other 
equipments and not least of all on manpower, a 
subject especially dear to European hearts. 
7. CSCE, the United Nations- there is room 
for all countries who wish to play at least some 
part in the arms control saga. The latest moves 
by the United States are obviously linked to pro-
blems of control in a gradually fragmenting 
Soviet Union. The Soviets in turn are trying to 
grasp the ideal moment to push, perhaps for the 
last time, certain ideas such as zero options, 
nuclear-free zones, naval arms control, etc. The 
end result is surely that the (Western) Europeans 
must keep their wits about them and not allow 
their own legitimate interests to be eroded. 
8. Such is also the case in Geneva where, at 
the Conference on Disarmament, the Defence 
Committee in June witnessed at first hand the 
rivalries and susceptibilities which sometimes 
divide even the staunchest of allies. "Intrusive 
inspection " was the watchword amongst those 
trying to thrash out the modalities of a 
convention on chemical weapons. Since June 
other initiatives aimed at clarifying positions 
and smoothing ruffled feathers have in fact had 
other effects on many of the participants. 
9. Notes follow on each of the forums in turn 
with the greatest emphasis being reserved for the 
latest dramatic developments (at the time of 
writing that is): the Bush and Gorbachev initia-
tives concerning all categories of nuclear weapons. 
10. Fortunately the Assembly's Rules of Pro-
cedure will allow your Rapporteur to update the 
present report and amend recommendations right 
up to the last moment: essential during a time of 
such swift and sudden change when the potential 
for pragmatic political gesticulation rather than 
calm cartesian logic is probably at its highest 
point since Reykjavik (although obviously for 
other reasons and in a quite different context). 
II. Nuclear disarmament 
(i) The START agreement 
11. Apart from the failed coup in the Soviet 
Union, with its obvious implications for the 
future of arms control, as discussed elsewhere by 
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your Rapporteur, a major event this past summer 
has been the signing of the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START) between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on Wednesday, 31st July 
1991. The treaty is documented at Appendix I. 
12. The START agreement is of course a 
major advance in the continuing battle to reduce 
weapons of mass destruction but, when put in 
perspective, proves in fact to be only a very 
small step in the right direction. For example, 
the START warhead reductions, when imple-
mented, will leave both sides at a point higher 
than when the SALT 11 talks began in 1972 
(although of course lower than when the START 
discussions themselves began in 1985). Total 
actual strategic warheads over the years: 
1972 1985 1991 post-START 
United States 7 883 11 984 11 966 8 926 
USSR ..... 2 441 10012 10 880 7 052 
13. Apart from the comparatively small 
reductions involved and the length of time taken 
for the negotiations themselves, the START 
agreement is remarkable for the issues it did not 
raise or cover, viz. naval weapons, space 
weapons and strategic arms belonging to third 
parties (especially Britain, France and China). 
Britain in particular had always declared that 
the United Kingdom would only become 
involved in talks on the reduction of strategic 
nuclear weapons when the two superpowers had 
declared their intent to abolish " well over 50% " 
of their own arsenals. The treaty signed on 31st 
July 1991 presented no imminent incentive for 
any of the " second echelon " nuclear powers to 
become involved in new rounds of talks. 
14. Events only two and a half weeks later 
were to present a very new and unexpected 
dimension, bringing us to: 
(ii) American disarmament proposal& 
15. In his address on 28th September 1991, 
President Bush presented the United States' new 
nuclear strategy, and his spokesman, Marlin 
Fitzwater, said that this address would mark 
" an historic turning-point in our national 
defence posture ". 
16. This plan, following the evolution of the 
situation in the Soviet Union, proposes new 
limitations in strategic nuclear armaments, 
including the elimination of multiple-warhead 
strategic missiles and a review of United States 
opposition to reductions in sea-launched bal-
listic missiles. 
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17. This proposal showed an evolution com-
pared with the last START treaty of 31st July 
which limited only the number of nuclear war-
heads and allowed the Soviet Union to repa-
triate to Russia the strategic missiles stationed 
in other republics. Here, the aim is to eliminate 
the vehicles necessary for launching warheads. 
In fact, the United States is afraid that the 
central Soviet Government will lose control over 
nuclear weapons. It is possible that at least three 
republics might share control and political 
responsibility for strategic weapons. 
18. President Bush therefore believed that to 
avert nuclear proliferation in the Soviet Union it 
was necessary to negotiate greater reductions in 
the arsenals of the superpowers. 
19. The new American proposals extend well 
beyond the previous START treaty. The 
reduction and possible banning of multiple-
warhead missiles was welcomed by arms control 
groups which have long maintained that SS-18s 
and MXs were the most destabilising elements 
in the balance of forces. 
20. The new proposals might therefore 
concern a ban on the plan for the new version of 
the MX missile and therefore open the possi-
bility of negotiations on sea-launched multi-
warhead systems, although the Americans will 
probably maintain that submarine-borne mis-
siles are less destabilising than those based on 
land. 
21. However, if missile-launching submarines 
are covered by the new negotiations, this might 
affect Britain's Trident programme, although 
the United Kingdom is still adamant that the 
Trident cannot be banned. Similarly, France will 
be in an embarrassing position if it continues its 
Hades programme. For the time being, the 
White House is proposing that the Soviet Union 
work in parallel with the United States on their 
own defence strategies. 
22. The United States disarmament plan also 
has internal repercussions and some experts are 
wondering whether President Bush sincerely 
wishes to accelerate arms reductions or whether 
he is trying to relieve pressure on his budget. 
Furthermore, ifthis is an upheaval in the United 
States defence strategy, its nature has not 
changed. It is still based on deterrence. 
23. The American plan which contains uni-
lateral measures and proposals submitted to the 
Soviet Union is causing far-reaching strategic 
changes and calling for vast cuts in the nuclear 
arsenals of the two powers so as to reduce the 
nuclear threat. This proposal is justified by the 
end of the cold war and of the Soviet threat and 
has been fostered by a recent French proposal 
for a meeting of the four nuclear powers in 
Europe. 
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24. The American proposal concerns two 
nuclear weapons systems: short-range nuclear 
weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. 
25. Regarding the first category, by unilateral 
decision the United States is to repatriate or 
destroy missiles, shells and bombs stationed in 
Europe. It will do likewise for missiles on naval 
vessels, in submarines or stationed on American 
territory. 
26. Although unilateral, this decision was 
taken so that the Soviet Union would take 
equivalent measures and dismantle tactical 
weapons spread throughout its territory which 
constitute a real danger in the event of regional 
hostilities and the decline in central control. 
2 7. Regarding strategic nuclear weapons, the 
United States proposes new negotiations with 
the Soviets on the elimination of land-based, 
multiple-warhead intercontinental missiles 
which are considered to be the most 
destabilising. 
28. This proposal is favourable to the United 
States, however, since it does not cover the mul-
tiple warheads in submarines where the United 
States has the lead over the Soviet Union. 
However, the American proposal is an 
improvement on the 31st July START treaty 
which concerns only relatively old weapons 
systems. 
29. President Bush also announced the end of 
the permanent alert for bombers and strategic 
missile batteries. Similarly, the modernisation 
programmes of Midgetman missiles and MXs 
were abandoned. To offset these measures, the 
United States President is still asking for equiv-
alent Soviet decisions, none of which call in 
question the existence of credible nuclear deter-
rence based on intercontinental missiles and 
strategic bombers. 
30. The third part of the American proposal 
concerns the joint development of an anti-
missile defence system which would mean rene-
gotiating the 1978 anti-ballistic missile treaty 
which authorises the United States or the Soviet 
Union to deploy only one anti-missile system so 
as not to upset the balance of power, but the 
Soviet Union is opposed to any such renegoti-
ation. 
31. The Soviet Union's initial response on 
31st September to the United States proposal 
contained no specific measures apart from a 
proposal to introduce an immediate ban on 
nuclear testing and General Omelichev said the 
Soviet Union was prepared to follow the United 
States in standing down Soviet bombers on 
nuclear alert. 
32. The Soviets are now continuing talks with 
the Americans to see how the proposals can be 
implemented. 
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33. At the same time, the International Mon-
etary Fund said it was preparing to unveil a plan 
for achieving global reductions in military 
spending that could save between $140 billion 
and $180 billion a year worldwide. If adopted, 
the plan would save the Soviet Union alone 
between $80 billion and $100 billion, freeing 
funds desperately needed to achieve the coun-
try's transition to a market economy. The IMF 
believes that these reductions are now possible, 
thanks to the end of the cold war. 
34. According to Pravda, the American 
administration was deeply concerned about the 
reliability of Soviet control over its nuclear 
arsenal and this may be one of the driving 
motives behind the American proposals. 
Moscow saw some inequity in President Bush's 
proposal for rapid reductions in heavy, land-
based multiple-warhead missiles which were the 
main pillar of the Soviet deterrent, whereas the 
Americans were also heavily reliant on 
submarine-launched weapons. 
35. The Soviet response was carefully calcu-
lated to show that President Gorbachev was not 
content to follow blindly President Bush's initia-
tives. He therefore insisted that they were the 
direct consequence of the transformation of 
Soviet-American relations and the logical pro-
longation of the various summit meetings 
attended by President Gorbachev. He thus 
stressed that disarmament was not solely the 
result of American initiatives. 
36. He subsequently tackled the problem of 
other European nuclear powers to ask the Pres-
ident of the United States whether the United 
Kingdom and France were concerned by his pro-
posals and· renewed questions about nuclear 
tests which he wished to be totally eliminated. 
3 7. Boris Y eltsin, for his part, has often said 
he wanted the USSR to take important recip-
rocal measures. Again, Marshal Shaposhnikov, 
the Soviet Defence Minister, wants the total 
elimination of tactical nuclear weapons and a 
larger reduction in strategic weapons. 
38. Like the Soviet reaction, NATO's reaction 
was very positive. The United Kingdom and 
France, the two other European nuclear powers 
concerned by the Soviet proposals for disarm-
ament, reacted, in the case of the former, by 
announcing that British warships would no 
longer be permanently equipped with nuclear 
weapons and land-based, short-range shells and 
missiles would be eliminated. France declared 
that it would be associated with the disarm-
ament of the two great powers only when the 
latter reached a sufficient level. 
39. According to the Secretary-General of 
NATO Mr. Manfred Warner, the American ini-
tiative '" opens up a new and promising chapter 
in Soviet-American relations. It is a milestone 
in building a peaceful, free and co-operative 
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Europe, thereby making the whole world a sig-
nificantly safer place ". He therefore hoped the 
Soviet Union would respond favourably to these 
proposals. 
40. Finally, to discuss the consequences of 
this proposal at the level of NATO member 
states, he convened a special meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council at the level of permanent 
representatives on 28th September. The latter 
stated that these disarmament initiatives were 
following the same course as the present reno-
vation of the alliance decided in London in July 
1990. 
41. Furthermore, after the American nuclear 
disarmament proposal, the meeting proposed by 
President Mitterrand on 11th September last 
between the four European nuclear powers has 
now secured an agreememt of principle in spite 
of British and American reticence since they 
would have preferred prior consultation between 
the western powers. The United Kingdom fears 
this might disturb public opinion and part of the 
American administration does not wish to break 
with the tradition of bilateral negotiations on 
strategic problems. 
(iii) The So11iet respo111e 
42. The Soviet response came on 6th October 
with a more ambitious plan than the American 
initiative. It proposed the destruction of nuclear 
mines and shells, the dismantling of tactical mis-
siles and warheads and the withdrawal of tac-
tical nuclear weapons from naval vessels and 
submarines. As anticipated, President Gor-
bachev also proposed that the other nuclear 
powers take part in this massive disarmament 
plan. He also announced that the Soviet Union 
would cut its troops by 700 000 men. 
43. The destruction of tactical nuclear 
weapons in response to the American proposals 
reassured the White House regarding its fears 
about the use of such weapons in local conflicts 
or their falling into the hands of enemies. Since 
these weapons were spread throughout Soviet 
territory they might escape the control of a legit-
imate authority as the power of the central 
Soviet Government declined. 
44. The last two items in the Soviet proposal 
concerned nuclear bombers in respect of which 
the Soviet Union fell in with the American pro-
posal by decreeing the end of a permanent state 
of alert and declaring a unilateral halt in the 
manufacture of mobile ballistic missiles, a freeze 
on multiple-warhead ballistic missiles and the 
withdrawal of six nuclear submarines. Finally, it 
was proposed that the United States study cre-
ating a joint anti-missile system. 
45. There are therefore five specific proposals 
in President Gorbachev's statement: tactical 
weapons, strategic means, anti-missile defence, 
nuclear testing and conventional means. 
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46. The Soviets followed the American pro-
posal for tactical weapons by undertaking to 
destroy atomic shells and mines, deactivate anti-
aircraft rockets and withdraw tactical nuclear 
weapons from the navy and naval aircraft. Pres-
ident Gorbachev went beyond the American ini-
tiative, however, by proposing to extend these 
measures to the air force and inviting the other 
nuclear powers to act in concert with the two 
superpowers. 
4 7. In the strategic area, like President Bush, 
President Gorbachev declared the end of the 
permanent state of alert for bombers and unilat-
erally he extended this measure to 503 intercon-
tinental missiles, 134 of which had multiple war-
heads. Finally, six submarines have been, or will 
be, de-commissioned, but President Gorbachev 
did not follow up the American proposal to ban 
multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles for which President Bush had proposed 
negotiations. He merely announced a freeze on 
modernisation programmes for this type of 
weapon. 
48. Regarding anti-missile defences, Pres-
ident Gorbachev proposed studying the possi-
bility of creating joint systems to avert nuclear 
missile attacks. 
49. The Soviet Union again proclaimed a 
one-year unilateral moratorium on nuclear 
testing, but it is hardly probable that President 
Bush will do likewise. 
50. In the conventional area, President Gor-
bachev announced a reduction of 700 000 men 
in the strength of the Red Army, which would 
bring its strength down to some 3 million. 
51. The historical impact of President Bush's 
address is due to the fact that, for the first time, 
the strategic defence of the United States is no 
longer based on the possibility of a surprise 
Soviet attack. Yet the unilateral measures taken 
by President Bush are not irreversible: the 
nuclear bombers are still operational within 24 
hours, the withdrawal and destruction of tactical 
weapons, although decided unilaterally, may be 
revised if the Soviet Union fails to take recip-
rocal measures and the programmes that have 
been halted can be reactivated. 
52. This attitude on the part of the United 
States may be explained by the fact that the dis-
armament plan is addressed to three different 
audiences: the Soviet Union, of course, but also 
the other nuclear powers and the United States 
Congress. In regard more particularly to 
American-Soviet relations, a problem arises at 
present with short-range nuclear weapons whose 
chain of command is no longer reliable. They 
must therefore be eliminated as quickly as pos-
sible. Beyond the consequences this would have 
on security, this measure is also destined to 
weaken the Soviet Union as a superpower and to 
increase the present gap between the two super-
powers, particularly since the American propo-
sal concerns only ground-based weapons, whereas 
the United States is a maritime power. 
53. In like manner, the American proposal in 
no way changes the development of the B-2 
stealth bomber, the Sea Wolf silent submarine 
and the SDI programme. Yet Washington 
reacted favourably to President Gorbachev's 
speech and consequently the present disarm-
ament process bears no resemblance to past 
practices based on negotiations. It is more a 
question of the two great powers trying to outbid 
each other. In Washington there is now talk of 
the disarmament race. 
54. As matters now stand, the most important 
thing for the Americans is President Gor-
bachev's agreement to start negotiations on anti-
missile defences whereas traditionally he was 
inflexible about any renegotiation of the 1972 
ABM treaty. 
55. Furthermore, in tactical weapons, the 
Soviet Union goes farther than its commitments 
under the START treaty and will keep only 
5 000 missiles instead of 6 000, thus upsetting in 
favour of the United States the numerical 
balance that existed between the two great 
powers. Conversely, the Soviet Union proposes 
not to eliminate but to limit the deployment of 
airborne weapons in Europe, the only category 
of tactical weapons not mentioned by President 
Bush, thus trying to break the strategic link 
between Europe and the United States and thus 
shake one of the pillars of NATO's doctrine. 
This is the question raised by General John 
Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
who welcomed the Soviet initiative, but recalled 
that NATO would retain airborne tactical 
weapons. 
56. He believes the Atlantic Alliance is nec-
essary for handling instability in Europe and the 
Soviet military capability, although the Soviet 
Union no longer has aggressive intentions. 
57. The Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, John Major, reacted in like manner 
when he emphasised that the American-Soviet 
disarmament plan in no way affected the nuclear 
submarine programme equipped with Trident 
missiles which was the minimum defence 
Britain needed. 
(iv) The Bush and Gorbtu:he-, nuclear initiatiPes 
58. Heralded by many as the great leap 
forward in nuclear disarmament, the Bush and 
Gorbachev nuclear initiatives make for an inter-
esting comparison: 
Ground-based tactical nuclear weapons 
Bush: will bring home and destroy all 
nuclear artillery shells and short-
range missile warheads. 
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Gorbachev: will match those cuts by destroying 
all nuclear artillery shells and war-
heads from short-range tactical 
missiles. As Bush suggested, Soviets 
also will remove nuclear warheads 
from their anti-aircraft missiles and 
land mines, two types of weapons 
the United States no longer has. 
Sea-based tactical nuclear weapons 
Bush: will withdraw all tactical nuclear 
weapons from surface ships, sub-
marines and navy aircraft. Some 
will be dismantled; others will be 
stored in central areas in case of 
crisis. 
Gorbachev: will match by removing all tactical 
nuclear weapons from ships and 
submarines, as well as from navy 
planes. Some will be destroyed, 
others put in central warehouses. 
Goes a step further than Bush by 
offering to open talks on disman-
tling all naval tactical nuclear 
weapons. 
Air-based tactical nuclear weapons 
Bush: will preserve air-delivered nuclear 
capability in Europe because it is 
"essential to NATO's security". 
Gorbachev: calls for bilateral talks to remove all 
tactical nuclear weapons from air-
craft, and to store these bombs and 
air-to-ground missiles in ware-
houses. 
Heavy bombers 
Bush: immediately will take all United 
States strategic (B-52) bombers off 
alert. 
Gorbachev: matches by removing heavy bombers 
from alert and storing their nuclear 
weapons in warehouses. 
Land-based strategic missiles 
Bush: will immediately " stand down 
from alert " all intercontinental 
nuclear missiles scheduled for dea-
ctivation under the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty, or START, 
signed in July at the Moscow 
summit. Calls on Soviets to confine 
their mobile strategic missiles to 
their garrisons. 
Gorbachev: will match by taking 503 interconti-
nental ballistic missiles off alert, 
including 134 with multiple war-
heads. As Bush asked, Soviets will 
freeze the number of mobile stra-
DOCUMENT 1288 
tegic missiles and place them at 
fixed locations. Also will stop their 
modernisation. 
Sea-based strategic missiles 
Bush: does not suggest any cuts in nuclear 
missile submarines, a category in 
which the United States has 
advantage over Soviets. 
Gorbachev: will take three nuclear missile sub-
marines, with 48 launchers, out of 
service. 
Bush: calls on Soviets to allow limited 
deployment of anti-missile 
defences to protect against attack 
by any of 15 countries with ballistic 
missiles. Says United States will 
proceed with SDI, known as Star 
Wars. 
Gorbachev: proposes development of a joint 
Soviet-United States early-warning 
system on land and in space, plus a 
joint anti-missile defence system. 
Essentially calls bluff by former 
President Reagan, who proposed 
eventually to share such tech-
nology. 
Overall numbers of warheads 
Bush: will accelerate timetable for war-
heads to be cut under START agree-
ment, as soon as it is ratified. Also 
proposes talks to eliminate all land-
based missiles with multiple war-
heads, where Soviets have numeri-
cal superiority. Does not mention 
possibility of cuts in sea-based mis-
siles, where United States is 
ahead. 
Gorbachev: goes beyond Bush, pledging uni-
lateral cut in the Soviet strategic 
arsenal to 5 000 warheads, instead 
of 6 000 required by START. Calls 
for negotiations for a further 50% 
reduction in strategic offensive 
weapons, but does not limit scope 
of talks to land-based missiles. 
Testing 
Bush: no mention in proposal. 
Gorbachev: announces an immediate, uni-
lateral, one-year moratorium on 
testing of nuclear warheads. Calls 
on other nuclear powers to follow 
suit. 
Weapons development 
Bush: will cancel development of a short-
range nuclear missile for heavy 
bombers, the MX missile, and 
mobile portions ofthe small ICBM 
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Midgetman programme. But will 
proceed with B-2 Stealth bomber 
programme. 
Gorbachev: will cancel development of a short-
range nuclear missile for heavy 
bombers, and of a small mobile 
intercontinental ballistic missile. 
Will not modernise railroad-based 
strategic missiles. 
Command and control 
Bush: will put strategic weapons under a 
single command, instead of having 
navy in charge of submarines and 
air force in charge of bombers and 
land-based missiles. Calls for talks 
on safe storage, transportation and 
control of nuclear weapons to 
prevent accidental use. 
Gorbachev: expressed readiness to begin talks 
on safe methods of storing and 
transporting nuclear weapons. Also 
will put all strategic nuclear 
weapons under a single comman~. 
Doctrine 
Bush: no mention in proposal. 
Gorbachev: calls for joint declaration of " no 
first use" policy, meaning both 
sides would pledge not to be the 
first to use nuclear weapons. This 
would mean a change in NATO 
doctrine, which now includes threat 
of United States nuclear retaliation 
if Soviets attacked Europe with 
conventional forces. 
Conventional forces 
Bush: no mention in proposal. 
Gorbachev: will reduce army by 700 000 men, 
from 3. 7 million to 3 million. 
(A schematic comparison of the various bids 
and offers is at Appendix 11.) 
(.,) NAT0'1 ltltm decilioiiS 
59. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of 
the North Atlantic Alliance held its 50th minis-
terial meeting at Taormina, Sicily, on 17th and 
18th October 1991. The following statements 
were made in the final communique: 
" The principal objective of our meeting 
was to agree a new sub-strategic nuclear 
force posture and stockpile level which 
responds to the changing security envi-
ronment in Europe. In adapting our 
nuclear policy to the needs of the 1990s 
we were guided by the conclusions of the 
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London summit last year that the alliance 
could reduce its reliance on nuclear 
weapons and in particular those of the 
shortest ranges. Events since then have 
confirmed the validity of these conclu-
sions, but allow us to go even further; 
there is no longer any requirement for 
nuclear ground-launched short-range bal-
listic missiles and artillery. In this context, 
we welcomed President Bush's recent 
decision, and the reciprocal response by 
President Gorbachev, to withdraw and 
destroy the associated nuclear warheads 
worldwide. We also welcomed the 
decision to withdraw all tactical nuclear 
weapons from surface vessels, attack sub-
marines and land-based naval aircraft, 
and to destroy many of these weapons. 
In addition to the elimination of ground-
launched nuclear systems, the number of 
air-delivered weapons in NATO's Euro-
pean stockpile will be greatly reduced. 
The total reduction in the current NATO 
stockpile of sub-strategic weapons in 
Europe will be roughly 80%. 
These unilateral measures, which are 
additional to the substantial reductions 
already made in recent years, accord with 
our long-standing policy of maintaining 
only the minimum level of nuclear forces 
required to preserve peace and stability. 
Nuclear weapons will continue for the 
foreseeable future to fulfil their essential 
role in the alliance's overall strategy, since 
conventional forces alone cannot ensure 
war prevention. We will therefore con-
tinue to base effective and up-to-date sub-
strategic nuclear forces in -Europe, but 
they will consist solely of dual-capable air-
craft, with continued widespread partici-
pation in nuclear roles and peacetime 
basing by allies. Sub-strategic nuclear 
forces committed to NATO continue to 
provide the necessary political and mil-
itary link to NATO's strategic nuclear 
forces and an important demonstration of 
alliance solidarity. 
President Bush's initiatives also include 
far-reaching proposals aimed at changing 
the strategic nuclear postures of the 
United States and the Soviet Union, to 
which there has also been a constructive 
Soviet response. These initiatives taken as 
a whole, together with the recently agreed 
START treaty, represent a historic step 
towards enhanced security and stability. 
They will result in smaller nuclear 
arsenals and a dramatic change in the 
speed of transformation to a more secure 
and co-operative relationship. In this 
regard, we are convinced that a dialogue 
with the Soviet Union on nuclear policy 
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would result in improved understanding 
and increased co-operation. 
We discussed the growing problem of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, which 
remains a matter of great concern. We 
also discussed the crucial issue of the 
control of nuclear weapons in the Soviet 
Union and welcomed the statement by the 
Soviet leadership about their plans to 
ensure the safe, responsible and reliable 
control of these weapons. This matter 
clearly affects the security interests of the 
entire alliance. We look forward to further 
steps by the Soviet Union to meet our 
concerns and to continuing timely consul-
tations within the alliance. " 
60. In essence, these decisions are a 
formalisation of American and then British 
announcements of unilateral reductions and 
make up for a definite lack of consultation 
between the allies before the event. 
61. Nevertheless, an 80% reduction in tactical 
nuclear weapons represents the decimation of 
Europe's original nuclear stockpiles over some 
ten years and is quite an achievement. 
62. As for the remaining 20%, SACEUR has 
been asked to prepare proposals on the sharing 
of nuclear responsibilities with future 
deployment presumably linked to the existing 
principles whereby seven European nations 
(Germany, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom) share 
the commitment from which no country has yet 
asked to be released. 
63. In addition, however, NATO is to study 
Mr. Gorbachev's proposal on centralised basing, 
an idea which is the mirror image of Mr. Bush's 
suggestion intended to maintain one nuclear 
interlocutor in the Soviet Union, but which 
would be a definite paradox for the European 
countries, given past insistence on " nuclear 
burden-sharing ". Again the WEU nations must 
be very circumspect about such ideas. 
(Jii) Nuclear perspecti11es 
64. In its annual review, the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) considers 
that the USSR is no longer a superpower and the 
evolution of the Soviet system will have very 
far-reaching repercussions on the strategic 
organisation of Europe. The first problem is the 
risk of the illegal use of the Soviet nuclear 
potential. This problem turns on three points, 
the first of which is who controls what. Then 
there is the question of how the nuclear capa-
bility will be shared out between the Soviet 
republics. Finally, there is the risk of a spread of 
nuclear weapons sold or stolen by terrorist 
groups or third world dictators. 
DOCUMENT 1288 
65. There is also the problem of the future of 
Soviet nuclear experts who will find themselves 
unemployed. They must be given no oppor-
tunity to reveal their knowledge to unauthorised 
states. Co-operation between the western 
powers, the USSR and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency seems necessary to settle this 
problem. 
66. Disarmament cannot be total. States 
which have had access to the system of deter-
rence will not give it up, but nuclear strategies 
might now follow the French example with a 
logic of no war, or existential deterrence, as 
Fran~is Heisbourg, Director of the IISS, has 
said. · 
67. The question is therefore: what implica-
tions do the Bush and Gorbachev initiatives and 
NATO's latest decisions hold for the Europeans 
in general and for WEU in particular? 
68. Only four short years ago, in October 
1987, our Western European countries, shaken 
less than a year earlier by the sudden realisation 
that, at Reykjavik, decisions which could affect 
our very vital interests were being taken over 
our heads, our countries decided to subscribe to 
The Hague platform. Seven countries, with the 
same Dutch President as now serves the 
European Community, chose willingly to sign a 
solemn declaration - a restatement of faith 
which brought up to date nearly 40 years of 
common experience of alliance. In this decla-
ration the long-standing Seven of WEU were 
soon to be joined on accession by Spain and 
Portugal, giving the present nine-nation mem-
bership. 
69. About nuclear issues we declared: 
" To be credible and effective, the strategy 
of deterrence and defence must continue 
to be based on an adequate mix of appro-
priate nuclear and conventional forces, 
only the nuclear element of which can 
confront a potential aggressor with an 
unacceptable risk. 
lead to a stable balance of forces at the 
lowest level compatible with our security. 
Arms control policy should, like our 
defence policy, take into account the spe-
cific European security interests in an 
evolving situation. It must be consistent 
with the maintenance of the strategic 
unity of the alliance and should not pre-
clude closer European defence co-
operation. Arms control agreements have 
to be effectively verifiable and stand the 
test of time. East and West have a 
common interest in achieving this. 
We are each determined to carry our 
share of the common defence in both the 
conventional and nuclear field, in 
accordance with the principles of risk-
and burden-sharing which are funda-
mental to allied cohesion: 
- in the conventional field, all of us will 
continue to play our part in the on-
going efforts to improve our defences; 
- in the nuclear field also, we shall con-
tinue to carry our share: some of us 
by pursuing appropriate co-operative 
arrangements with the United States; 
the United Kingdom and France by 
continuing to maintain independent 
nuclear forces, the credibility of which 
they are determined to preserve. " 
70. Would we be prepared to make the same 
statement today? Or has the situation changed 
so much that we can now afford to abandon the 
nuclear commitment and rely solely on a con-
ventional defence? It is possible to appreciate 
both ends of the argument, to advocate one 
extreme or the other, or even a series of nuances 
in between. 
71. The world has changed even in those four 
short years since 1987 and we may all cite our 
own examples of just how much change there 
has been and indeed which still lies potentially 
around the corner. But what we need now, as 
Europeans, in the nuclear realm as well as in the 
The Europeans have a major respon- conventional, is a thorough re-appraisal of dis-
sibility both in the field of conventional armament needs vis-a-vis our need for security. 
and nuclear defence. In the conventional Such a re-appraisal should be conducted within 
field, the forces of WEU member states the European pillar and should involve thorough 
represent an essential part of the alliance. transatlantic consultation on the effective way of 
As regards nuclear forces, all of which preserving European security over the coming 
from a part of deterrence, the co-operative years. Transatlantic consultation, preferably in 
arrangements that certain member states the context of the Atlantic Alliance, but also 
maintain with the United States are nee- West-East consultation in an open and deter-
essary for the security of Europe. The mined manner to ensure a proper dialogue with 
independent forces of France and the our eastern neighbours who are themselves 
United Kingdom contribute to overall engaged in similar exercises on defence policies 
deterrence and security. and doctrines. 
Arms control and disarmament are an 72. While the adage " nuclear deters only 
integral part of western security policy nuclear " is probably truer now than ever before, 
and not an alternative to it. They should there has been such a qualitative leap in delivery 
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systems: guidance and propulsion improvements 
leading to vastly perfected accuracy - accuracy 
which, as we saw during the Gulf war, may 
provide precision possibilities which virtually 
eliminate the need for nuclear warheads in 
certain circumstances. This aspect must be 
prime consideration in attempting further 
denuclearisation. 
73. In parallel with such developments, 
however, has come a measure of inexorable pro-
liferation where nuclear systems are concerned. 
One of our WEU nations, France, is now joining 
its allies in signing the nuclear non-proli-
feration treaty (NPT). An essential step if we are 
to turn a common face to the problem of prolife-
ration. Coupled with the NPT regime, we need 
to strengthen the provisions and scope for action 
of the partial test ban treaty (the missile tech-
nology control regime) and also the work of the 
Nuclear Suppliers' Group and in these contexts 
the Bush and Gorbachev nuclear initiatives are 
not without potential influence. 
74. In particular, five WEU nations will be 
affected by President Bush's decision to remove 
battlefield nuclear weapons: Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
All operate nuclear-tipped artillery shells and 
Lance short-range surface-to-surface missiles 
under dual control with the Americans. In 
addition, the United Kingdom has announced a 
significant change to nuclear weapons policy by 
deciding to remove all nuclear-armed depth 
charges from ships and aircraft and stocking 
them for contingencies. In another context, 
France had already announced a decision to 
produce only 30 examples of the new Hades 
short-range surface-to-surface missile system, 
and not to deploy them. 
75. In the particular setting of European 
security, the Bush and especially the Gorbachev 
initiatives carry special implications for much 
greater co-operation in a range of nuclear matters 
between the two Western European nuclear 
powers: France and the United Kingdom. Some 
co-operation is perhaps imminent but there is 
much greater potential for such convergence in 
all aspects of nuclear deterrence. 
76. Your Rapporteur ventures to suggest that 
the Defence Committee should further inves-
tigate the whole realm of nuclear deterrence in 
order to provide informed debate in the 
Assembly over the coming crucial months. 
Ill. Conventional disarmament 
(i) The CFE Treaty 
77. The CFE Treaty is designed to limit per-
manently the major equipment holdings in 
Europe of the NATO and former Warsaw Pact 
countries (Table 1 ). 
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78. The maximum holdings permitted will 
serve largely to eliminate the existing imbal-
ances in major conventional weapons systems in 
the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. Regional 
limitations will prevent concentrations of forces 
in particular regions which would have a 
destabilising effect for the security of Europe. 
Finally, under a sufficiency rule, ceilings limit 
the holdings of any one state to ensure that no 
one country can hold in Europe more than about 
one-third of the total. Maximum holdings for 
individual nations were set by agreement within 
each group of states (Figure 1 ). 
79. The reductions thus fixed are to be com-
pleted within 40 months from treaty ratifi-
cation. Implementation of the CFE limits by the 
Soviet Union, together with unilateral reduc-
tions already under way, would reduce its 
holdings of military equipment in Europe by 
nearly 100 000 major weapons systems com-
pared to 1988 levels. But even then the Soviet 
Union will remain by far the preponderant mil-
itary power in Europe (Figure 1). 
80. Problems of application include the classi-
fication of certain equipment according to data 
provided and the removal of equipment from 
the zone covered by the treaty before it was 
signed. 
81. For verification, all countries should 
provide each year detailed information 
regarding the size and deployment of its land 
and air forces in Europe. The first such 
exchange, giving details of each country's 
current holdings in each category of armaments 
covered by the treaty and the maximum levels to 
which they would be entitled after implemen-
tation, took place as the treaty was signed 
(Tables 2 and 3). 
82. Inspection teams will be able to check the 
information provided by each state through 
visits to declared sites· and challenge inspections 
of other sites. Nations also have the right to 
inspect the destruction of equipment in excess of 
treaty ceilings and to ensure that it has been 
carried out in an irreversible manner. In the 
United Kingdom, the Ministry of Defence has 
established a joint arms control implementation 
group to carry out inspections abroad and to 
escort inspections in the United Kingdom. 
83. Transparency could be further facilitated 
by adoption of the open skies proposal to allow 
NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries to fly 
unarmed aircraft over one another's territory in 
order to verify the effective implementation of 
measures taken by states to conform with the 
obligations of the treaty. 
84. Future prospects include new negotiations 
for limiting military personnel in Europe and 
agreement on this should be sought in time for 
the next scheduled meeting of the CSCE in 
Helsinki in March 1992. 
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TABLE I 
Maximum holdings of CFE 
tl'tllty-limited equipment 
Maximum Maximum 
Equipment holding holding 
type for each for any 
group of states individual state 
Tank ........... 20000 13 300 
Artillery piece ... 20000 13 700 
Armoured 
combat 
vehicle (ACV) ... 30000 20000 
Combat aircraft . 6 800 5 150 
Attack helicopters 2000 1 500 
85. The implementation of the cuts agreed in 
the CFE Treaty will contribute to cementing 
improvements in European security and will 
allow the goal set in 1986 to be achieved and eli-
minate any possibility of the Soviets launching a 
major offensive or surprise attacks. 
86. Regarding the confidence- and security-
building measures introduced by the Stockholm 
document of 1986, the CSCE leaders at a 
summit meeting in Paris in November 1990 
agreed a package of further CSBMs, including 
annual implementation review meetings, the 
establishment of a communications network 
linking all CSCE capitals, and provisions for the 
exchange and evaluation of information on mil-
itary forces and for the explanation, when 
requested, of unusual military activities. 
87. Regarding sub-strategic nuclear forces, the 
treaty on intermediate nuclear forces between 
the United States and the Soviet Union was 
brought up to date in May 1991 and now pro-
vides for the withdrawal of all United States 
ground-launched cruise missiles. Ten inspec-
tions by official Soviet representatives have 
already been made in the United States. At the 
London summit meeting in 1990, alliance 
leaders proposed that new negotiations to 
reduce United States and Soviet short-range 
nuclear forces should begin shortly after the 
CFE Treaty had been signed. They also pro-
posed the withdrawal of all NATO artillery 
shells from Europe, subject to reciprocal action 
by the Soviet Union. 
88. Since the end of the second world war, the 
division of Europe has been maintained by the 
massive conventional forces of the Soviet Union 
and its Warsaw Pact allies. The signing of the 
treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe 
on 19th November 1990 signalled the end of the 
Soviet Union's military dominance of Europe. It 
also fulfilled one of NATO's long-held ambi-
tions: to balance conventional force levels from 
the Atlantic to the Urals and thereby enhance 
the security and stability of all of Europe. 
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89. Implementation of the CFE Treaty was to 
inv.olve one of largest disarmament programmes 
in history. The Soviet Union was to destroy part 
of its arsenal and withdraw 30% of its 
equipment from Europe. 
90. The sufficiency rule set out in the treaty is 
intended to prevent any nation from creating a 
conventional force greater than one-third of the 
total armaments permitted in the area con-
cerned. In practice, it affects only the Soviet 
Union. Finally, through a system of regional 
sub-limits, the CFE Treaty curbs any nation's 
ability to concentrate forces in a manner threat-
ening to its neighbours. 
91. A stringent verification regime will ensure 
that reductions prescribed under the treaty are 
carried out. Inspections and information 
exchanges will make it difficult to hide mili-
tarily-significant violations of the treaty. In 
addition, it will hamper any nation's ability to 
amass equipment in excess of the treaty's limits. 
92. The verification measures thus act as a 
hedge against future militarism or political 
excess and provide a standard by which we can 
judge the actions of the other signatories. The 
treaty's required reductions and provisions for 
intrusive monitoring constitute obligations that 
go well beyond the unilateral and bilateral with-
drawal agreements the Soviet Union concluded 
following the coup in 1989. The binding nature 
of the CFE Treaty, its extensive verification 
regime and the strict regulations on destruction, 
location and storage of equipment will make a 
significant contribution to the security and con-
fidence needed to produce a new, more stable 
European order. 
Sub-zones 
ZoiUll linritr to grouiUl equipnre11t ;, actin u11its 
Ground Expanded equipment Central Extended Flanks 
in active units central 
Tanks ..... 7 500 10 300 11 800 4700 
Artillery ... 5000 9100 11000 6000 
Armoured 
combat 
vehicles .... 11 250 19 260 21400 5 900 
93. The CFE Treaty includes geographic sub-
zones with special limits on ground equipment. 
Equipment in excess of these limits must be kept 
at designated storage sites. 
Elements of the treaty: 
Conventional armaments limited by the treaty: 
Battle tanks: battle tanks are the chief 
instruments of an offensive campaign and 
their limitation is a vital element of the 
1 
i 
;•,' 
31,7'13 20,880 19,230 N/A 21,332 18.000 1,270 1,500. 24.'1Sj . ..... 8.4ZJ•. • .. 
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TABLE 3 
British equipment declared under CFE 
Battle Tanks 
Type 
Chieftain 
Challenger 
Centurion 
Total 
Artillery Pieces 
Type 
M/07 
MJJO 
Ml09 
FH70 
Abbot 
105 Light Gun 
5.5" Howitzer 
Pack Howitzer 
MLRS 
Total 
UK 
244 
44 
11 
299 
UK 
4 
8 
68 
18 
173 
9 
52 
6 
339 
Elsewhere <V 
508 
364 
27 
899 
Elsewhere <V 
33 
15 
101 
133 
7 
8 
297 
Armoured Combat Vehicles 
Total 
752 
408 
38 
1198 
Total 
37 
16 
109 
68 
151 
180 
9 
52 
14 
636 
Type UK Elsewhere <V Total 
FV432 180 
FV432 Rarden 
Humber 274 
Saracen 129 
Spartan 254 
Saxon 291 
Saladin 13 
Scorpion 176 
Warrior 115 
Total 1439 
Combat Aircraft 
Type 
Buccaneer 
Canberra 
Harrier 
Hunter 
Jaguar 
Lightning 
Phantom 
Tornado 
Total 
UK 
62 
50 
94 
33 
137 
I 
97 
214 
688 
Attack Helicopters 
Type UK 
Gazelle 
Lynx 
Scout 
Total 
128 
56 
66 
250 
1,060 
12 
39 
32 
278 
11 
117 
211 
1754 
Elsewhere <V 
30 
28 
96 
154 
Elsewhere 11' 
65 
53 
118 
Note: (!)Almost entirely Germany. 
1,240 
13 
313 
161 
532 
302 
13 
293 
326 
3193 
Total 
62 
50 
124 
33 
137 
125 
310 
842 
Total 
193 
109 
66 
368 
204 
CFE Treaty. Each side- NATO and the 
states of the former Warsaw Pact- will be 
restricted to 20 000 battle tanks. Equip-
ment over this limit must be destroyed, 
but each state may convert up to 750 
tanks to civilian use. No one country may 
hold more than 13 300 battle tanks. 
Armoured combat vehicles (ACVs): These 
vehicles provide infantry mobility and 
fire support during combat. They can be a 
crucial factor in an offensive campaign 
and their restriction is therefore linked to 
the need to reduce tanks. Each side is 
limited to 30 000 ACV s, with an 18 000 
subceiling of the more capable armoured 
infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) and 
heavy armament combat vehicles 
(HACVs). Of these, no more than 1 500 
can be HACVs. Equipment over this limit 
must be destroyed; however, each state 
may convert up to 3 000 ACVs to civilian 
use. No one country may hold more than 
20 000 ACVs. 
Artillery: Artillery provides the major fire 
support for conducting combat opera-
tions. Artillery, tanks and ACVs together 
constitute the core of conventional 
offensive capability. Each side is limited 
to 20 000 pieces of artillery and no one 
country may hold more than 13 700 
pieces. 
Combat helicopters: Combat helicopters 
offer fire support and air transport for the 
infantry, giving a commander consid-
erable flexibility of manoeuvre in con-
ducting military operations. Combat heli-
copters include both attack helicopters 
and combat support helicopters. Each side 
will be limited to 2 000 attack helicopters. 
Specialised attack helicopters in excess of 
agreed limits must be destroyed. Multi-
purpose attack helicopters in excess of 
agreed limits may be recategorised by ren-
dering them incapable of employing 
guided weapons. No one country may 
hold more than 1 500 attack helicopters. 
Reductions, regional differentiation and suffi-
ciency: 
Reductions: Under the terms of the CFE 
Treaty, all equipment above agreed levels 
must have its military capability irre-
versibly destroyed. This important pro-
vision will prevent the rapid recreation of 
military capability or the holding of 
equipment for future military use. 
Regional differentiation and sufficiency: In 
addition to agreed limits on the number 
of armaments in each category that can be 
maintained, regional numerical limits also 
have to be negotiated to prevent 
destabilising force concentrations in any 
I 
' 1 
i 
i 
' 
Reduction NATO 
required from D 
present level 
Eastern 
Europe 
Post-CFE total D 
30,000 
25,000 
20,000 
15,000 
10,000 
5,000 
0 
NE 1.9% 
SP 2.0% 
UK 2.5% 
FR 3.3% 
IT 3.4% 
GR 4.3% 
TU 7.0% 
us 10.0% 
GE 10.4% 
Other NATO 3.1% 
--
NE 1.5% 
SP 3.3% 
UK 1.6% 
FR 3.2% 
IT 4.9% 
GR 4.7% 
TU 8.8% 
us 6.2% 
GE 6.8% 
Other NATO 4.7% 
~ BE 1.7% 
SP 2.3% 
UK 6.6% 
FR 5.9% 
IT 4.8% 
GR 4.8% 
TU 5.5% 
us 5.8% 
GE 6.6% 
OtherNAT05.1% 
D 
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fiGURE 1 
The treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) 
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@ 
D .. 
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Attack 
Helicopters 
...,. 
CD Declared NATO holdmgs of combat 
a1rcraft are below the overall cellmg 
of 6,662 
@ Declared NATO, eastern European 
and Sov1et holdmgs of attack 
helicopters are below the overall 
ce1lmgs of 2000, 500 and 1500 
respectively. 
BU 3.7% ..... BE 1.8% BU 3.3% 
cz 3.6% SP 2.6% cz 3.4% 
HU 2.1% UK 5.3% HU 2.8% 
PO 4.3% FR 6.4% PO 3.6% 
RO 3.5% 
RO 3.4% IT 5.6% 
GR 4.2% 
TU 5.2% 
Soviet Union 
us 9.0% 33.4% 
GE 5.7% 
Tanks Other NATO 3.9% 
BU 4.4% 
cz 2.9% A Suff1c1ency Rule governs the holdmg 
HU 2.1% of equ1pment by md1v1dual countnes 
PO 4.0% NATO countnes w1th the nme h1ghest 
res1dual ce1lngs are shown for each 
RO 3.7% category. In each case, 'Other NATO" 
compnses aggregate res1dual ce1lmgs 
of remam1ng NATO countnes 
For all categones except attack helicopters, 
total percentages are less than 100% 
because agreed ce11ings for NATO 
countnes do not take up the full allowance 
Artillery 
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one area. A series of interlocking sub-
regions has been created with specifically 
numerical limitations on each category of 
ground equipment within each region. 
sidered that the CFE Treaty now depended on 
Gorbachev's attitude since he had to find a 
means for the army to save face. 
100. Ratification of the treaty had, in fact, 
Verification been delayed because three divisions had been 
transferred from the Soviet army to the navy, 
94. Each state has to declare the location of thus removing them from the treaty area. The 
its armaments. The treaty provides for the United States accused the Soviet Union of vio-
exchange of information which should be lating the spirit of the treaty but, to end the 
brought up to date regularly and as significant deadlock, President Bush has now offered to let 
changes to such data and reductions of the Soviet Union keep the three extra divisions, 
equipment take place. Inspections and infor- provided it removes the equivalent number of 
mation exchange will add to military trans- equipment from divisions in the treaty area. 
parency in the entire region, significantly 
enhancing confidence and stability throughout 101. Having accepted this compromise, the 
Europe. Soviet Union then agreed to destroy more than 
10 000 pieces of military hardware it had moved 
95. The parties have the right to conduct out of Europe and a fifth of the equipment it 
on-site inspections within the area of appli- had moved beyond the Urals. This solution was 
cation. Two types of on-site inspections are confirmed on 14th June, thus ending the CFE 
without quota or the right of refusal: (i) Treaty deadlock. The Soviet Union therefore 
reduction inspections of treaty-limited equip- agreed to include in the thresholds established 
ment destroyed or converted, and (ii) inspec- by the treaty the equipment of four infantry 
tions of the certification of recategorisation of divisions transferred to the navy, the remaining 
certain helicopters and of the reclassification of artillery tanks being offset, in regard to the 
certain combat-capable trainer aircraft. One of treaty, by reductions in other divisions. The 
the most important outcomes of the treaty will combat capability of armoured vehicles was to 
be the destruction of many thousands of Soviet be reduced and their ability to transport troops 
weapons systems and these two types of inspec- modified. 
tions will allow us to confirm compliance with 102. The thresholds for the Soviet Union were 
all CFE Treaty reduction obligations. fixed at 13 150 battle tanks, 13 200 artillery 
96. On-site inspection at declared sites is pieces and 20 000 armoured vehicles. 
subject to quotas, but cannot be refused. On-site 103. The fact that the deadlock was now ended 
challenge inspections may be refused, but if so allowed the states to start planning new discus-
the refusing state must provide reasonable sions on the level of troops not covered by the 
assurance that the area specified for inspection 
does not contain treaty-limited items. In present treaty. This second stage started in 
addition, parties to the treaty are committed to Vienna on 4th July 1991. Three proposals were 
made regarding national forces: the one by 
negotiating a CFE aerial inspection regime Hungary, Poland and the United Kingdom sug-
during the current CFE lA negotiations. gested a three-stage procedure for limiting 
97. This regime is intended to go into effect national forces, the first stage being concen-
after the completion of the CFE reduction trated on the exchange of information on 
period. present levels, the second would be devoted to 
98 Regarding verification of conventional defining the military forces to be limited and the 
disarmament, it may be considered that on-site third would be concerned with fixing thresholds 
for each state. inspections, together with open skies measures 
for air and space observation, would allow any 104. The second proposal was made by Czecho-
violation of the CFE Treaty to be detected in slovakia, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
time, thus avoiding surprise attacks. This means Poland and the United Kingdom on the formal 
of verification raises no technical problems and structure of the new treaty. The third proposal 
the slight margin of error that remains is tol- was made by NATO for fixing national 
erable and is no threat to the security of the thresholds for ground-based forces, thus 
countries concerned. The only obstacles would ensuring a balance of conventional forces in 
be political. Verification raises the problem of Europe at a lower level. 
unequal access to data gathered by satellite. To 105. These negotiations are due to be corn-overcome this shortcoming, Europeans should 
therefore develop their space observation tech- pleted by 1992 before the CSCE meeting in Hel-
sinki, starting on 23rd March. However, the 
nology. failed coup in the Soviet Union will certainly 
99. Before verification problems, however, have repercussions on disarmament. The CFE 
that of the implementation of the treaty itself Treaty will have to be reviewed with particular 
arises due to the Soviet attitude after the signing regard to the thresholds fixed which are now no 
of the treaty. At the end of April, it was con- longer valid because of changes in the Soviet 
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structure. This is particularly so for areas and 
sub-areas with specific limitations. A further 
question is what authority will now be respon-
sible for pursuing negotiations on behalf of the 
Soviet Union in the new CFE lA round, which 
started in Vienna on 5th September. This 
second stage of negotiations concerns the level 
of troops in Europe regarding which there is 
great uncertainty since the events in Moscow. 
The Soviet Delegation has promised that the 
CFE 1 Treaty would enter into force as quickly 
as possible and emphasised that the Soviet 
Union wished to continue the negotiations but 
the political and military restructuring might 
raise problems. 
106. The CFE Treaty is an essential pillar for 
European security and two principles must be 
respected, whatever may happen in the Soviet 
Union. The first is that the Soviet republics con-
cerned by the treaty must continue to respect it. 
This applies to the republics within its area of 
application (cf. the recent declaration by 
Ukraine) and which might declare their inde-
pendence. The second is that the Baltic republics 
should quickly clarify their position in regard to 
the CFE Treaty. 
107. President Bush has now transmitted the 
treaty to the Senate for ratification. He recalled 
that the treaty was an essential foundation for 
moving " from the European security order 
based on confrontation to one based on co-
operation ". In spite of recent events in the 
Soviet Union, the CFE Treaty is still valid and 
we must reconfirm our interest in having it rat-
ified quickly. 
(ii) Jlerifu:ation 
108. Verification has become a watchword, not 
only for WEU (whose whole raison d'etre for 
over 30 years was bound up in the implemen-
tation of a very special verification regime) but 
also for the United States and Soviet Presidents. 
And with the creation of the WEU satellite data 
interpretation centre the WEU is on its way to 
setting up a growing operational organisation for 
the first time since the early 1950s. 
109. At the meeting of the WEU Council of 
Ministers on 27th June 1991 in Vianden, Lux-
embourg, it was formally decided to further 
operational co-operation in a number of areas 
among member states: 
(a) In the field of space 
110. With the aim of intensifying space 
co-operation within WEU and giving concrete 
expression to that co-operation, ministers 
decided to: 
- set up a satellite data interpretation 
centre whose immediate task would be 
to train European experts in the photo-
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interpretation of satellite-derived data, 
compile and process accessible data and 
to make those data available to member 
states, particularly within the frame-
work of the verification of arms control 
agreements, crisis monitoring and envi-
ronmental monitoring. The activities of 
the centre will be reviewed no later than 
three years after it has entered into 
operation; 
- task the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space to 
pursue studies on the possibilities for 
medium- and long-term co-operation 
on a European satellite observation 
system. 
(b) In the military field 
111. Ministers restated their resolve to give 
fresh impetus to programmes of co-operation 
among member states. 
112. The meeting of the chiefs of defence staff 
in Paris on lOth April gave further impetus to 
the discussions under way on the possibilities of 
developing various forms of practical 
co-operation. 
113. Ministers mandated the Defence Repre-
sentatives Group to spell out and assess, in 
liaison with the Special Working Group, pro-
posals to make co-operation more operational 
both in the politico-military field as well as in 
the military field proper, covering among other 
things tasks and the requirements for co-
ordination and planning structures. The results 
of this work will be submitted to ministers at 
their next meeting, (scheduled for 18th 
November). 
(c) In the field of arms control verification 
114. Ministers decided to step up programmes 
of co-operation among member states on the 
verification of arms control agreements. In this 
context, they underlined the link between space 
co-operation and arms control verification, 
including verification of the CFE Treaty. 
115. Ministers have agreed on practical 
arrangements for co-operation within WEU con-
cerning the implementation of the verification 
regime of the CFE Treaty. they also agreed to 
mandate verification experts to continue their 
study of the possibilities for practical co-
operation on the implementation of a future 
open skies agreement. 
116. At the time of writing it is known that a 
number of countries: France, Italy, Spain and 
the United Kingdom have bid to provide the 
site for the WEU satellite data interpretation 
centre and, in some cases, also to provide the 
first director for the centre. By the time the 
present report is scheduled for discussion in the 
plenary session, such matters should have been 
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decided and the first director should be well on 
the way to establishing a modus operandi for the 
centre. 
117. Your Rapporteur trusts that a regular and 
formal link will be established early on with 
NATO's Verification Co-ordinating Committee 
which is already making progress, together with 
the Verification Support Staff in Evere, in pre-
paring the implementation of the CFE verifi-
cation regime, once ratification by national par-
liaments is achieved. Once again it is worth 
repeating the Assembly's wish, originally 
expressed in the Defence Committee's report on 
"Vienna, disarmament and Western European 
Union" (Rapporteur Lord Newall), that the 
WEU centre should not be exclusive but should 
co-operate extensively with other bodies/nations 
involved in CFE. 
118. Another area where co-operation should 
be established as a matter of urgency is with the 
NATO school at Oberammergau where courses 
are being run to help train future inspectors for 
the CFE verification regime 2• Four courses have 
been run there this year, and others are planned 
next year. All our countries have sent students 
on the verification courses, bar France and the 
United Kingdom which have contributed ins-
tructors. Your Rapporteur is certain that an 
input would be much appreciated from WEU on 
the practical programmes of co-operation 
among member states and on the experience 
gained through the various trial inspections 
already held. 
(iii) Conventional and unconventional perspectives 
"Arms procurement as part of arms control " 
119. The WEU Council of Ministers " restated 
their resolve to give fresh impetus to pro-
grammes of co-operation among member 
states " and the Secretary-General has made ref-
erence to a possible reinstatement of the 
Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) dis-
solved perhaps too hastily when the old WEU 
agencies were abolished at the end of June 1990. 
There is probably room for such a body still in 
the international context, perhaps establishing a 
formal link with the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group (IEPG). 
2. The CFE Arms Control Verification Inspector/Escort 
Procedures Course taught at the NATO school, Oberam-
mergau, is designed to prepare designated individuals to 
perform duties as inspectors and escorts to ensure proper 
compliance with the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty. 
The course teaches in detail all aspects of the treaty and its 
protocols necessary for correct implementation of the treaty 
including: entry/exit procedures; identification of treaty-
limited equipment (TLE); inspection reporting requirements 
and procedures, etc. A mock inspection practical exercise 
using German or United States forces is included to put into 
practice procedures taught in the classroom. 
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120. Three years ago, when the presidency of 
both WEU and IEPG was held in the United 
Kingdom, the principle was established of an 
annual report from the IEPG to WEU (along the 
same lines as the OECD's annual report to the 
Council of Europe, despite similar different 
membership disparities). This arrangement has 
continued although somewhat intermittently 
through Belgian and French presidencies of 
WEU. The time has come to formalise the 
liaison, especially as the IEPG itself has recently 
created a new ad hoc group dealing with EC and 
WEU matters. 
121. The potential for co-operation in arma-
ments procurement must be fully exploited in 
these times of falling defence budgets and in 
addition a link with the various arms control 
regimes established. 
122. For the furnishing of armaments for 
export must be seen in the same context as arms 
control. The bitter experience of the Iraqi 
episode should serve as a lesson to us all, where 
proliferation, conventional as well as nuclear, is 
concerned. The recommendation adopted by the 
Assembly in June 1991 on " Arms control: force 
reductions and the role of multinational units ", 
(Rapporteur: Mr. Uyttendaele) to "Institute a 
register of arms sales by member countries, 
support European initiatives to ensure trans-
parency in this domain and urge the United 
Nations Security Council to begin the process of 
seeking a general agreement on the regulation of 
arms sales ", is particularly relevant and greater 
efforts are needed, in the Security Council and 
other bodies - why not in a particular WEU ini-
tiative also? 
123. Of course, it is difficult to distinguish 
between " offensive " and " defensive " arma-
ments, but manufacturers might well be advised, 
if they wish to safeguard their profits, to concen-
trate on developing "defensive" systems for 
export, both land and air based. Given the 
increasing ranges of missiles available now to 
countries which hitherto had never possessed 
such systems, placing the accent on anti-missile 
defence may well prove a money-spinner for the 
future. The United States has already taken 
various steps forward in this domain showing a 
new flexibility in United States policy, a change 
from the previous refusal to bargain over the 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). This comes 
with increasing confidence in Washington that 
American military predominance is growing as 
the Soviet Union disintegrates. 
124. The United States idea, a spin-off from 
SDI, would no longer try to protect the United 
States from a massive missile attack but would 
rather intercept missiles, including those launched 
by " third parties ". This programme for a space-
based missile defence is known as Global Pro-
tection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). 
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125. If, as announced by President Bush, the 
United States has offered to share this type of 
technology with the Soviets and other nations, 
there are far-reaching implications for the future 
effectiveness of British and French minimum 
nuclear deterrence systems. 
126. While on such considerations, as well as 
co-operating on hardware, our governments 
would be well advised, through WEU and/or 
IEPG, to concentrate more particularly on 
developments in the fascinating fields of Elec-
tronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic Counter 
Measures (ECM). In terms of defence per se EW 
and ECM systems have a vast potential which 
has not yet been exploited. Further study in the 
WEU Defence Representatives Group and 
perhaps in our sister committee, the Techno-
logical and Aerospace Committee, is strongly 
recommended. 
127. This sort of lateral, not to say tangential, 
thinking will be essential as arms control comes 
of age and as new structures and approaches for 
arms control become necessary especially in the 
light of what may be possible at and after the 
CSCE review conference in Helsinki in March 
1992. 
IV. Open skies 3 
128. The open skies conference between 
member states of NATO and of the former 
Warsaw Pact resumed in Vienna for one week 
on 9th September 1991. The three Baltic 
republics were invited as observers, but did not 
send representatives. 
129. The open skies negotiations had been sus-
pended since the opening meeting in Ottawa in 
February 1990 and the Budapest meeting in 
April 1990. The aim of this new meeting is to 
promote greater transparency through the notifi-
cation of flights in accordance with 
pre-established quotas in order to verify disarm-
a,ment treaties, for instance. 
130. An open skies treaty should be concluded 
before the next CSCE conference in Helsinki in 
March 1992. 
131. Differences between East and West bear 
mainly on the nationality of aircraft used for 
flights, the on-board technical equipment, the 
number of flights and the areas opened for 
flights. 
132. According to Ambassador Hartmann of 
Germany, there is a chance that the open skies 
treaty will be concluded as planned, thanks to 
3. For a background to these talks, see Appendix 11 A 
" Current negotiations - a primer" in Document 1223 
" Vienna, disarmament and WEU " (Rapporteur: Lord 
Newall). 
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the greater flexibility of the Soviet Delegation 
whose previous reticence had deadlocked the 
conference for a year and a half. 
133. The open skies regime is intended to 
organise reciprocal overflying of the territory of 
member states for purposes of verification and 
transparency. The head of the German Dele-
gation, however, said that there were still two 
problems: the USSR did not wish to open large 
areas of its territory to overflights and was 
calling for the opening of bases in third coun-
tries, which was an unacceptable condition for 
the West. Regarding the number of flights, the 
USSR was authorising 25, whereas NATO pro-
posed 100. A compromise might be some 52 
flights per year or one each week. 
134. The choice of equipment and nationality 
of the aircraft used has not been settled. The 
German Delegation is proposing to form a pool 
of aircraft of various nationalities. 
135. The conference is to be continued at the 
beginning of November to settle the problem of 
sharing the information gathered for which the 
CSCE conflict prevention centre might be used. 
However, at the request of the USSR, the next 
round has been delayed for 15 days and, fur-
thermore, it will be extended to the 38 members 
of the CSCE, instead of the 22 members of 
NATO and of the former Warsaw Pact. 
V. Chemical disarmament 4 
(the Genera Disarmament Conference) 
136. At present, a few states are blocking the 
agreement on the programme of work which 
would allow the treaty banning chemical weapons 
to be concluded in 1992. For the time being, the 
central aim of the conference is to complete 
work on the convention. 
137. At the disarmament conference, a con-
vention is being negotiated which would ban the 
procurement, development, production, transfer 
and use of chemical weapons, eliminate stocks 
throughout the world and introduce effective 
verification measures. 
138. In May, the United States undertook, 
unconditionally, to destroy all its chemical 
weapons and production capabilities connected 
with such weapons. It proposed that the confer-
ence's ad hoc committee remain in session until 
the end of the conference so that the more 
important questions may be settled before the 
end of 1991 and the convention completed in 
May 1992. 
4. For a background to these talks, see Appendix 11 A 
"Current negotiations - a primer" in Document 1223 
" Vienna, disarmament and WEU " (Rapporteur: Lord 
Newall). 
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139. The question of inspections is one of the 
problems that will have to be settled before the 
end of the year. Similarly, verification of the 
chemical industry and the composition of the 
executive council raise problems. 
140. Regarding challenge inspections, Aus-
tralia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States have presented a new approach to 
the Conference on Disarmament to reassure 
certain states which feared that such on-the-spot 
inspections might be also used to spy on their 
defence secrets. This approach outlines a certain 
level of protection for national security and 
installations and suggests procedures to solve 
this problem. In order to avoid any abuse, the 
four delegations endeavoured to establish a 
balance between efficient verification and the 
need to present sensitive activities which have 
no connection with chemical weapons. 
VI. Biological disarmament 
141. The third Geneva review conference pro-
vided an excellent opportunity to strengthen the 
implementation of a system to prevent such 
weapons. The problem is to verify the ban on 
biological and toxin weapons. 
142. As emphasised in the preamble to the 
1972 convention, the purpose of the negotia-
tions is to eliminate completely the use of bio-
logical and toxin agents as arms of mass 
destruction. To meet their responsibilities, par-
ticipants in the conference must reaffirm their 
support for a complete ban on such weapons 
which are a threat to humanity as a whole. The 
international community cannot, nor must it, 
tolerate the development, production and stock-
piling of such weapons. 
143. This convention is the only usable inter-
national standard concerning biological and 
toxin weapons, but it is not perfect. One aim of 
the United States will be to pursue actively the 
search for efficient verification measures to 
implement the convention and strengthen confi-
dence. The convention will be the main world 
rampart against this type of weapon and one of 
the aims of the United States is to strengthen its 
implementation. It is for the signatory states, 
however, to give assurances that their biological 
research is for peaceful purposes since this con-
vention cannot be verified effectively, nor is 
there any indication that this will be possible in 
the future. During the conference, therefore, the 
United States insisted on transparency. The 
states must be as open as possible regarding 
their biological weapons-related activities. 
144. During the third review conference, many 
questions were raised concerning proliferation, 
non-conformity to the convention and confi-
dence-building measures. 
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(i) Proliferation concerns 
145. The proliferation of biological and toxin 
weapons is frightening the whole world. Such 
weapons may be more potent than the most 
deadly chemical weapons and many are highly 
unpredictable in their effects. Many countries 
are working to produce these weapons in spite of 
the bans introduced by the convention because 
the control of proliferation is difficult since 
many research and development efforts in this 
field are dual use. 
146. Unlike the production of chemical 
weapons, there is no equipment that can be used 
solely for the production of biological agents for 
hostile purposes. The same materials are critical 
for vital research to control the spread of many 
serious diseases and for certain types of vaccine 
production. Many substances that may be used 
as biological weapons occur naturally on the ter-
ritory of a number of parties. Actually, any 
nation with a modestly developed pharmaceu-
tical industry can produce material for bio-
logical or toxin weapons, if it so chooses. We 
must therefore ensure that such a choice is not 
an option. 
147. In November 1990, President Bush issued 
an executive order tightening United States 
sanctions aimed at preventing the proliferation 
of several weapons of mass destruction. For 
instance, the export of dual-use equipment 
suitable for making biological and chemical 
weapons now requires an export licence. The 
President of the United States has strengthened 
sanctions against United States citizens who 
knowingly assist foreign chemical and biological 
weapons or missile programmes. 
148. The present situation in the Middle East 
raises many problems. On 29th May 1991, Pres-
ident Bush took steps to curb the spread of 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in this 
area of the world. He called for strengthening 
the 1972 biological weapons convention through 
full implementation of existing provisions; he 
urged regional states to adopt biological 
weapons confidence-building measures. These 
initiatives complete the measures already taken 
regarding the United Nations Security Council 
embargo against arms transfers to Iraq, as well 
as the efforts of the United Nations special com-
mission to eliminate Iraq's remaining capabil-
ities to use or produce nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and the missiles to deliver 
them. 
149. The United States Delegation is also 
endeavouring to strengthen the implementation 
of the biological weapons convention in ways 
that do not impede the biotechnology industry 
or legitimate biological defence activities. Thus 
the United States is reported to be proposing 
that the parties declare their intentions 
regarding possible national export controls and 
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the transfer of dual-use equipment to states that 
are not parties to the convention. To this end, 
the United States would provide parties with a 
list of organisms and dual-use equipment to 
encourage other states to consider similar mea-
sures in their individual export and control pol-
icies. 
150. It is important for no state to contribute 
to the proliferation of these weapons. An 
important step in this direction would be the 
adoption of national export controls on biolo-
gical agents and toxins and related equipment. 
(ii) Compliance concerns 
151. Unfortunately, the problem of the prolife-
ration of biological weapons is not limited to 
states which have not yet signed the convention. 
We must not and cannot turn a blind eye to 
states not in compliance with the object and 
purpose of this convention. 
152. Proliferation is a problem for all of us, in 
part because some states have not lived up to 
their international obligations. 
153. A striking recent example of the threat 
posed by non-compliance is Iraq, which has 
clearly had a biological weapons programme, 
even though it had signed the convention. No 
one knows how many biological weapons Iraq 
has produced, nor what it may be hiding in 
order to pursue this deadly trail. Such behaviour 
is unacceptable and international pressure 
should be brought to bear on states which do not 
conform to the treaty. 
(iii) Confidence building 
154. Since the convention on biological 
weapons is not effectively verifiable, the only 
way for the conference to achieve its aims is to 
increase transparency and openness. The first 
United States request in this matter is to make 
confidence-building measures as effective as 
possible by drawing attention to violations of 
the convention and by advocating a series of 
confidence-building measures to increase trans-
parency and to support international investiga-
tions into allegations of violations. 
155. The final document of the second review 
conference in 1986 had listed several confidence-
building measures, but only a quarter of the sig-
natories applied them. We must do better. 
156. The United States proposed that states 
should declare whether or not they had a bio-
logical defence programme. If so, they should 
provide detailed information on their work. 
Such information might include a general 
description of main research activities, the 
location of facilities, the source and amount of 
funding for a given year at each research facility 
and testing and evaluation involving any bio-
logical or infectious agent or toxin. 
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157. The United States also proposed that 
states provide a null report should they not have 
a biological defence programme. Finally, the 
United States proposes that all states inform the 
World Health Organisation of unusual out-
breaks of disease. 
(iv) Problems in verification 
158. There is an inherent difficulty in verifying 
methods of producing micro-organisms and 
toxins. From the standpoint of technology, the 
production of such materials for offensive pur-
poses is extremely difficult to differentiate from 
production for peaceful purposes and, as long as 
these practical problems of differentiation 
remain, the convention will not be verifiable. 
(v) Efforts towards effective verification 
159. The United States is prepared to explore 
the feasibility of effective verification, provided 
a multilateral effort is made. The United States 
proposes to encourage parties to study on a 
national level the technical feasibility of 
effective verification and the results of these 
studies should be reported to other parties; it 
also proposes to support the establishment of an 
ad hoc multilateral expert group to study the 
technical feasibility of effective verification. 
(vi) Consultation/enforcement measures 
160. The United States proposes the adoption 
of national legislation that includes domestic 
penal legislation to prohibit any support by its 
nationals of prohibited activities in any country 
and report annually on measures taken in this 
regard. This report might include whatever legis-
lation in enacted and whatever enforcement 
measures are taken. 
161. It also proposes to establish reports where 
a state considers its international obligations are 
suspended and to respond to any claim by a 
state that considers that another state party is no 
longer respecting its international obligations 
through consultation procedure or through the 
Security Council of the United Nations. 
162. The United States also asks parties to 
declare their intentions regarding sanctions 
against any state using biological weapons. 
These measures might include cessation of sci-
entific and technical collaboration on any bio-
logical work, trade restrictions or denial of 
foreign assistance. 
(vii) Facilitation mechanism 
163. The United States emphasises the need to 
improve the distribution of information. Reports 
circulated solely in the original language are not 
readily usable. The aims sought in exchanging 
information are not therefore attained. 
DOCUMENT 1288 
164. The United States therefore proposes that 
the review conference establish a mechanism for 
facilitating the implementation of confidence-
building measures during the five-year period 
between review conferences. Such a mechanism 
should be informal and flexible and include 
facilitating implementation of the agreed 
confidence-building measures, making arrange-
ments for consultative meetings requested by a 
party, providing support for meetings mandated 
by the review conference, serving as a clearing-
house for scientific and technical information, 
obtaining information from WHO on unusual 
outbreaks of disease and providing a channel for 
protective or humanitarian assistance. 
(viii) Conclusion 
165. This third review conference represented 
an important opportunity to review how well the 
conference has functioned so far and to consider 
ways of strengthening the implementation of the 
regime against biological and toxin weapons. 
166. Stress should be laid especially on wider 
participation in the convention and confidence 
through greater transparency on all sides. 
VII. The WEU role 
167. Earlier this year, the Defence Committee 
unanimously adopted the report on " Arms 
control: force reductions and the role of multi-
national units - reply to the annual report of the 
Council " 5• The draft recommendation adopted 
then (and debated in plenary session by the 
Assembly in June) read: 
The Assembly, 
(i) Conscious that Soviet rede-
ployment undermines the provisions of 
the Treaty on Conventional Armaments 
in Europe signed in Paris in November 
1990, but insisting on full respect for both 
the letter and the spirit of this interna-
tional agreement; 
(ii) Looking forward to a convention 
on a global ban on the manufacture, pos-
session and use of chemical weapons, 
together with appropriate verification 
methods; 
(iii) Insisting that discussions should now 
begin on considerably reducing numbers 
of short-range nuclear weapons; 
(iv) Determined that general agreement 
should be reached on the regulation of 
arms sales, preferably within a United 
Nations context; 
5. Document 1270, Rapporteur: Mr. Uyttendaele. 
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(v) Noting that unco-ordinated defence 
budget cuts in the majority of member 
countries are proceeding apace; 
(vi) Reiterating the need to maintain 
transatlantic solidarity through NATO; 
(vii) Emphasising the development 
within the Atlantic Alliance of a European 
pillar, which should be comprised of all 
European NATO members who wish to 
be associated; 
(viii) In the knowledge that the WEU 
Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee has 
already discussed the creation of a 
European multinational rapid action force 
and that NATO's Military Committee has 
endorsed the idea of a NATO multina-
tional rapid reaction force; 
(ix) Respecting the sovereignty of each 
member nation, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Encourage member nations to begin 
the ratification process of the Treaty of 
Paris while remaining firm with the 
Soviet Union on respect for both the letter 
and the spirit of the CFE Agreement; 
2. Encourage member nations to give 
a common impetus to the United Nations 
Conference on Disarmament with a view 
to obtaining a convention on a global ban 
on the manufacture, possession and use of 
chemical weapons, together with an 
appropriate verification regime; 
3. Make the services of the WEU 
Agency for the Control of Armaments 
available to the United Nations for advice 
on verification of the chemical arms ban 
on Iraq; 
4. Urge the United States and the 
Soviet Union to begin the promised dis-
cussions on considerably reduced numbers 
of short-range nuclear weapons; 
5. Institute a register of arms sales by 
member countries, support European ini-
tiatives to ensure transparency in this 
domain and urge the United Nations 
Security Council to begin the process of 
seeking a general agreement on the regu-
lation of arms sales; 
6. Initiate discussion within WEU on 
the co-ordination necessary to ensure that 
a sufficient level of security is maintained 
in Europe despite cuts in national defence 
budgets; 
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7. Express its wholehearted support 
for the need to maintain transatlantic soli-
darity through NATO and emphasise that 
the European pillar within the alliance 
should be composed of all European 
members of NATO who wish to be so 
associated; 
8. Instruct its chiefs of defence staff to 
begin work on the creation of a permanent 
multinational command structure capable 
of planning, co-ordinating and exercising 
WEU actions in the context of Article 
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty." 
168. While the WEU Council has failed to 
move on a number of recommendations, a good 
proposition seems well on the way to fulfilment 
and the Council deserves congratulation for 
what is now being achieved. Let us hope that 
this may be a new beginning and that the 
Council will now acknowledge the pioneering 
spirit which the Assembly tries to bring to its 
work, together with a wealth of parliamentary 
experience which reflects the will of the elector 
and the mood of the population. 
169. One of the particular strengths of the 
WEU Assembly is that it brings together the rep-
resentatives of nine member parliaments: nine 
European assemblies which are fully in touch 
with the mood in national capitals; a complete 
contrast where WEU competence (defence and 
security) is concerned with other, supposedly 
more European instances. 
170. We should now be working whole-
heartedly to bring our expertise in WEU 
together with that of colleagues in national 
defence committees as well as those in sister 
organisations such as the North Atlantic and 
CSCE Assemblies. 
171. With the Defence and Security Com-
mittee of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) 
we have held regular exchanges of views, facili-
tated in particular because of a coincidence of 
membership where five of our countries are con-
cerned. The frequency of joint meetings is 
increasing with two held this year: firstly at the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to hear 
the differing views of a range of national delega-
tions there and then latterly at the 37th annual 
session of the NAA in Madrid. Consideration 
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should now be given to the possibility of 
appointing mutual observers between the two 
committees. 
172. The CSCE Assembly is a new creation 
which is in the process of elaborating a mandate 
to coincide with what is being tackled in the 
CSCE conference proper. We should ensure that 
the WEU Defence Committee stays abreast of 
the subjects being discussed in the CSCE with a 
view to making appropriate contributions to the 
debates, beginning in July next year in 
Budapest. 
173. As to the WEU Council's own part in fur-
thering arms control, there are two strands to be 
developed. Firstly more of the same, building in 
particular on recent decisions concerning the 
establishment of the satellite data interpretation 
centre (see Ill (ii) above) and further study on 
the possibilities for medium- and long-term 
co-operation on a European satellite observation 
system. This is a very positive move towards 
helping share the burden of effective verification 
without which no arms control agreement is 
really worth the paper on which it is written 
(who will verify the announced short-range 
nuclear reductions?). 
174. Secondly, there should be a shift of 
emphasis from the concentration hitherto on 
bloc-to-bloc weapons holdings towards a new 
openness, a transparency in international 
dealings - a harmonisation of interests - more 
actual reductions perhaps, but also a security 
dialogue coupled with more structural arms 
control. 
175. High on the list for future action must be 
arms export policy, arms production, arms pro-
liferation. The question is how to tackle the 
problem: through selective measures, concen-
trating on regional or geographic problems? 
176. Should one go for the naval dimension in 
the future, now that President Bush has opened 
that particular Pandora's box? (Probably too dif-
ficult to attack on a zonal basis given the 
mobility of fleets ... ). 
177. Hence the idea of trying to enhance con-
flict prevention, crisis management, etc. - which 
brings us back to the CSCE and the need for a 
more formal link between CSCE and WEU -
something which should appeal to the present 
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council! 
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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) signed on 31st July 1991 includes a 
basic treaty text and a number of supporting 
documents. In addition, there are several pro-
tocols that provide implementing procedures 
that support the obligations of the treaty and 
which are integral parts of the treaty. 
The treaty document 
The 17 articles in which the United States 
and the Soviet Union agree to reduce and limit 
their strategic offensive arms cover weapons 
limits, counting rules, conversion or elimination 
of weapons, verification and inspections, co-
operative measures, the creation of the Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), 
and procedures for entry into force, amendment, 
duration and withdrawal. 
Basic provisions of the treaty 
Reductions 
Reductions to equal levels in strategic 
offensive arms, carried out in three phases over 
seven years from the date the treaty enters into 
force. 
Specific, equal interim levels for agreed 
categories of strategic offensive arms by the end 
of each phase. 
Central limits include: 
- 1 600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
(SNDVs) 
- 6 000 accountable warheads 
- 4 900 ballistic missile warheads 
- 1 540 warheads on 154 heavy intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for 
the Soviet side. The Soviets also agreed 
in a side letter to eliminate 22 SS-18 
launchers every ye:p- for seven years to 
achieve this level 
- 1 100 warheads on deployed mobile 
ICBMs 
- Throw-weight ceiling of 3 600 tons. 
Delivery vehicles 
1 600 ceiling on the number of SNDVs, 
comprising deployed ICBMs and their asso-
ciated launchers, deployed submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their associated 
launchers, and heavy bombers. 
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Warheads 
6 000 accountable warhead ceiling, com-
prising the number of warheads attributed to 
deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of 
long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise 
missiles (LRNA), attributed to heavy bombers 
equipped for LRNA (see LRNA), and one 
warhead attributed to each heavy bomber 
equipped only for nuclear-armed gravity bombs 
and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs). 
Ballistic missile warheads 
Each ballistic missile warhead attributed 
to a missile counts as one under the 6 000 
warhead ceiling. 
No flight testing of missile with RVs in 
excess of attributed number. 
A quota of on-site inspections to verify 
that deployed ballistic missiles contain no more 
RV s than the number of warheads attributed to 
them. 
Ban on new types of ICBMs and SLBMs 
with more than 10 warheads. 
Ban on increasing warhead attribution on 
future types of ICBMs and SLBMs. 
Downloading 
The number of warheads on up to three 
types of ballistic missiles and their attribution 
under START may be reduced(" downloaded ") 
up to a total of 1 250 RVs. 
Each Soviet SS-N-18 may be attributed 
with 3 RVs; a total of 896 SS-N-18 warheads 
count toward downloading limit. 
United States Minuteman Ill may be 
reduced by 1 or 2 RVs. Insofar as permitted by 
the 1 250 limit, up to 500 RV s may be 
downloaded on two other existing ballstic 
missile types (up to 4 RVs per missile). 
Ban on downloading of new types. Ban on 
deploying a new type with more warheads than 
on a downloaded type (except for the Min-
uteman III and the SS-N-18). Ban on 
downloading of heavy ICBMs. 
If an ICBM is downloaded by more than 
two RVs, it must be equipped with a new front 
section platform, and all old platforms destroyed. 
Heavy ICBMs 
In addition to the requirement to reduce 
deployed heavy ICBMs and their warheads by 
50%, other constraints on heavy missiles 
1 
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include: no downloading; no increase in launch-
weight or throw-weight; no mobile launchers for 
heavy ICBMs; ban on new types of heavy mis-
siles. New heavy ICBM silo construction 
allowed, but only in exceptional cases for relo-
cating; never to exceed 154 such silos. 
Modernisation and testing of existing heavy 
ICBMs can continue. 
New types of ICBMs and SLBMs 
An ICBM or SLBM will be considered a 
new type of ICBM or SLBM if it meets any of 
the following criteria: change in number of 
stages; change in type of propellant; 10% change 
in missile or first stage length; 10% change in 
missile launch weight; 5% change in diameter; 
5% change in first stage length combined with 
21% increase in throw-weight. 
Ceiling of 21% on permitted increases to 
throw-weight of existing types of ICBMs or 
SLBMs. 
Warheads attribution for future types of 
ICBMs and SLBMs will be the maximum 
number ofRVs tested and simulated, but no less 
than the number derived by dividing 40% of 
missile throw-weight by the weight of the 
lightest RV tested on that type of ICBM or 
SLBM. Application of the 40% rule to new 
systems with unconventional front ends will be 
discussed at the JCIC. 
Heavy bombers 
Each heavy bomber counts as one SNDV. 
Each heavy bomber equipped only for nuclear 
weapons other than long-range nuclear air-
launched cruise missile (i.e., only for gravity 
bombs and SRAMs) counts as one warhead 
under the 6 000 limit. An agreed number of 
heavy bombers could be removed from account-
ability under the 1 600 SNDV limit by con-
version to a non-nuclear capability. Heavy 
bombers equipped for long-range nuclear 
ALCMs (LRNA) will be distinguishable from 
other heavy bombers. 
In exchange for not including the Tupolev 
22-M (Backfire) bomber in START, the Soviet 
Union will make a politically-binding decla-
ration that it will not deploy more than 300 air 
force and 200 naval Backfires and that these 
bombers will not be given intercontinental capa-
bility. 
Long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles 
(LRNA) 
Nuclear-armed ALCMs with a range in 
excess of 600 kilometres (LRNA), will be affected 
under START. New long-range conventionally-
armed ALCMs that are distinguishable from 
nuclear-armed ALCMs are not limited in 
START and may be deployed on any aircraft. 
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For the purpose of counting against the 
6 000 warhead limit, accountable warheads will 
be attributed to heavy bombers equipped for 
LRNA as follows: each current and future 
United States heavy bomber equipped for 
LRNA will count as 10 warheads but may 
actually be equipped for up to 20 LRNA (except 
as noted below). Each current and future Soviet 
heavy bomber equipped for LRNA will count as 
8 warheads but may actually be equipped for up 
to 16 LRNA (except as noted below). 
The United States may apply the above 
counting rule to 150 heavy bombers equipped 
for LRNA; the Soviet Union may apply the above 
counting rule to 180 heavy bombers equipped 
for LRNA. For any heavy bombers equipped for 
LRNA in excess of these levels, the number of 
attributable warheads will be the number of 
LRNA for which the bombers are actually 
equipped. 
Multiple-warhead long-range nuclear 
ALCMs are banned. 
Mobile ICBMs 
Categories of permitted movements and 
associated notifications have largely been agreed. 
Non-deployed mobile ICBMs and 
launchers will be limited numerically and geo-
graphically (see Non-deployed missiles below). 
Soviet mobiles are: SS-24 and SS-25. For pur-
poses of reciprocity the United States 
Peacekeeper will be treated as mobile although it 
has never been tested as a mobile ICBM. 
Non-deployed missiles 
There will be a numerical limit of 250 on 
non-deployed ballistic missiles for all ICBMs of 
a type that has been flight-tested from a mobile 
launcher; of those, no more than 125 may be 
non-deployed missiles for rail-mobile launchers. 
There will also be a numerical limit of 110 on 
non-deployed launchers for mobiles of which no 
more than 18 may be non-deployed launchers 
for rail-mobile ICBMs. 
Other non-deployed ballistic missiles will 
not be subject to numerical limits, but there will 
be restrictions on their locations and move-
ments and they will be subject to data exchange 
requirements. 
Various other provisions are also agreed 
to prevent rapid reload of ICBM launchers. 
The sides have also agreed there will be no 
restrictions on the number of cruise missiles and 
other heavy bomber weapons. There will be 
limited restrictions on the location of LRNA. 
Exemptions from treaty limits 
7 5 non-modern heavy bombers equipped 
for non-nuclear arms, former heavy bombers, 
and training heavy bombers. 
20 test heavy bombers. 
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25 test silo launchers and 20 test mobile 
launchers at test ranges. 
SLCMs 
Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will 
not be constrained in the START Treaty. 
However, each side will provide the other with a 
politically-binding declaration concerning long-
range SLCMs, i.e. those nuclear SLCMs whose 
range is over 600 kilometres. In annual declara-
tions, the planned maximum number of these 
deployed nuclear SLCMs for each of the fol-
lowing five treaty years will be specified. The 
planned maximum number will not exceed 880 
long-range nuclear SLCMs. Nuclear-armed 
SLCMs with a range of 300-600 kilometres will 
be the subject of confidential annual data 
exchanges. The sides will not produce or deploy 
multiple-warhead nuclear SLCMs. 
Verification 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) was designed with verification in 
mind, and verification measures were nego-
tiated in parallel with other aspects. Thus, the 
basic structure of the treaty is designed to facil-
itate verification by national technical means 
(NTM). The START Treaty contains detailed, 
interlocking and mutually reinforcing provi-
sions, which supplement national technical 
means to establish an effective verification 
regime. This regime provides for data exchanges 
and notifications on strategic systems and facil-
ities covered by the treaty, a ban on the denial of 
data from telemetry, twelve types of on-site 
inspection and exhibitions, continuous moni-
toring at mobile ICBM final assembly facilities, 
and co-operative measures. These elements are 
outlined below. 
National technical means (NTM): START 
provides for the use of, and non-interference 
with, national technical means of verification, 
e.g., satellites. There are explicit provisions pro-
hibiting interference with NTM, or use of con-
cealment measures that impede verification by 
NTM. 
Telemetry: Parties are prohibited from 
engaging in any practice that denies full access 
to telemetric information during missile flight 
tests, with certain limited exceptions. Moreover, 
parties are obligated to exchange telemetry 
tapes, interpretive data and acceleration profiles 
for every test flight. 
Data exchange and notifications: Prior to 
treaty signature, the sides will exchange data on 
numbers, locations, and the technical character-
istics of START-accountable weapons systems 
and facilities and will provide regular notifi-
cation and data updates thereafter. 
Co-operative measures: Seven times a 
year, either party may request the other to 
display in the open-road mobile launchers, rail 
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mobile launchers, and heavy bombers at bases 
specified by the inspecting party. Additional 
co-operative measures may be requested fol-
lowing an operational dispersal. 
Continuous monitoring activities: START 
establishes continuous monitoring at the 
perimeter and portals of each side's mobile 
ICBM assembly facilities. The United States had 
the right to establish a monitoring facility at 
Vorkinsk, which is the final assembly facility for 
the SS-25, and at Pavlograd, which is the final 
assembly facility for the SS-24. The Soviet side 
had the right to monitor the Thiokol strategic 
operations facility at Promontory, Utah, the 
final assembly facility for the accountable stage 
of the Peacekeeper. Such monitoring would also 
be established at any future facilities at which 
ICBM assembly takes place. 
On-site inspections (OSI): There are 
twelve types of OSI and exhibitions. These are: 
baseline data inspections, data update inspec-
tions, new facility inspections, suspect site ins-
pections, re-entry vehicle inspections, post-exer-
cise dispersal inspections, conversion or elimi-
nation inspections, close-out inspections, for-
merly declared facility inspections, technical 
characteristics exhibitions, distinguishability exhi-
bitions and heavy bomber baseline exhibitions. 
Compliance: Compliance concerns may 
be raised by either side in the Joint Compliance 
and Inspection Commission (JCIC) or any other 
appropriate forum. 
Data denial 
Agreement to broadcast all telemetric 
information from test flights of ICBMs and 
SLBMs and to ban any practice (including 
encryption, encapsulation and jamming) that 
denies full access to telemetric information, with 
certain limited exceptions. Requirement to 
provide full telemetry tapes, acceleration pro-
files, and certain specified interpretive infor-
mation after each test flight of an ICBM or 
SLBM. As a goodwill gesture, the sides agreed 
not to engage in encryption or jamming 
beginning 120 days after treaty signature. 
Treaty duration 
The treaty will have a duration of 15 
years, unless superseded by a subsequent 
agreement. If the sides agree, the treaty may be 
extended for a successive five-year period. 
Non-circumvention/third country issues 
No transfer of strategic offensive arms 
(SOA) to third countries, except that there will 
be no interference with existing patterns of 
co-operation. 
There will be no permanent basing of 
SOA outside national territory and no inspec-
tions outside national territory. Temporary sta-
tioning of heavy bombers overseas permitted, 
but certain notifications may apply. Port calls 
for SSBNs permitted. 
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United States and Soviet nuclear proposals 
United States offer 
- Negotiations to eliminate land-based ICBMs 
with MIRVs 
- Mobility of ICBMs cancelled 
- ICBM development to one single warhead 
missile (Midgetman) silo-based 
- United States ICBMs due out under START 
stand down from alert - early destruction 
after ratification 
- Bomber stand-down from alert 
- Cancel STAM-2 missile 
- Centralise strategic command and control 
(C2) 
- Destroy worldwide all ground-launched tac-
tical nuclear weapons 
- Withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from 
submarines and surface vessels, return to 
United States, many destroyed, rest stored 
centrally 
- Cancel SRAM-T (TASM), but preserve an 
effective air-delivered nuclear capability in 
Europe 
- Jointly permit deployment of limited ABM 
system and to prevent nuclear and missile 
proliferation 
- Improvements in security, safety and C2 
- Technical co-operation on storage, transport 
dismantling and destruction of warheads 
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Soviet offer 
- 5 000 strategic warheads instead of 6 000 
under START 
- Immediate negotiations after ratification on 
further cuts of 50% 
- Retention of some MIRVed ICBMs 
- Stop work on mobile ICBMs 
- Scrap work on rail cars and to modernise 
them 
- Return to storage ICBMs on rail cars 
- Heavy bombers removed from alert, nuclear 
weapons stored 
- Stop work on bomber SRAM and remove 
from alert 503 ICBM, including 134 MIRVed 
missiles 
- All nuclear artillery, mines, warheads to be 
destroyed 
- Anti-aircraft warheads stored in central bases, 
some destroyed 
- All tactical weapons removed from surface 
ships, multi-purpose submarines and ground-
based naval aviation, some stored, some des-
troyed 
- Propose United States and USSR destroy all 
naval weapons 
- Remove all DCA weapons and to central store 
- Study joint systems - avert nuclear missile 
attacks 
- One-year unilateral moratorium on tests 
leading to full cessation of nuclear testing 
- Agreement with United States on cessation of 
all fissionable materials for weapons 
- Dialogue on development of safe and ecologi-
cally clean technologies to store, transport, 
etc. 
- Agreement on no first use 
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1st August 197 5 
30th May 1986 
11th July 1986 
11th December 1986 
27th July 1987 
17th December 1987 
2nd-3rd March 1988 
7th December 1988 
8th December 1988 
APPENDIX Ill 
A CFE chronology 
Signing of the Helsinki Final Act 
APPENDIX Ill 
Halifax: meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The ministers call for 
serious progress towards conventional arms control. A working group is 
set up to work out recommendations 
Budapest: meeting of the Warsaw Pact: 
- proposal to discuss conventional force reductions in Europe from the 
Atlantic to the U rals 
- proposal to negotiate reductions in troop levels 
Brussels: meeting of the North Atlantic Council: declaration on the 
control of conventional weapons, providing for two series of negotia-
tions: 
- confidence-building and security measures 
- elimination of existing disparities between conventional weapons of 
NATO and Warsaw Pact member countries and establishment of sta-
bility at the lowest possible level 
NATO presents to member states a draft plan for negotiations with three 
priority aims: 
- elimination of force disparities that are detrimental to stability and 
security 
- elimination of possibilities of launching surprise attacks or mounting a 
large-scale offensive 
- establishment of an effective verification system requiring an 
exchange of information and on-site inspections 
Vienna: opening of informal talks between member states of NATO and 
of the Warsaw Pact to work out a plan for negotiations on conventional 
forces in Europe 
Brussels: NATO summit meeting 
Declaration of the heads of state: " Conventional arms control: the way 
ahead ": " The Soviet Union's military presence in Europe, at a level far 
in excess of its needs for self-defence, directly challenges our security as 
well as our hopes for change in the political situation in Europe. Thus the 
conventional imbalance in Europe remains at the core of Europe's 
security concerns. " 
President Gorbachev submits a unilateral decision to the United 
Nations: 
- reduction of 500 000 troops in the Soviet armed forces within two 
years 
- reduction of 8 500 pieces of artillery 
- reduction of 800 aircraft 
- reduction of 10 000 tanks withdrawal of 50 000 troops from Eastern 
Europe 
The North Atlantic Council outlines NATO's approach to future negoti-
ations on conventional forces: 
- substantial limitations on tanks, pieces of artillery and armoured 
troop carriers 
- limitation of forces stationed outside national territory 
- effective and strict verification measures 
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lOth January 1989 
9th March 1989 
23rd March 1989 
5th May 1989 
29th-30th May 1989 
13th July 1989 
7th September 1989 
22nd September 1989 
19th October 1989 
9th November 1989 
21st December 1989 
12th January 1990 
13th February 1990 
22nd February 1990 
15th March 1990 
26th April 1990 
27th April 199 
14th May 1990 
1st June 1990 
5th October 1990 
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Vienna: NATO and the Warsaw Pact initial a plan defining the scope 
and form of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe 
Opening of the CFE talks in Vienna 
NATO proposes reductions in and limitations on battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles and artillery 
Conclusion of the first round of CFE talks 
Start of the second round of CFE talks 
NATO summit meeting. States approve President Bush's proposal to 
extend the scope of the CFE Treaty to include the limitation of troop 
levels, combat aircraft and combat helicopters 
Vienna: NATO presents the plan drawn up at the May summit meeting 
Conclusion of the second round of CFE talks 
Start of the third round of CFE talks 
NATO proposals: exchanges of information, stabilisation and verifi-
cation measures 
Conclusion of the third round of CFE talks 
Start of the fourth round of CFE talks 
Conclusion of the fourth round of CFE talks 
Start of the fifth round of CFE talks 
Ottawa: meeting of ministers for foreign affairs: limitation of American 
and Soviet air forces stationed outside national territory 
Conclusion of the fifth round of CFE talks 
Start of the sixth round of CFE talks 
Convocation of stage lA of the CFE negotiations 
Official opening of the meeting of the joint consultative group 
Conclusion of the sixth round of CFE talks 
Start of the seventh round of CFE talks 
Washington: summit meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. 
Joint declaration that the CFE Treaty is essential for stability and 
security on the continent. They undertake to conclude the treaty by the 
end of 1990. Joint declaration by the Federal Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and the Prime Minister of the GDR. Troop levels in the armed 
forces of unified Germany should not exceed 370 000 
Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze agree on the principal questions in the 
CFE Treaty: 
- artillery and combat helicopters 
- progress in regard to ceilings on the number of aircraft, zones and veri-
fication 
12th October 1990 Moscow: Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze declare that manpower levels 
should not be taken into account in the CFE Treaty 
30th October 1990 Unification of Germany 
18th November 1990 End of the negotiating procedure 
19th November 1990 The heads of state or of government sign the CFE Treaty in Paris 
November-December 1990 Problem of the accuracy of data provided by the Soviet Union. Dis-
cussion on coastal defence equipment, naval infantry, strategic missiles 
and the organisation of civil defence which, for the Soviets, is outside the 
scope of the treaty 
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6th December 1990 
14th February 1991 
21st February 1991 
21st March 1991 
20th-23rd May 1991 
2nd-3rd June 1991 
14th June 1991 
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American team of experts in Moscow; discussion of the fact that, 
between March 1989, when the CFE negotiations started, and the date 
the treaty was signed, the Soviet Union considerably reduced its forces in 
Europe. Some of these reductions were made by a unilateral decision by 
President Gorbachev and some were the consequence of bilateral agree-
ments with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Germany. Others were due to 
the efforts to make reductions under the CFE Treaty 
The Soviet Union submits further data on its equipment but continues 
to exclude from the area of application of the treaty equipment held by 
the coastal defence naval infantry, strategic missiles and the organisation 
of civil defence. This is a problem of interpretation of Article Ill. 
The United States does not wish to submit the treaty to the Senate until 
the Soviet Union has fulfilled its commitments 
Convocation of stage lA of the CFE negotiations 
Conclusion of stage lA of the CFE negotiations 
Visit by Chief-of-Staff Moiseyev to Washington to discuss the problem 
of Article Ill 
Mr. Baker and Mr. Bessmertnyk seek an arrangement in regard to Article 
Ill 
The Soviet Union makes a declaration at the extraordinary conference 
on conventional forces in Europe bringing them into line with the treaty 
ceilings 
The other signatories accept the Soviet proposals as a satisfactory basis 
for proceeding to ratify the treaty 
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" 23 " talks 
AA 
AAM 
AB 
ABM 
ACM 
ACV 
AD 
AEW 
AFAP 
AFV 
AIFV 
ALCM 
APC 
ASAT 
ASM 
ASW 
• ATBM 
ATGW 
ATK 
ATM 
AWACS 
BM 
BMD 
BW 
BWC 
CBM 
CBW 
CD 
CDE 
CFE 
CPD 
CSBM 
CSCE 
CTB 
cw 
DEW 
EDI 
ENDC 
EW 
EWng 
FAC 
FAC(G) 
FAC(P) 
FAC(T) 
FBS 
FGA 
FOTL 
GLCM 
Group of 23 
Group of Six 
GW 
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Glossary of arms control 
Conventional Forces in Europe talks (CFE) 
anti-aircraft 
air-to-air missile(s) 
airborne 
anti-ballistic missle(s) 
advanced cruise missile 
armoured combat vehicle(s) 
air defence 
airborne early warning 
artillery-fired atomic projectile 
armoured fighting vehicle(s) 
armoured infantry fighting vehicle(s) 
air-launched cruise missile(s) 
armoured personnel carrier(s) 
anti-satellite (sometimes anti-satellite talks or weapons) 
air-to-surface missile(s) 
anti-submarine warfare 
anti-tactical ballistic missile 
anti-tank guided weapon(s) 
anti-tank 
anti-tactical missile 
airborne warning and control system 
ballistic missile 
ballistic missile defence 
biological weapon 
Biological Weapon Convention 
confidence-building measure(s) 
chemical and biological weapons 
Conference on Disarmament 
Conference on Disarmament in Europe 
Conventional Forces in Europe talks 
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament 
confidence- and security-building measure(s) 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Comprehensive Test Ban 
chemical warfare 
distant early warning, radar system across Canada 
European Defence Initiative, for tactical defence of Europe 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, a precursor of the CD 
electronic warfare 
early warning 
fast attack craft (gun) 
fast attack craft (missile) 
fast attack craft (patrol) 
fast attack craft (torpedo) 
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forward-based systems (US nuclear-capable delivery systems based out of the US 
" forward " toward the Soviet Union) 
fighter(s), ground-attack 
follow-on to Lance (SNF missile) 
ground-launched cruise missile(s) 
the 16 NATO and 7 WTO nations which put together the CFE mandate 
Mexico, Sweden, India, Argentina, Tanzania and Greece seek to halt arms race (also 
known as Five-Continent Peace Initiative and Six-Nation Peace Initiative) 
guided weapon(s) 
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HACV 
HLTF 
ICBM 
IEPG 
INF 
IRBM 
KT 
LCA 
LCAC 
LCM 
LCT 
LCU 
LCVP 
LHA 
LRTNF 
LSD 
LSM 
LST 
LTB 
MAD 
MARV 
MBFR 
MBT 
MCMV 
MENFZ 
MICV 
MIRV 
MLRS 
MR 
MRBM 
MRL 
MRV 
MT 
NATO 
NNA 
NNFZ 
NNPA 
NNWS 
NPT 
NST 
NTM 
NWF 
NWS 
PNE 
PTB 
PUNE 
RCL 
RDF 
RL 
RV 
RW 
SALT 
SAM 
SANFZ 
SAR 
SCG 
SDI 
SES 
SLBM 
SLCM 
heavy armament combat vehicle 
NA TO's High Level Task Force 
intercontinental ballistic missile(s) 
Independent European Programme Group 
intermediate-range nuclear forces 
intermediate-range ballistic missile(s) 
kiloton (1 000 tons TNT equivalent) 
landing craft, assault 
landing craft, air cushion 
landing craft, medium/mechanised 
landing craft, tank 
landing craft, utility 
landing craft, vehicles and personnel 
amphibious general assault ship(s) 
long-range theatre nuclear forces 
landing ship, dock 
landing ship, medium 
landing ship, tank 
Limited Test Ban Treaty 
mutual assured destruction 
manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks 
main battle tank 
mine counter-measure vessel(s) 
Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone 
mechanised infantry combat vehicle(s) 
multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle(s) 
multiple-launch rocket system 
maritime reconnaissance 
medium-range ballistic missile(s) 
multiple rocket launcher(s) 
multiple re-entry vehicle(s) 
megaton (1 million tons TNT equivalent) 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
neutral and non-aligned 
Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone 
United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 
non-nuclear weapon state 
Non-Proliferation Treaty 
nuclear and space talks, Geneva 
national and technical means, usually referring to verification 
nuclear weapon-free 
nuclear weapon state 
peaceful nuclear explosion, also Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty 
Partial Test Ban Treaty 
Conference on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
recoilless launcher(s) 
Rapid Deployment Force (US) 
rocket launcher(s) 
re-entry vehicle(s) 
radiological weapon 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or talks 
surface-to-air missile 
South Asia nuclear weapon-free zone 
search and rescue 
NATO Standing Consultative Group, followed the INF negotiations 
Strategic Defence Initiative 
surface-effect ship(s) 
submarine-launched ballistic missile(s) 
sea-launched cruise missile(s) 
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SNDV 
SNF 
SPNFZ 
SRAM 
SRBM 
SRINF 
ss 
SSBN 
SSD I 
SSD 11 
SSD Ill 
SSM 
SSN 
START 
STOL 
svc 
TASM 
TTB 
UNDC 
V(/S)TOL 
WDC 
WEU 
WTO 
Zero option 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicle 
short-range nuclear forces 
South Pacific nuclear weapon-free zone 
short-range attack missile(s) 
short-range ballistic missile(s) 
shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces 
surface to surface, designation for missiles 
ballistic-missile nuclear submarine(s) 
First Special Session on Disarmament 
Second Special Session on Disarmament 
Third Special Session on Disarmament 
surface-to-surface missile(s) 
submarine(s), nuclear 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
short take-off and landing 
Standing Verification Commission for INF Treaty 
tactical air-to-surface missile 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
United Nations Disarmament Commission 
vertical(/short) take-off and landing 
World Disarmament Conference 
Western European Union 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
DOCUMENT 1288 
United States INF proposal to stop deployment if Soviets withdraw all medium-range 
missiles 
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Draft Recommendation 
on arms control negotiations - further initiatives for WEU 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the positive results of the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn on Monday, 
18th November 1991, namely: 
(a) the decision to establish the WEU satellite data interpretation and training centre at 
Torrejon, in Spain, with effect from 1st January 1992; 
(b) the decision to form a study group in 1992, in France, to examine the necessity and desira-
bility of a medium- and long-term realisation of a European space-based observation system; 
(ii) Pleased that the Council has taken so many of the Assembly's previous recommendations on 
arms control verification to heart and strongly approving the 18th November communique on the 
subject: 
" Ministers took note of the progress made on co-operation among member states on the verifi-
cation of arms control agreements. In this context, they underlined the link between space 
co-operation and arms control verification, including verification of the CFE Treaty. 
Ministers noted with approval the preparatory steps taken to set up multinational inspection 
teams as part of the implementation of the verification regime laid down in the CFE Treaty. 
They approved a set of rules for the co-operation of multinational teams. 
They decided to take into account in their subsequent deliberations the possibility of 
co-operation with all CSCE member states. 
The Council welcomed the progress made following the resumption of the open skies negotia-
tions in Vienna, which gives hope for their successful conclusion by the time of the Helsinki 
follow-up meeting. The ministers continue to attach great importance to accelerating the search 
for cost-effective solutions in the implementation of an open skies agreement. " 
(iii) Taking account of the new strategic concept defined by NATO at its Rome meeting and its con-
sequences and urging still further practical co-operation between WEU member states to cover all 
aspects of arms control and disarmament; 
(iv) Concerned however that not enough international concertation has been applied to the par-
ticular problem of pollution control now urgently required to ensure the safe disposal of both conven-
tional and nuclear weapons; 
(v) Welcoming all moves towards a reinforcement of the missile technology control regime and 
especially the People's Republic of China's recent declared willingness to abide by its provisions, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Support the Atlantic Alliance's new strategic concept and show that WEU, as the European 
pillar, is ready to respond to current challenges by producing a specific initiative on arms control which 
would demonstrate our considerable political, legal and technical capabilities; 
2. Encourage the participants at the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces to reach positive 
conclusions to be presented at Helsinki in March 1992; 
3. Encourage member countries and CSCE colleague states to pay greater attention to the environ-
mental problems linked with the destruction of both conventional and nuclear weapons, study and 
report on avoiding this type of potential pollution, thus ensuring greater transparency in this important 
domain; 
4. In addition to seeking progress on verification, satellite observation, multinational inspection 
teams and open skies, actively seek a greater respect for the missile technology control regime. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by M. de Puig, Rapporuur) 
I. Introduction 
When the Defence Committee adopted 
the report on arms control negotiations - further 
initiatives for WEU, your Rapporteur promised 
to produce an addendum to bring matters up-to-
date. The present recommendations are designed 
to reflect that promise and the following conclu-
sions cover a number of points made by col-
leagues on 7th November. A further report will 
be necessary next year to develop certain other 
arms control themes. 
II. Conclusions 
1. Throughout the original report, the 
Rapporteur expressed his opinion on various 
aspects of the subjects tackled, making what he 
felt to be apt analyses in each case, as can easily 
be seen in the chapters on nuclear and conven-
tional prospects and the role WEU should play 
in arms control and disarmament. However, at 
the risk of much repetition, he thinks it is more 
important in point of fact to draw general con-
clusions that take account of what we know of 
decisions taken in Taormina, Rome and Bonn in 
recent days. In other words, these conclusions 
are no longer provisional as they were when the 
draft report and recommendation were written. 
2. It should first be ·said that the analyses 
and opinions expressed provisionally by your 
Rapporteur were quite simply confirmed by the 
recent NATO and WEU decisions taken in 
November and which add a touch of optimism 
and satisfaction insofar as we can hope for sub-
stantial progress in disarmament, detente and 
demilitarisation in international relations. 
3. We have never in fact had such peaceful 
means of solving possible conflicts, be it in 
Europe or in the world. The changes in Eastern 
Europe brought a move from the military to the 
political which allows hope to be cherished of 
peace being established. Dialogue, political com-
promise, co-operation and security agreements 
are increasingly able to replace armed peace and 
the balance of terror. 
4. To create lasting stability and the nec-
essary mutual confidence, a radical change was 
needed in what had hitherto been the arms race 
and the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons. 
This radical change is undeniably under way. 
The establishment of the CSCE, the ensuing dis-
armament agreements, President Bush's initia-
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tives, President Gorbachev's proposals, the dis-
appearance of the Warsaw Pact and the uni-
lateral disarmament decisions taken by NATO 
and its new strategic roncept are a historic 
change and the unequivocal sign of a new inter-
national order and more particularly of a new 
European order. 
5. Many factors have helped to bring about 
this new situation. It is not only a matter of 
changes in the East. The situation requires far 
more complex analysis and it is not for your 
Rapporteur to do so here; he nevertheless ven-
tures to point out the importance in this process 
of the new military concepts and doctrines, tech-
nological progress, pacifist thinking and 
pressure, the economic situation, the planned 
European union, the internationalisation of con-
flicts, the Gulf war, the progress of international 
political co-operation and, above all, the desire 
of citizens, of the public, for the establishment 
of a lasting, stable peace free from incalculable 
risks. All these factors, plus the crisis in the com-
munist system, have enabled us today to look 
towards a far more promising new order. 
6. The dilemma that constantly has to be 
faced is how to reconcile disarmament and the 
peaceful solution of disputes with the need for 
guarantees of non-aggression and, in the last 
resort, means of defence. When one has political 
responsibility, history, human nature and the 
present international situation preclude giving 
in to ingenuity or idealistic or even romantic 
pacifism, however respectable. Europe and the 
world must disarm in depth and control arma-
ments rigorously and implacably while guaran-
teeing security, it being understood that, by 
ensuring ability to neutralise any aggression, it 
is, in reality, being avoided: through deterrence, 
war is being averted and prevented. 
7. To guarantee peace and attain desirable 
levels of detente and confidence, arms had to be 
reduced, controlled and, in certain cases, totally 
banned. The report shows the great progress 
achieved in this area in recent years and even 
recent hours. There have been considerable 
quantitative and qualitative reductions in 
nuclear, conventional, chemical and biological 
armaments and the most important thing is that 
the process is only just starting. 
8. To ensure lasting stability, there had to be 
compromises with a view to co-operation and 
in-depth verification agreements. These com-
promises and agreements are in the process of 
being achieved as the report tried to show. 
Confidence-building measures and technological 
co-operation initiatives also allow us to be opti-
mistic in certain cases. 
9. It still has to be seen exactly what arma-
ments system will be adopted in the long run. It 
seems evident that it can only be a defensive 
system at the lowest level compatible with 
security guarantees. The threat of a massive 
attack from the East has disappeared. Possible 
threats are of another kind: deep-rooted insta-
bility due to social and economic factors, ethnic 
rivalry, expansionist fundamentalism, etc. To 
avert these dangers, work must be done far more 
in the political than in the military field. The 
decisions taken in Paris, Rome and Bonn give a 
glimpse of a solely defensive system at the 
minimum level, sufficient to safeguard peace 
and stability. This is the right direction. 
10. The diminishing numbers of nuclear 
weapons are being assigned a strictly political 
role in that their only purpose must be to per-
suade a possible aggressor of the uselessness of 
his action and convince him of the impossibility 
of winning and of the incalculable price of his 
act. Nuclear weapons obviously help to 
maintain peace, and the possibility of their 
being used is extremely remote. Progress in this 
area is fundamental and, if it has been impos-
sible to take one step further, it is perhaps due to 
the circumstances with which we are concerned 
today, the proliferation of such weapons and 
their technology or, at least, their possible prolif-
eration being a negative factor. 
227 
DOCUMENT 1288 ADDENDUM 
11. As for conventional weapons, the impetus 
given by the CFE agreements and the agree-
ments relating to the CSCE meeting in Helsinki 
will be decisive if these arms are to be reduced 
to a sufficient minimum on the basis of the new 
strategic concept of small but operational and 
rapid multinational forces. In all cases, the 
defensive system will be based on conventional 
forces. 
12. For other weapons of mass destruction 
- chemical and biological - we are moving 
towards a universal, worldwide ban that we 
must enthusiastically support. 
13. In this context, WEU has much to say and 
do. In the body of the report, as in the recom-
mendations, your Rapporteur proposes certain 
initiatives which it is possible to carry out: 
co-operation between members in disarmament 
matters, control and verification, harmonisation 
of legislation, co-ordination with other bodies 
and direct participation in the decision-taking 
process and the implementation of agreements. 
The satellite data interpretation centre - to be 
set up in Torrejon (Spain) - may be a funda-
mental instrument in this participation. 
14. In the end, your Rapporteur considers 
that WEU, its Council of Ministers and its 
Assembly must support progress achieved to 
date during this historic stage in the process of 
disarmament and detente without, moreover, 
giving up proposing new action likely to lead to 
further progress in the near future. 
DOCUMENT 1288 ADDENDUM APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
References to arms control and disarmament at the NATO meetings 
in Taormina (17th and 18th October: Nuclear Planning Group) 
and Rome (7th and 8th No,ember: NATO summit) 
A. NATO Nuclear Planning Group, TaormiiUl, 
17th and 18th October 1991 
" 1. The principal objective of our meeting 
was to agree a new sub-strategic nuclear force 
posture and stockpile level which responds to 
the changing security environment in Europe. In 
adapting our nuclear policy to the needs of the 
1990s we were guided by the conclusions of the 
London summit last year that the alliance could 
reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons and in 
particular those of the shortest ranges. Events 
since then have confirmed the validity of these 
conclusions, but allow us to go even further; 
there is no longer any requirement for nuclear 
ground-launched short-range ballistic missiles 
and artillery. In this context, we welcomed Pres-
ident Bush's recent decision, and the reciprocal 
response by President Gorbachev, to withdraw 
and destroy the associated nuclear warheads 
worldwide. We also welcomed the decision to 
withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from 
surface vessels, attack submarines and land-
based naval aircraft, and to destroy many of 
these weapons. 
2. In addition to the elimination of ground-
launched nuclear systems, the number of air-
delivered weapons in NATO's European stock-
pile will be greatly reduced. The total reduction 
in the current NATO stockpile of sub-strategic 
weapons in Europe will be roughly 80%. 
3. These unilateral measures, which are 
additional to the substantial reductions already 
made in recent years, accord with our long-
standing policy of maintaining only the 
minimum level of nuclear forces required to pre-
serve peace and stability. Nuclear weapons will 
continue for the foreseeable future to fulfil their 
essential role in the alliance's overall strategy, 
since conventional forces alone cannot ensure 
war prevention. We will therefore continue to 
base effective and up-to-date sub-strategic 
nuclear forces in Europe, but they will consist 
solely of dual-capable aircraft, with continued 
widespread participation in nuclear roles and 
peacetime basing by allies. Sub-strategic nuclear 
forces committed to NATO continue to provide 
the necessary political and military link to 
NATO's strategic nuclear forces and an 
important demonstration of alliance solidarity. 
4. President Bush's initiatives also include 
far-reaching proposals aimed at changing the 
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strategic nuclear postures of the United States 
and the Soviet Union, to which there has also 
been a constructive Soviet response. These initi-
atives taken as a whole, together with the 
recently agreed START Treaty, represent a his-
toric step towards enhanced security and sta-
bility. They will result in smaller nuclear 
arsenals and a dramatic change in the speed of 
transformation to a more secure and 
co-operative relationship. In this regard, we are 
convinced that a dialogue with the Soviet Union 
on nuclear policy would result in improved 
understanding and increased co-operation. 
5. We discussed the growing problem of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, which remains 
a matter of great concern. We also discussed the 
crucial issue of the control of nuclear weapons in 
the Soviet Union and welcomed the statements 
by the Soviet leadership about their plans to 
ensure th~ safe, responsible and reliable control 
of these weapons. This matter clearly affects the 
security interests of the entire alliance. We look 
forward to further steps by the Soviet Union to 
meet our concerns and to continuing timely con-
sultations within the alliance. " 
B. NATO summit, Rome, 
7th and 8th NoPember 1991 
" 1. We strongly support President Bush's ini-
tiative of 27th September 1991 which has 
opened new prospects for nuclear arms 
reduction. We also welcome President Gorbachev's 
response. We particularly applaud the decisions 
of both sides to eliminate their nuclear warheads 
for ground-launched short-range weapons 
systems. The allies concerned, through their 
consultations, have played a central role in Pres-
ident's Bush's decision which fulfilled the SNF 
arms control objectives of the London Decla-
ration. They will continue close consultations on 
the process of the elimination of ground-based 
SNF warheads until its completion. We will con-
tinue to work for security at minimum levels of 
nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and 
stability. We look forward to the early ratifi-
cation of the recently signed START 
agreement. 
2. We note with satisfaction the recent 
achievements in the fields of conventional arms 
control and disarmament. We reiterate the para-
mount importance we attach to the CFE Treaty 
APPENDIX 
and call upon all CFE signatories to move 
forward promptly with its ratification and 
implementation. We urge our negotiating 
partners to work with us to reach substantial 
agreements in the CFE lA and CSBM negotia-
tions, and remain dedicated to achieving con-
crete results by the time of the CSCE Helsinki 
follow-up meeting. We welcome the resumption 
of the open skies negotiations; we look forward 
to agreement on an open skies regime by the 
time of the Helsinki meeting as an important 
new element in greater openness and 
confidence-building in the military field. 
3. The Helsinki meeting will mark a turning 
point in the arms control and disarmament 
process in Europe, now with the participation of 
all CSCE states. This will offer a unique oppor-
tunity to move this process energetically 
forward. Our goal will be to shape a new 
co-operative order, in which no country needs to 
harbour fears for its security, by: 
- strengthening security and stability at 
lower levels of armed forces to the 
extent possible and commensurate with 
individual legitimate security needs 
both inside and ouside of Europe; 
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- conducting an intensified security dia-
logue within a permanent framework 
and fostering a new quality of trans-
parency and co-operation about armed-
forces and defence policies; and 
- promoting effective mechanisms and 
instruments for conflict prevention. 
4. The proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and of their means of delivery 
undermines international security. Transfers of 
conventional armaments beyond legitimate 
defensive needs to regions of tension make the 
peaceful settlement of disputes less likely. We 
support the establishment by the United 
Nations of a universal non-discriminatory reg-
ister of conventional arms transfers. We support 
steps undertaken to address other aspects of pro-
liferation and other initiatives designed to build 
confidence and underpin international security. 
We also deem it essential to complete a global, 
comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on 
chemical weapons next year. We welcome the 
positive results of the Third Review Conference 
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conven-
tion, in particular the decision to explore the 
feasibility of verification. " 
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Rapporteur's Preface 
In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
WARSAW 
Ministry of Industry and Trade 
Commander A.W. Ochal, Engineer, Director, Defence Industry Department; 
Mr. Piotr Kowalski, Director, Department for Economic Integration with Foreign Countries; 
Colonel E. Hacel, Deputy Director, Defence Industry Department; 
Colonel J. Olszak, Chief Expert, Defence Industry Department; 
Mr. S. Soja, Chief Expert, Department of Industrial and Technical Policy; 
Mr. J. Kipikroch, Chief Expert. 
Ministry for Foreign Economic Co-operation 
Mr. J. Suvinski, Director, CENZIN. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
Mr. Jerzy Makarczyk, Secretary of State; 
Mr. A. Towpik, Director, European Institutions Department; 
Mr. Stankiewicz, Chief Expert. 
PCO Warsawa, industrial centre of optics 
Mr. Roman Lukaszewski, Engineer, Managing Director. 
BRATISLAVA 
Ministry of the Economy of the Slovak Republic 
Mr. Jozef Belcak, Minister of the Economy; 
Mr. Lancaric, Counsellor to the Vice-Prime Minister; 
Mr. Kinces, Counsellor to the Vice-Prime Minister; 
Mrs. Maria Hrachovcova, Counsellor to the Vice-Minister for International Relations of the 
Slovak Republic; 
Mr. lng. Peter Tirinda, Deputy, Slovak National Council; 
Mr. lng. Josef Blahusiak, Expert. 
TRENCIN 
Aircraft repair factory 
Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Palko, Director. 
PRAGUE 
Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) 
Mr. K. Viktorin, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Assembly, and members of the Defence and 
Security Committee, the Economic Committee, the Committee for Plan and Budget and the Com-
mittee for Foreign Affairs of the House of the People and of the House of the Nations. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the CSFR 
Mr. Busniak, Director in charge of the CSCE, and staff members. 
Ministry of Defence 
Major General Dr. Jire Jindra. 
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Ministry of Industry of the Czech Republic 
Mr. Vitezslav Vasica, Deputy Minister. 
Ministry of the Economy of the CSFR 
lng. Jozef Kralik, Head of the Department of Industry Policy. 
The Rapporteur also wishes to thank the following persons, who have been kind enough to 
provide useful information and help in the preparation of the abovementioned visits: 
Mr. Juraj Berta, Press Attache, Embassy of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 
Mr. Roman Jankowiak, Minister Plenipotentiary, Economic and Commercial Counsellor, 
Embassy of the Polish Republic, France. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ferenc Pados, Defence Attache, Embassy of the Hungarian Republic, 
France. 
Mr. Marek Witkowski, Economic and Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of the Polish Republic, 
France. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the defence industry in Czechoslo11akia, Hungary and Polllnd 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the complete economic reform from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy 
now taking place in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, here also to be referred to as the Triangle; 
(ii) Recognising that the Triangle, in the framework of the former Warsaw Pact, was obliged to 
develop a large defence industry with considerable armaments and equipment production and several 
hundred thousand employees; 
(iii) Aware that the traditional export markets for this defence industry, mainly the former Warsaw 
Pact allies and third world countries formerly in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, have virtually 
collapsed overnight; 
(iv) Conscious that, due to arms control, severe budget cuts and restructuring of the national armed 
forces, the home market of the Triangle's defence industry has also shrunk dramatically, with imme-
diate negative consequences for its production level; 
(v) Aware that massive unemployment in many of the Triangle defence industry's establishments 
will lead to a complete collapse of those regions where they are the exclusive generator of economic 
activity and the basis of the social and cultural structure as is often the case; 
(vi) Recognising that conversion in a narrow sense, insofar as it means turning defence manufac-
turing companies fully or partially into manufacturers for the civilian market, will mainly have to 
depend on private enterprise initiatives; 
(vii) Understanding that the Triangle countries, after more than forty years of complete dependence 
and submission, have a legitimate interest in an autonomous defence capability linked to the mainte-
nance of a national defence industrial base; 
(viii) Conscious that the Triangle countries have pledged to stop arms exports to areas of tension and 
terrorist organisations; 
(ix) Recognising that the Triangle countries will gradually have to adapt their armed forces and 
defence equipment to their new security needs and to their future role in a larger European security 
framework; 
(x) Aware that, in the foreseeable future, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are bound to be full 
members of the European Community and that in parallel they will be included in a future European 
security and defence system; 
(xi) Aware that the defence ministers of the member countries of the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group (IEPG) recently initiated appropriate contacts between the IEPG on the one hand and, 
on the other hand, Western European Union and the European Community, both engaged in the elabo-
ration of the future European security architecture; 
(xii) Convinced that for the Triangle nations the IEPG as a European forum is an ideal framework to 
start harmonising their operational requirements and re-equipment time-scales, while offering them, 
through a concerted European military research programme and cost-effective defence equipment pro-
grammes, a fair chance to adapt their slimmed down defence industry to new circumstances and 
include it in European collaborative efforts; 
(xiii) Recalling that, notwithstanding considerable liberalisation in the Cocom export control regime, 
in particular regarding Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, these countries are still among the pro-
scribed countries of Cocom, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Urgently call for negotiations between Cocom and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to 
remove these countries from the list of proscribed countries as soon as possible; 
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2. Promote the participation of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in the activities of the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group (IEPG), in particular with a view to including them in the 
European sessions for armament managers, in the work of Panel I (operational requirements pro-
grammes) at an early stage, later to be followed by participation in Panel 11 (research and technology, 
including Euclid) and Panel Ill (procedures, economic matters and action plan for a more efficient 
European defence industry); 
3. Promote the idea of granting Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland the st_atus of developing 
defence industry countries as defined by the Independent European Programme Group which might 
enable them to share in the opportunities offered by the opening of the European defence equipment 
market; 
4. Urge all member states to respond positively to requests for advice on re-training, the acqui-
sition of new skills, special help for self-employment and the establishment of small businesses, 
attracting new industries and developing employment opportunities by establishing enterprise zones. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Breathtaking is one of the words fre-
quently used to describe both the character and 
speed of changes which occurred and are still 
occurring in Central and Eastern Europe. But 
while this word is rightly being used here in a 
metaphorical sense, the very pace of these 
changes sometimes literally seems to take the 
West's breath away when the time comes for 
adequate responses to the many different 
emerging needs. 
2. Granted, many efforts are still being made 
in different areas of concern and no doubt the 
West's general attitude is positive. Still, one can 
imagine the sense of uneasiness, if not disap-
pointment, in Central Europe when comparing 
the fine statements of all Western European gov-
ernments at the collapse of the communist 
system in the Warsaw Pact countries with the 
painful attitude of some of the same govern-
ments when it came to fulfilling the expectations 
raised. 
3. Such feelings were perfectly voiced by 
Lech Walesa, President of Poland, formerly 
highly appreciated in the West for his candid 
statements on the communist system, when he 
said that the West "shirks its responsibilities 
and ventures painfully into the economic trans-
formation (of those countries)". He called this 
attitude " myopic if not frivolous " 1• 
4. One of the many problems Central 
European countries are now facing is the future 
of their defence industries. Under communist 
rule these industries used to be pampered and 
no questions were asked about competitiveness, 
priority access to raw materials and waste of 
energy. Now that its privileges are quickly disap-
pearing and that it will have to compete in a 
shrinking world market, operating according to 
the rules of the market economy, its prospects 
are, less than bright. Even so, it is employing 
more than 200 000 workers and its collapse will 
only aggravate the social economic situation in 
those countries. 
5. The present report highlights the defence 
industry of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland in an attempt to indicate existing 
problems, their solution as pursued by these 
countries and the positive contribution which 
could be made by Western European nations. 
l. Statement made at a Triangle conference, 6th October 
1991, Krakow. 
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6. Even if the products of the Central 
European defence industry are well known 
among experts, relatively little is known of its 
organisation and of the governments' policy to 
transform and partly convert it. This report 
should be seen as a first investigation which may 
be followed up if there are new developments. 
II. The general framework 
7. It is a well-known fact that under com-
munist rule the countries of Central Europe 
were effectively satellites of the USSR. Not just 
politically, but also economically and militarily, 
they were fully dependent on their great ally. 
Naturally, the defence industry was no 
exception to this general rule. As a result of a 
determined Soviet policy, the defence industry 
of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland was 
practically an integral part of the military-
industrial complex of the Warsaw Pact. 
8. In the early years after the second world 
war, after the imposition of communist regimes, 
it is believed these countries were provided with 
Soviet military equipment free of charge. 
9. The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation, known as the Warsaw Pact, also 
introduced a completely different method of 
organising military equipment transfers. The 
Soviet Union deliberately wanted to build up 
the military capability of its Central European 
allies in order to counterbalance the rearmament 
of West Germany. Worried that its own 
economy would be unable to sustain the full 
burden of a large military build-up, the Soviet 
Union induced its Warsaw Pact allies to share 
the burden, a procedure which sounds familiar 
to Western European ears. 
10. Among other allies, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland were urged to set up a 
national defence industry, but at the same time 
none was allowed to be self-sufficient militarily. 
They were allowed only a very limited research 
and development capability, the development 
and production of key weapons systems was 
excluded and there was a ban on arms exports 
without Soviet permission. 
11. Within this narrowly-defined framework, 
Poland was allowed to manufacture landing 
craft, tanks, light helicopters and some training 
aircraft. 
12. Czechoslovakia mainly made tanks, 
explosives, artillery, armoured personnel car-
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riers and training aircraft and Hungary pro-
duced armoured personnel carriers, hand 
weapons and guns. 
13. Arms transfers between Warsaw Pact 
countries were carried out on a barter basis with 
weapons being swapped for other weapons, raw 
materials or manufactured goods. When sales 
involved the Soviet Union, the barter rate was 
set by the Soviet Union in its favour. 
14. Moreover, Central European countries 
had to deliver weapons and military equipment 
to friendly third world countries free of charge 
at the Soviet Union's request. 
111. Arms production in Czechoslovakia 
15. Czechoslovakia has a long tradition of 
arms production, but the efforts of this industry 
increased considerably when communist rule 
was installed after the second world war. As said 
earlier, satellite states of the former Warsaw 
Pact were encouraged to set up their own arms 
industries in order to share the burden of a 
massive build-up of military capability. Czecho-
slovakia was allowed to produce artillery, tanks, 
armoured personnel carriers, training aircraft 
and explosives, of which Semtex became world-
famous through its use in terrorist actions. Ship-
ments of Czechoslovak automatic weapons to 
revolutionary and terrorist organisations around 
the world were also frequently mentioned in the 
press. 
16. The entire arms industry, now consisting 
of some 110 state-owned companies, was then 
narrowly connected with the armed forces 
command of both Czechoslovakia and the 
Soviet Union. Its management was centralised 
and brought under the responsibility of the now 
abolished Federal Ministry for Metallurgy, 
Mechanical Industry and Electrotechnology. 
The share of arms production in this sector of 
the industry increased from 4% in 1950 to 27% 
in 1953, which illustrates how steep the rise was. 
In the late 1980s, military production repre-
sented 2-3 % of gross industrial production in 
Czechoslovakia. 
1 7. Among the best known arms production 
companies in the Czech Republic are AERO 
Ltd. Praha with its successful L-39 Albatros jet 
training aircraft and MESIT Uherske Hradiste, 
producing aircraft radio communication sets 
and a wide range of electronic and other 
equipment. Ceska Zbrojovka Uhersky Brod is a 
well-known manufacturer of sporting and 
hunting firearms and other small arms and 
TESLA Pardubice produces airport radars, 
radar systems for military applications and 
other electronic equipment. 
18. In the post-war build-up of the arms 
industry, large arms production companies were 
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established in Slovakia. This stemmed from 
obvious strategic considerations, but economic 
policy also played a role, since these new com-
panies were supposed to boost the economy of 
this part of the country. 
19. Here, ZTS Martin and ZTS Dubnica nad 
V akom are producing heavy armour and 
artillery, such as the T-72 tank, infantry fighting 
vehicles and self-propelled rocket launchers, 
cannon howitzers, mortars, towed mortars and 
all kinds of munitions. 
20. Other important companies in Slovakia 
are Povazska Strojame, Povazska Bystrica, pro-
ducing the DV-2 jet engine and a wide range of 
other products such as bearings, machine tools 
and gearboxes, and the computer industry in 
Banska Bystrica. Almost two-thirds of arms pro-
duction is located in Slovakia with a labour 
force of approximately 80 000. 
21. When in the late 1980s, for a number of 
only too well-known reasons, the demand for 
military equipment dwindled, the consequences 
were felt immediately, and conversion came of 
its own accord. 
IV. Czechoslovak arms exports 
22. Until about 1985, the yearly revenue from 
Czechoslovak arms sales outside the Warsaw 
Pact amounted to approximately $ 500 million, 
which was one third to one half of total Czecho-
slovak export revenue. Exports then started to 
decrease. In 1989, Czechoslovakia had a 1.5% 
share in global conventional arms exports. 
In that same year, Czechoslovakia exported 
conventional arms totalling $ 543 million, 
$ 256 million of which was destined for devel-
oping countries. According to SIPRI, Czechoslo-
vakia is seventh on the world list of leading 
exporters of major conventional weapons with a 
total value of arms exports in the period 
1986-90 of $ 2 408 million. It should be noted, 
however, that its arms industry is far more 
dependent on exports than the arms industries 
of its major competitors, which all have a con-
siderable home market. Until now, the largest 
export customer by far has always been the 
Soviet Union. Other traditional customers are 
India, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Syria, Iraq, Iran, 
Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Libya, very few 
of them being reputed for their purchasing 
power. It is said that Czechoslovakia has not 
received cash for any arms sold to the third 
world since 1985. These customers bought their 
weapons with long-term government credits. 
23. Apart from the licence-produced T-55 and 
T-72 tanks, the Aero L-39 Albatros basic and 
advanced jet trainer is prominent among 
Czechoslovakia's export successes. The Albatros 
flew for the first time in 1968 and series pro-
duction started in late 1972. It is the standard jet 
. ' 
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Value of exports of major weapons by Czechoslovakia, 1981-90 2 
Figures are S/PRI trend-indicator values, as expressed in US $m, 
at constant (1985) prices 
Recipient 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total 
USSR .............. 373 373 373 373 373 373 373 373 259 259 3 500 
Iraq ................ 107 98 79 79 79 38 38 38 19 0 573 
Iran ................ 0 0 0 0 0 44 44 44 98 23 253 
Ethiopia ............ 0 0 0 44 8 16 16 57 29 29 199 
German DR ........ 41 39 39 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 145 
Syria ............... 30 30 30 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 119 
Cuba ............... 0 0 37 37 37 0 0 0 0 0 111 
Vietnam ............ 0 93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 
Nigeria ............. 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 89 
Romania ............ 18 12 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 
Libya ............... 7 7 8 33 0 15 0 0 0 0 71 
Algeria .............. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 0 59 
Afghanistan ......... 7 7 0 7 0 11 11 7 0 0 52 
Bulgaria ............ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 37 
Poland .............. 0 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 
Congo .............. 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
Ghana .............. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 10 
TOTAL ............ 583 664 644 634 497 497 570 548 437 355 5 429 
2. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by lan Anthony, Oxford University Press 1991. 
trainer for the Soviet and many other air forces 
and it is also being produced in a ground attack 
and reconnaissance version. The Albatros has 
been exported to at least 13 foreign nations and 
to date more than 2 000 have been built. 
24. An upgraded version of this trainer, the 
L-59, now being built, will be equipped with an 
integrated fire control system, allowing for live 
firing. According to Omnipol, Czechoslovakia's 
main export organisation, it has good sales pros-
pects in Egypt, Libya and possibly Iran. 
Omnipol also hopes to obtain United States 
approval to fit the. L-59 with a United States 
built engine and avionics system, which would 
enable it to compete in the United States Air 
Force future trainer programme. 
25. Other well-known export products are 
the TESLA airport radar equipment, the self-
propelled multiple launch rocket system on an 
armoured Tatra 813 (8 x 8) chassis, the 
Skorpion machine pistol and the 7 5 model 
9 mm pistol which is even used by the United 
States police. 
26. The DANA, a 152 mm self-propelled 
howitzer mounted on a Tatra 815 (8 x 8) truck 
chassis deployed by the Czechoslovak army, has 
been exported to Libya and Poland. 
27. The industrial plastic explosive Semtex, 
frequently used by terrorist groups, is too well-
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known as an export product to be mentioned in 
detail here. 
V. The future of arms exports 
28. Under communist rule, where political 
considerations always held sway over economic 
performance, arms exports were a means of 
forcing political influence in the world-wide 
battle against capitalism. 
29. For a long time, arms were often provided 
free or on long-term credit in the framework of 
military assistance agreements. Later, when a 
growing need for foreign currency and raw mate-
rials gained ground, commercial principles 
played an increasing role in arms exports and 
arms had to be paid for in hard currency or were 
bartered against strategic raw materials. 
30. But arms exports had barely started to 
promise a profitable source of income when 
radieal changes in East-West relations at the end 
of the 1980s caused a general movement 
towards arms control and disarmament, 
formalised in the CFE treaty. Especially in 
Central and Eastern Europe the demand for new 
arms collapsed completely, the more so because 
these countries were aware that the arms race 
had even further eroded their already crippled 
economies. Developing countries, the other tra-
ditional export market for Central European 
arms manufacturers, are in such a state of bank-
ruptcy that arms are and must be their lowest 
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priority. Moreover, some countries such as 
Brazil, Singapore, South Korea and others are 
serious competitors with attractive prices on a 
leaner arms market. 
31. The velvet revolution and the advent of a 
new government did not facilitate the national 
defence industry's export prospects. 
32. In accordance with their long-standing 
tradition of non-violence, the leaders of the new 
federal government, desirous to give the world a 
clear sign that a new Czechoslovakia was taking 
its seat in the concert of nations in 1990, made it 
known that it wished to reduce arms exports and 
that as a first step no weapons would be sold to 
areas of tension. At the same time, it announced 
that much of the defence industry would be con-
verted to civilian production. Soon, however, it 
was forced to recognise that the economic and 
political situation in the country did not allow it 
to live up to these sincere and lofty ideals. 
33. Prospects of political and social unrest in 
the regions most touched by a possible sudden 
breakdown of the defence industry led to recon-
sideration of government policy. 
34. A first incentive for arms export contracts 
was the country's search for the hard currency it 
needed for the conversion of its arms industry. 
Secondly, it was also obliged to eliminate large 
quantities of the heavy weapons in its national 
armed forces' inventory as stipulated in the CFE 
treaty. Last but not least, there was an urgent 
demand from the Slovak authorities to allow 
exports of heavy arms for the near future in 
order to allow its defence industry a more 
gradual transition towards civilian production, 
thus preventing additional political and social 
unrest. 
35. In the same year, 1990, Omnipol agreed 
to sell approximately 1 500 T-55 tanks to Iran. 
According to some Czechoslovak sources, it had 
also started negotiations with Iran to build an 
assembly line in Iran to manufacture the T-55. It 
seems, however, that negotiations on both issues 
have not led to a contract being signed. 
36. When Jiri Dienstbier, the Czechoslovak 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Iran in 
March 1991, his hosts told him they were inter-
ested in the procurement ofT -72 tanks and mis-
siles. The government's policy to limit arms pro-
duction and not to export arms to crisis areas 
was an obstacle to this deal. This same policy 
has prevented an agreement to sell 200 tanks to 
Pakistan. It should be said that Poland, less 
catholic this time, then seized this opportunity 
to deliver the number of tanks solicited. 
3 7. The proposal to sell 300 T -72 tanks to 
Syria produced a national political storm. The 
government argued that such arms exports were 
virtually the only means of obtaining the hard 
currency it needed to convert an estimated 700 
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military factories to civilian production. On the 
other hand, the authorities hinted that they could 
cancel the tank sale to Syria in exchange for sub-
stantial United States conversion financing. 
38. It has been said that both the United 
States and Israel have urged Prague to halt the 
tank transaction to Syria 3, but there is no 
official confirmation of such contacts, nor if a 
quid pro quo agreement was reached. 
39. On 9th October 1991, the Czechoslovak 
Government suspended its sales of heavy 
weapons to Middle East countries including 
Syria, pending the international peace con-
ference on that region. Officially, this measure 
also covered the planned export ofT -72 tanks to 
Syria, but the Slovak Government seems to be 
determined to implement the original contract 
in one way or another. 
40. In May 1991, the Czechoslovak author-
ities cleared Semtex, the well-known Czech 
plastic explosive manufactured by the Synthesia 
Company in Sentim, for export sales. This hap-
pened after an international team of chemists 
had devised a chemical additive to make it more 
easily detectable by airport devices. Names of 
purchasers of Semtex will be kept strictly secret, 
but Synthesia insists that it will maintain strict 
control over end users. 
VI. Con,ersion in Czechoslo,akia 
41. As early as 1988, the then Communist 
Government of Czechoslovakia announced 
measures to reduce its military potential in the 
framework of unilateral Warsaw Pact initiatives 
to stimulate early results in the forthcoming 
CFE negotiations in Vienna. Inter alia, it 
planned to reduce military production by 16 % 
in 1989 and a further 25 % in 1990. In May 
1989, it adopted a resolution expressing the 
need to expand civilian production at the 
expense of military production. 
42. With the new government that came into 
power after the velvet revolution, conversion 
became inevitable because of the new Czecho-
slovak military doctrine aiming at sufficient 
defence at reduced cost. The structure of the 
armed forces is to be changed in order to make 
the best use of existing resources, while the 
quality of equipment is to be improved. At the 
same time, the government declared that it is 
not prepared to spend a single penny on heavy 
weaponry for years to come. An additional 
reason for conversion is that the new gov-
ernment wants to end the production of heavy 
armour and the indiscriminate export policy of 
its communist predecessor. 
43. Moreover, it was believed that the heavy 
arms industry is consuming large quantities of 
3. International Herald Tribune, 20th October 1991. 
raw materials and energy, both of which are 
being imported from the Soviet Union, which is 
now becoming an unreliable source, as was 
proved recently when energy deliveries were 
heavily cut. According to the government, scarce 
raw materials and energy should be used rather 
to improve the standard of living through 
civilian production and exports of civilian 
products. 
44. In the federal budget for 1990, 1.5 billion 
koruna was allocated for direct conversion pro-
grammes. Arms manufacturing companies were 
asked to submit their own schemes for civilian 
production programmes with an application for 
government financial support. 
45. In September 1991, from a total of over 300 
schemes submitted, the federal Ministry of the 
Economy selected 127 schemes which will obtain 
financial support. Slovak companies will obtain 
1.2 billion koruna, while the remaining 300 
million koruna will go to Czech companies. 
46. On top of the 1.5 billion koruna for direct 
conversion programmes, the federal government 
released 2.6 billion koruna in 1990 to resolve 
other problems related to conversion, in par-
ticular to help companies eliminate huge stock-
piles and machinery which has become useless, 
although not obsolete. The huge stockpiles now 
still being accumulated by some companies are a 
consequence of the centrally-planned economy. 
Under the old economic system, raw materials 
and semimanufactured products had to be 
ordered eighteen months or more in advance. 
The sudden reduction in production levels left 
many with large stockpiles which are often still 
increasing due to fixed long-term contracts. 
Stockpiles are now being sorted out. Materials 
that can still be used will be sold at residue price 
and the rest will be destroyed. 
47. In order to give an indication of the char-
acter of the conversion effort, some of the 
projects retained are mentioned here. 
48. ZTS Martin, the largest arms manufac-
turer in Slovakia, which employed more than 
11 000, obtained a 406 million koruna state 
subsidy in 1990. One programme employing 350 
envisages the production of bulldozers in 
co-operation with the German firm Hanomag. 
Another programme is preparing the production 
of water-cooled diesel engines in co-operation 
with an Italian company and will employ 650. 
Lorries may be produced in co-operation with 
an American company at the Podpolianske 
strojarne Detva. This company signed an 
agreement with the Italian firm Cesab on the 
production of diesel-engined forklifts and is 
negotiating the production of shafts and spindles 
with the American firm Canon. At the same 
time, Martin is continuing its efforts to attract 
foreign capital and the participation of foreign 
firms in the framework of privatisation. 
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49. ZTS Dubnica nad V ahom, the second 
largest arms producer in Slovakia, mainly of 
combat vehicles, has decided to extend the 
production of hydrostatic gear-boxes in 
co-operation with the Swedish firm Sauer-
Sandstrom. It has also developed the technology 
for producing snow vehicles and snow scooters. 
The production of forklift trucks in the 5 to 10 
ton range is now starting and there is a pro-
gramme to produce excavators. 
50. A relatively small part of arms production 
will be maintained because it is considered to 
be vital for the defence capability of the state 
or because it still provides export opportu-
nities without producing seriously offensive 
weapons systems. This includes the production 
of ammunition, radio and other electronic 
equipment, jet training aircraft, artillery systems 
and small arms. Among the manufacturers of 
these products are AERO Ltd. Praha, Blanicke 
strojirny Vlasim, ZTS Dubnica nad Vahom, 
Tesla Pardubice and Ceska Zbrojovka Uhersky 
Brod. 
VII. The scale of conversion 
51. The rate of the decline in arms production 
and the parallel conversion effort in Czechoslo-
vakia should not be underestimated. In 1987-88, 
when arms production was at its highest peak, 
its value was 29 billion koruna. It is expected 
that the 29 billion koruna of arms production in 
1988 will fall to only 4 billion koruna in 
1992. 
52. The Slovak Republic in particular is 
affected. While in 1988 the total Slovak arms 
production was 19.3 billion koruna, it was 9 
billion koruna in 1990 and only 5 billion in 
1991. It is expected that in 1992 there will be an 
output of 1.4 billion koruna, or only 7.2% of the 
1988 production. 
53. According to the federal Ministry of the 
Economy, the number of jobs in the arms 
industry will fall from 100 000 in 1988 to an 
estimated 15 to 20 000 in 1993. In some regions, 
particularly in Slovakia, where the arms 
industry is the only employment generator, 
unemployment will seriously affect the pur-
chasing power of the entire population and 
cause an additional crisis in other branches of 
economic activity such as the service sector. 
54. However serious the situation may be in 
the near future, the existing overcapacity leaves 
the government and the arms industry no 
choice. In some companies, arms production 
dwindled by 80 %. It is said that in ZTS Martin, 
the heavy arms manufacturer with more than 
11 000 employees, 10 % of the employees is 
responsible for 60 to 70 % of total production, 
generating more than 90 % of the profit. One 
may wonder if profit is the appropriate word to 
be used in this case. 
DOCUMENT 1289 
55. In general, the governments of both the 
Czech and the Slovak Republics agree that con-
version of the defence industry is inevitable and 
urgent. Slovakia, however, has criticised the 
pace at which conversion is being imposed by 
the federal government. Its economy is far more 
dependent on the arms industry, which in some 
regions is virtually the only primary source of 
income for an overwhelming part of the popu-
lation. It is afraid that an all too sudden decline 
in arms production at a time when alternative 
civilian production is not yet possible might 
disrupt the social and political structure of the 
Slovak Republic, thus opening a door to radical 
political movements wishing to destabilise the 
country to their own advantage. 
VIII. Economic reform 
56. Mter early hesitation, Czechoslovakia 
launched its economic reform policy on 1st 
January 1991, the last of the Triangle countries 
to do so. This is progressing in such areas as 
price liberalisation, monetary reform and the 
limitation of subsidies, while in others, to name 
only corporate law, bankruptcy, privatisation 
and financial institutions, it has not yet really 
got into its stride. 
57. The control of inflation is one of the early 
successes. While at the start of 1991 price 
liberalisation produced a steep rise, the situation 
has now stabilised and according to Vaclav 
Klaus, the Finance Minister, the inflation rate is 
at a level comparable to that of other European 
nations. Here, a tight incomes policy has made 
an important contribution. It should be noted 
that the population has accepted a drop in pur-
chasing power of 30 % without too much grum-
bling. 
Monthly 
increase 
in 1991 
Inflation under contro/4 
Annual increase 
in retail 
prices 
1991 
-0.10% 0% 
February March Apnl May June July August 
4. Source: Le Monde, 1st October 199L 
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58. Another success was the stabilisation of 
the exchange rate. After a 100 % devaluation in 
relation to western currencies in 1990, the 
koruna's exchange rate has now stabilised very 
close to the black market rate of five western 
currencies. 
59. Many structural reforms still remain to be 
done. Ownership law has been redefined, but 
continuing discussions on the restitution of 
nationalised property have delayed its intro-
duction. The commercial code has not been 
revised. In industry, important changes are still 
awaited. 
60. The bankruptcy law came into force on 
1st October 1991. So far, very few state com-
panies have closed their doors or dismissed their 
employees. Many continue to operate thanks to 
mutual credit agreements. In fact there is a 
hyperindebtedness among state companies 
which allows them to survive artificially for 
some time. It is, however, a dangerous potential 
source of inflation which will sooner or later 
create tremendous problems for the gov-
ernment. 
61. Fiscal reform should lead to the intro-
duction of the VAT by 1st January 199 3. 
Because of slowness in reforming the fiscal 
system, foreign investors have been reluctant to 
move. According to the Central Bank, Czecho-
slovakia has absorbed $600 million in foreign 
investments during the first half of 1991, this 
being the equivalent of 3 to 4% of the GDP. 
IX. Privatisation 
62. Privatisation, an essential part of the gov-
ernment's economic reform, only just started in 
1991. In Czechoslovakia, the private sector has 
always been less important than in Hungary and 
Poland. Before the velvet revolution, 97 % of 
total production was in government control. 
63. The so-called small privatisation has been 
under way since the beginning of 1991. It is said 
that until now more than 10 000 shops, restau-
rants and small industrial companies have been 
sold. The government's aim is to sell 100 000 
economic units to the private sector. 
64. Czechoslovakia has now started to 
privatise large companies. A company should 
take the initiative of choosing one of four 
options: selling itself to foreign partners, 
turning to the stock exchange, distributing 
shares to employees, or using the voucher 
method (see paragraphs 68-69). Some 1 776 
large companies are to present their plans for the 
future for approval before 31st October 1991 
and the second batch of 1 118 companies should 
follow before 31st May 1992. 
65. Recently, however, the Minister for 
Privatisation of the Czech Republic announced 
that this privatisation programme was being 
delayed to make sure it was prepared properly. 
Originally scheduled to start in January 1991, it 
is now unlikely to start before March. 
66. Approval should be obtained from the 
ministry which owns the company, the Ministry 
for Privatisation and the " Fund responsible for 
national wealth". It is still questionable, 
however, whether enough reliable experts can be 
found to handle all requests. 
67. The defence industry will be privatised 
only in the last resort. No final decisions have 
yet been taken as to which part of this industry 
will remain under state control. Some larger 
companies may be divided into sections in order 
to allow partial privatisation. 
68. Parallel to privatisation, Czechoslovakia 
will have to modernise its banking system from 
top to bottom. The client-oriented service is 
non-existent and a great deal of red tape will 
have to be eliminated. 
69. Another issue is the new legislation gov-
erning investment funds. As part of the 
privatisation effort, citizens will be able to buy 
investment vouchers. These vouchers entitle 
them to subscribe to shares of individual com-
panies or to shares in special investment funds. 
The government is endeavouring to have all 
privatisation shares distributed by the end of 
1992. 
70. Nobody knows how the investment funds 
will function and many questions still have to be 
settled such as how these funds will be managed 
and if there will also be specific responsibility 
for surveying and advising former state com-
panies so that they may become modem, effi-
cient companies. 
X. Government support programmes 
for the industry 
71. The Czechoslovak industry is now facing 
several problems caused by the lack of flexibility 
of the centrally planned economy and its ina-
bility to react immediately to the needs of the 
market. The greatest problem now is the inferior 
level of the technology of Czechoslovak indus-
trial production, in particular in the consumer 
goods industry. The poor-quality products pro-
vided by an antiquated industry lacking even the 
most basic knowledge in marketing could not be 
competitive on the European or world market. 
This has the inevitable consequence of poor per-
formance on the export market, the complete 
inability to buy in the markets of industrialised 
nations and thus there is ever-increasing under-
development. 
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72. Both the Czech and the Slovak Republics 
agree that economic reform is the only solution 
for the many social and economic problems they 
are facing. The two have different opinions on 
the speed and the degree of progress towards 
economic reform. 
(a) Policy of the Czech Republic 
73. At the end of March 1990, the Czech 
Government published a support programme 
for the development of industrial production in 
the Czech Republic which is aimed mainly at 
support for the creation and development of 
small and medium-sized companies, in par-
ticular in the weakest areas of the existing 
structure of Czech industry. 
74. A state subsidy will be granted to citizens 
whose projects, in accordance with the criteria 
set out in the programme, are accepted in a com-
parative test. Projects should contribute to 
reducing the consumption of energy and mate-
rials, to better use of the country's raw material 
resources and to increased performance and 
competitiveness of industrial production. 
Among the remaining criteria are the creation of 
new jobs and a positive environmental contri-
bution. Candidates should guarantee a majority 
participation in funding the project. Accepted 
projects will have advantages such as a 
three-year interest-free loan, a non-reimbursable 
allowance up to 20 % of the cost, reimbursement 
of the cost of a bank credit, a tax reduction and a 
state guarantee of up to 70% for bank credits. 
Several hundred applications have now been 
submitted and they are being examined by 
experts. 
(b) Policy of the Slovak Republic 
75. However, while the Czech Republic is in 
full agreement with the shock therapy chosen by 
the federal government, a number of Slovak 
economists are not. They argue that the basic 
conditions of the Slovak economy are different 
from those in the Czech Republic, referring to 
the following specific odds: 
- Slovak industries are mainly concerned 
with processing imported raw materials 
such as petrol, iron ore and non-ferrous 
metals; 
- the triple devaluation of the koruna has 
strongly limited Czechoslovakia's 
import ability and this had a far more 
direct negative influence on Slovakia's 
industry than on the Czech industry 
which is mainly manufacturing con-
sumer products; 
- the major part of the federation's arms 
industry, now confronted with a radical 
conversion programme affecting more 
than 80 000 employees, is located in the 
Slovak Republic. 
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76. But there is more. In the Czech Republic 
including Bohemia and Moravia, with 10.3 
million inhabitants, unemployment in May 
1991 was 92 000 or 1.9 o/o of the labour force. In 
Slovakia with a 5.2 million population, including 
53 000 Czechs and 560 000 Hungarians, unem-
ployment in May 1991 was 130 000 people or 
5 o/o of the labour force with a daily increase of 
one thousand unemployed since June this year. 
77. The price of food in Slovakia is on 
average 4 o/o higher than in the Czech Republic, 
while consumer goods in Slovakia are even 13 o/o 
more expensive. 
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78. As the economic reform gathers mo-
mentum, the creation of new industrial activity 
appears to be limited and unemployment is 
increasing twice as fast as in the Czech Republic. 
This is causing a sharp decline in the 
population's purchasing power, which in turn 
has a negative influence on the marketing of new 
products. Social and political problems are the 
result of this downward spiral. 
79. As pointed out in earlier chapters, 
Slovakia's main concern is its arms industry 
with 80.000 employees. Since the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact, it has been deprived of 90 o/o 
of its market in Eastern Europe. Other regular 
consumers such as Syria and Iran are still willing 
to buy heavy arms, but this is causing a political 
upheaval and recently the federal government 
stopped heavy arms exports to the Middle East, 
5. Source: Le Monde, 1st October 1991. 
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a decision which the Slovak Government con-
tested by all possible means. 
80. Apart from the arms industry, the Slovak 
building industry is also seriously affiicted and it 
is said that 30 o/o of the workers in this sector will 
soon be unemployed. It goes without saying that 
the suppliers of this industry will suffer the same 
fate. 
81. All this, Slovak economists say, combined 
with the strict austerity policy of the federal gov-
ernment, could lead to an outright disaster. In 
short, they plead for an active employment 
policy by the government, which means main-
taining and stimulating industries with good 
chances for the future and creating new jobs by 
supporting investments in both the production 
and services industry. In particular they strongly 
advocate rapid action in the following: 
- solving the problem of company insol-
vency; 
- creating regional employment pro-
grammes; 
- establishing rules to stimulate the 
employment of graduates, which would 
also prevent a brain drain from Slo-
vakia. 
82. Until now, this partly-justified criticism has 
not led to new decisions and a determined policy 
on the part of the Slovak Government, mainly due 
to lack of funds and the difficulty in reaching 
agreement with the federal government. It is to be 
hoped that no precious time will be wasted ; only 
an early dynamic approach will help. 
XI. C:;.echoslo,akia's economic results 
and prospects 
83. Understandably, in many respects 1990 
was a disastrous year for the Czechoslovak 
economy. The old communist economic system 
collapsed while new market relations only grad-
ually started to emerge. The management of 
companies was changed radically and large eco-
nomic units were split up into smaller ones. 
There were many uncertainties about property 
and the best way to organise privatisation. 
84. There was just as much trouble in external 
trade relations. Comecon disintegrated and the 
economic situation in the Soviet Union, tra-
ditionally Czechoslovakia's most important 
trading partner, continued to deteriorate. At the 
moment, the Soviet Union has a debt of approx-
imately $5 billion in its trade with Czechoslo-
vakia. Both these developments led to the loss of 
important export markets and problems in the 
provision of fuel and raw materials. Other 
important export markets virtually disappeared 
when the GDR ceased to exist and a trade 
embargo was proclaimed against Iraq. 
85. The main economic indicators for the 
first half of 1991 are bad. On average, industrial 
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production was down 17 %, while the unem-
ployment rate went up 5 %. Consumer prices 
went up almost 50 % after the price liberalisation 
on 1st January 1991. It is encouraging, however, 
that the transition to a market economy did not 
cause any significant social unrest and that, for 
the time being, inflation is under control at a 
level comparable to the Western European 
average rate. 
XII. Czechoslovakia's economy 
86. It is expected that by the end of 1991 the 
Czechoslovak balance of payments will have a 
deficit of$ 2.5 billion. 
87. The communist government was quite 
careful not to increase the national debt beyond 
the country's resources. While in the period 
1985-89 the debt increased from $ 2.6 billion to 
$ 7.9 billion, it is expected to increase to a rela-
tively modest $ 8. 7 billion by the end of 
1991. 
88. In January 1991, the IMF approved 
Czechoslovakia's economic reform programme 
and granted a loan of $ 1. 7 billion. At the same 
time, the EC granted a $ 500 million loan and 
the World Bank a$ 450 million loan. 
89. In the Czech Republic, the total value of 
privatised property is estimated at 550 billion 
Czech koruna. Privatisation concerns 1 321 
companies of the Czech Ministry of Industry. Of 
these, more than 150 have made progress in 
their negotiations with foreign partners. 
90. In 1990, federal expenditure for defence 
and security was slashed by 12 % compared to 
1989. Part of the savings were a reduction of 
military service from 24 to 18 months and from 
19 to 12 months for conscripts with higher edu-
cation certificates. 
91. Also in 1990, subsidies to economic 
organisations such as co-operative agricultural 
establishments were cut by 10 %. The gov-
ernment is also considering economies in 
research and development. 
92. The government's restrictive policy 
regarding subsidies for industrial activity has 
caused serious financial problems for a number 
of companies. It has been clearly stated, 
however, that companies should solve these 
problems preferably by mobilising internal 
reserves, with bank credits or by bond issues. 
XIII. Hungary's defence industry 
93. As compared to Czechoslovakia and 
Poland, the capabilities of Hungary's national 
defence industry are rather limited. A number of 
defence manufacturers are concerned with the 
production of hand weapons, guns and ammu-
nition, in particular the companies FeG (arms 
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and machinery), Danuvia, Diosgyori Gepgyar, 
Mechanikai Miivek (mechanical works), Matra-
videki Femmiivek (steelworks of the Matra 
area), and Bakony Miivek. Of these manufac-
turers, Danuvia is no longer existent while FeG 
and Diosgyori Gepgyar are being restructured. 
All the others have practically given up their 
defence manufacturing activities. 
94. There is no aeronautical industry in 
Hungary but the Pest-videki Gepgyar is a main-
tenance establishment for aircraft of the 
national air force. This establishment is in 
financial trouble at the moment because of the 
lack of new maintenance contracts for aircraft 
and helicopters of former Warsaw Pact coun-
tries, once an important source of income. Dis-
cussions to privatise Pest-videki Gepgyar have 
started with a British company interested in 
civil aircraft repair, but these can only be con-
cluded successfully if the new company to be set 
up can guarantee the maintenance and repair of 
the national air force's aircraft. According to 
experts, both these different activities would 
have to be conducted in strictly separate estab-
lishments. 
95. Moreover, the continuation of an auto-
nomous national military aircraft maintenance 
and repair activity is considered to be vital for 
future aircraft replacement. It is said that 
Hungary will have to replace its aging fighter air-
craft by the end of this decade, in which case it 
should have a national industrial establishment 
which could serve as a basis for offset activities. 
96. The truck manufacturers Raba and 
CSEPEL still have the capacity to produce 
heavy trucks for the army in the 5 to 10 tons cat-
egory, but an imminent bankruptcy is jeopar-
dising the very existence of both establishments. 
97. The mechanical works of Godollo, a 
repair shop for the armed forces' armoured cars 
which is also partly responsible for manufac-
turing army vehicles, has already gone bankrupt 
but the managers are arguing that an immediate 
state subsidy for the Godollo mechanical works 
would be cheaper than recreating the same 
capacity at a later stage. 
98. Hungary also has an electronics industry 
which is producing for both the civilian and the 
military market. This industrial activity could 
boast positive results in the era of radio tubes 
until the beginning of the 1960s, but lost its 
competitive edge when it had to comply to 
Soviet licences which were less advanced than 
the Hungarian technology. A microelectronics 
programme, initiated in 1978 to catch up with 
new developments, was not very successful. The 
main national companies in this field, 
Mechanikai Labor Miivek, Finommechanikai 
Miivek and ORlON, are in great trouble now 
and Videoton has started to wind down its activ-
ities. Apart from producing for the military, 
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Videoton used to export electronic goods with 
vintage technology to the Soviet market and 
throughout Eastern Europe, but all this came to 
an end when the importation of these goods 
from third countries was liberalised. It should be 
noted, however, that many of Videoton's skilled 
labourers have found jobs at a consumer elec-
tronics plant taken over by Philips or at a $ 100 
million new electronics component plant built 
by Ford in Videoton's home town. 
99. Notwithstanding this gloomy situation, 
Hungary has managed to create and maintain a 
research capability of world level in certain 
areas of electronics which is believed would 
enable it to play a role in the development of a 
new air defence system, considered as one of the 
major priorities. 
100. Both industry representatives and 
national defence authorities are well aware that 
a national defence industry, due to the limited 
needs of the national armed forces, would not be 
cost-effective without considerable export activ-
ities. In this framework it should be noted, 
however, that according to SIPRI's latest world 
list of values of exports of major conventional 
weapons over the period 1981-90, Hungary is 
ranked 48th, as compared to Czechoslovakia 8th 
and Poland 16th. It is noted here that Hungary 
will certainly not have an easy job in trying to 
extend its share ih a leaner international defence 
market where it will meet increasingly aggressive 
marketing practices of other established defence 
industries. 
XIV. Hungary's economic policy 
101. Since 1968, Hungary has already made 
cautious attempts to shift to a market economy 
under its reform-minded communist regime, but 
the pace has been very slow. The new demo-
cratic government has had to take far more 
radical decisions about economic reform and it 
is well known that the main goals of the Hun-
garian economic policy are to curb inflation, 
create a monetary and fiscal balance and 
institute structural reform. 
102. The cut in subsidies for energy prices and 
a further reduction in a number of other sub-
sidies made the consumer price inflation 
increase to 38.9% in June 1991. Since then, the 
inflation rate has declined and it is expected to 
fall towards 20% next year. 
103. Exports to hard currency markets have 
increased by 18 % in both 1990 and 1991. 
Exports to the former Comecon countries 
however are expected to fall by 60 % in 1991, 
and at the moment these represent only 15 % of 
total exports. 
104. Hungary's energy-consuming heavy 
industry is performing very badly at the 
moment, but the declining production and 
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growing unemployment in this sector of the 
economy is partly counterbalanced by the activ-
ities of many small private companies. The gov-
ernment intends to restructure part of the heavy 
industry in order to maintain employment in 
especially hard hit areas of the country. Unem-
ployment is expected to rise to between 300 000 
and 320 000 by the end of 1991. 
105. It should be noted that in the last 18 
months more than 40 000 small private com-
panies have been established. While a few years 
ago, the private sector as a whole accounted for 
approximately 10% the nation's GDP, some 
experts now estimate it at about 50% of GDP. 
This is more than the 25 % reflected in official 
statistics, but these experts point to the fact that 
a large part of the private sector's activities is 
not yet covered by official statistics. 
106. Unlike Czechoslovakia and Poland, 
Hungary rejects any system to distribute own-
ership of state companies among the population 
through vouchers or otherwise. With a few spe-
cific exceptions, privatisation is taking place 
through the classic method of sale to new 
owners. 
107. A first centralised privatisation pro-
gramme, launched in 1990, turned out to be a 
failure, and this year, a simplified method, 
called" self-privatisation" has been introduced. 
The State Property Agency has drawn up a list of 
approved privatisation consultants. Companies 
can choose a consultant from this list, but apart 
from that they are expected to find private 
investors on their own. This new system of self-
privatisation is being applied for a first group of 
343 small state enterprises and this number 
could be extended to 900 in the coming 
months. 
108. At the moment, approximately one-tenth 
of Hungary's 2 000 state-owned enterprises have 
been fully or partly privatised, representing 4 % 
of GDP. This last figure is expected to rise to 
14% by mid-1992. 
109. Among the Triangle countries, Hungary 
appears to be the most attractive country for 
foreign investors. While in 1990 it attracted 
$ 300 million in foreign investments, in the first 
nine months of 1991 these investments totalled 
around $ 800 million and the central bank 
expects this amount to increase to more than $ 1 
billion by the end of this year. The Hungarian 
Government has now published a list of stra-
tegic companies in which foreign control would 
not be permitted and this clarification has to 
define the field for action for foreign 
investors. 
110. As is the case in the other Triangle coun-
tries, many companies need more than foreign 
investments; they also need management skills, 
technology and marketing channels. 
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XV. Arms production in Poland 
111. Poland started to establish the basis of its 
existing defence industry shortly after the first 
world war. The first combat aircraft were built 
in 1921 and in the same early 1920s arms manu-
facturing companies like MESKO in Skarzysko 
Kamienna, Lucznik in Radom and Pronit in 
Pionki were established. Other defence indus-
tries, later established in the framework of the 
central industrial area, were the steelworks at 
Stalowa Wola and the electronics industry PZL-
Rzeslow. Also dating from the years before the 
second world war are the well-known 
mechanical industries Bumar-Labedy, now pro-
ducing tanks and artillery trucks, and PZL 
Wola, part of the aerospace industry. 
112. Mter the second world war, existing 
defence manufacturers were enlarged and some 
new ones were created. In the framework of 
burden-sharing and division oflabour within the 
Warsaw Pact, Poland started exporting arms, 
mainly to its pact allies, on average the desti-
nation of approximately 80 % of total Polish 
arms exports. Other export destinations were 
third-world countries within the Soviet Union's 
sphere of influence. 
113. Main products of the Polish defence 
industry were landing-craft and small sea-going 
vessels, helicopters, small transport and training 
aircraft and tanks, in particular the T-55 and 
lately the T -72, both licensed by the Soviet 
Union. In fact, most of the Polish arms and 
equipment production was based on Soviet 
licences. Major weapon systems, such as combat 
aircraft, fighting ships and missile systems, had 
to be imported. 
114. During the 1980s, Poland started to 
develop new defence equipment to indigenous 
design such as helicopters, training aircraft, 
and advanced optical and communications 
equipment. Other production includes radio-
location equipment, hand weapons and logistics 
equipment. 
115. According to a well-known concept in the 
former Warsaw Pact, defence manufacturing 
establishments in Poland have a rather large 
capacity, which has never been used to the full. 
116. The aeronautical industry is capable of 
producing several hundreds of small aircraft and 
several hundreds of helicopters per year, with 
the corresponding engines. The tank manufac-
turing industry can turn out each year 350 tanks, 
600 armoured cars and 1 000 tracked vehicles, 
while the ammunition industry has a yearly 
capacity of several hundred thousand artillery 
grenades and several hundred million rounds of 
ammunition for hand weapons. In a number of 
companies, the existing overcapacity for mil-
itary production was used for the civilian 
market. 
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117. For reasons too well-known to be repeated 
here, a steep decline in the demand for military 
equipment both in Poland and on the world 
market started to make itself felt from 1988. 
118. This forced the defence industry to try to 
change from military to civilian production. 
Actually it led to the same wild and rather 
chaotic conversion effort as took place in the 
Soviet Union at that time. Some manufacturers 
extended their existing civilian production of 
domestic appliances and consumer electronics. 
Others made use of their military production 
lines to turn out civilian products. Many 
examples could be given, but most of these 
well-intentioned efforts foundered because of 
the dramatic recession and the almost non-
existent expertise in marketing. 
119. The urgency of restructuring the national 
defence industry is sufficiently illustrated by the 
fact that, during the last few years, the value of 
Poland's defence industry production has 
declined dramatically from $ 3 1 77 million in 
1988 to $ 1 022 million in 1991. In the same 
period, the procurement budget of the Ministry 
of National Defence declined from $ 1 422 
million in 1988 to $ 350.1 million in 1991. 
Clearly a coherent policy was needed, and the 
government took action, as will be seen in the 
next chapter. 
120. In the early eighties, the Soviet Union 
stopped supplying arms to Poland, but by the 
mid-1980s, when the Polish political situation 
seemed to have stabilised, the Soviets resumed 
deliveries of modem weapons. It was then that 
licensed production of the T -72 tank started at 
Labedy in Poland. 
121. Nowadays, most of the products of 
Poland's defence sector are licence-produced 
Soviet designs, such as the T -72 tank at Bumar-
Labedy and the Mi-2 helicopter, built by PZL at 
Swidnik. 
122. On the other hand, the Soviet Union 
allowed very few transfers of advanced military 
technology and the Warsaw Pact allies were not 
allowed to develop their research and tech-
nology base to any extent. 
123. Successful modifications made to Soviet 
designs by the Poles indicate that they would 
have a potential to develop their own domestic 
research and development base to modem 
western standards if resources were made 
available. 
XVI. Polish aviation industry 
124. More should be said here about Poland's 
aviation industry since it is a relatively well-
developed industrial activity, parts of which 
may have good chances of surviving in one form 
or another in a wider European framework. 
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125. In 1982, the activities of the Polish avi-
ation industry came under the control of the 
Ministry of Mechanical Industry. 
126. The PZL (Association of Aircraft and 
Engine Industries) comprises 27 factories, scien-
tific and development units, technical and com-
mercial organisations which at the moment are 
employing approximately 90 000 workers. 
127. Products ofPZL are aircraft, engines and 
equipment of its own design, but there are also 
co-operation and eo-production programmes 
with foreign aircraft manufacturers in both East 
and West such as Antonov, Mil, Ilyushin, and 
Piper. 
128. Aircraft manufacturing in Poland started 
as early as 1910 and since then thousands of air-
craft have been delivered. As an example, 
mention should be made of the Soviet-designed 
Antonov AN-2 workhorse of which PZL Mielec 
has manufactured more than 11 200 under a 
licence agreement. 
129. Currently, the latest military aircraft of 
Polish design is the PZL 1-22 lryd, a two-seat 
advanced jet trainer reconnaissance and light 
close support aircraft with day/night and bad 
weather capability, the prototype of which made 
its first flight in 1985. The PZL-130 Orlik, a 
piston-engined training aircraft performing a 
wide range of training duties, made its first 
flight in 1984. Later, a turboprop version was 
developed for the export market. 
130. The most successful company of the 
Polish aviation industry is probably PZL 
Swidnik, which mainly manufactures heli-
copters and employs about 10 000 people. It has 
built large numbers of Soviet-designed Mil Mi-1 
and Mi-2 helicopters under licence. PZL 
Swidnik got the exclusive right to develop, 
produce and market it in several different ver-
sions. More than 5 000 have been produced 
since the beginning of series production in 1965. 
131. At the moment, the showpiece is the PZL 
Sokol, an all-Polish design developed since the 
late 1970s. Fitted with two Polish-developed 
turboshaft engines, the Sokol accommodates a 
crew of two and 12 passengers or a maximum of 
2 100 kg internal cargo. 
132 Recently, in a major move to reduce 
Poland's reliance on Soviet equipment, it has 
fielded two new helicopters based on the PZL 
W-3 Sokol. 
twin GSh-23 cannon and stub-wing mounted 
AT -6 Spiral missiles or 80 mm rocket pods. 
135. A smaller new model is the PZL-Kania, a 
new light utility helicopter powered by two 
Allison 250-C20B turboshaft engines. The 
standard passenger version provides seating for 
1 pilot and 9 passengers. Converted for cargo, it 
is capable of carrying up to 1 200 kg of cabin 
load. Different other configurations of the PZL-
Kania are on offer. 
136. On the other hand, there are clear signs 
that Poland wishes to be associated with western 
helicopter industries. The Polish Air Force, 
which has a requirement to replace its Mil Mi-8s 
in transport helicopter regiments, is said to have 
selected the Bell 412 and the Sikorsky S-70L 
Black Hawk as possible candidates. There are 
rumours that PZL-Swidnik would like to 
produce the S-70 under licence. 
XVII. Conrersion in Poland 
137. In 1988, when the Warsaw Pact made 
public important unilateral measures to reduce 
its arms potential, the Polish Government took 
initiatives to convert some of its arms pro-
duction lines to civilian production. This early 
conversion effort was especially focused on arms 
manufacturing factories where existing 
machinery and production lines could easily be 
adapted for civilian production. 
138. In this framework, the Bumar-Labedy 
heavy armour factory decided to produce fork-
lifts, cranes and other lifting equipment, to be 
used in construction and the mining industry. 
However, this civilian production had barely 
started when a deep recession affected both con-
struction and the mining industry and the 
demand for new equipment fell almost to 
zero. 
139. More examples of this rather improvised 
early conversion effort could be given, recalling 
that the general recession in Eastern Europe rad-
ically changed the situation, raising serious 
problems for the converting arms manufac-
turers. 
140. In other specific cases a combination of 
various factors left no chance of survival for 
large companies producing partly for the 
defence industry and partly for the civilian 
market. 
133. One is the Anakonda search and rescue 141. Such is the case for the FUM ball-bearings 
version which completed its service trials in factory at Ostrzeszow, established in 1969 to 
June. It is expected that a total of 12 Anakondas serve the Soviet mechanical industry. In the top 
will replace the Soviet Mil Mi-14 PS helicopters production year 1989, when it had 1 600 
currently in service with the Polish naval avi- employees, FUM produced 650 000 bearings, 
ation. 580 000 of which were exported to the Soviet 
134. The other is the Salamandra assault Union. Half of the total production of this 
version with equipment developed from the largest ball-bearings factory in Europe was made 
Soviet Mi-24 Hind such as a fuselage-mounted for the defence industry. Since January 1991, 
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when Central and Eastern European countries, 
then still united in Comecon, decided to drop 
the " transferable rouble ", the accounting cur-
rency formerly used between these countries, 
and use hard currency, no new orders came in 
from the Soviet Union. The recession in Poland 
itself caused a dramatic decline in domestic 
orders. Conversion of the factory in order to 
produce for western markets would have 
required such huge investments in machinery, 
while marketing know-how was non-existent, 
that this idea had to be rejected. At the moment, 
FUM still has 700 employees, but only 100 are 
at work and the factory will soon have to be 
closed. 
142. Meanwhile, the new Polish Parliament 
passed a resolution, stating that Poland, as· an 
independent sovereign nation, should have a 
national defence industry capable of providing a 
range of arms and ammunition required for the 
protection of the national territory. 
143. The government then decided that all sub-
jects related to the security and defence of the 
nation should be thoroughly reviewed. On the 
one hand, a complete review of the national 
defence doctrine was initiated. On the other 
hand, in 1990, the government set up a com-
mission under the chairmanship of the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade charged with developing a 
concept on the position of the defence industry 
in the nation's industrial structure and keeping 
account of the economic reform taking place. At 
the same time, trade in defence products was to 
be an integral part of this study. 
144. The final conclusions of this commission 
will be submitted to the government by the end 
of 1991, but according to an outline of its likely 
recommendations, the existing 80 defence man-
ufacturers would be organised into three 
groups. 
145. The first group of 8 basic defence manu-
facturers which has been selected provisionally 
would obtain the status of " military state 
factory ". These companies would come under 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade. They would operate under the 
general rules of the market economy, managed 
by a board of directors, nominated by the Min-
istry of Industry and Trade in accordance with 
the Ministries of National Defence and of the 
Interior. There would be no works council in 
these factories and the role of the trade unions 
would be limited. The general activities of these 
companies would be ruled by a statute for 
defence industry companies to be granted by the 
council of ministers. The companies in this 
group and their military products are the fol-
lowing: 
- personal arms and artillery - Metal 
Works Lucznik in Radom and Metal 
Works Tarnow; 
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- ammunition and rockets - Metal 
Works Mesko in Skarzysko Kamienna, 
Home Appliance factory in 
Niewiadow; 
- powder components and rocket pro-
pellant - Synthetics factory Pronit in 
Pionki and Synthetics factory 
Gamrat-Erg in Jaslo; 
- radiolocation equipment - Radwar 
factory in Warsaw; 
- armoured equipment - Bumar-Labedy 
factory. 
These military state factories would maintain 
their present military and civilian production. 
146. The second group would comprise 24 
defence industry companies with the state 
having a majority of shares. This would enable 
the state to have a decisive influence on the 
nature and scale of the military production. 
147. The activity of each of these companies 
would be controlled by a board of directors com-
posed of representatives of the Ministry of 
Privatisation, the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, the Ministry of National Defence, the 
Ministry of Finance, the National Bank of 
Poland and of the employees. These companies 
would be open for foreign capital partici-
pation. 
148. These companies would manufacture 
defence products but they would at the same 
time produce for the civilian market. Among 
others, this group would include: 
- aircraft production and aviation 
equipment: PZL-Mielec, PZL-Swidnik, 
PZL-Rzeszow, PZL- Kalisz, 
PZL-Okecie, PSL-Warszawa 11; 
- electronics and optical electronics: 
Radwar, Unimor, Kasprzak Radio 
factory; 
- ships and ship repairs: North Shipyard 
and Wisla Shipyard. 
Other companies in this group are workshops 
for repair, maintenance and overhaul of defence 
equipment and spare parts manufacturers. 
149. The third group would comprise the 
remaining 48 companies. These companies 
would be completely privatised and no longer 
come under the organisation and responsibility 
of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Their 
production should be completely market-
oriented. Under consideration is the possibility 
of them having to accept a legal obligation to put 
their production capacity at the disposal of 
defence and state security in case of threat, war 
or disaster. If they decided to turn out defence 
products in a period not subject to compulsory 
production, it would be completely at their own 
risk. 
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150. The abovementioned study of all aspects 
of the defence industry, to be submitted to the 
government by the end of 1991, is expected to 
lead to final decisions in the Council of Min-
isters after decisions on the new national 
defence strategy, expected in the first half of 
1992. 
XVIII. Polish arms exports 
151. In the former Warsaw Pact, Poland was 
the third largest arms exporter in the years 
1981-90, but the level of its arms exports has 
always been considerably lower than exports 
from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. 
152. According to the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, in 1988, the last peak year, the total value 
of defence production in Poland, was $3 177 
million, or between 2.4% and 2.6 % of the total 
GNP. The production was meant both for the 
Ministries of National Defence and of the 
Interior and for export destinations. Approxi-
mately 40 % of the total defence production was 
exported in that year, but this was not more than 
1 % of Poland's total exports. 
153. The value of arms exports in 1989 was 
estimated at only $ 188.3 million and at the 
moment, exports have almost come to a com-
plete halt. 
154. Traditionally, an average of 80-90 % of 
Poland's arms exports went to Warsaw Pact 
countries. In recent years, other customers have 
been Angola, Cuba, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
North Korea, Nicaragua, Syria and Vietnam. 
155. Until 1990, all decisions concerning 
Poland's arms exports were the monopoly of 
Cenzin (central engineering management), a 
department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
now the Ministry of Foreign Economic Co-
operation. 
156. In May 1990, it was announced that 
Cenzin would become a partnership with a 
majority share for the government and the rest 
to be owned by the arms industry. The idea was 
to give it the rOle of a more independent trading 
company. In the structure now being prepared, 
arms exports contracts would no longer be 
monopolised by the state, but they would be a 
matter between manufacturers and consumers. 
Nevertheless, all arms sales and exports would 
be subject to state control in accordance with 
strict legislation. 
157. All defence-related products which may 
come under" special trade" have been divided 
into two main categories: military supplies and 
auxiliary equipment. Military supplies cover 
such items as explosives, ammunition, hand-
held weapons, artillery rocket launchers, tanks, 
armed aircraft and helicopters, ships, armoured 
personnel carriers, special communications 
systems, other armoured equipment and sup-
plies for military or armed police use. Auxiliary 
equipment covers items such as communica-
tions systems, radars, engines, construction 
equipment, transport, engineering and logistics 
equipment or other goods manufactured 
according to special specifications but not 
armed. The two remaining categories cover ser-
vices and technology and know-how. 
158. At the moment, all defence-related eco-
nomic activity is still subject to the law of 23rd 
December 1988. This law requires a licence 
granted by the Ministry of Interior for all eco-
nomic activity in the field of production and 
trade of explosives, arms and ammunitions 
within the borders of Poland's territory. 
159. On top of this, a specific licence granted 
by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Co-
operation is required for export activities 
regarding arms, military or police equipment. 
Value of exports of IIUijor wapo1111 by Polluul, 1981-90 6 
Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator values, 
as expressed in US $m., at constant (1985) prices 
Recipient 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total 
USSR ..................... 103 103 99 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 950 
Iraq ....................... 204 68 0 0 20 20 0 0 0 0 312 
India ...................... 0 0 0 0 35 35 0 0 0 0 69 
Libya ..................... 21 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 
Syria ...................... 0 0 21 5 9 0 0 0 0 0 34 
Hungary ................... 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Nicaragua ................. 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
Cuba ...................... 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Czechoslovakia ............ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL ................... 327 181 142 97 158 149 92 92 92 92 1423 
6. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by lan Anthony, Oxford University Press, 1991. 
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An export activities licence can be refused if a 
vital state interest or the defence and security of 
the state are at issue. 
160. Finally, a specific export or import 
licence, also to be granted by the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Co-operation, is required for 
every single transaction. Surveillance, control 
and inspection at the frontier is implemented by 
the customs authorities. 
161. The export control system also concerns 
chemical products, explosives, radioactive ele-
ments and isotopes which can directly or indi-
rectly be used for weapon production. A supple-
mentary control system concerns the export of 
modem technologies and products resulting 
from the application of such products. 
162. All exports of arms and equipment to con-
flicting parties, to countries supporting ter-
rorism or to terrorist organisations are pro-
hibited. Arms embargos decided by inter-
national organisations are strictly observed. 
163. Since the beginning of 1990, Poland is 
having bilateral negotiations with the United 
States and a number of other Cocom member 
states. Bilateral agreements have now been 
signed with Belgium, France and the United 
Kingdom. The ultimate aim of these negotia-
tions for Poland is to be completely removed 
from Cocom's current list of proscribed nations. 
To this end, it has promised to expand its safe-
guard system for controlling end-user destina-
tions in Poland. 
164. In the first phase, which went into effect on 
1st October 1991, the Ministry of Foreign Eco-
nomic Co-operation controls all technology 
imports as listed by Cocom through a system of 
import certificates. The importer is also informed 
that, in case of re-export, the Polish Government 
should first be asked for permission. In the second 
phase, legislation will be introduced in order to 
comply with all other existing international export 
regimes, i.e. the MTCR (missile technology 
control regime), the Australia group, and the NPT 
(non-proliferation treaty). 
165. A draft bill has now been prepared, for 
discussion by the parliament in 1992, which will 
impose a strict import and export control regime 
for all products listed in the abovementioned 
agreements. It goes without saying that the gov-
ernment will only be able to manoeuvre this leg-
islation through parliament if it can make suffi-
ciently clear that Poland would no longer be a 
proscribed country once the new legislation 
comes into force. 
166. Poland takes the view that the future of its 
defence industry is closely related to the chances 
of arms exports. Since Poland's traditional arms 
export market - the Warsaw Pact countries -
has collapsed completely, it is seeking new 
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export markets. At the moment, the government 
is trying to make its national arms production 
and arms exports more competitive. Implicitly, 
it hopes that Western European countries will 
give up some of their traditional export markets 
in favour of the Polish defence industry or at 
least that Poland will obtain a fair chance to 
compete in those markets. 
167. According to the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, the only viable way to save the Polish 
defence industry would be through close 
co-operation with western companies which 
could bring in capital and modem technologies, 
thus allowing this now ailing branch of the 
national industry to develop new products for 
domestic use and export to western markets. , 
168. Some individual defence manufacturing 
companies have found western partners to set 
up production lines for specific civilian 
products. The Radwar factory has a joint 
venture with the American firm Westinghouse 
for the production and marketing of radio-
location equipment for air traffic control. The 
Bumar-Labedy factory is producing heavy 
trucks in a joint venture with Volvo, and 
Polcolor is negotiating now with Thomson CSF 
to conclude a joint venture for the production of 
electronics equipment. 
169. On the other hand, both government and 
parliament agree that Poland should remain self-
sufficient in branches of arms and equipment 
manufacturing in which it has proved expertise. 
Here, the Ministry of Industry and Trade is 
thinking specifically of the production of different 
types of seagoing vessels, helicopters, communi-
cation equipment, tanks, armoured vehicles, 
trucks, trailers, fire control systems and different 
types of anti-armour munitions. 
170. It was stressed that in the future the 
Polish defence industry should preferably 
produce defensive weapon systems. 
XIX. Polish defence expenditure 
171. In 1989, after the major cuts made by the 
new government, Poland spent 500 billion zlotys 
or 23.2 % of its total military expenditure on pro-
curement, including research and development. 
172. In order to indicate the trend, SIPRI pro-
vides the following figures on Polish defence 
spending 7: 
%ofGDP % of total government 
expenditure 
1986 ......... 3.6 8.3 
1987 ......... 3.4 8.5 
1988 ......... 3.0 7.7 
1989 ......... 2.8 6.3 
7. SIPRI Yearbook 1991, page 154. 
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SIPRI estimates that currently the Polish 
defence industry has a dramatic excess capacity 
of 60 to 80 % as a result of lower demand at 
home and abroad. 
XX. Polllnd's economic policy 
173. In its efforts to transform Poland's social-
economic structure, the Polish Government has 
concentrated mainly on two issues: the creation 
of a new legal system and the modernisation of 
the economy. 
174. In the new legal system, parliament has 
adopted the most important laws which will lay 
the foundations for a market economy. 
175. The modernisation of the economy is a 
more complicated issue, but here too important 
progress is being made. 
176. Here, one of the government's main 
objectives is to privatise the economy through 
the promotion of new private entrepreneurship. 
This is thought to bring about changes in the 
substantive structure of industry and foster 
decentralisation and smaller companies as well 
as shape a competitive operating environment. 
177. By far the largest part of the private sector 
is dependent on newly-established enterprises. 
Since 1st January 1990, some 400 000 new 
enterprises have started business. 
178. A large part of Poland's economic pro-
duction is now in private hands as is shown by 
the following mid-1991 percentage sh~re figures: 
trade 75-80% (7-8% in 1989), industry 20% 
(2 % in 1989), construction 43 %, transport 
17%, exports 15%, imports 43%. 
179. In agriculture, which has never been 
collectivised on a large scale, 85% of the pro-
duction is in private hands. It is estimated that 
altogether about 40-45% of the working popu-
lation is employed in the private sector, which is 
responsible for approximately 40% of GDP. 
Apart from the agricultural sector, Poland has 
about two million unemployed and there will be 
many more once a number of large state com-
panies close down for lack of orders and 
financial means. 
180. Meanwhile, the government has recog-
nised that state companies will have to be 
privatised, but not much has been done so far. 
Only recently, the government took a new initi- _ 
ative to promote privatisation. It is said that 
around 8 000 companies, half of them in the 
coming three years, will be released from the 
state's responsibility. The details of this pro-
gramme have not yet been worked out com-
pletely. At the moment, only fifteen large state 
companies have been privatised. 
inflation, remove obstacles to foreign invest-
ment and establish a western-style banking 
system. 
182. Inflation, which reached 2 000 % by the 
end of 1989, is now under relative control and 
for the whole of 1991 the inflation rate is 
expected to be 80-90 %. 
183. One major problem in reshaping the 
economy is that Poland still has considerable 
difficulties in attracting foreign investment. It is 
noted that self-government structures in large 
companies and the trade unions have proved to 
be stumbling-blocks in many negotiations on 
privatisation, joint ventures and take-overs by 
foreign investors. The 1989 law on joint ven-
tures was relaxed considerably in June 1991 and 
the government expects this to have positive 
results in the near future. 
184. In the transitional period, expectations 
that the economic reform would have a negative 
effect on production were largely true. In the 
first half of 1991, industrial production fell by 
10% and investment by 13 %, while unem-
ployment rose to 10 %. 
185. In September 1991, the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
published an action plan indicating sectors that 
can be promoted with relatively modest invest-
ments. It says that in Poland technical and 
financial help should preferably be made 
available for privatising and restructuring state 
companies, banks and selected private com-
panies. The action plan points out that the 
transport sector needs huge investments. Other 
sectors in great need of support are the building 
of houses, development projects in communities 
and cities, tourism and education. The potential 
of Poland's agriculture and agro-industry is 
highly rated and specific support for this vital 
sector is examined in depth. 
186. Finally, the action plan believes that the 
high technology which has been developed in 
the military industry could be used for civilian 
applications. 
187. Through negotiations with the Paris Club 
of creditor governments, Poland has managed to 
shed 50% of its $ 33 billion official debt burden. 
188. In April 1991, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) granted a loan of$ 2.5 billion for a 
three-year period to support Poland's economic 
reform. At the end of September 1991, however, 
the IMF suspended its credit loan to Poland 
because the country was no longer able to meet 
the conditions, which were a strict control of 
government spending and inflation. At that 
time, the Polish Parliament had just decided to 
increase the budget deficit. 
181. Other objectives of the government's 189. Part of the loan was meant to absorb the 
original shock therapy were to reduce rampant increased cost of imported fossil fuel. The Soviet 
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Union, Poland's traditional fuel supplier, is now 
to be paid in dollars while delivering less. This 
forced Poland to buy part of its fuel needs on the 
world market. In September 1991, Poland 
signed a barter trade agreement with the Soviet 
Union to export among other things agricultural 
products in exchange for natural gas. 
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190. In its negotiations with the EC, Poland 
has frequently insisted - as did Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary- on the taking away of as many 
trade barriers as possible, indicating that exports 
to the EC were of vital importance for its eco-
nomic life. The following chart is a clear illus-
tration of this argument: 
Polish trade balance 8 
(January-Augu.st 1991, in '000 million zlotys) 9 
EC Former Other Total Comecon1 trade partners 
Exports ...................... 46024 16104 24 679 86 807 
%share .................... 53.0 18.6 28.4 100.0 
% 2 evolution ............... +24.4 -39.5 - 11.3 -2.5 
Imports ...................... 40684 17 981 27 450 86 115 
o/o share .................... 47.2 20.9 31.9 100.0 
% 2 evolution ............... + 85.4 -44.5 + 61.1 41.0 
Balance ...................... 5 340 -1877 -2 771 692 
1. European members only, including USSR and, until October 1990, also the former GDR. 
2. Compared with the same period last year, at constant prices. 
191. Poland's economic reform programme 
introduced in 1991 included the removal of a 
broad range of import limitations in the belief 
that imported goods would stimulate compe-
tition, which in turn would increase pressure to 
change the structure of production through 
monopolies in the national economy. Polish 
authorities argue that if western markets are not 
soon opened more generously for Polish 
products, they will be forced to take protec-
tionist measures leading to the same autarky as 
had recently caused the collapse of both com-
munism and the national economy. 
192. The EC's fear of imports from Poland and 
the other Triangle countries is paranoid indeed 
if it is realised that in 1990 the convertible cur-
rency exports of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia 
were together the same as those of Hong Kong 
(excluding its re-exports). In the same year, 
Country Battle tanks 
Czechoslovakia ............ 3 035 
Cuts ...................... 1 600 
CFE ...................... 1 435 
Hungary ................... 1 345 
Cuts ...................... 510 
CFE ...................... 835 
Poland .................... 2 850 
Cuts ...................... 1120 
CFE ...................... 1 730 
Germany's exports were five times as large as 
the convertible currency exports of the Soviet 
Union and the six abovementioned Central and 
Eastern European countries. 
XXI. Defence equipment requirements 
of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
193. When considering the defence industry of 
the Triangle countries, the present and future 
defence equipment needs of these countries 
should also be taken into account. 
194. At the moment, each of the Triangle coun-
tries has a surplus of treaty-limited equipment, 
which, according to the CFE Treaty, should be 
reduced. The following table indicates the 
holdings of the individual countries in 
November 1990 when the treaty was signed, the 
cuts required and the 1995 CFE ceilings 9• 
Artillery ACVs Combat Attack 
aircraft helicopters 
3 485 4 359 369 56 
2 335 2 309 24 19+ 
1 150 2050 345 75 
1047 1 720 110 39 
207 20 70+ 69+ 
840 1 700 180 108 
2 300 2 377 654 128 
690 227 194 2+ 
1 610 2150 460 130 
8. Source: GUS Central Statistics Office, Monthly bulletin, August 1991. 
9. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1991, page 423. 
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195. It should be noted, however, that even 
after the implementation of the required CFE 
cuts, much of the remaining equipment will be 
old and ill-suited to the new defence posture 
which is now being implemented. 
196. Nevertheless, these countries have made 
it clear that the acquisition of new equipment 
cannot be a priority as long as the national gov-
ernments are under heavy pressure to provide 
financial means in order to solve huge economic 
and social problems. 
197. An intermediate solution now being nego-
tiated is to acquire surplus spare parts and more 
up-to-date equipment, in particular from 
Germany which has large stocks of the former 
East German People's Army's equipment, but it 
is believed that the negotiations with Germany 
will not lead to very substantive results. The 
items concerned are subject to the same 
restrictive regulations as defence products man-
ufactured in Western Germany and, in addition, 
the question arises of how to reconcile possible 
exports with the Cocom regulations still in force. 
198. One priority problem which cannot be 
solved in the same way is the need to improve 
the air defence network. During the Warsaw 
Pact years, the Triangle countries' air defences 
were designed to fit the needs of the Soviet 
Union. Apparently, this does not meet the new 
requirement of providing proper protection of 
the national airspace. Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland are now co-operating in an effort to 
find collaborative solutions for this and other 
immediate problems. 
199. Considering the present situation with 
extremely tight defence budgets, major restruc-
turing operations of the national armed forces 
and still much uncertainty over their eventual 
tasks and military doctrines, the procurement by 
the Triangle countries of any major weapons 
from western arms manufacturers would be pre-
mature. 
200. A far better procedure would be to make 
these countries' defence authorities familiar 
with all that is inherent in the management of 
armed forces in a democratic nation including 
military doctrines, restructuring of armed 
forces, procurement and relations with the 
defence industry. This would be a task for 
Western European nations through both bi- and 
multilateral contacts, especially since many of 
them are very similar in scale. This would create 
a far more natural and gradual process leading 
to deliberate procurement schemes which might 
better respond to long-term defence needs while, 
it is hoped, using certain national capabilities in 
defence equipment manufacturing. In Chapter 
XXIII some more specific proposals are made 
which may help to institutionalise such con-
tacts. 
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XXII. Cocom (Co-ordinating Committee 
for Multilateral Export Controls) 
201. In November 1989, the Committee which 
was then called the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions of the 
WEU Assembly published an extensive report 
on Cocom 10• Suffice it here to say that Cocom is 
an informal co-ordinating arrangement, the 
members of which are all NATO countries 
minus Iceland plus Japan and Australia. A small 
number of other countries with high-technology 
industries has pledged to conform to Cocom's 
rules. The main objective of Cocom is to 
prevent the eastern bloc from obtaining highly 
sensitive technology from the West, which could 
jeopardise the western alliance's military tech-
nological edge. At the moment, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland are still listed among the 
proscribed countries. 
202. In a recommendation adopted unani-
mously on 7th December 1989, the Assembly 
called for a complete review of the Cocom lists 
with a view to encouraging maximum opportun-
ities for trade. The Assembly also stressed that 
more high technology should be shared between 
East and West. It was thought that this would 
help countries in Central and Eastern Europe to 
modernise their economies and succeed in the 
conversion of their defence industries, for which 
early proposals were then emerging. 
203. Since December 1989, there have been 
many changes. Among the essential changes it 
should be noted that the Warsaw Pact has been 
dissolved completely and that one of the main 
objectives of the Triangle countries is to be asso-
ciated with western defence and security alli-
ances as closely as possible if they cannot be 
made full members. 
204. Meanwhile, Cocom understood that it 
had to react positively to the sweeping changes 
taking place. At a high-level meeting in June 
1990, important decisions were taken to relax 
the existing export control regime. Inter alia, it 
was decided to liberalise controls for the com-
puter, machine tools and telecommunications 
sectors, to delete 38 items from the Cocom 
international industrial list and to start devel-
oping a new " core list " to replace the interna-
tional industrial list. 
205. Moreover, it was decided to further 
liberalise levels of controls and give more 
favourable consideration to " exception requests " 
for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, pro-
vided they adopted Cocom-approved safeguard 
regimes, since these particular countries were 
considered to represent a lesser strategic risk. 
10. Cocom, report submitted on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by Mr. 
Atkinson, Rapporteur, Document 1207. 
• 
i 
i 
l 
206. A new Cocom high-level meeting was 
scheduled for February 1991, but it was post-
poned several times, especially because the 
United States could not make up its mind over a 
further relaxation in the export regime for tele-
communications equipment. 
207. Finally, the meeting took place on 
23rd-24th May 1991 and a new " core list " was 
established including the following categories of 
technologies with important reductions of con-
trolled items in all important technology cate-
gories: 
- electronics: controls were lifted on most 
32-bit microprocessors, all dynamic 
random access memories (DRAMs) and 
semiconductor manufacturing equip-
ment for 2.5-micron integrated circuits. 
The new core list represents a 45 % 
reduction in currently controlled 
items; 
- machine tools: an overall decontrol to 
machine tools with a plus or minus 3 
microns precision; 
- telecommunications: the export of 
fibre-optic cable with transmission 
speeds of 565 megabits per second 
is now allowed to Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland, which compares 
to what is available in most parts of the 
world. However, the export of fibre-
optic cable with transmission speeds 
above 45 megabits per second to the 
Soviet Union is still prohibited by 
Cocom; 
- lasers and sensors: the number of con-
trolled items has been reduced by 60 %, 
but restrictions have been maintained 
on second generation night vision and 
thermal imaging equipment and their 
components; 
- navigation, avionics and aircraft tech-
nology: controls over most civilian air-
craft were lifted, while control was 
reduced on civil air navigation and 
communications equipment. This rep-
resents a reduction of approximately 
50 % in controlled items; 
- marine technology: there is a 30 % 
reduction of the list, and most com-
mercial hydrofoils and surface effect 
ships and certain unmanned sub-
mersible systems will be available; 
- computers: a new parameter called 
" composite theoretical performance " 
was adopted for computers, permitting 
a more accurate measurement of their 
performance and critical capabilities. 
Using the new measurement, Cocom 
will decontrol most personal corn-
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puters, workstations and minicom-
puters. The core list is expected to 
result in up to a 70 % reduction; 
- advanced materials: all but the 
strongest carbon and polymer fibres 
which are used in structural composites 
have been taken from the control list, 
resulting in a 30 % reduction of con-
trolled items; 
- propulsion systems: the controlled 
items have been reduced by 50%; this 
concerns civilian certified gas turbine 
engines, certain marine gas turbine 
engines and some liquid fuel rocket 
engines and technologies. 
208. New measures were taken at the high-level 
meeting to expand the access of three East 
European countries, Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland, to goods on the Cocom list. Over 
the past eighteen months, Cocom has signed 
strategic trade agreements with these countries 
to ensure the effective protection of Cocom-
controlled technology. Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland have all agreed to set up export 
control systems in line with those of the Cocom 
countries. In turn, the three " will be eligible for 
every item on the core list on a favourable con-
sideration basis." Some cases will still have to 
be brought before Cocom, but most will now 
enter the grey area of " national discretion. " 
209. Even if it is true that, according to the 
existing Cocom decisions and strategic trade 
agreements, the Triangle countries will have 
favourable treatment, their technology imports 
are still at the discretion of Cocom or of the gov-
ernments of other nations, which still places 
these countries in a humiliating "beggar's" 
position. 
210. While now a relatively large group of tech-
nology exports to Central and Eastern Europe 
has been liberalised, the export control regime 
for the most highly-advanced, sensitive products 
and technologies included in the core list has 
been strengthened according to the " higher 
fences around fewer products " approach. 
211. It is generally agreed that Cocom, apart 
from maintaining a western technological edge 
in military matters, has also implicitly forced 
the proscribed countries to rely on technologi-
cally less sophisticated and thus less efficient 
equipment in many branches of the civilian 
industry and services which in turn has signifi-
cantly slowed down the economic development 
of these countries. It can be argued that this dra-
matic technological inferiority and economic 
leeway was the communist system's and rulers' 
fault because they wasted energy and resources 
while always giving priority to the military but, 
even if that may be true, such arguments no 
longer make sense. 
DOCUMENT 1289 
212. In the Triangle countries, new democratic 
governments have acceded to power which are 
all involved in a painful process of complete 
economic and social reform. They have deliber-
ately urged and finally succeeded in completely 
dissolving the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. At 
the same time they are changing - one could 
almost say reversing - their military structure 
and doctrine while aiming at association with, if 
not inclusion in, western security alliances. 
213. This all means that the fundamental 
rationale for applying Cocom export controls 
and in particular maintaining these three coun-
tries on the list of proscribed countries has sig-
nificantly altered or even disappeared. Since 
these countries no longer pose any strategic 
threat to the West, Western European nations 
and the United States as united in Cocom 
should not only stop restricting but should 
actively support the flow of new technologies to 
these countries in order to support the political 
and economic changes taking place. 
214. Mr. J. Makarczyk, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of Poland, speaking in The 
Hague on 22nd-23rd May 1991, was right in 
saying that the lunatic economic system based 
on ideology which was imposed upon Central 
and Eastern Europe has caused civilisational ret-
rogression and deprived the former socialist 
world, including the USSR, of access to the 
means of modem advanced technological 
progress, creating the huge civilisation gap 
which is perhaps the main European problem 
that we all face. 
215. A proposal to remove Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland from Cocom's list of pro-
scribed countries should be considered urgently 
and seriously. 
XXIII. IEPG (Independent European 
Programme Group) 
IEPG countries have agreed upon an action plan 
for a more efficient European defence industry, 
including: 
- the pursuit of a transnational open and 
competitive market; 
- a dedicated European co-operative 
research effort, now formalised with the 
establishment of " Euclid ", a common 
defence research and technology pro-
gramme; 
- the encouragement of the developing 
defence industry nations (DDis) 
Greece, Portugal and Turkey. 
219. Arguably, IEPG could offer practical pro-
cedures and a matter-of-fact approach which 
could help the Triangle countries to confront at 
least part of their problems regarding equipment 
procurement and national defence industries in 
a structured framework which is tailored to their 
long-term security and defence requirements. 
220. Having said that, it is worth while quoting 
the communique of the last meeting of IEPG 
Defence Ministers in Brussels on 3rd July 1991. 
Regarding the relation between IEPG and 
EC-WEU it reads as follows: 
" Ministers recognised the profound 
implications of discussions now taking 
place on the future security architecture of 
Europe, and the significant impact these 
could have on the research, development, 
production and trade in defence 
equipment. The unique expertise of the 
IEPG on defence equipment matters 
could be useful to the discussions that are 
taking place in the intergovernmental con-
ference on political union, the European 
Community, and Western European 
Union. The future activities and structure 
of the IEPG is one of the issues linked to 
the outcome of this debate. Ministers 
agreed to exchange information through 
appropriate contacts between the IEPG 
216. In this report, IEPG as a European on the one hand and, on the other hand, 
organisation is singled out because it specifically the European bodies engaged in the elabo-
covers issues which are closely related to a ration of the future European security 
number of problems faced by the defence architecture. " 
industry of the Triangle countries as observed in 221. Clearly, the Ministers see a role for the 
the preceding chapters. IEPG and its main tasks in a future European 
217. The IEPG, consisting of all European security architecture even if they recognise that 
NATO member states except Iceland, has been the IEPG's structure and activities may be 
dealt with in detail in a recent report by this adapted if it is to be integrated in a future all-
committee published in May 1990. IEPG's main embracing European union. This future union, 
objective is to enhance co-operation in defence now being debated very intensively in different 
equipment procurement and thereby to promote forums, may not take shape this year or next 
efficiency and economy in Western Europe's year, but evidently there is an irreversible trend 
armaments industry. towards a political union. A political union 
implies the gradual elaboration and implemen-
218. Following key recommendations of a tation of a common foreign and security policy 
major study of the future of the European and a stronger European defence identity with 
defence industry, the Ministers of Defence of the longer-term perspective of a common 
254 
defence policy as is recognised by even the most 
reluctant participants in the intergovernmental 
conference. 
222. A European identity in security and 
defence will naturally have to be pursued 
through an evolutionary process involving suc-
cessive phases. 
223. It is hoped that, before the end of 1991, 
the EC will sign an association agreement with 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, with the 
explicit intention of preparing their full ~e~­
bership in the foreseeable future, perhaps withm 
the following decade. The preparation of full 
membership should include all aspects of a 
future European union, even if some of them, in 
particular a common foreign and security po~icy 
including a common European defence pohcy, 
may take longer to reach maturity. 
224. Four different activities of IEPG which 
seem to be particularly relevant for the Triangle 
countries are discussed in the following para-
graphs: 
(a) Harmonisation of requirements and equip-
ment co-operation 
225. In their July 1991 communique, 
" Ministers stressed that - in view of the 
new political/military environme~t ~nd 
limited defence budgets - harmomsation 
of requirements and equipment 
co-operation and standardisa~ion we~e 
more important than ever. Notmg that It 
was an uncertain time for the initiation of 
new programmes, Ministers welcomed the 
measures taken to improve procedures. 
These measures are designed to help 
identify opportunities for increa~ed 
co-operation based on common require-
ments and to implement them more effec-
tively." 
226. It should be recalled here that essential 
work in this field is being done by IEPG's Panel 
I. The core of Panel I's work is the equipment 
replacement schedule (E~S) e~e~cise, its p~n­
cipal mechanism fo~ Identifymg pot~n~Ial 
projects for collaboratiOn. The ERS, outhmng 
all the IEPG nations' forward equipment plans, 
is updated annually. It highlights equipment 
areas where prima facie reasons exist . for 
co-operation, that is, where two or more nations 
appear to have broadly similar requ~rements 
with in-service dates (lSD) up to a maximum of 
five years apart. In a following phase, Panel I 
invites nations to comment on the result of the 
ERS review and their subsequent examination. 
The panel will then prepare. a rep?rt to ~ational 
Armaments Directors, which Will outhne the 
equipment areas which appear to offer scope for 
co-operation. A representative of the European 
Defence Industry Group (EDIG) sits in as an 
observer in all Panel I meetings. 
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227. The Triangle countries would be worst 
served with headlong procurement of different 
types of western arms and equipment, not only 
because they lack the financial resources. Their 
procurement schemes should be seen as the 
logical consequence of a defence posture. and 
strategic doctrine which in the longer run will be 
an integral part of common European defence 
policy. 
228. It is recommended that arrangements be 
made for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
to participate in the activities of IEPG's Panel I 
at the earliest possible date. It would allow these 
countries to consider commonality and 
standardisation of their defence equipment at an 
early stage. At the same time it would offer the 
best opportunity to examine in detail the role of 
their national defence industries in a future 
larger framework of European equipment co-
operation. 
(b) Developing defence industries (DD!) and 
Euclid 
229. Even if the defence industries of the Tri-
angle countries, according to their scale and 
range of products, are well developed in many 
respects, there are undeniably some character-
istics in common with what the IEPG calls 
developing defence industries (DDI). These 
characteristics include the following: 
- shortage of advanced technologies and 
modem management techniques; 
- lack of capability for the design and 
integration of arms systems an~ ~ rela-
tively low level of research activity; 
- small domestic market and difficulty in 
finding access to foreign trade markets. 
230. In order to support DDI nations, the 
developed defence industry countries have 
established special information centres for DDI 
countries to give them a possibility of obt~i~i!lg 
contracts. It is recommended that the possibility 
of creating a similar poss~bility for the Tr:i~n~e's 
defence industry be considered, thus facihtatmg 
the implementation of t~eir inte~tion to 
maintain at least part of theu defence mdustry. 
In the programme memorandum of under-
standing for IEPG's military research and tech-
nology programme Euclid, measures. h~ve b~e!l 
included to facilitate the DDI countnes partici-
pation in Euclid projects. Consideration s~ould 
be given to whether,,il:l the ~uture, the ~nan~e 
countries could participate m such proJects m 
the same conditions. 
(c) European session for armaments managers 
231. Since 1989, IEPG member countries have 
offered study programmes lasting several weeks 
twice a year to relevant officials. The a~m of 
these programmes is to favour mutual mfor-
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mation relating to the operation of organisations 
in charge of arms procurement, as well as to 
improve relations between partners who are sup-
posed to work together. They reflect a sincere 
intention on the part of IEPG countries to create 
a European cadre of armaments managers who 
are well acquainted with each other's pro-
curement problems and procedures and who 
know each other personally through intensive 
joint experience, which is also important. 
232. It is proposed here to invite Triangle offi-
cials to these sessions, believing that it could be 
mutually beneficial. 
XXIV. Other European support 
and co-operation agreements 
with the Triangle countries 
(a) Multilateral co-operation arrangements 
233. The Visegrad declaration of 1991, a tri-
lateral declaration by Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary, contains no specific clauses on 
security co-operation but it envisages a new 
commitment to work more closely to solve 
common problems. The main objective of the 
Triangle is co-ordination of approaches to 
European integration. Possibilities are now 
being explored. 
234. For any co-operation between countries of 
the Triangle and Western European countries to 
be fruitful, Western European economic stan-
dards and procedures should be observed. This 
means that certain transformations and adapta-
tions of the Triangle's economic system are still 
required. 
235. The Hexagonal, consisting of Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Poland and 
Yugoslavia, offers another particularly impor-
tant opportunity for multilateral co-operation in 
a regional framework. It is a flexible and prac-
tical framework for carrying out economic, 
infrastructure and cultural projects and for 
exchanges of information on European inte-
gration processes. It should be observed, 
however, that this co-operation agreement is still 
at an early stage of development. The industry 
has not yet started direct collaboration in this 
framework. 
(b) Association agreements with the EC 
236. The association agreements with the 
European Community which have now been 
negotiated are regarded by these countries as a 
major contribution to building the structures for 
a prosperous, stable and united Europe, with the 
EC as one of its cornerstones. There can be no 
question but that this association is an inter-
mediate stage in the process leading to full mem-
bership of the EC, at the turn of the millennium 
- it is hoped. 
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237. In the negotiations between the Triangle 
and the EC, the Triangle countries have been 
asked to guarantee a certain reciprocity, limiting 
the possibility of invoking the protection clause 
for new industries. This is meant to parallel the 
Commission's policy of taking into account the 
repercussions on certain EC areas of the 
liberalisation of imports of sensitive products, in 
particular in the sectors of textiles, agricultural 
products and steel. 
238. On 22nd November 1991, association 
agreements between the EC and the Triangle 
countries were finally concluded. They are 
expected to be signed by the foreign ministers. 
An interim agreement encompassing many trade 
issues will enter into force on 1st March 1992 to 
tide over until the national parliaments of all 
nations concerned have ratified the agree-
ments. 
239. In the preambles of the three nearly iden-
tical agreements, it is said that they " will help to 
reach the objective " of EC membership. The 
agreements are meant gradually to dismantle 
trade barriers between the signatories over the 
next ten years for both industrial and agricul-
tural products and they call for an increasingly 
free movement of workers and capital. They 
provide for progressive harmonisation in legis-
lation in order to prepare the three countries for 
possible future membership and institutionalise 
a regular political dialogue among senior offi-
cials. 
240. The multi-year financial assistance under 
the PHARE programme will continue. PHARE 
(Pologne-Hongrie: Assistance a la Restructuration 
Economique) is a programme set up by the EC 
in 1989 specifically to channel aid to Poland and 
Hungary. In early 1990, its scope was enlarged 
to include other countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. PHARE is to provide technical 
assistance to the governments of the above-
mentioned countries to help them to privatise 
their economies in the best possible conditions 
and to create a favourable environment for 
foreign investment. 
241. One area of PHARE's activities is the 
conversion of the defence industry. Specific 
action is being taken to determine what can be 
done in this respect. Experts involved in these 
activities recognise the multiple problems 
pointed out earlier in the present report, but 
they see certain limited chances for successful 
conversion in areas where the Triangle's defence 
industry has developed specific capabilities. 
However, they think that the opportunities for 
large-scale classic conversion should not be 
exaggerated. 
242. It should be noted that the PHARE pro-
gramme has a substantial budget. While, in 
1990, 500 million ecu were earmarked, the 
figure for 1991 is 850 million and 1 billion for 
1992. 
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243. Mention should also be made here of the 
activities of the EBRD (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development) which was 
established in April 1991. It started granting the 
first credits in mid-1991 and the number of 
credits granted to companies and organisations 
for specific projects in the Triangle countries is 
growing rapidly. EBRD credits are meant espe-
cially to help bring about important reforms 
such as creation of capital and financial 
markets, promotion of the private sector, the 
restructuring of banks and industrial companies, 
trade decentralisation, introduction of interna-
tional standards for accounting, stocktaking and 
amortisation and the creation of a modern infra-
structure for telecommunication, transport and 
energy. The EBRD has made it known that it is 
considering the establishment of a new bank to 
finance trade from Central and Eastern 
European countries to the Soviet Union. 
(c) Eureka 
244. Eureka, the European advanced tech-
nology programme for civilian applications 
which was established in 1985, could play an 
important role in the development of market 
economies in Central Europe. 
245. Its aim was to "raise through closer 
co-operation among enterprises and research 
institutes the productivity and competitiveness 
of Europe's industries on the world market", as 
was stated at that time. 
246. In June 1990, the Vlllth ministerial con-
ference in Rome acknowledged the possibilities 
of scientific and technological co-operation with 
companies and institutes from Central and 
Eastern European countries. The ministers 
ascertained that co-operation in the framework 
of Eureka could contribute to the transfor-
mation process in European non-member coun-
tries towards free and open market economies. 
24 7. Along this line of thought, a congress was 
held in Budapest on 2nd and 3rd May 1991, 
called " Eureka, exploring co-operation between 
East and West". 
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intensive and extended dissemination and dis-
tribution of information on activities in Eureka, 
inter alia by promoting the setting up of national 
points of contact in the respective European 
non-member countries. A flexible application of 
the Eureka rules should facilitate increased and 
earlier participation by these countries in 
Eureka projects. 
XXV. Conclusions 
250. Since the end of the second world war and 
for more than forty years, the citizens of Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary and Poland have been sub-
jected to the despotism of an ally which had 
imposed itself upon them with the consent of 
the western allies. 
251. Now the complete failure of the com-
munist ideology to redeem its promises of better 
living standards and an equitable society has 
ultimately led to the liberation and rebirth of 
these Central European nations. They are facing 
the immense task of complete reconstruction. 
This does not mean just the revitalisation of 
their societies through drastic social and eco-
nomic reform. 
252. There is much more to be achieved in the 
immaterial field too. One of the central issues at 
stake here after so many years of collective 
humiliation is the re-establishment of a well-
balanced feeling of national pride and self-
esteem. Under these circumstances the basic ele-
ments confirming the sovereignty of a state play 
an extremely important role. 
253. One basic element is the ability of the 
state to guarantee the security and defence of its 
citizens. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 
this issue is one of the main thrusts in the 
foreign policy of the Triangle nations. In all 
fairness, it should be admitted that the actual 
geostrategic situation does not enable any one of 
these nations to implement such a security guar-
antee without allies. Hence the comprehensible 
striving for incorporation in an alliance of 
western nations. 
248. At their IXth ministerial conference held 254. Having regard to the forthcoming associ-
in The Hague on 19th June 1991, ministers and ation of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in 
the Vice-President of the Commission stressed preparation for future full membership of the 
the importance of further enhancing eo- EC, their future inclusion in a common 
operation with European non-member coun- European security and defence system can only 
tries, while also stressing the need to use and be a question of time. 
improve the transparency of Eureka's sup-
portive structures for companies and institutes 255. It should be noted, however, that their 
from European non-member countries which incorporation in a European security system 
are moving towards a market economy. would be meaningful and lasting only if these 
countries are able to make a contribution in 
249. To that end, an action programme was accordance with their status and capabilities. 
decided upon, including an extended infor- Their desire to maintain a basic defence manu-
mation policy, expanded network and a flexible facturing capability appears perfectly legitimate 
application of the Eureka rules. The first two now and against the background of a future 
elements of this programme are aimed at more wider European context. 
257 
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256. However, like all European countries, 
they will have to give up the considerable over-
capacity of their defence industry. They should 
not exclude the possibility of mergers with or 
take-overs by other companies inside or outside 
the borders of the Triangle even if reduced state 
influence was the consequence. Taking into con-
sideration their own arms exports in recent 
years and the considerable amount of Soviet 
equipment in use all over the world which may 
need maintenance, overhaul and updating, there 
must still be chances for exports of goods and 
services, but these should not be overestimated, 
given the surplus of conventional weapons on 
the second-hand market as a consequence of the 
CFE treaty. · 
257. There is another reason why the prospects 
for arms exports from Central European coun-
tries are not very bright. Until recently, Central 
European arms were relatively cheap. With the 
introduction of economic reforms, including the 
application of commercial accounting methods, 
prices will be more realistic and consequently 
higher. Moreover, as matters now stand, Central 
European arms will still not have the same level 
of technological sophistication as may be offered 
by western arms producers. 
258. A more delicate issue is that certain coun-
tries had no choice but to procure Central or 
Eastern European arms because, for political 
reasons, they did not have access to western 
arms. Will Central European countries, under-
standably keen to have the closest possible links 
with Western Europe, be able to continue with 
impunity their cynical attitude of indiscriminate 
arms exports? Apparently this issue is still being 
debated in the Triangle countries. 
259. In the first instance, however, the 
Triangle's national defence industry will mainly 
have to manage with their home market which, 
in the years to come, will be rather restricted. 
260. In the present report it is therefore sug-
gested that these countries be included in a 
number of specific IEPG activities and granted a 
status comparable to DDI nations in that 
framework. It may help them to become familiar 
with the western alliance's system of pro-
curement and defence equipment co-operation. 
At the same time it may facilitate the survival of 
the defence manufacturers they consider 
essential for their national security through par-
ticipation in collaborative programmes on a 
European scale or through successful bidding for 
contracts on the European defence market, 
whether or not in co-operation with other 
defence manufacturers. 
261. An additional advantage would be that, 
over the years, the Triangle would gradually 
develop commonality, harmonisation and 
standardisation of their equipment preparing for 
full participation in Europe's future. 
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262. It is further suggested that Cocom, in 
close co-operation with Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary and Poland, should now quickly remove 
these nations from the list of proscribed coun-
tries as soon as they have passed the necessary 
legislation in export control matters. This would 
finally raise the formal barriers which are still 
denying them access to advanced technologies 
indispensable for their development into 
modem economies with a sound basis of high-
technology products up to world standards. 
263. If some people raise their eyebrows, consid-
ering these to be far-fetched proposals, the answer 
is that the West and in particular Western Europe 
cannot continue to deliver promising speeches, 
containing little substance when it comes to 
implementation. The far from generous attitude of 
some European partners during the association 
negotiations is a disgraceful example which would 
be better forgotten quickly. 
264. Moreover, it should be noted that at the 
NATO summit in Rome on 7th and 8th 
November it was decided to develop a more 
institutional relationship of consultation and 
co-operation on political and security issues 
between NATO and Central and Eastern 
European countries. Among the activities pro-
posed are annual meetings with the North 
Atlantic Council at ministerial level in what 
might be called a North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council, and also regular meetings with the Mil-
itary Committee and, under its direction, with 
other NATO military authorities. 
265. Likewise, at its meeting in Bonn on 18th 
November 1991, the WEU Council of Ministers 
took decisions to enhance the dialogue between 
WEU and the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe on security and co-operation. The mea-
sures envisaged by WEU were meant to rein-
force and to be complementary to similar 
endeavours by the Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Community. 
266. Nobody can pretend that the Triangle's 
ailing defence industry can be maintained to a 
large extent. Conversion in a wider sense will be 
possible only for a small part which can be 
adapted to new markets and which is viable for 
joint ventures with foreign companies prepared 
to take a calculated risk. It can only be left to 
private enterprise to act in this area. 
267. To organise another symposium on con-
version may be useful, but it is not suggested 
here. 
268. The Triangle countries' wish to maintain 
a defence industrial base is completely legit-
imate. It will only make sense, however, in a 
wider framework of defence needs, procurement 
and industry. This framework is bound to be 
European. Western European nations can take 
practical steps to help them achieve this. They 
should not hesitate. 
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Amendment 1 
Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mrs. Blunck 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper. 
l. See 11th sitting, 3rd December 1991 (amendment negatived). 
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2nd December 1991 
Signed: Blunck 
Document 1289 
Amendment 2 
Defence industry in Cuchoslovakia, Hungary and Polluul 
AMENDMENT 2 I 
tabled by Mr. Tummers 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. 
l. See 11th sitting, 3rd December 1991 (amendment agreed to). 
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2nd December 1991 
Signed: Tummers 
Document 1289 
Amendments 3 and 4 
3rd December 1991 
Defence industry in Cz.edoslorakia, Hungary and Poland 
AMENDMENTS 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Atkinson, 
on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from " (IEPG) " to the end and 
add: 
" as an ideal framework to gain familiarity with procurement procedures for democratically-
controlled armed forces, in particular with a view to including them in: 
(a) those regular meetings of government officials known as ·the 'European sessions for 
armament managers', organised with the objective of exchanging information relating to the 
operation of organisations in charge of arms procurement; 
(b) the work of Panel I, which would help them to harmonise their equipment requirements with 
other European nations and to identify potential projects for collaboration; " 
4. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after" skills" insert "conversion". 
Signed: Atkinson 
1. See 11th sitting, 3rd December 1991 (amendments agreed to). 
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Dear President, 
25th November 1991 
Information letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-Generdl of 
WEU, on the activities of the ministerial organs 
The relentless confrontation of Serbs and Croats, an odious anachronism, together with the eco-
nomic collapse of the former Soviet Union, are a sombre backdrop for the current negotiations on 
developing institutions for the European enterprise in furtherance of the 1985 Single Act. 
The declaration on Yugoslavia adopted by the WEU Ministerial Council takes note of the failure 
of the Federal Army to comply with cease-fire agreements or its own undertakings. WEU can now 
direct its action along two lines: preparing for the deployment of Blue Helmets on the basis of a 
Security Council resolution, a deployment to which member states might contribute; and stepping up 
member states' efforts to create humanitarian corridors. It is the ad hoc group's role to consider the 
practical arrangements for the contingency plans required with this prospect in mind. 
The extraordinary Ministerial Council on 29th October and the regular Ministerial Council on 
18th November- both of which were held at the Petersberg in Bonn- provided an opportunity to take 
interim stock of member states' views on the role and place of WEU in the new European security 
architecture. This stocktaking exercise was accompanied by a number of decisions sanctioning the 
work of our organisation since the Ministerial Council in Vianden on 27th June 1991. 
The purpose of this sixteenth information letter is therefore to give you a succinct but compre-
hensive account of these meetings, as you prepare for the second part of your Assembly's 37th ordinary 
session and the meetings of the Presidential and other committees to be held on this occasion. 
The final decisions on WEU's role and place in the new European security architecture are on 
the agenda of the European summit in Maastricht. The most obvious points of convergence are the 
inclusion of a security and defence dimension in the European enterprise, the strengthening of WEU's 
operational role and the recognition that relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance on the one 
hand and, on the other, between WEU and the political union differ in nature. 
The primacy of the Atlantic Alliance is recognised by all WEU member states. The texts adopted 
by the Rome summit are unequivocal: Europe can and must work on the development of military 
structures, which will have a major role to perform in reinforcing the allies' capacity to co-operate on 
their own common defence. It should no longer be too hard to devise a common language for the Nine 
and the Twelve on the future structuring of relations between WEU and the alliance. Progress with the 
substance of the debate can now be expected from the Intergovernmental Conference and the 
conclaves of foreign ministers. WEU can be said to be at the fulcrum point of the scales. A comparison 
of the Rome texts with the Copenhagen communique bears witness to the remarkable progress that has 
been made, and this progress must now be followed up by the success of the European summit. 
Whatever happens, the practical implications of that summit for WEU must be evaluated in the wake 
of Maastricht. 
Developing an operational role for WEU will be a gradual process. There will have to be several 
stages in confirming our organisation's role as the union's defence component and as the means 
whereby the European pillar of the alliance can be strengthened. The formulation of a European 
defence policy and its translation into practice must be based on a series of practical steps designed to 
forge new links with both the alliance and the political union. Progress with this demarche should be 
reviewed as necessary from time to time. A review focusing on WEU will no doubt be necessary 
towards the end of the decade. 
WEU's third field of action to which ministers have been devoting their attention is that of 
contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Their decisions may be summed up in three 
points: following the fact-finding missions to Bulgaria and Romania, these two countries will be offered 
the same opportunities for co-operation as Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia; relations with these 
five countries will be further expanded; and it is WEU's intention to initiate relations with the 
republics of the former Soviet Union and with the three Baltic states, provided that both groups 
express interest. 
Decisions have now been reached on a whole series of intergovernmental measures, with a view 
to developing relations between WEU and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe: 
- an extraordinary meeting of the members of the Council and the Foreign and Defence Min-
isters of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia is planned for next year; 
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- contacts will be organised on an ad hoc basis at ministerial level on specific subjects of 
common interest, in addition to the bilateral contacts between WEU and each of these five 
countries; 
- an information link will be established between the WEU Secretariat-General and the five 
countries' embassies, and between the embassy of the Presidency's country and their 
respective governments; 
- seminars under the auspices of the WEU Institute will be organised for officials responsible 
for politico-military affairs in the foreign and defence ministries of WEU member states and 
the five countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
In Vianden, WEU ministers decided to set up a WEU satellite centre for a three-year experi-
mental period, with a budget of 38.25 million ecus. As decided by ministers in Bonn on 18th 
November, this centre will be established on the site of the Torrej6n base near Madrid from 1st 
January 1992. Its Director will be Mr. Blaydes, a scientific expert from the United Kingdom Ministry 
of Defence, who will be appointed for a period of three years. In 1992, the sum of 4.5 million ecus will 
be allocated towards commissioning from industry feasibility studies on the opportunities for medium-
and long-term co-operation on developing a European satellite observation system. These studies will 
be administered by a team set up in Paris under Italian chairmanship. 
In all other fields of operational co-operation among member states, ministers took note of the 
reports submitted to them, i.e. interim reports and one report on activities. The Council will continue 
its work on all these subjects, in particular the operational reinforcement ofWEU, and I shall of course 
keep you informed of progress in the course of 1992. 
One last word, Mr. President, about relations between the WEU parliamentary Assembly and 
the Permanent Council. As you know, when I visited Paris on 6th November to address the Political 
Committee, I had an extremely fruitful dialogue with its members; the following day at the Secretariat, 
I had the honour and pleasure of welcoming you and Mr. Rathbone, Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. You addressed the Permanent Representatives on the direction 
being taken by the Assembly in its future activities and on the guidelines for its draft 1992 budget. In 
the ensuing discussion, you explained your concerns about the Assembly's political programme over 
the coming months. 
This exchange of views will, I believe, have made a positive contributioR to the institutional dia-
logue between the intergovernmental organs and the parliamentary component of our organisation. 
I look forward to more such meetings in the future on specific topics, which need not be confined 
to administrative or budgetary matters. Through this dialogue, we shall not only improve our mutual 
understanding of the problems facing us but we shall also have a far clearer perception of the con-
straints under which we are working together in carrying forward the process of European construction. 
* 
* * 
Since 1st October, the Permanent Council has met four times (9th and 23rd October, 
7th November, and 11th November as the Enlarged Council to prepare for the ministerial meeting on 
18th November). 
During these six weeks, the Council has continued to supervise the activities of its various 
working groups. The three main topics of its deliberations during this period of preparation for the 
ordinary ministerial meeting on 18th November in Petersberg, near Bonn, were as follows: 
- developments in the Yugoslav crisis; 
- further contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; 
- the role and place of WEU in the new European security architecture. 
With regard to the deteriorating situation in the republics of the former Yugoslav Federation, 
the Permanent Council was briefed on progress with the work of the ad hoc group and the sub-groups 
of experts tasked with preparing a report for ministers on the political implications of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 713 and possible measures to be agreed by the WEU member states. This 
report, drawn up by the Presidency, was considered at the extraordinary meeting of the Ministerial 
Council on 29th October, and ministers took due note. On 11th November, the Enlarged Council 
thanked the ad hoc group for its studies and reports and agreed that the ad hoc group and the Joint 
Contingency Study Group (JCSG) would not be convened again unless warranted by a change in the 
situation as a result of a decision to impose economic sanctions. 
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As regards contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Council decided on 
fact-finding missions to Bulgaria and Romania in the early part of November. Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, have been invited to send representatives from 
their foreign and defence ministries to the seminar being organised by the WEU Institute for Security 
Studies in Paris on 28th and 29th November next; also participating will be the heads of delegations 
from the Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group. At the meeting of the 
Enlarged Council, there was a preliminary exchange of views on how WEU could best carry forward its 
relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The Permanent Council discussed the role and place of WEU in the new European security 
architecture with a view to the extraordinary meeting of the Ministerial Council in Bonn on 
29th October, and in preparation for the regular meeting of the Ministerial Council on 18th November. 
In the context of negotiations on a draft treaty of political union, due to be submitted to the European 
summit in Maastricht, the Council considered the joint Baker-Genscher declaration of 3rd October, 
the Anglo-ltalian declaration of 4th October and the joint letter from President Mitterrand and Chan-
cellor Kohl of 14th October. These three contributions have stimulated a constructive debate within 
WEU and within the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union and the Atlantic Alliance. As a 
result of the discussions on 29th October, a closer convergence of positions has been secured. The Per-
manent Council has kept this item on its agenda so that it can draw initial conclusions from the 
outcome of the alliance summit on 7th and 8th November. 
The Council's Special Working Group (SWG) and Defence Representatives Group (DRG) held a 
series of meetings on 16th and 17th October. The SWG Deputies' Group also met on 25th October to 
complete preparations for the extraordinary Ministerial Council on the 29th. 
Apart from topical questions, overshadowed by the developments in Yugoslavia, the two groups, 
at their joint meeting on 16th October, analysed the Anglo-ltalian declaration, the joint letter from 
President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl and a paper submitted by the Netherlands in the framework 
of European political co-operation. On the basis of this analysis, the idea of drawing up a preliminary 
draft declaration by WEU member states to be annexed, at the appropriate time, to the treaty on 
political union, received delegations' assent. A preliminary draft was therefore discussed by the Dep-
uties' Group the following week. Preparations for the extraordinary Council meant that the discussion 
on the prospects for progress with arms control and for a joint approach in preparing for the Helsinki 
CSCE Conference had to be adjourned. 
On 17th October, the Defence Representatives Group took stock ofthe work ofthe Joint Contin-
gency Study Group and the fresh prospects for Franco-German military co-operation opened up by the 
letter from President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. 
The Group also continued its work on the military implications of WEU being given a more 
operational role. Two reports were to be submitted to ministers: one on possible tasks for WEU opera-
tional capabilities and the resulting requirements, the other on new requirements for co-ordination and 
planning structures which would arise from the organisation's operational role. 
The group continued its analysis of the ballistic missile threat and the means of countering that 
threat, as well as of Europe's strategic mobility requirements. It has kept the subject of arms 
co-operation on its agenda, briefly addressing the proposal for a European arms agency contained in 
the letter by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. 
The Mediterranean Sub-Group of the Special Working Group met on 5th November. Infor-
mation was exchanged on the situation in Albania, preparations for the referendum in Western Sahara 
and the Cyprus question. As part of the continuing process of joint reflection on proposals concerning 
security in the Meditterranean, the group discussed the Middle East Peace Conference, which opened 
in Madrid on 30th October, and the Ministerial meeting of the Five + Five Group held in Algiers on 
26th and 27th October. Several delegations felt that a discussion on the appropriate arrangements for a 
dialogue on security between WEU and the Maghreb countries would be opportune. 
Several contributions were made to the work of developing key principles likely to contribute to 
a settlement of security questions in the Mediterranean. Attention focused on transparency and the 
non-proliferation of weapons. 
The experts on the verification of arms control agreements met on 24th October. The aim of this 
meeting was to review CFE inspections, examine various documents concerned with practical 
co-operation in implementing an open skies agreement and prepare a report on activities for sub-
mission to ministers on 18th November. 
The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space met on 14th and 15th October. The experts on medium- and 
long-term studies continued their work in London in the margins of this meeting, while the team 
responsible for the establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre met from 7th to 1Oth October and on 
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23rd and 24th October. On the basis of this project team's work, the group was able to reach agreement 
on a draft ministerial decision. 
* 
* * 
The annual seminar of the Public Administration Committee was held in Maastricht from 
14th to 18th October 1991 at the European Institute of Public Administration. The theme was the 
implications for the organisation of public administration in WEU member states of a changing 
security environment. Participants examined the potential implications of changes in the international 
security environment for the organisation of public administration, including policy structures, in 
WEU member states, both domestically and with respect to international organisations. 
The seminar was opened by the Secretary-General of Western European Union and chaired by 
Ambassador Charles Rutten (retired) , former Permanent Representative ofthe Netherlands to the EC. 
Apart from EIPA faculty members, the invited speakers included experts from ministries, other institu-
tions and intergovernmental agencies. 
The seminar working groups concluded that, in the space of four short years, European security 
conditions as listed in the Hague platform had changed radically on account of the revolutions in 
Europe and the Gulf war. Henceforward, Europe had to face new risks associated principally with the 
demise of Soviet power as well as risks from outside Europe. The working groups thought that a new 
definition of common security interests was needed which went beyond the purely military aspects and 
embraced other aspects referred to in the modified Brussels Treaty, namely economic, social and 
cultural. 
The seminar working groups made a comparative study of the positions of WEU member states 
and were able to identify a number of basic common attitudes to the new strategic environment. The 
seminar participants called in particular for a West-East transfer of expertise in the field of public 
administration, in respect of which the Public Administration Committee could be given a 
co-ordinating role. 
* 
* * 
Under the programme of two-way information contacts with the democratically-elected govern-
ments of Central and Eastern Europe, Ambassador Klaiber and I made two fact-finding missions 
during the period covered by this letter: to Bulgaria on 31st October and 1st November followed by 
Romania on 3rd and 4th November 1991. 
In Sofia, we had meetings in turn with: the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Victor Valkov; the Bulgarian President, Mr. Jelio Jelev; the Defence Minister, Mr. Yordan 
Mutavchiev; the Prime Minister, Mr. Dimitar Popov, and the Chairman of the UDF Co-ordination 
Committee, Mr. Filip Dimitrov. 
We briefed them on the status of discussions on the role and place of WEU in the new European 
security architecture and explained WEU's approach to its relations with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. We asked for their opinions on the changing situation of European security and the 
role of the CSCE. They also described to us the main aspects of Bulgaria's security and defence policy. 
Bulgaria regards its association with, and subsequent integration into, the European Community 
as a priority. It supports the efforts by the Community and the CSCE to find a peaceful solution to the 
Yugoslav crisis. Bulgaria has no territorial claims ·and is concentrating its efforts on strengthening 
bilateral relations (a treaty has been signed with Germany and with Greece; negotiations are under way 
with Turkey and Italy). Bulgaria supports the proposals set out in the joint Baker-Genscher declaration 
and hopes that there will be no discrimination among the countries of Central Europe. It is in favour of 
the development of a political dialogue with WEU, including a dialogue at parliamentary level. As 
regards the country's security, Bulgaria would like to see regional imbalances corrected and new 
security guarantees negotiated. All our interlocutors stressed their determination to pursue the process 
of democratisation in their country and the urgent need for economic development to ease the tran-
sition to a market economy. 
In Bucharest, we met: the Romanian President, Mr. Ion Iliescu; the Prime Minister, Mr. Teodor 
Stolojan; and both the Foreign and Defence Ministers, Mr. Adrian Nastase and Mr. Micolae Spiroiu. 
To each one we explained WEU's present role, resources, objectives and future prospects. 
Our interlocutors stressed their wish to see Romania treated on an equal footing with the other 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They pointed to their initial proposal to set up an 
organisation similar to WEU to bring these countries together, thus promoting a better understanding 
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of their positive attitude to the proposals contained in the joint Baker-Genscher declaration and the 
recent letter sent by President Illiescu to the Secretary-General of NATO. 
Mention was made of the problems of Romania's southern and eastern frontiers and of minor-
ities in Romania. Instability in both the West and the East, in the former Soviet Union and in the 
former Yugoslav Federation are matters of great concern to the Romanian leaders, who fear that their 
country might feel isolated; hence their interest in developing relations with NATO, the Community 
and WEU. The process of democratisation is continuing, and we were told of the government's inten-
tions regarding the electoral timetable for the first half of 1992: local elections, referendum on the 
Constitution, followed by a general election. 
Lastly, we had talks with representatives of the Romanian Parliament, including the Vice-
President of the Senate, Mr. Oliviu Gherman. 
* 
* * 
As part of the ongoing contacts with the government authorities of member states, I had the 
opportunity on 8th October, on the occasion of a conference organised by the Spanish Atlantic Associ-
ation in Madrid, to meet H.E. Mr. Julian Garcia Vargas, the Spanish Defence Minister, with whom I 
had useful discussions on preparations for the Ministerial Council in Bonn. 
- On 24th October in Brussels, I met H.E. Mr. W. Martens, the Belgian Prime Minister. We had 
a wide-ranging exchange of views on the prospects for the process of European construction 
and talked about the role of WEU; 
- on 29th October, I was invited to join H.E. Mr. G. De Michelis, the Italian Foreign Minister, 
on board the aircraft bringing the Italian delegation back to Rome after the extraordinary 
Ministerial Council on 29th October. During the flight, we exchanged views on the outcome of 
the ministerial meeting that day and on preparations for the regular Ministerial Council on 
18th November; 
- on 30th October in Rome, I had talks with H.E. Mr. G. Andreotti, the Italian Prime Minister. 
We took stock of the negotiations in the two intergovernmental conferences in the run up to 
the European summit in Maastricht. I also met H.E. Mr. C. Vitalone, State Secretary in the 
Italian Foreign Ministry with responsibility for European affairs and European organisations, 
and also H.E. Ambassador B. Bottai, Secretary-General in the Italian Foreign Ministry, with 
whom I discussed preparations for Italy's future Presidency of WEU. Whilst in Rome, I was 
also invited to visit the premises of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs information research unit 
and crisis unit. 
* 
* * 
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Turning to public relations and information on WEU's role and current and future missions, my ; 
colleagues and I have taken part in the following events: 
- on 3rd October at the Secretariat-General, I received a group of Dutch students from the Uni-
versity of Groningen; 
- from 7th to 8th October in Barcelona, I took part in a seminar entitled " Challenges in the 
Mediterranean- the European response", organised by the Bertelsmann Foundation; 
- on 8th October, I gave a talk in Madrid on the subject " WEU relations with the European 
union and the Atlantic Alliance " as part of a seminar organised by the Spanish Atlantic Asso-
ciation; 
- from 9th to lOth October, in Washington, I took part in the conference on NATO's future: a 
congressional-executive dialogue; this event was eo-sponsored by the Congressional Research 
Service and the United States Information Agency under the auspices of Senators Nunn and 
Warner and Representatives Aspen and Dickinson. On the 11th, I spoke on WEU's role in the 
emergence of a new European security order. During my stay in Washington, I had a number 
of contacts with senior officials in the administration. In particular, I had talks with General 
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Reginald Bartholemew, Under-
Secretary of State at the State Department, and Mr. Robert Zoelick, Adviser in the State 
Department. I explained to all of them the importance of the European pillar for the future of 
transatlantic relations; 
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- on 9th October, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, and Mr. A. Jacomet, Head of 
the Policy and Planning Section, outlined WEU's structures and activities to foreign students 
at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich; 
- on 11th October, I spoke of the role and place of WEU to students at the Defence University 
in Washington; 
- on 12th October, I gave a talk on Europe's role in NATO during a dinner-debate organised at 
Casteaux by the SHAPE Officers' Association as part of their 31st general assembly; 
- on 14th October in Maastricht, I gave the opening address, entitled" The role of WEU in a 
changing security environment", in the seminar on the implications for the organisation of 
public administration in WEU member states of a changing security environment; this was 
being held under the auspices of the WEU Public Administration Committee at the European 
Institute of Public Administration; 
- on 14th October in Aachen, I gave a talk on WEU as part of an event organised by the 
Arbeitskreis Aachen of the Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft; 
- on 15th October I took part in a seminar entitled " Security policy in the Y€?~r 2000 " organised 
by "the Deutscher Bundeswehrverband e.V." in co-operation with the OTV (Gewerkschaft 
bffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr) in Hanover. I spoke on the subject of the evo-
lution of Europe and the armed forces: the role of WEU; 
- on 19th/20th October I took part in the European meeting of the Trilateral Commission in 
Brussels. On the 20th, I addressed the issue of building a European defence identity; 
- on 20/21st October, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented the Sec-
retariat at the annual session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Madrid; 
- on 21st October, I spoke to the IEPG National Armament Directors' meeting in The Hague on 
a WEU perspective on the future European security architecture and its implications for 
European co-operation; 
- on 22nd October, I took part in a seminar organised by the Economist at Gleneagles in 
Scotland on the theme of" The retrenchment of defence spending and how to live through it ". 
I gave an address entitled " An ideal world: a prescription for Europe "; 
- on the same day, I gave a talk on WEU at a dinner-debate organised by the Anglo-Netherlands 
Society in London; 
- on 22nd/23rd October, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, attended a 
conference in Madrid on " The European puzzle: the new geometries of security ", organised 
by the Humanism and Democracy Foundation. He spoke on the defence of Europe and its 
uncertainties: the end of bipolarism, European integration, new nationalisms; 
- on 23rd October, I took part in the 12th Armed Forces Communications and Electronics 
Association (AFCEA) symposium and exposition in Brussels, speaking about WEU during a 
dinner-debate organised as part of this meeting; 
- on 25th October, I delivered the opening address of a seminar on European security and eco-
nomics - the role of regional powers, organised in The Hague by the Young Europeans for 
Peace and Security; 
- on 30th October, in the company of Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, I gave an 
address on WEU in Rome as part of a seminar eo-sponsored by the Italian Centre for 
Advanced Defence Studies and the Diplomatic Institute. In the presence of senior representa-
tives of the Italian military establishment and ambassadors of WEU member states, I gave an 
address on WEU's role in maintaining security and stability on the European continent; 
- on 31st October, Mr. P. Casardi spoke to students on the General and Flag Officers Course at 
the NATO Defence College in Rome on the subject " WEU's rOle in the emergence of a new 
European security order"; 
- on 4th November, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, and Mr. D.J. Wil-
liams, Head of Council Secretariat, represented the Secretariat-General at a seminar on the 
new agenda and institutions of European security policy: the changing roles of WEU, the EC 
and NATO, organised in London by the Federal Trust. Ambassador H. Holthoff spoke on the 
new role of WEU. 
- on 5th November in Paris, I took part in a debate among members of the Journalists' Group 
of the WEU Institute on " European security in a changing world "; 
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- on 8th November, Ambassador H. Holthoff visited the premises of the Deutsche Luft- und 
Raumfahrt-gesellschaft (DLR) at Oberpfaffenhofen near Munich; 
- on 9th November in The Hague, I took part in the se'cond meeting of general secretaries of 
European and regional institutions and organisations with a delegation of the Executive Com-
mittee of the International European Movement; 
- the same day, I spoke about WEU to members of the Stichting voor vrijheid en veiligheid at 
Apeldoorn in the Netherlands; 
- on 12th November, I gave an address on WEU to students of the Joint Service Defence 
College in Greenwich (London) on the theme of WEU's role in maintaining security and sta-
bility on the European continent; 
- on 13th November, I spoke about WEU to students from the Faculty of Diplomacy of the 
University of Leeds; 
- on 14th November, I spoke about WEU to students of the Royal College of Defence Studies in 
London; 
- on the same day, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, spoke on European security 
and the role of WEU at the Forecast Conference on Advanced Technology International 
which was held in London; 
- on 15th November, I took part in a seminar entitled" De West-Europese opbouw met een 
deur naar het Osten" (the European construction process with a door to the East) organised 
by the Stichting VredesPolitik in The Hague. I spoke on the subject "De West-Europese 
veiligheid: een nieuwe pijler?" (Western European Union: a new pillar?) ; 
- on 16th November, I took part in the conference of leading members of the Young ~uropeans 
for Security movement organised in Zeist, the Netherlands, by the European Movement in the 
Netherlands, where I gave an address on WEU; 
- on 19th November, I gave a talk on WEU in Munich as part of a conference organised by the 
Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung; 
- on the same day, I spoke about WEU during a symposium on the EC as a world power in the 
new world order, organised by the NA VO-Kring Association in Louvain. 
Over the past two months, I have maintained regular contact with the press and with specialists 
on European and strategic problems, both in London and in my travels. These meetings have given me 
an opportunity to clarify the present orientation of WEU's work. 
Annexed to this information letter are the texts of two presentations I gave on similar topics on 
5th and 14th November. They are in the language in which they were delivered. 
My concern is that you should receive them without having to wait for a translation into the 
other official language of the organisation, otherwise these texts - which are not official Council docu-
ments - would probably be out of date. 
* 
* * 
At the request of the Permanent Council, the Secretariat prepares summaries of international 
press reaction to WEU activities. The following is a resume of its note for October 1991. 
WEU was mentioned in the international press throughout the month of October 1991. The 
organisation was featured in a number of editorials and commentaries following the ministerial 
meeting on 30th September 1991 in Brussels, which was specifically devoted to the situation in Yugo-
slavia. The press set this meeting of WEU in the far wider context of the European Community and the 
Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. The attention of journalists, however, rapidly switched to the 
question of the role and place of WEU in the new European security architecture, due to the rapid suc-
cession of major initiatives by member states directly concerning the future of the organisation. 
The Anglo-Italian declaration of 4th October 1991 was generally perceived by the press as an 
important stage in the process of defining a common European defence policy. Noteworthy in this 
context has been the growing interest in WEU shown by the Italian press. The commentaries on the 
Anglo-ltalian declaration soon gave way, however, to comments prompted by the Franco-German ini-
tiative of 11th October. The rapid sequence of events relating to WEU prompted a good deal of 
comment and speculation about the role and place of the organisation in the immediate run-up to the 
extraordinary meeting of the Ministerial Council in Bonn on 29th October 1991. 
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The Paris Charter of the CSCE proclaimed: " the era of confrontation and division of Europe has 
ended". However, the geopolitical situation of Europe is more fragmented than ever before. More than 
a hundred minority problems and twenty border disputes can be enumerated. Several risks of confron-
tation exist, from the Baltic shores to the Balkans where the former Yugoslavia has erupted in violence. 
They could trigger unforeseeable repercussions ranging from economic chaos to unprecedented migra-
tions. What happened with the Albanians in Bari last summer may only have been a foretaste. Several 
statesmen have underlined that mass migrations from the East and the South are indeed the main 
threat to Western European security. 
The Gulf conflict was a timely reminder of Europe's role and responsibilities in the world when 
many of our countrymen were only too eager to see their governments reap the peace dividends of the 
new detente; some even ventured that " history had come to an end " and, with the demise of the 
Warsaw Pact, advocated a swift dismantling of our security institutions- WEU and NATO- which 
had guaranteed more than four decades of peace. 
Before considering where we stand in the process of reinforcing the European pillar, I should like 
to consider with you two situations that affect Europe's security directly and that should instil in us a 
real sense of urgency. Accelerando seems to be the tempo of history on our continent after almost forty 
years of East-West stalemate. 
1991, from a European defence viewpoint, is the year in which success must be achieved on all 
three fronts of the ongoing reappraisal of the structures of European security: 
- NATO's strategy review; 
- the intergovernmental conference's work on European political union and, finally, 
- WEU's transformation into a more operational organisation contributing to the 
Europeanisation of the revamped Atlantic Alliance. 
The synchronisation of these exercises is indeed necessary but their coherence is of paramount 
importance. WEU's future is very much dependent on their outcome since its reactivation placed it at 
the crossroads of the process of European integration with the ultimate goal of a fully-fledged political 
union on the one hand, and the indispensable transatlantic partnership on the other. 
If we look at the international scene, there are four levels on which the emerging European 
defence and security architecture should be buttressed: 
- First, the United Nations which has, in timely fashion, acquired a new prestige. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the recent consensus between the permanent members of the Security 
Council will again be forthcoming in future international crises. 
- The second level is the pan-European framework of the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, the ongoing process leading us from Helsinki 1975 to Helsinki 1992. It was 
instrumental in making human rights a legitimate subject of East-West dialogue and played an 
important role in bringing us where we are today. Its value lies in principles and prevention - prin-
ciples of conduct among states and prevention of conflicts arising among them. If, however, prevention 
l. The English and French texts of this annex are not identical. They consist of two speeches by the Secretary-General on the 
same subject, one in English, the other in French, made at close intervals. It should therefore be considered that they are two 
equivalent expressions of the same communication. The Secretariat-General consequently decided not to have them translated. 
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fails and conflict breaks out, the consensus-based CSCE will be a cumbersome machinery for effective 
action. The consequences of the rule of unanimity are exemplified by the Yugoslav crisis as conflicts 
are most likely to arise as a result of tension among minorities or nationalities for ethnic, cultural or 
even religious reasons. The test for the CSCE will come when such conflicts spill over and assume 
international proportions. During my visits to five Eastern European countries I was struck by the 
declining level of interest in the CSCE; those countries aim at more concrete security guarantees 
through links with NATO or WEU. This largely results from the fact that the pan-European agenda has 
moved from individual human rights to peoples' rights with an increased risk of limited, albeit pro-
tracted, conflicts. 
Secretary Baker suggested, in his address to the Aspen Institute in Berlin on 18th May 1991, a 
larger Euro-Atlantic community for which the CSCE could be a comprehensive and diverse 
framework, which should be extended to the Soviet Union. Last September's German-American initi-
ative for regular ministerial meetings with the East European countries and the republics of the former 
Soviet Union is an illustration of how NATO's increased political role is now envisaged. It will not be 
to the detriment of the alliance's core function, namely collective defence. 
Our American allies have also taken on board the idea of co-operative security in Europe for 
which CSCE, NATO, WEU, the Community and other European institutions, taken as a set, would 
form the basis. It will not, however, be easy to give substance to an extended Euro-Atlantic community. 
East European countries look primarily to the European Community to resolve their economic 
problems, while their admission to the Council of Europe will transfer much of the human rights dis-
cussion to Strasbourg. There will be subjects for pan-European co-operation in all three baskets of the 
Helsinki process but, on the whole, the potential of CSCE to integrate the ex-Soviet republics with the 
West '"Should not be exaggerated. The CSCE could acquire a new dimension if it becomes involved in 
the definition of the security posture of the independent republics. The CSCE would primarily have to 
monitor the development of their armed forces and the implementation of their share of the provisions 
of the CFE Treaty. Today we can only conclude that the notion of collective security needs further 
development and seems likely to be useful only in conjunction with well-established collective defence 
arrangements such as those embodied in NATO and in WEU. 
- The third level is NATO. The Rome Declaration on peace and co-operation has clearly reas-
serted that it will continue to find its main purpose in collective defence and deterrence. It will remain 
a much needed forum where Europeans and North Americans discuss any politico-military issue 
affecting their common interests anywhere in the world. In our continent, Russia is more than likely to 
remain the largest military power, with a sizeable nuclear armoury. Unless dramatic improvements in 
arms control take place before the mid-nineties, that capability can be balanced only in conjunction 
with the United States; that is what NATO is all about. In the past, it was geared to meet a surprise 
attack and could move quickly from a peacetime posture to war fighting. In the future, it will provide 
an irreplaceable insurance against things going wrong. Equally, its consultation function should remain 
as wide as possible. 
The new mechanisms for contacts with Eastern Europe as sketched out in the Rome Declaration 
are useful since they might effectively link new democracies and new republics to a consultative 
process which has proven its efficiency for over forty years in defusing crises. But there is an element of 
window-dressing in offering an association without the prospect of an extension of guarantees through 
membership. Indeed, NATO as a defensive alliance uniting European countries to the American super-
power, cannot provide for ad hoc interventions outside the treaty area. 
NATO enabled us Europeans to live more or less comfortably in the vicinity of the other super-
power, the Soviet Union, but it also had its limitations. Joint action outside the NATO area, although 
legally possible if all sixteen member nations agree, is unlikely, because it would be regarded as the 
extended arm of the United States. Of course, there would be consultation in NATO, but in my view 
NATO action will have to concentrate on collective defence and deterrence. Outside the NATO Treaty 
area I see a two-pillar approach, as we organised twice in the Gulf, with close liaison on the spot, but 
not under a NATO flag. 
- That brings me to the fourth defence tier, the West European one. I like to describe WEU as 
both the European pillar of NATO and as the security dimension of the European integration process, 
but I have to admit that in both roles WEU is far from perfect. But it is irreplaceable and easily per-
fectible. We do not have all the European Community countries as members, and other European 
members of NATO are outside our organisation as well. Nevertheless, it is the only pillar we have. The 
Eurogroup and the IEGP cannot provide an alternative in that respect. 
From the London summit to the Rome summit, the Europeans have succeeded in securing the 
recognition of their security identity and defence role within the alliance. The two paragraphs agreed in 
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Copenhagen at foreign minister level have been expanded into a full sub-section of the Rome Decla-
ration. Paragraphs 6 to 8 are indeed worth quoting in full. Allow me to sum them up in three sentences: 
- enhanced responsibilties for the Europeans are essential for a successful transformation of our 
alliance; 
- strategic unity and the indivisibility of security are compatible with the emergence of specific 
European defence arrangements; 
- such arrangements would entail practical measures guaranteeing transparency and comple-
mentarity between NATO, WEU and other European institutions competent in the field of security 
and defence. 
The strategic concept even recognises in its paragraph 52 that future European integrated and 
multinational structures will have- and here I quote- " a similarly important role to play in enhancing 
the allies' ability to work together in the common defence". 
The alliance's new strategic concept is a framework common to the Sixteen and to the Nine for 
their future national defence programmes and collective defence co-operation ventures. 
The need for a strong transatlantic partnership in an unstable world has never been challenged 
by any ally. Unquestionably, a North American military presence in Europe remains necessary as does 
nuclear deterrence. However, the size of North American contingents will also depend on factors 
external to Europe. The Europeans are very likely to have to do more rather than less. The more they 
act together, the more militarily efficient and cost-effective their effort will be. 
In the run-up to the European summit at Maastricht, we can now be more confident that a con-
structive compromise will be reached on the definition of the European pillar. The European pillar of 
the alliance is essential if NATO is to retain its vitality. How can we expect the United States to 
maintain significant forces in Europe unless we Europeans organise ourselves? Without such a 
European pillar NATO would lose its vitality and wither away. 
I cannot imagine a European union without a defence dimension. Unfortunately, the Twelve 
have been entangled in an artificial distinction between defence and security, with European political 
co-operation being able to deal only with the political and economic aspects of security. That was the 
outcome of the Genscher-Colombo initiative leading to the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart of 1983. 
As a result, those countries wanting to go further in the field of defence decided to revitalise WEU and 
bring the ministers of defence into the WEU Council, which previously consisted of ministers of 
foreign affairs only. 
I believe that today we should not go back to the early 1980s and attempt to attach defence to 
European political co-operation. In so doing, we would lose the ministers of defence, because I do not 
yet see the Twelve unanimously agreeing to meetings of the defence ministers. It seems preferable to 
use WEU as a transitional framework until defence can be fully incorporated into a European union. 
The platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague in 1987 underlined that 
perpsective. It is necessary to provide a link with the process of convergence towards European union. 
Does it make sense to envisage a defence dimension being separate in the Europe of the future, where 
defence will no longer have the priority it received in the past? 
In my paper published by the WEU ministers on 22nd February 1991, I proposed a link with the 
European Council of heads of state or government. The conclusions of the European Council on the 
principles and orientation of the common foreign and security policy would also serve as a guideline 
for co-operation under the Brussels Treaty. It would mean that any common conclusions reached by 
the Twelve would also apply to WEU. This idea may well be implemented in relation to Yugoslavia. 
WEU could be the operational body implementing the decisions in the defence field and would retain 
its full autonomy in cases where no conclusions were reached by the European Council. In this way, 
there would be some coherence between the Twelve and the Nine. 
Does this linkage give countries who belong to the Community but not to WEU an indirect voice 
in WEU or indirectly even in NATO? I believe not. Defence will be the last area to apply majority 
voting, so the Council's conclusions will have to be unanimous, with an· abstention not standing in the 
way of reaching a conclusion. If there are contrary opinions there will be no conclusions and WEU will 
have full freedom to act. Thus the position would be that whatever the Twelve are able to agree would 
also apply to WEU; if any member objects, WEU would not be bound by it. 
At present the European Commission does not claim a role in defence except on questions like 
arms production and export, which do not touch on the " hard core " of defence. In principle the 
European Parliament's involvement in defence matters could be similar to the arrangements agreed for 
the common foreign and security policy. It would mean closer co-operation with the WEU parlia-
mentary Assembly- the only such body whose competence in defence matters is based on a treaty. 
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Returning to the NATO side of the coin, I plead for more consistency in approaching European-
American relations on both sides of the Atlantic. IfWashingtoa advocates" partnership in leadership" 
then the only partner can be a European pillar as such. The problem of the non-member countries is 
difficult but not all-pervasive. 
The Americans do not want to be marginalised in European security debates. America's anxiety 
about being presented with European " faits accomplis " which are virtually impossible to influence is 
quite understandable. Both sides of the Atlantic have to make their proposals with an open mind. It is 
essential to ensure that all allies are willing to take account of each other's points of view before final 
positions are reached in alliance consultations. That applies to the Americans just as much as to the 
Europeans. 
Washington has come to accept WEU as a useful instrument for out-of-Europe contingencies. 
Europe needs to develop and maintain capabilities for intervention when and where the political will 
exists to take it. Therefore European multinational forces should be structured so that they can be used 
by NATO in collective defence scenarios and by WEU in European contingencies as well as out-of-
Europe. Their commanders could be " double-batted ", with NATO and WEU responsibilities. In situ-
ations where not all participating nations are prepared to join in a specific action, parts of the multina-
tional units would be available as building blocks for a task force. In addition to their great political 
importance, multinatioaal units, with national imputs at brigade level and above, would be a powerful 
incentive for equipment standardisation and interoperability. 
The decision to deploy these forces would be reached in a process of alliance and European con-
sultation. The Americans want to be involved in any crisis management which might ultimately 
involve them in hostilities on the European continent. On the other hand, NATO has nev~r been 
created for intervention in Eastern Europe. I foresee some situations in which Europe takes the lead 
and the United States follows and others where the United States provides its traditional leadership. A 
scenario in which Europe would act alone, without North American involvement, is most 
improbable. 
To sum up, WEU cannot be relegated to an" out-of-Europe" role only. The strengthening of 
NATO depends both on a clearer definition of the respective roles of the Europeans and the Americans 
and on a WEU contribution to collective defence on the European continent. If a European security 
dimension requires an overall framework, transatlantic relations in general - economic, monetary as 
well as security - need much care, especially at a time when defence budgets are being stream-
lined. 
In the aftermath of the Gulf war, Europe has a role to play by contributing to the definition of a 
concerted approach to the Euro-Arab dialogue, which should be a major component of any future 
European foreign and security policy. Western European Union has enhanced its profile through its 
role in co-ordinating the military presence of member countries in the Gulf. It has fulfilled this 
essential role because it is not hampered by the traditional obstacles to NATO being involved " out-of-
area " and can base the defence of vital European security interests on Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
Building on the experience of co-ordinated mine-hunting activities in the Gulf in 1987/1988, 
WEU set up a co-operation framework with agreed guidelines for the duration of the sanctions against 
Iraq under the auspices of the United Nations. 
An ad hoc group of experts from foreign and defence ministries supervised a network of naval 
and military points of contact, a permanent co-ordination unit in Paris and co-ordination among com-
manders on the spot which was eventually put under the command of a WEU naval authority. 
The guidelines for co-ordination went well beyond the measures adopted in 1987. They covered: 
- definition and performance of missions; 
- definition of areas of action; 
- co-ordination of deployments; 
- exchange of information; 
- mutual protection of shipping in the area; 
- logistic and operational support. 
In the implementation ofthe embargo strategy, over 16 000 out of some 21 000 ships challenged 
for inspection were monitored by WEU vessels. After the war, WEU countries bore the brunt of mine-
clearing operations. 
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The presence of European forces in the Gulf underscored WED's acceptance of its responsibil-
ities, side by side with the United States, for providing the means to attain the objective supported by 
the United Nations Security Council. Since collective action under similar circumstances would be 
more efficient and politically more acceptable than intervention by individual states, Europe should 
acquire its own capability to project forces and support them wherever necessary. It would entail 
increased co-operation in intelligence acquisition, earth observation communications, transport and, 
possibly, highly professional multinational units as a reaction force. 
The threat posed by the dissemination and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will 
have to be closely monitored in the future and, if needs be, checked by means of the relevant interna-
tional co-operative mechanisms, which should now be planned for that purpose. 
Lastly, there is no room for complacency about defence planning and arms co-operation now 
that tension in Central Europe has eased. With the combined pressures of successful arms control, 
lower budgets and international competition, a more comprehensive and coherent system of pro-
curement co-operation is increasingly needed. A sensible division of tasks among Europeans is the only 
way to achieve interoperability and standardisation to the benefit of all. 
Our traditional view of crisis management has to evolve. In the past we thought that crisis man-
agement involved primarily light forces, showing the flag and demonstrating allied solidarity. The Gulf 
war showed the need for heavier forces to deal with an opponent possessing large armoured forces and 
advanced technological capabilities. 
The new challenges which have emerged in continental Europe also require our full preparedness 
and vigilance. Ukraine's independence is the foremost. What about nuclear weapons stockpiled on its 
territory? Maybe the West should offer to help neutralise them in exchange for immediate economic 
aid. Proliferation by leakage could be countered by the concerted use of appropriate inducements. How 
will Moscow react if nuclear weapons are used as bargaining chips in the context of the disintegration 
of the union? What about Ukrainian plans for a conventional army which would be stronger than the 
German, French, British or Italian armies taken individually? It seems to me that some quick thinking 
is needed to establish a common West European approach to the Government of the Ukrainian 
Republic when it officially becomes a new sovereign state in early December. 
The military invasion of Croatia by Serbia and the extraordinary spread of ethnic unrest across 
Eastern Europe may well do much to convince European leaders of the urgent need to endow WEU 
with the permanent structures it needs to reach joint decisions on continental and out-of-Europe 
security problems and, where necessary, to implement plans of action tailored to possible theatres of 
operation. 
To come back to the Yugoslav quandary, I wonder whether it is appropriate any more to speak 
of a civil war. What we have in effect seen since the beginning of October is a virtual take-over by 
Serbian communists and a step-by-step military invasion of Croatia. To me, the leaders and com-
manders involved on the Serbian side are a clique akin to the one which launched the failed coup in 
Moscow last August. 
The United Nations, in their Resolution 713, have commended the European determination to 
influence events through political mediation. To intervene in Yugoslavia, Europe would need not only 
the blessing of the United Nations Security Council and the unanimous endorsement of the CSCE-
responsible for the enforcement of principles and for conflict prevention - but also a commonly agreed 
Community policy which could finally lead to an appropriate mandate for WEU action in the field. 
The WEU ad hoc group has been reactivated and has been engaged in intense work since late Sep-
tember. All the mechanisms set up at the time of the Gulf crisis could similarly be reactivated at very 
short notice. 
The action envisaged - at the stage of pre-contingency planning - was a reinforcement of the 
observers' mission with the possibility of guaranteeing their security in an autonomous way. Twelve 
failed ceasefires make such a step increasingly unlikely. Intervention as such or interposition would be 
on a different scale and probably imply a long-term military commitment. The evolution of the situ-
ation shows that such a course of action could well worsen the conflict and extend it to other republics 
within the Yugoslav Federation. The CSCE principles and the commitments subscribed to at The 
Hague peace conference are being blatently ignored. 
Politically, one must recognise that the Community has succeeded in being firmly in the lead 
with the backing of the CSCE. Both the United States leadership and the United Nations Secretary-
General are well aware of the positive role of the Community. The joint statement of the Twelve, the 
United States and the Soviet Union demonstrated a common will to contain the conflict. Sanctions 
were inescapable although their immediate effect is likely to be limited. Political mediation will remain 
useless as long as the belligerents continue to pay no attention whatsoever. It is on the spot that a 
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political framework must emerge, not in the cosy conference centres of The Hague or Brussels. An 
irregular army faction out of political control is running the shameful risk of re-enacting on European 
soil the atrocities of Lebanon and Cambodia at a time when those protracted conflicts have been 
brought to an end. 
* 
* * 
These dramatic events certainly militate in favour of the development of joint planning and 
capabilities by WEU member states. A genuine division of labour among Europeans is the only way of 
combining greater effectiveness and interoperability with the economies of scale and cost made pos-
sible by standardisation. 
Until such time as WEU merges with the European union, it can play two roles. 
First, from an institutional viewpoint, it should have a similar, though not identical, contrib-
utory role with regard to European political co-operation and in relation to NATO. WEU could caucus 
on items on the European agenda and contribute to their deliberations. Establishing the Secretariat in 
Brussels would make it easier to work with NATO and European institutions. It would also facilitate 
relations with non-member countries. Within WEU, it seems possible to agree on the presence of the 
other European allies as observers when discussing important matters on the NATO agenda. This hap-
pened in ministerial meetings on the Gulf and Yugoslavia. 
Second, from an operational viewpoint, it should develop as the military arm of the Community 
without being subjected to the same rules. This would have to be done on the basis of political compati-
bility and operational complementarity with all the relevent alliance mechanisms. 
The road to Maastricht should see the progress made at Rome translated into a more realistic 
appraisal of the definition of a new ~estern European defence structure for the nineties. 
May I remind you that the Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk of 1947 paved the way for the 
Brussels Treaty of March 1948 which in turn preceded the Washington Treaty of 1949. By deciding to 
be bound together by collective security arrangements, six European states thus made possible the 
Atlantic Alliance and a continued American presence in Europe. In so doing, they devolved part of 
their sovereignty to intergovernmental structures. The new circumstances in Europe have in turn led 
the alliance to acknowledge and encourage the establishment of a strong European pillar based on 
WEU. 
Forty-three years after European initiatives opened the way for American underpinning of our 
security, the alliance now offers the WEU countries an opportunity to regain the ground lost at the time 
of the European defence community. 
It should entail the devolution of some military responsibilities to the reactivated union. The 
Twelve now clearly know the strategic framework in which the Nine intend to co-operate further. Their 
decisions in four weeks' time should therefore be made easier. In any case, much more could be 
achieved in the defence field without any more sovereignty being relinquished than occurred at the 
time of the signing of the Brussels Treaty. 
The 1989 revolution and the momentous events of summer 1990 and 1991 have forced a change 
in the pace of construction of European union. In the final analysis, the future of peace and security in 
Europe depends on the political will of the WEU member states and the Community to develop their 
co-operation and harmonise their policies more closely. For want of a foreign and security policy, there 
is a real risk of Europe being a spectator on the sidelines of history and being reduced to a " regional 
non-power". The time has come for a choice in favour of a reactivated WEU with a credible opera-
tional role whatever the differences may be between its member countries regarding the long-term evo-
lution of European security structures. That choice can no longer be deferred. 
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 491, 494 and 496 to 505 
RECOMMENDATION 491 1 
on WEU and the European Community 2 
1. The Assembly is the only parliamentary assembly empowered to deal with the implementation 
of the modified Brussels Treaty and regrets that, in spite of this, the Council did not inform it of 
important proposals made by a member country to associate Western European Union with the 
European Community. 
2. It notes that the Commission of the European Communities is considering the inclusion in the 
Rome Treaty of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus separating it from the other provisions 
of the treaty although they are its essential complement, particularly in regard to relations between 
member countries and NATO. 
3. It also notes that a resolution adopted by the European Parliament proposes that the reactivation 
ofWEU be terminated so that it may be integrated into the Community, although some member states 
of the EEC are still opposed to developing a European concept of defence. 
4. The Assembly considers that, if implemented, these various measures would weaken the Atlantic 
Alliance and Europe's ability to play a major role in international affairs. 
5. It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council pursue the reactivation of WEU so as to allow Europe 
to play a more effective part in NATO and to provide it with the wherewithal to act more effectively 
each time the security of Europe is threatened. 
6. It also RECOMMENDS that the Council take no decision calling in question the modified Brussels 
Treaty without consulting it beforehand. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1990 during the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (7th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 
1250). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 491 
Redefining the future role of Western European Union is a fundamental exercise not only for the 
organisation itself but also in the challenge it represents, both in the context of the European con-
struction process and within the framework of the Atlantic community. At issue is the major political 
impetus that member states have agreed to give to the organisation. In this enterprise, it is the Coun-
cil's prime concern to identify the means of creating a specifically European security and defence 
dimension that will be of benefit to the Atlantic community as a whole. 
The working document on the " Role and place of WEU in the new European security archi-
tecture ", made public by ministers at the extraordinary Council meeting on 22nd February 1991, 
reveals the aims espoused by member states and the new responsibilities they would like WEU to 
assume. 
The framework within which WEU's role could be strengthened was specified by the Ministerial 
Council of 27th June. For the information of members of the Assembly, the communique issued at the 
end of the meeting has the following to say on this subject: 
" Ministers recalled that the European security and defence identity was emerging within the 
Twelve and WEU. In this connection, ministers confirmed their desire that WEU be fully part of 
the process of European integration while enhancing its contribution to solidarity within the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
They stated that the role of WEU should be strengthened in the context of the European con-
struction process, which is leading the Twelve to a political union having a common foreign and 
security policy. They agreed that European political union implies a genuine European security 
and defence identity and thus greater European responsibility for defence matters. This is in 
accordance with the Hague platform which makes clear that the construction of an integrated 
Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. Ministers 
therefore agreed that WEU should be developed in this phase of the European integration 
process as its defence component. 
They also agreed that the development of a genuine European security and defence identity will 
be reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. This will 
reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the alliance and will require, at each stage, appro-
priate practical arrangements to ensure transparency and complementarity. This will call for 
appropriate procedures for co-operation with other allies. 
Ministers noted the need for the European and Atlantic debates to proceed in parallel. " 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd July 1991. 
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RECOMMENDATION 494 1 
on enhancing WEU's public relation 2 
(i) The Assembly notes with satisfaction the increased interest shown by the media, public opinion 
and in parliamentary debates in the role of WEU as a result of its action in the Gulf region following 
Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. 
(ii) This open debate nevertheless shows that a large section of the public, if not ignorant of WEU, 
still holds preconceived and mistaken ideas about it which, in member countries and across the 
Atlantic too, lead to a lack of credibility in the institution that does not correspond to the increase in its 
activities. 
(iii) Conversely, the Assembly is gratified at being kept better informed of the Council's activities, in 
particular through the information letters from the Secretary-General, in spite of the fact that their 
contents in no way commit the Council. 
(iv) The Assembly notes with interest that, starting this year, numerous communiques have been 
issued at the close of meetings of the Council of Ministers and several of its organs. It considers the 
· Council is thus starting to ke~p the public better informed. 
(v) However, upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe and new threats emanating from regions 
outside Europe call for more systematic, coherent efforts to explain to the public the possibilities 
offered by the modified Brussels Treaty for establishing a new European security system; the Council 
must not, however, transfer the burden of these efforts to members of the Assembly. 
(vi) The hesitation shown by the Council and member governments, failing to grasp the political 
importance of public relations or to agree on WEU's future role, might increase the now prevalent 
uncertainty among the public about how Europe's future security should be guaranteed and organised. 
THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Include information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency, in accordance with the sugges-
tions made by Mr. Pontillon in Written Question 285, with a view in particular to increasing the now 
inadequate financial means available to WEU and its Assembly in this area; 
2. Work out, with the assistance of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, a communications 
strategy allowing the public debate on European security to be intensified and WEU's image to be 
enhanced in public opinion, not only in Europe but also in North America; 
3. Support and extend the Secretary-General's public relations work and urge member govern-
ments to intensify their efforts to explain to the public WEU's work in helping to establish a new 
security system in Europe; 
4. Inform the Assembly of measures taken to attain the abovementioned goals. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1990 during the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (11th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Roman on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations (Document 1246). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 494 
As the Council pointed out in its reply to Written Question 285 by Mr. Pontillon, all WEU 
bodies are helping, each as appropriate to its functions, to inform public opinion on WEU activities. 
This effort has continued during the first few months of the year, particularly as regards the 
Assembly. The Presidency's Chief of Defence Staff, for example, personally briefed a joint meeting of 
the Political and Defence Committees on the co-ordination measures decided by the Council in the 
Gulf crisis. 
As recommended by the Assembly, special attention has been devoted to intensifying the public 
debate on European security in the United States. 
Taking advantage of his many contacts, the Secretary-General, accompanied by a representative 
of the Presidency, has paid an information visit to the United States, where he met senior officials in 
the United States administration to clarify WEU's current thinking on the organisation's future role. 
The Institute for Security Studies, for its part, is also directing special efforts towards the United 
States, and has arranged several missions and events on the other side of the Atlantic in the first half of 
1991. 
Finally, the Council welcomes the activities conducted by the Assembly, such as the joint 
meeting of its committees in Palermo on 24th-26th March 1991 and the visit of a delegation to Egypt 
on 28th April-2nd May, a useful contribution towards enhancing international awareness of WEU. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th June 1991. 
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RECOMMENDATION 496 1 
on konversiya - conversion in Soviet military industry 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the far-reaching changes taking place in the USSR, in particular since the Reykjavik 
agreement; 
(ii) Convinced that the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency in defence being introduced by the Soviet 
Union will have immediate repercussions on military production; 
(iii) Aware that the INF Treaty and the imminent agreement on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) 
will reduce even further the quantitative demand for military equipment; 
(iv) Considering that, through conversion, the Soviet Union is making a sincere effort to use for 
civilian purposes the human and material resources thus being released; 
(v) Aware that the Soviet authorities consider conversion to be an important means of improving 
the living standards of the population; 
(vi) Recalling that the preamble to the Brussels Treaty refers to economic, social and cultural ties as 
means for fortifying and preserving the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty; 
(vii) Recognising that it is too early to assess the full significance of economic and political reforms 
now taking place in the Soviet Union; 
(viii) Convinced that in the post cold war era strong social, economic and cultural ties between 
Western European nations and the Soviet Union will greatly contribute to reinforcing peace and 
security in the whole of Europe; 
(ix) Recognising that, in a first phase of the Soviet Union's transition to market economy, direct 
exchanges between companies, experts and politicians will be crucial; 
(x) Aware that, notwithstanding existing uncertainties, both the Federal Republic of Germany and 
France have recently concluded bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union on partnership and 
co-operation, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Urge member governments to promote the extension of existing and the establishment of new 
exchange programmes so as to enable both Soviet and Western European experts to learn more about 
each other's social, economic and cultural systems; 
2. Urge those member governments which have not yet done so to conclude formal bilateral agree-
ments on good neighbourliness, partnership and co-operation, based on the new pattern of interna-
tional relations in Europe and modelled on two such agreements as recently concluded by WEU 
member states; 
3. Appoint a special committee of experts from national administrations with the task of studying 
conversion problems and exchanging experience and advice with their opposite numbers in the Soviet 
Union. 
1. Adopted on 6th December 1990 during the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (12th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee 
(Document 1249). 
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to Recommendation 496 
1. The security ofWEU states, and of all European states, can only benefit from the Soviet Union 
opening out to democracy and from its leaders' resolve that it be part of a single European area. WEU 
states are wholeheartedly in favour of stepping up exchanges with these countries over the widest range 
of sectors, since such contacts will promote confidence and weave a close fabric of relationships, 
serving as a powerful factor for stability. 
2. In the politico-military domain, the confrontation between two blocs is disappearing with the 
dismantlement of the Warsaw Pact and with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe now 
under way. It is being replaced by a desire for co-operation, which several member states have trans-
lated into treaties. These legal instruments are helping to set up a network of bilateral agreements bene-
ficial to all European states. The Council hopes that these instruments will be the formal embodiment 
on a bilateral level of the equality and sovereignty of states, as expressed notably in the Helsinki Final 
Act and in the Charter of Paris. 
3. The conversion of the military industry is a major challenge for the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and for the Soviet Union. 
WEU member states consider that discussions and the sharing of expertise with the Soviet 
Union on this question may be a useful contribution towards meeting this challenge. 
To ensure that the technical assistance is as effective as possible, member states consider that it 
should be established between the Soviet Union and those countries best able to contribute their expe-
rience. The prime need is for a flexible approach commensurate with the problems to be solved. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th June 1991. 
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RECOMMENDATION 497 1 
on European security and threats outside Europe -
the organisation of peace and security in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the crisis caused by Iraq's aggression against Kuwait aggravated an already dif-
ficult situation in the Middle East which makes it urgent for Europe to take steps to promote a solution 
to conflicts in the Middle East and the establishment of a peaceful, secure order throughout the Medi-
terranean basin and the Middle East with due respect for the cultural and religious traditions of each 
people; 
(ii) Welcoming Arab initiatives to establish a regional security system and considering that a 
reduction of tension requires co-operation between the countries of the region, respect for human 
rights and the promotion of balanced economic and social development; 
(iii) Considering that an international conference is needed in order to solve Middle East problems 
on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and approving the intention expressed by the 
European Council on 8th April 1991 to have Europe play an active part in settling conflicts in the 
Middle East; 
(iv) Considering that the organisation of lasting peace requires immediate preparations to be made 
for a conference on peace and security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM) after the 
fashion of the CSCE, duly adapted for application in the Mediterranean region; 
(v) Considering that the limitation of arms supplies to countries in the region calls for international 
agreement associating purchasing countries and selling countries in order to fix levels of armaments for 
countries in the region; 
(vi) Considering that the proliferation of all conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, 
in particular chemical weapons, in the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East is a serious threat to 
peace; 
(vii) Gratified that WEU, after helping to apply the embargo imposed on Iraq as decided by the 
Security Council, has taken responsibility for co-ordinating military action to assist Kurdish refugees 
following the decision taken by the European Council on 8th April 1991, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I 
With a view to helping to bring about peace in the Near and Middle East, should, where appro-
priate: 
1. In all areas within its purview, pursue the action undertaken by the European Council to allow 
Europe to help to establish and then maintain peace in the Middle East and security in the Mediter-
ranean, in particular by laying the foundations for a system of co-operation, good-neighbourliness, 
eo-responsibility and interdependence between all countries in the region with respect for human 
rights. This system will make possible the essential process of economic and social development that 
should reduce the present imbalances between those states. It will also ensure respect for the legitimate 
rights of all peoples in the region, including those of the Palestinian people; 
2. Continue to implement European Council decisions relating to humanitarian aid to the Kurdish 
people; 
3. In all its activities, use the good offices of the Secretariat-General; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Martinez on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1271). 
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4. Instruct the WEU committee of chiefs of defence staff to: 
(a) determine, if so requested by the countries concerned or decided by the United Nations 
Security Council, the kind of military assistance member countries are able to make at the 
present time in order to guarantee any peace agreements which may be reached in the 
Middle East and organise the co-ordination of such assistance; 
(b) ensure an improvement in member countries' means of information, communication and 
transport with a view to affording such assistance if necessary; 
(c) co-ordinate the use of military and other resources used for peaceful purposes for the benefit 
of refugees in the region; 
5. Promote the achievement of a general agreement governing the possession of and trade in arms 
in the Middle East and insist on transparency in the arms trade by having the United Nations record 
contracts and sales; 
6. Promote agreement between member countries to end or at least to reduce supplies of arms to 
the Middle East with a view to making peace and stability possible; 
7. To this end, invite the Institute for Security Studies to: 
(a) study the ongoings of armaments of all kinds in the Middle East; 
(b) gather information supplied to it by member countries on the armaments contracts they or 
their private firms sign with countries in the region and on the possible transfer of tech-
nology that might be used to produce armaments and ensure compliance, wherever possible, 
with end-user certificates; 
(c) report back to the Assembly; 
11 
Help to prepare a conference on security and peace in the Mediterrranean and the Middle East 
by instructing its Mediterranean Sub-Group to work out Western Europe's positions on all matters 
relating to the first basket, in particular: 
(a) the non-proliferation of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and a ban on the pro-
duction and holding of chemical and bacteriological weapons as a first step towards the cre-
ation of a zone free of atomic, biological and chemical weapons; 
(b) controlling the arms trade; 
(c) the limitation and verification of conventional armaments; 
(d) confidence-building measures; 
(e) the creation of a conflict prevention centre; 
Ill 
Append to its annual report detailed information on the activities and conclusions of the Medi-
terranean Sub-Group and information obtained by the unit responsible for studying armaments in the 
Middle East. 
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1. The Council and its working groups are closely and continually monitoring the evolution of the 
recent initiative launched by the United States for a regional peace conference leading to the start of 
negotiations between the parties in the Middle East. They are making every bilateral and multinational 
effort to contribute to the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and for security in the 
Mediterranean including the respect for the legitimate rights of all peoples in the region. In this 
context, they have successfully co-ordinated their maritime presence in the Gulf area and their human-
itarian aid in favour of the civilian population of Iraq. Within the framework of the European Com-
munity and on a bilateral basis they will continue to promote a balanced social and economic devel-
opment in the region as a necessary element of lasting peace. 
2. The Council welcomes the initiative of the European Community and Japan for a compre-
hensive but non-discriminatory register of arms transfers in the framework of the. United Nations. 
WEU member states are, moreover, actively fostering a convention of a global ban on the manufacture, 
possession and use of chemical weapons, together with an appropriate verification regime to be con-
cluded in 1992. They also support all measures against proliferation of all weapons of mass 
destruction. 
3. The Council is studying the idea of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediter-
ranean (CSCM). The WEU Institute for Security Studies devotes a substantial part of its analytical 
work to questions pertaining to security in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sub-Group - in 
accordance with a ministerial mandate of 1Oth December 1990 - has drawn up an annotated list of 
principles likely to contribute to a resolution of the security issues in the Mediterranean. At their 
meeting in Vianden on 27th June 1991, WEU ministers took note of the work and asked the sub-group 
to continue its activities. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991. 
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RECOMMENDATION 498 1 
on the Gulf crisis - lessons for Western European Union 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Congratulating the WEU Council of Ministers on what has been achieved by the forces of 
member nations to help the coalition resolve the crisis in the Gulf and in particular applauding the ini-
tiatives taken by the Chairman-in-Office to co-ordinate WEU activities; 
(ii) Seconding the Council's prompt action in helping to provide the military support necessary to 
take aid to and ensure the protection of the Kurdish refugees; 
(iii) Welcoming the German decision to join current WEU mine-clearing operations in the Gulf; 
(iv) Believing that a longer-term WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area would considerably 
strengthen the chances of maintaining peace and stability in the region; 
(v) Supporting the idea of regular meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff; 
(vi) Dismayed that there is no certainty that the excellent arrangements made by the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council to co-ordinate WEU activities both in the Gulf area and between national cap-
itals, as well as in the WEU operational cells, will continue beyond the end of June; 
(vii) Convinced that the time is now ripe formally to associate Denmark, Greece, Norway and 
Turkey, if they wish, with the work of WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Establish, in co-operation with the United Nations and especially with the relevant Gulf states, a 
WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty with as many member countries as possible contributing assets at least on an occasional basis, 
to help maintain peace and stability in the region and support diplomatic efforts directed towards the 
same ends; 
2. Invite the governments of Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey to be associated on a per-
manent basis with the work of WEU at all levels and in all bodies; 
3. Instruct the chiefs of defence staff to meet regularly and to examine the feasibility of 
co-ordinating national assets to establish WEU rapid action forces for extra-European operations; 
4. Ensure the continuity, as long as may be necessary, of WEU co-ordination of: 
(a) the application of the United Nations embargo on arms, etc., for Iraq; 
(b) mine-clearing operations in the Gulf; 
(c) helping to protect the environment where the threat to ecology is used as a weapon; 
(d) support for aid to the Kurds and their protection, 
both on the spot and between national capitals, by either transferring the total task from Paris to Bonn 
with the change of Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 1st July 1991, or mandating the Secretary-
General to make the necessary arrangements. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 
1268). 
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1. The WEU Council of Ministers in Vianden stated that ministers are resolved to grasp the 
" opportunity of promoting measures that would secure lasting peace and stability " in the Gulf region. 
In this context, member states have successfully co-ordinated their maritime presence in the Gulf area 
and their humanitarian efforts in favour of the civilian population of Iraq. They will continue to 
promote, on a multinational and national basis, the search for a just and lasting peace. 
2. The question of associating other European states with the work of WEU is under discussion in 
the competent international organisations. Different solutions are being studied by WEU member 
states but it is still too early to predict the outcome. The Council is confident, however, that appro-
priate procedures for adequate co-operation with all European members of EC and NATO can be 
worked out. 
3. On 27th June 1991, ministers mandated the WEU Defence Representatives Group" to spell out 
and assess, in liaison with the Special Working Group, proposals to make co-operation more opera-
tional both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other 
things tasks and the requirements for co-ordination and planning structures ". The result of this work 
will be submitted to ministers as soon as possible. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991. 
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RECOMMENDATION 499 1 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1990 (supplementary budgets) and 1991 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that: 
(a) the abolition of the Agencies for Security Questions meant the Secretariat-General bearing 
the cost of pensions payable to the staff of those agencies and expenditure relating to the 
operation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments; 
(b) the Secretary-General consequently submitted two supplementary budgets (the first and the 
third) during the financial year 1990 to include the abovementioned expenditure in his 
budget; 
(c) a " liquidation " budget terminated the management of the former agencies as from 
30th June 1990; 
(d) in the financial year 1990, the Secretary-General strengthened his staff on the basis of a man-
agement study conducted by the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, intro-
duced new means of work and included the corresponding credits in a supplementary budget 
(the second) for 1990 and in the 1991 budget; 
(e) these measures, representing a groWth rate of 15.05% in the budget for 1991, seem fully jus-
tified by the increase in work due to the reactivation ofWEU and the implementation ofthe 
principles set out in the platform of October 1987; 
(ii) Regretting that: 
(a) the WEU Council refused the proposals to strengthen the staff of the Office of the Clerk of 
the Assembly and authorised the creation of only two new posts on condition one of them 
was financed by savings elsewhere in the Assembly's operating budget; 
(b) this decision, justified by "the present climate of financial stringency [which] places severe 
constraints upon national budgets", is in contradiction with the decisions taken in respect of 
the Secretariat-General and discriminates against the Assembly; 
(c) the Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration had great diffi-
culty in obtaining. the budget documents from the Secretariat-General whereas communi-
cation of these documents is an obligation for the Council under Article VIII (c) of the 
Charter and Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly; 
(iii) Noting that: 
(a) the conclusions of the examination in the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts of matters concerning the staff (participation of staff representatives in negotiations 
on employment conditions and establishment of means for encouraging and facilitating 
movements of staff from one co-ordinated organisation to another), referred to in Assembly 
Recommendation 487, have still not been communicated; 
(b) the Committee on the Budget and the Intergovernmental Work Programme of the Assembly 
of the Council of Europe has conducted a study of the careers of staff of the Council of 
Europe and this study sets out the broad lines of a career policy which might be applied to 
WEU staff, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
--·--- --- ~- - ---- - ---
1. Reconsider its position towards the Assembly's requirements, which were set out and duly jus-
tified in its draft budget for 1991; 
2. Arrange for all documents on budgetary matters, circulated under B, C-B, BR or CR references, 
to be systematically sent to the Assembly; 
3. Communicate to the Assembly its conclusions on staff policy problems; 
4. Examine to what extent the proposals contained in the study of the careers of staff of the Council 
of Europe might be taken into account in the framework of WEU's staff policy. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fabra on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration (Document 1264). 
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1. The regular contacts between the Secretariat-General and the President of the Assembly have 
cleared the way for a mutually accepted compromise solution as to the Assembly's budget for 1991. 
2. As the references B, C-B, BR or CR indicate working or classified documents, an automatic pre-
sentation to the Assembly cannot unfortunately be envisaged. However, in order to meet the 
Assembly's increasing information requirements, such documents, or an indication of their content, 
could be sent to the Assembly at the latter's request, on a case by case basis and when deemed nec-
essary. 
3. At the present moment, the Council endeavours to maintain a maximum of flexibility in the for-
mulation of its staff policy in order to cope with the changing challenges to which the organisation has 
to react. When a final decision has been taken as to the role and place of WEU in the European security 
architecture it would of course become possible to envisage a longer-term staff policy. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1991. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 500 1 
on the consequences of dnelopments in Central 
and Eastern Europe for European security 2 
(i) Welcoming the fact that events in the Soviet Union have not modified the guidelines of its 
external policy; 
(ii) Welcoming the Soviet Union's support in defending the cause of peace and law at the United 
Nations Security Council during the crisis provoked by the invasion of Kuwait; 
(iii) Considering that the signing of the CFE agreement, although preceded by a redeployment of 
Soviet armed forces which places Western Europe out of reach of a surprise attack, has not yet led to a 
massive reduction in the level of Soviet armaments; 
(iv) Considering as positive the Supreme Soviet's vote in favour of ratification of important parts of 
the agreement providing for the reunification of Germany; 
(v) Recalling that the new international order, whose principles were affirmed in the Paris Charter 
of November 1990, implies maintaining freedom of expression for all and respect for the rights of 
minorities and calls for an intensive effort to find practical means of implementing these prin-
ciples; 
(vi) Recalling that the Charter of Paris expresses new principles and includes specific measures for 
disarmament, the establishment of a European security system and, in particular, the creation of a con-
flict prevention centre; 
(vii) Noting the will shown by certain European countries to redirect their internal and external pol-
icies and to seek ways of drawing closer to Western Europe; 
(viii) Also noting with great concern the re-emergence of national conflicts in the Soviet Union and in 
certain Central European and Balkan countries; 
(ix) Noting the extreme difficulties encountered in reforming the economy of all the countries in 
these regions and in particular the current Soviet request for western economic assistance and Pres-
ident Gorbachev's desire to address the forthcoming G-7 summit in London on 15th-17th July; 
(x) Considering that, according to the preamble and Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
one ofWEU's tasks is" to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe", 
there being no limit to the geographical extension of this undertaking; 
(xi) Recalling further that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty invites WEU to co-operate 
closely with NATO; 
(xii) Underlining finally that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty does not limit participation 
in the activities of the Council's subsidiary bodies to member countries and recalling that the Council 
has in certain cases invited representatives of non-member countries of WEU to its ministerial 
meetings; 
(xiii) Welcoming the pursuit of its exchanges with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and the 
participation of observers from the parliaments of Central and Eastern European countries at its ses-
sions; 
(xiv) Considering that the various organisations contributing to co-operation in Europe participate in 
the establishment of security throughout the European continent, 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1263). 
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Promote, as provided for in the Charter of Paris and in accordance with the recommendations of 
the Assembly, the negotiation of a second agreement on conventional forces to establish a true balance 
of forces and armaments between the Soviet Union and the deployment of the Atlantic Alliance in 
Europe, a second agreement on confidence-building measures extended to the thirty-five countries par-
ticipating in the CSCE and the rapid creation of the conflict prevention centre in Europe; 
2. Examine with the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe which are no longer members of 
the Warsaw Pact, insofar as they so wish, the conditions for making them" associated countries" by 
allowing them to co-operate here and now in: 
(a) the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies; 
(b) bodies for European co-operation in armaments matters; 
(c) the activities of the Council's subsidiary bodies whose aim is to verify the application of 
agreements on the limitation of conventional armaments; 
(d) any activities of the Council itself intended to consolidate international peace in Europe or 
outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty; 
and examine with those countries any desire on their part to be released from being proscribed under 
the Cocom rules; 
3. Foster a rapprochement between those countries and the Community and WEU; 
4. Examine any steps that might be taken to ensure application of principles defined by the CSCE 
to all European countries, with particular regard to the inviolability of frontiers, in view of the require-
ments of security, respect for human rights and economic and social co-operation; 
5. Foster the development of the international mechanism provided for in the supplementary doc-
ument of the CSCE Charter of Paris and to this end support the establishment of a CSCE parlia-
mentary assembly in which WEU would undertake its rightful role; 
6. Promote co-operation between all institutions participating in the security of Europe, in par-
ticular the CSCE, NATO, the Community, the Council of Europe and WEU, and take steps to con-
tribute thereto, especially in regard to exchanges of information and documents. 
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1. At their meeting in Luxembourg on 27th June 1991, the foreign and defence ministers ofWEU 
member states explicitly welcomed the recent initiatives by member countries aimed at relaunching the 
arms control process. They expressed their resolve to continue concertation among member states, in 
consultation with partners, in order to develop a joint approach which takes account of the interests of 
Europeans in every field of arms control. Ministers welcomed the solution reached in resolving the 
questions regarding implementation of the CFE Treaty. They expressed the hope that the continuation 
of the negotiations on conventional armed forces would rapidly lead to an additional agreement aimed 
at strengthening stability in Europe, particularly through measures to limit and, where necessary, 
reduce manpower levels. 
WEU ministers also expressed their hope that the negotiations on security- and confidence-
building measures would be used to enhance transparency and confidence in Europe. 
Furthermore, WEU member countries have actively contributed to the creation of the CSCE 
Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), which was inaugurated in Vienna on 18th March 1991. At the 
Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council on 19th-20th June 1991, the foreign ministers ofWEU member 
states - together with their counterparts from the other CSCE member states - adopted a mechanism 
for consultation and co-operation with regard to emergency situations. 
2. On the basis of its April 1990 ministerial mandate, WEU has established and is developing 
" contacts for two-way information with the democratically-elected governments in Central and 
Eastern Europe ". Meeting in December 1990, ministers took note of a progress report on the contacts 
established, and endorsed steps to develop those contacts. At their meeting in Vianden on 27th June 
1991, ministers hoped that this dialogue could be given more depth and breadth. They viewed the pre-
liminary exchanges as very positive and proposed the following measures: 
- to explore the possibilities of giving the dialogue a more political dimension, for example by 
organising ad hoc contacts at ministerial level on specific subjects of common interest; 
- to intensify the exchanges of views among experts on subjects of common interest. 
In line with the activities already undertaken, WEU ministers also agreed that the WEU Institute 
for Security Studies should make a number of scholarships available to young researchers in the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
In July 1991 in London, the WEU Secretary-General and a representative of the German presi-
dency met on separate occasions with the Ambassadors of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to 
inaugurate the information links between the WEU Secretariat-General and the embassies of those 
countries. 
Furthermore, WEU fact-finding missions to Bulgaria and Romania will take place soon in 
accordance with the same ministerial mandate with the aim of extending WEU's dialogue to those two 
countries. It is also envisaged to organise a follow-up to the seminar organised under the aegis of the 
WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris earlier this year and which brought together the officials 
responsible for politico-military affairs in the foreign and defence ministries of both the WEU member 
states and Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The WEU Institute for Security Studies is estab-
lishing links with the academic communities of Central and Eastern Europe. The Institute has also 
created a" task force" on the Soviet Union composed of experts in Soviet affairs from WEU member 
countries. 
The Council is therefore confident that WEU co-operation with Central and Eastern Europe is 
developing in a very positive direction. 
3. As regards Cocom, any desire on the part of the Central and Eastern countries to be released 
l 
i 
.; 
from the residual proscriptions under the Cocom rules will have to be examined primarily in the ~ 
framework of the seventeen-nation Cocom organisation. 
4. The principles of the Helsinki Final Act apply to all CSCE member countries. It is the policy of 
WEU member states to encourage steps that might be taken to ensure the application of principles 
defined by the CSCE. The Council agrees with the Assembly that the task now is to exploit fully the 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991. 
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opportunities to improve security and stability in Europe through the institutions established by the 
Charter of Paris. 
5. It is the policy of WEU member governments to promote the development of the international 
mechanism provided for in the supplementary document of the CSCE Charter of Paris. To this end, 
WEU member states have supported the establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly. At the 
Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council on 19th-20th June 1991, ministers of foreign affairs of the 
Thirty-five welcomed the establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly. 
6. The promotion of co-operation and the practical asp~cts of co-operation between all institutions 
"participating in the security of Europe, in particular the CSCE, NATO, the Community, the Council 
of Europe and WEU " are at the heart of WEU's ongoing discussions. 
In this context, the Council wishes to recall that, on 27th June 1991, WEU foreign and defence 
ministers explicitly underlined the importance of the CSCE ministerial meeting in Berlin. They 
stressed the significance of its conclusions, particularly as regards the complementarity and links 
existing between the various institutions of the European security architecture, of which WEU is a part. 
Ministers also stated that WEU should be fully part of the process of European integration while 
enhancing its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. 
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on weaponry after the Gulf war -
new equipment requirements for restructured armed forces 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the continuing improvement in relations between all countries participating in the 
CSCE; 
(ii) Recognising that the process of political detente, combined with the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from the territory of Central European nations and reductions of troops and equipment in the 
framework of the CFE agreement have reduced the security risk in Central Europe; 
(iii) Aware that the economic deterioration and increasing political instability in the Soviet Union 
and in Eastern and South-East Europe constitue a security risk for Europe which cannot be ignored; 
(iv) Conscious that, in some parts of Eastern Europe, recent democratisation has also brought to the 
fore a number of ethnic, national and economic difficulties, thus creating instability; 
(v) Recognising that the Gulf war was very different from past wars, particularly in regard to new 
technology and lessons and consequences have to be drawn from it; 
(vi) Fearing that for many years to come the Near and Middle East may remain an area of instability 
marked inter alia by the accumulation of military equipment and thus carry serious risks for the 
security and other interests of Europe; 
(vii) Concerned that existing intelligence and surveillance systems failed to provide adequate infor-
mation on the military build-up prior to the invasion of Kuwait as was also the case in Afghanistan in 
1979; 
(viii) Alarmed by developments in ballistic missile technology in a number of countries in the Medi-
terranean and in the Near and Middle East; 
(ix) Aware that as a consequence of institutional constraints some possible security risks cannot be 
controlled by NATO as such, but that in certain conditions, such as out-of-area crises, WEU can play a 
useful complementary role; 
(x) Convinced that WEU will need an operational capability in order to give Europe more influence 
within NATO and the ability to respond with the United States to world events; 
(xi) Convinced that a European rapid reaction force for use outside the NATO area would be logical 
and compatible with NATO's responsibilities to defend NATO territory; 
(xii) Aware of the new force structures which will be introduced in the allied forces, on both a 
national and multinational level, based on the principles of flexibility, mobility and reinforcement, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Urgently establish a WEU centre for satellite data interpretation as a first step towards setting up 
a European observation satellite agency; 
2. Thoroughly review national force reductions as soon as the Atlantic Alliance has reached deci-
sions regarding future allied force structures; 
3. Instruct the committee of chiefs of defence staff of WEU to examine in detail the consequences 
of future allied force structures and the lessons of the Gulf war for European military co-operation, in 
particular with a view to studying: 
(a) the possibility of setting up a European strategic airlift command equipped with a military 
version of the Airbus A-340 and operating in a WEU framework; 
(b) the ballistic missile threat on Europe's southern flank and a possible subsequent common 
European requirement for an anti-ballistic missile capability; 
(c) a common European requirement for a stand-off capability and precision-guided weapons. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee (Document 1272). 
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1. In the field of space co-operation within WEU, and with a view to giving concrete expression to 
that co-operation, the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states decided at their meeting in 
Luxembourg on 27th June 1991 to: 
- set up a satellite data interpretation centre whose immediate task would be to train European 
experts in the photo-interpretation of satellite-derived data, to compile and process accessible 
data and to make those data available to member states, particularly within the framework of 
the verification of arms control agreements, crisis and environmental monitoring. The activ-
ities of the centre will be reviewed no later than three years after it has entered into operation. 
- task the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space to pursue studies on the possibilities for medium- and 
long-term co-operation on a European satellite observation system. 
2. The Ministerial Council on 27th June 1991 in Vianden tasked the WEU Defence Representa-
tives Group to" spell out and assess, in liaison with the Special Working Group, proposals to make 
co-operation more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, 
covering among other things tasks and the requirements for co-ordination and planning structures" . In 
this framework, the structures and the lessons of the Gulf war will be considered. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991. 
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RECOMMENDATION 502 1 
on arms control: force reductions and the role of multinational units 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Conscious that Soviet redeployment undermines the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional 
Armaments in Europe signed in Paris in November 1990, but insisting on full respect for both the 
letter and the spirit of this international agreement; 
(ii) Looking forward to a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, possession and use of 
chemical weapons, together with appropriate verification methods; 
(iii) Insisting that discussions should now begin on considerably reducing numbers of short-range 
nuclear weapons; 
(iv) Determined that general agreement should be reached on the regulation of arms sales, preferably 
within a United Nations context; 
(v) Noting that unco-ordinated defence budget cuts in the majority of member countries are pro-
ceeding apace; 
(vi) Reiterating the need to maintain transatlantic solidarity through NATO; 
(vii) Emphasising the development within the Atlantic Alliance of a European pillar, which should be 
comprised of all European NATO members who wish to be associated; 
(viii) In the knowledge that the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee has already discussed the 
creation of a European multinational rapid action force and that NATO's Military Committee has 
endorsed the idea of a NATO multinational rapid reaction force; 
(ix) Respecting the sovereignty of each member nation, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Encourage member nations to begin the ratification process of the Treaty of Paris while 
remaining firm with the Soviet Union on respect for both the letter and the spirit of the CFE 
Agreement; 
2. Encourage member nations to give a common impetus to the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament with a view to obtaining a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, possession 
and use of chemical weapons, together with an appropriate verification regime; 
3. Make the services of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments available to the United 
Nations for advice on verification of the chemical arms ban on Iraq; 
4. Urge the United States and the Soviet Union to begin the promised discussions on considerably 
reduced numbers of short-range nuclear weapons; 
5. Institute a register of arms sales by member countries, support European initiatives to ensure 
transparency in this domain and urge the United Nations Security Council to begin the process of 
seeking a general agreement on the regulation of arms sales; 
6. Initiate discussion within WEU on the co-ordination necessary to ensure that a sufficient level of 
security is maintained in Europe despite cuts in national defence budgets; 
7. Express its wholehearted support for the need to maintain transatlantic solidarity through 
NATO and emphasise that the European pillar within the alliance should be composed of all European 
members of NATO who wish to be so associated; 
8. Instruct its chiefs of defence staff to begin work on the creation of a permanent multinational 
command structure _capabl-e of planning, co-ordinating and exercising WEU actions in the context of 
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (7th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Uyttendaele on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1270). 
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1. At their meeting in Luxembourg on 27th June 1991, the foreign and defence ministers ofWEU 
member states " welcomed the solution reached in resolving the questions regarding implementation of 
the CFE Treaty. They expressed the hope that the continuation of the negotiations on conventional 
armed forces would rapidly lead to an additional agreement aimed at strengthening stability in Europe, 
particularly through measures to limit, and, where necessary, reduce manpower levels." 
2. The functions of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) are exhaustively defined in 
Part 11 (Article VII- Article XII) of Protocol No. IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the 
Control of Armaments, signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954, which entred into force on 6th May 
1955. Article IX states explicitly:" The operations of the Agency shall be confined to the mainland of 
Europe." 
3. WEU member states are actively fostering a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, 
possession and use of chemical weapons, together with an appropriate verification regime. This 
position has been stated repeatedly by the Council over the last couple of years, inter alia, in the Coun-
cil's replies to Assembly Recommendations 403 (communicated to the Assembly on 14th November 
1984, Assembly Document 996, paragraph 4), 441 (communicated to the Assembly on 27th April 
1987, Assembly Document 1104, paragraph 6), 460 (communicated to the Assembly on 11th April 
1990, Assembly Document 1233, paragraph 7). 
Within the framework of the European Community, WEU member states have, together with 
Japan, introduced a resolution at the 46th United Nations General Assembly calling for a compre-
hensive but non-discriminatory register of arms transfers in order to enhance and make worldwide the 
process of reducing excessive holdings of conventional weapons. 
4. As regards the planning, co-ordination and exercising of WEU action in general, the Council 
would like to draw the Assembly's attention to the ministerial mandate of 27th June 1991 given to the 
Defence Representatives Group" to spell out and assess, in liaison with the Special Working Group, 
proposals to make co-operation more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the 
military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the requirements for co-ordination and 
planning structures ". 
5. On 27th June 1991, the foreign and defence ministers ofWEU member states" agreed that the 
development of a genuine European security and defence identity will be reflected in the strengthening 
of the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance ". Ministers noted furthermore the need for the 
European and Atlantic debates to proceed in parallel. The question of associating the European 
members of NATO with the work of WEU is under consideration in this framework. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991. 
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RECOMMENDATION 503 1 
replying to the annual report of the Council 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering the security and defence aspects of the annual report of the Council, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Instruct its Defence Representatives Group to make a study of the suggestions in the present 
report concerning multinational units and report; 
2. Provide the Assembly with fuller accounts of the discussions held by its various bodies and give 
the Assembly priority of information concerning its decisions; 
3. Instruct the WEU Institute for Security Studies to prepare unclassified versions of its reports and 
discussion papers and forward them to the Assembly; 
4. Continue to provide the Assembly with information regarding inspections carried out by the 
WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (7th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Uyttendaele on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1270). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 503 
1. The Council has noted with interest the suggestions concerning multinational units contained in 
the Assembly's report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. Uyttendaele on " Arms 
control: force reductions and the role of multinational units - reply to the annual report of the 
Council" (Assembly Document 1270). The Council considers that these suggestions represent a useful 
contribution to the reflection on this subject. In this context, and as a result of the ministerial mandate 
of 27th June 1991, the Defence Representatives Group has been tasked " to spell out and assess, in 
liaison with the Special Working Group, proposals to make co-operation more operational both in the 
politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the 
requirements for co-ordination and planning structures ". 
2. As the abovementioned report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. 
Uyttendaele readily admits, communication between the Council and the Secretariat-General on the 
one hand and the Assembly on the other has steadily improved in line with WEU's reactivation. While 
bearing in mind the need for confidentiality, the Council considers that possibilities for further 
improvements in the exchange of information with the Assembly could be explored as WEU becomes 
more operational. 
3. The Assembly has full access to the Institute's unclassified work. As regards the preparation of 
unclassified versions of the Institute's classified reports and discussion papers with the aim of for-
warding them to the Assembly, this presents a number of practical problems. Indeed, in most cases the 
preparation of unclassified versions of the Institute's classified documents would lead to a considerable 
loss of substance. In other cases, questions discussed in the Institute's unclassified publications are 
already closely related to problems analysed in classified documents prepared by the Institute. Never-
theless, the Council will try to find solutions to improve the information of the Assembly by the 
Institute as WEU becomes more operational. 
4. The Council has no intention of discounting its current practice of providing the Assembly with 
general information regarding inspections carried out by the WEU Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991. 
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RECOMMENDATION 504 1 
on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU and the reunification of Germany 
make necessary a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty: 
(ii) Considering that certain provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer meet European 
security requirements but are obstacles to harmonious co-operation between member countries in 
security and defence matters; 
(iii) Considering that WEU is required to take its place, together with the Community and political 
co-operation, in a European union whose responsibilities will be extended to include security and 
defence matters; 
(iv) Considering that the North Atlantic Treaty is still essential for the security of Europe as a whole; 
(v) Considering that the new order of peace and security that the CSCE is in the process of estab-
lishing throughout Europe calls for a demonstration of a collective European will to ensure respect for 
the principles set out in the Paris Charter; 
(vi) Considering that WEU is still essential for any co-ordinated action by member countries outside 
the area defined by the North Atlantic Treaty, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Examine without delay the changes to be made to the modified Brussels Treaty to adapt it to the 
new circumstances; 
2. To this end, take into consideration the draft treaty proposed by the Assembly as follows: 
The high contracting parties 
Resolved: 
To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
Ptf~Son and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the European 
Convention on Human Rights; 
To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the 
constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage; 
To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are 
already united; 
To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create a firm basis for the European 
economy; 
To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
provisions adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in maintaining interna-
tional peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression; 
To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe; 
To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals 
and animated by the like determination; 
Determined to pursue their action to organise the integration of their economies, their eco-
nomic, social and cultural co-operation, their legitimate collective defence and the organisation of 
security and co-operation in all European countries; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (7th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1261). 
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Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I I 
Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to 
play fully their due role in organising a new order of peace and security in Europe and maintaining 
peace and economic and social development in the world, the high contracting parties will co-ordinate 
their action in the various organisations helping to attain these aims. 
The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the 
Council referred to in Article VI, as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, 
or prejudice to, the work of other organisations in which the high contracting parties are or may be 
represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organisat1ons. 
ARTICLE 11 2 
In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them 
under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
While retaining the right to prepare for any military operations they may deem necessary, the 
Council and its subordinate bodies will ensure that there is no overlapping with NATO civil and mil-
itary bodies and will pursue a continuing exchange of information and opinions with them. 
ARTICLE Ill 3 
If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other 
high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their 
power. 
ARTICLE IV 4 
All measures taken as a result of the preceding article shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures nec-
essary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
The present treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the high contracting parties 
under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any 
way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
ARTICLE V 5 
The high contracting parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the interna-
tional engagements now in force between him and any other of the high contracting parties or any third 
state is in conflict with the provisions of the present treaty. 
None of the high contracting parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition 
directed against any other of the high contracting parties. 
ARTICLE VI 6 
1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging 
the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between them and with other European 
organisations, the high contracting parties to the Brussels Treaty create a Council to consider matters 
concerning the execution of this treaty. 
l. Amended text. 
2. Former Article IV amended. 
3. Former Article V, amended in French. 
4. Former Article VI. 
5. Former Article VII. 
6. Former Article VIII amended. 
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2. This Council is known as the " Council of Western European Union"; it is so organised as to be 
able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered 
necessary. It may invite to take part in some of its activities or those of any bodies it may set up any 
country subscribing to the principles set out in the preamble to the present treaty whose co-operation it 
considers useful. It may grant such countries a status of associated country in Western European 
Union. 
3. At the request of any of the high contracting parties, of the European Council or of the Assembly, 
the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to concert their approach to any 
challenge to security and co-operation in Europe or to the application of arms limitation conventions 
and to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise. 
4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has 
been or may be agreed. 
ARTICLE VII 7 
The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities to an 
assembly of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers appointed in accordance with the same cri-
teria as representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
ARTICLE VIII 8 
In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the high 
contracting parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions: 
The high contracting parties will, while the present treaty remains in force, settle all disputes 
falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
by referring them to the court, subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already 
made by that party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that party 
may maintain the reservation. 
In addition, the high contracting parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope 
of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and 
other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any party to the dispute shall have the 
right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation. 
The preceding provisions of this article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or 
agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement. 
ARTICLE IX 9 
The high contracting parties may decide, by joint agreement, after the Council has consulted the 
Assembly, to invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between 
them and the state so invited. 
Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing an instrument of accession 
with the Belgian Government. 
The Belgian Government will inform each of the high contracting parties of the deposit of each 
instrument of accession. 
ARTICLE X 10 
The present treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon 
as possible with the Belgian Government. 
It shall be considered to enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratifi-
cation of the 1954 Paris Agreements and will remain in force for fifty years. After the expiry of the fifty 
years, each of the high contracting parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided 
that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government. 
The Belgian Government shall inform the governments of the other high contracting parties of 
the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation. 
7. Former Article IX amended. 
8. Former Article X. 
9. Former Article XI amended. 
10. Former Article XII. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 504 
The Council takes due note of Recommendation 504 and of the report submitted on behalf of 
the Political Committee by Mr. Goerens on the" Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty" (Assembly 
Document 1261 ). In reply to Recommendation 504, the Council wishes to quote from its reply to Rec-
ommendation 490 (communicated to the Assembly on 5th June 1991, Assembly Document 1276, para-
graph 2): "The principle of a revision, as and when necessary, of the modified Brussels Treaty was 
agreed when Portugal and Spain joined WEU. The Council is aware that this is an extremely important 
political undertaking and that, logically, no new drafting could be undertaken until the process to 
redefine Europe's role in security and defence matters has been completed. This means that account 
will have to be taken of the developments taking place in the context of the Intergovernmental Con-
ference on Political Union and of the process of adapting NATO to the new situation in Europe. " 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991. 
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RECOMMENDATION 505 1 
on the role of women in the armed forces 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling the United Nations conventions, European directives and national legislation con-
cerning the equality of women, and civil liberties and rights to employment; 
(ii) Considering that there is a perceived reduction in East-West tension in Europe; 
(iii) In the knowledge that formal moves are under way towards a reduction in the strengths of armed 
services through negotiation (cf. the Vienna CFE process); 
(iv) Acknowledging that changing technologies are altering the way in which armed forces are 
employed; 
(v) Given the consequence of reduced defence budgets in most European countries; 
(vi) Bearing in mind that the debate on conscription is being re-opened in a number of WEU 
member countries, with a tendency towards shorter periods of service and a reduced requirement for 
the total male population to accomplish such service and that these considerations may lead in the 
future to volunteer forces; 
(vii) Recognising the growing operational character of the WEU organisation, with regular meetings 
now of chiefs of defence staff, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Encourage, where appropriate, member nations to pay more than lip service to the principle of 
women serving in the armed forces and indeed persuade those countries which at present do not permit 
women to join their armed forces to change their policies; 
2. Encourage those countries re-examining conscription to recognise the contribution to be made 
by women; 
3. Encourage member nations with women serving to increase or at least maintain the same rel-
ative percentage of women in national military forces during all future force reductions; 
4. Encourage all member countries actively to recruit women and provide full careers leading to the 
highest ranks on a basis both of equality of opportunity and integration; 
5. Encourage member nations to consult together to harmonise policies concerning women and 
combat; 
6. Persuade governments that the idea in some countries of a system of: 
(a) advisory bodies on the role of women in the armed forces; 
(b) women inspectors, 
should be adopted generally; 
7. Suggest that the WEU chiefs of defence staff include the subject of women in the armed forces on 
their agenda at a future meeting. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (7th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs. Baarve1d-Schlaman on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 
1267). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL' 
to Recommendation 505 
The Council notes with interest Assembly Recommendation 505 on the role of women in the 
armed forces and welcomes the report presented by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman on behalf of the Defence 
Committee. This report offers an interesting comparative analysis of questions pertaining to the role 
and status of women in the armed forces. It has the merit of pointing out the shortcomings in 
harmonisation in this field while describing objectively and comprehensively the considerable progress 
achieved over the past few years. For the time being, some differences in the status of women in the 
armed forces of WEU member states seem to be inevitable, however, as they arise mainly from diver-
gences in national traditions. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991. 
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Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee 2 
by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur 
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l. Adopted by 6 votes to 2 with 0 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stegagnini (Chairman): MM. Garrett (Alternate: Lambie), Lopez Henares (Vice-Chairmen): 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on arms and equipment for a European rapid action force 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the decision of NATO's Defence Ministers to establish a multinational Allied 
Command Europe rapid reaction corps; 
(ii) Aware of the declaration on European security and defence issued jointly by Italy and the United 
Kingdom on 4th October recommending that WEU members develop a European reaction force; 
(iii) Aware of the Franco-German initiative of 14th October on security and defence in the European 
union recommending the creation of military units under WEU's responsibility; 
(iv) Convinced that there is an irreversible trend towards more political responsibilities for Europe 
on the international scene in the context of a political union; 
(v) Recognising that a political union with a common security policy also implies a stronger 
European defence identity in the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy; 
(vi) Conscious that now and in the future the United States defence budget is and will be subject to 
considerable restraints which, as a consequence, will increasingly limit the possibilities for European 
armed forces to rely on United States equipment; 
(vii) Recognising that WEU member countries will be obliged to provide the full range of equipment 
needed for an operational and effective European rapid reaction force, in particular including an 
autonomous strategic and tactical airlift capability; 
(viii) Aware that major equipment procurement programmes are long-term projects requiring 
timescales up to 15 to 20 years before coming to fruition, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Instruct the committee of chiefs of defence staff of WEU to examine urgently the possible contri-
butions of all member countries which have agreed to participate in a future European rapid action 
force in order to harmonise the arms and equipment of this force at an early stage; 
2. Urge the Defence Representatives Group to proceed energetically with its study of a European 
sea- and airlift capability and include in this study the possibility of establishing a European strategic 
airlift command in the WEU framework. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In the last two or three years, such 
sweeping changes have taken place in Europe 
that even the most daring politicians and strate-
gists would not have thought them possible in 
their boldest imagination. 
2. In fact, they have left the Atlantic and 
European Community with a number of 
problems for which there are no immediate and 
adequate solutions. The changes are multiple 
and they generate difficulties of a different 
nature which nevertheless have to be addressed. 
3. Among the issues at stake are the devel-
opment of new democratic systems, economic 
reconstruction, the formation of a new security 
framework, including detailed reconsideration 
of existing strategies, the restructuring of armed 
forces and the possible reshaping of alliances. 
4. Moreover, these different issues cannot be 
dealt with in isolation and the solutions offered 
should preferably be part of a grand and logical 
design. 
5. The subject of this report is only a tiny 
part of the vast range of issues. By exception, it 
is also a inatter for which solutions are at hand 
relatively easily, even if some of the political 
. and military questions as regards the nature and 
participants of a future rapid reaction force 
(RRF) have not yet been answered in full. 
6. The aim here is not to offer a final answer 
to whether the rapid reaction force should 
operate exclusively in a NATO framework or 
whether it should also have the ability to operate 
out of atea under the aegis of WEU. At the time 
of writing of this report, the discussion on this 
subject was still going on and different proposals 
are mentioned in chapters Ill and IV. 
7. Here it is assumed that for a number of 
reasons, to be enumerated later, the creation of a 
multinational rapid reaction force is inevitable. 
For such a force to be effective, some important 
equipment issues will have to be addressed by 
the WEU member countries which are likely to 
be involved. This report makes an effort to 
provide a few considerations. 
8. The present report should also be seen as 
a follow-up to the report on weaponry after the 
Gulf - new equipment requirements of restruc-
tured armed forces 1• For this reason, the report 
does not repeat in full what has been stated 
l. Document 1272. 
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earlier as regards important equipment which 
has proved its value in the Gulf. 
9. With great pleasure the committee has 
taken note of the Council's reply to Recommen-
dation 501, especially as regards the Council's 
decision to establish a satellite data interpre-
tation and training centre. On 18th November 
1991, this decision was implemented by the 
Council, establishing the centre in Spain as from 
1st January 1992. 
10. The Council's recent decision that in 1992 
a study group will be formed to examine the 
need for and desirability of the development in 
the medium and long term of a E1,1ropean space-
based observation system has given further 
reason for satisfaction. The committee is 
looking forward to early results in the study 
group's activities. 
11. It is hoped that the working group of 
representatives of the defence ministries in asso-
ciation with the WEU Special Working Group 
on the operational organisation of co-operation 
within WEU both in the politico-military field 
and in the military field will make rapid and 
tangible progress. 
II. General character of the threat 
and resulting tasks 
for members of the alliance 
12. Even if the world balance of forces may 
have changed, the basic tasks of armed forces of 
European nations have not. These forces pri-
marily defend their national territory and make 
sure that the approaches to that territory remain 
open. In co-operation with other armed forces of 
the Atlantic Alliance, they should also help to 
preserve peace and security in Europe if the area 
covered by NATO is threatened. Finally, they 
should protect their nation's or Europe's 
interests throughout the world, alone or in the 
framework of a coalition, particularly under the 
aegis of WEU. 
13. After its ministerial session in Copen-
hagen on 6th and 7th June 1991, the North 
Atlantic Council summarised the fundamental 
security tasks of the alliance in the following 
solemn phrases: 
" (i) To provide one of the indispensable 
foundations for a stable security 
environment in Europe, based on the 
growth of democratic institutions 
and commitment to the peaceful res-
l 
i 
! 
; 
olution of disputes, in which no 
country would be able to intimidate 
or coerce any European nation or to 
impose hegemony through the threat 
or use of force. 
(ii) To serve, as provided for in Article 4 
of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a 
transatlantic forum for allied consul-
tations on any issues that affect their 
vital interests, including possible 
developments posing risks for 
members' security, and for appro-
priate co-ordination of their efforts in 
fields of common concern. 
(iii) To deter and defend against any 
threat of aggression against the ter-
ritory of any NATO member state. 
(iv) To preserve the strategic balance 
within Europe. " 
14. A large number of European allies, not 
completely satisfied with a NATO monopoly in 
this field, had insisted that reference should be 
made to other organisations. As a consequence, 
the Council also recognised that: 
" Other European institutions such as the 
EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to 
play, in accordance with their respective 
responsibilities and purposes, in these 
fields. The creation of a European identity 
in security and defence will underline the 
preparedness of the Europeans to take a 
greater share of responsibility for their 
security and will help to reinforce transat-
lantic solidarity. " 
15. At the Rome summit on 7th-8th 
November 1991, the heads of state and gov-
ernment participating in the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council solemnly reiterated and 
confirmed the Copenhagen texts as quoted in 
paragraphs 13 and 14. 
16. After all, the allies knew perfectly well 
that the governments of the twelve EC member 
countries were, in the framework of an intergov-
ernmental conference, discussing changes in the 
original Rome Treaty in order to include 
common foreign and security policy, objectives 
which ultimately cannot but lead to a common 
defence policy. 
1 7. Logically, in the final communique of the 
NATO Council meeting it was also made clear 
that there was an 
" agreement of all allies to enhance the 
role and responsibility of the European 
members. We welcome efforts further to 
strengthen the security dimension in the 
process of European integration and 
recognise the significance of the progress 
made by the countries of the European 
Community towards the goal of political 
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union, including the development of a 
common foreign and security policy. 
These two positive processes are mutually 
reinforcing. The development of a 
European security identity and defence 
role, reflected in the strengthening of the 
European pillar within the alliance, will 
reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of 
the Atlantic Alliance. " 
18. It is extremely difficult to specify which 
commitments are to be expected. The political 
situation in many areas of the world is extremely 
volatile. It is well known that in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North 
Africa the situation is far from stable. Anything 
could happen with serious consequences for 
Europe's security. In fact, one should expect the 
unexpected and it is impossible to have forces 
especially tailored to specific emergencies. 
19. Be that as it may, recent military history, 
supported by contingency studies, has suffi-
ciently demonstrated that a multinational rapid 
reaction force must be an essential part of the 
allied armed forces. If the general requirement 
for the efficiency of armed forces is to be 
mobile, well-equipped, highly-trained and ver-
satile, this is particularly true for a rapid 
reaction force, which is destined to be the 
spearhead in any military operation. 
Ill. Recent decisions in NATO 
20. Existing ideas on a rapid reaction force 
which were being discussed in different forums 
first crystallised in the framework of NATO, 
where the Military Committee worked out a 
concept for new force structures endorsed by the 
NATO Council in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th 
June 1991. It should be noted here that the new 
force structures were decided even before deci-
sions had been taken regarding NATO's future 
role and purpose or as regards the review of the 
existing strategic concept which is no longer . 
up-to-date. This new strategy was decided at 
NATO's summit conference on 7th and 8th 
November in Rome. 
21. Critics of NATO's force structure deci-
sions at that time said that they were taken at 
such an early stage in order to forestall exclu-
sively European initiatives on that subject. 
Another objective of NATO's decision was cer-
tainly to put a brake on defence budget cuts in 
almost all European member states which can 
hardly be called a co-ordinated effort and thus 
jeopardises the defence effort of allied countries 
which should be based on close co-operation. 
22. On 28th and 29th May 1991, the NATO 
Defence Planning Committee met in Brussels 
and sketched the main outlines of an allied mul-
tinational rapid reaction force. Among other 
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things, the communique of this meeting reads as 
follows: 
"We have agreed the basis of a new force 
structure consisting of main defence 
forces, reaction forces and augmentation 
forces, including multinational forces of 
all types: land, air and maritime. In par-
ticular we have agreed various national 
contributions to the multinational corps 
of main defence forces for which detailed 
planning will now proceed. With regard to 
reaction forces, we have agreed that these 
should consist of immediate and rapid 
reaction forces, comprising contributions 
from most NATO nations and including 
national as well as multinational forma-
tions. As part of the rapid reaction forces, 
we have agreed the creation of a rapid 
reaction corps for Allied Command 
Europe, under U.nited Kingdom command 
with a multinational headquarters. These 
forc~s, together with our future air and 
maritime force structures, will provide the 
basis for the flexible deployment of a 
range of forces depending on the situ-
ation. In this context we have agreed the 
establishment of a multinational reaction 
force planning staff at SHAPE for devel-
opment and co-ordination of plans for all 
Allied Command Europe reaction forces. 
A number of important aspects relating to 
the implementation of the new force 
structure now require examination, 
including the composition of multina-
tional air and naval components and their 
command arrangements. We agreed that 
the necessary studies should be under-
taken immediately. Finally, we have 
agreed that a study ofNATO's command 
structure should be pursued as a matter of 
urgency with the aim of streamlining and 
adapting it to the new situation. " 
23. This basic agreement left many questions 
which still had to be worked out, but gradually, 
more details are taking shape. The new rapid 
reaction force, referred to as the multinational 
Allied Command Europe rapid reaction corps 
(ARRC), will be established under British 
command and with a multinational corps head-
quarters. 
24. While, except in the United Kingdom, no 
final decisions on different national contribu-
tions have yet been made, with the detailed 
organisation still being developed within the 
alliance, it is thought that the ARRC could be 
composed of the following elements: 
- first division: a United Kingdom 
armoured division based in Germany; 
- second division: a multinational air-
mobile division comprising two air-
mobile brigades, one each from the 
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United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
and two airborne brigades, one each 
from Belgium and Germany; 
- third division: a multinational division 
comprising units from NATO's southern 
region nations, in particular Spain, 
Italy, Greece and Turkey; 
- fourth division: a United Kingdom 
division composed of two mechanised 
brigades and one airborne brigade, with 
possible support of a commando unit. 
A possible outline structure as given by the 
United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence 
is shown at Appendix I. 
25. Finally, it has been suggested that the 
United States armed forces could provide air 
support, satellite intelligence and other satellite 
services and naval support in the Mediterranean 
area. 
26. It is important to note here that, accord-
ing to the early concept, the entire corps of more 
than 70 000 troops including equipment should 
be deployable on five to seven days' notice. 
27. Experts estimate that it will take five years 
for this new force structure to become opera-
tional. 
28. A tentative effort has been made to endow 
the ARRC with a WEU command in case of out-
of-area operations, but this idea was abandoned 
after fierce French opposition. 
29. Important decisions regarding such sub-
jects as the exact command structure and the 
relation between the rapid reaction forces and 
other elements of the new force structure have 
yet to be taken. 
30. Early expectations that final decisions on 
the deployment and tasks of this ARRC would 
be taken at the NATO summit in Rome on 7th 
and 8th November 1991 did not materialise. 
IV. European initiati•es 
31. The Yugoslav crisis has demonstrated 
that in the post-cold war contingencies may 
develop which do not come within NATO's area 
of responsibility nor threaten vital United 
States' interests, but which could be contained 
by an armed forces operation. 
32. There can be little doubt that the recon-
struction of Central and Eastern Europe, 
including the development of democratic struc-
tures and the policing of its regional conflicts, 
will increasingly be a task of the Western 
European Community with closely co-ordinated 
responsibilities in the field of foreign policy, 
security and defence. 
i 
33. The reactions of European governments 
to the crises in both Kuwait and Yugoslavia 
have been confused and contradictory. In the 
Kuwait crisis they were able to adjust their reac-
tions thanks to the duration of the crisis and 
determined and decisive United States lead-
ership. A future crisis may allow them less time 
to organise themselves. 
34. Many people in Europe are convinced 
now that the present diverse ways of European 
governments of conducting security policy is 
disorderly and therefore unacceptable. Even the 
most dogged opponents of further integration in 
Europe begin to recognise that the road towards 
more unity in foreign and security policy is not 
only indicated by the creed of blind idealists but 
also by the logic of common self-interest. It is no 
surprise, therefore, that in recent weeks two new 
proposals were made in the framework of prepa-
rations for the European summit conference in 
Maastricht on 9th and 1Oth December 1991. 
One proposal, submitted on 4th October, was a 
common declaration by Italy and the United 
Kingdom. The other proposal, made public on 
14th October, is a combined Franco-German 
effort. 
(a) The Anglo-Italian proposal 
35. It has rightly been said that, in this decla-
ration, the United Kingdom for the first time 
has recognised the perspective of a common 
European defence, as stated in paragraph 2: 
" Political union implies the gradual elab-
oration and implementation of a common 
foreign and security policy and a stronger 
European defence identity with the 
longer-term perspective of a common 
defence policy compatible with the 
common defence policy we already have 
with all our allies in NATO." 
36. Obviously, in accordance with a long-
standing tradition in United Kingdom policy, 
reference is also made to the common defence in 
the Atlantic Alliance and to the presence of 
United States forces in Europe, which are both 
considered to be vital elements for the common 
defence of Europe. 
37. The document further emphasises the 
complementarity of the review of the alliance's 
tasks and strategy on the one hand and the 
development of a common foreign and security 
policy within the framework of a European 
political union. The document also states: 
" WEU should be entrusted with the task 
of developing the European dimension in 
the field of defence. It will develop its role 
in two complementary directions: as the 
defence component of the union and as 
the means to strengthen the European 
pillar of the alliance. " 
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38. It then makes a number of proposals to 
improve co-ordination between WEU and the 
Atlantic Alliance. In the three final paragraphs, 
the Anglo-Italian document proposes an auto-
nomous European reaction force for out-of-area 
operations as follows: 
" In order to give a first practical content 
to the European defence identity, 
members of WEU should develop a 
European reaction force. This would be 
capable of responding flexibly in a range 
of possible circumstances outside the 
NATO area, for example in response to 
threats to the interests of WEU members 
or in peace-keeping operations. It would 
thereby make a new contribution to the 
common defence. 
Such a force would be autonomous, sep-
arate from the NATO structure, and 
would have its own peacetime planning 
cell to develop contingency plans and 
organise exercises. Political control would 
be exercised by WEU Ministers. 
There should be co-ordination with other 
members of the alliance, so that such a 
force could deploy alongside forces of 
other allies. " 
(b) The Franco-German proposal 
39. Only a few days later, on 14th October 
1991, the President of France and the Chan-
cellor of Germany submitted a new initiative, 
which was more detailed and far-reaching than 
the earlier Anglo-Italian proposal. To discuss the 
Franco-German proposals in detail would lead 
beyond the scope of this report, but some of its 
aspects should be mentioned here. 
40. The Franco-German document considers 
the security and defence of the European union 
to be part of a common foreign and security 
policy. WEU has a role in the process within the 
framework of its competence and in accordance 
with the direction established by the union. 
41. It then lists a number of priority subjects 
to be included in a common foreign and security 
policy. Next, the main objectives of WEU are 
given, among which the need to establish a real 
European defence and security identity and to 
assume increased responsibilities in defence 
matters. 
42. It was further proposed to develop a clear 
organic link between WEU and the European 
union and to make WEU more operational, 
acting in accordance with the directives of the 
European union. 
43. The proposal also envisaged the creation 
of a military planning and co-ordination group 
in WEU with the following tasks: 
- the planning of common actions 
including actions in crisis situations; 
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- operational planning for co-operative 
action in case of natural disasters; 
- co-ordination of the examination of 
existing needs in all areas of co-operation; 
- organisation of common exercises. 
It recommended the creation of military units 
under WEU's responsibility without mentioning 
a time-frame. 
44. New procedures were proposed to improve 
co-operation and to ensure transparency and 
complementarity between WEU and the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
45. Finally, and strangely enough in a post-
cript at the end of the document, a proposal was 
made to reinforce the existing Franco-German 
brigade: 
"Franco-German military co-operation 
will be strengthened beyond the present 
brigade. Thus, the reinforced Franco-
German units could serve as the core of a 
European corps, including the forces of 
other WEU member states. This new 
structure could also become the model for 
closer military co-operation between the 
WEU member states. " 
46. Later some sources said that the rein-
forced Franco-German unit would consist of a 
German division, based in Sigmaringen, one of 
the two French divisions which were based in 
Germany until now, and the existing Franco-
German brigade, altogether some 20 000 troops, 
the size of a French army corps. The combined 
headquarters would be based in Strasbourg, 
which as a consequence would mean the per-
manent posting of German officers on French 
territory. 
47. It should be noted here that the Franco-
German proposal does not call for a rapid 
reaction (or action) force. On the other hand, it 
is difficult to imagine what other task could be 
assigned to this unit if it is meant to become the 
core of a European corps and even could 
become the model for a closer military 
co-operation between WEU member states. It is 
well known that the present Franco-German 
brigade, while having an important political sig-
nificance, could scarcely be deployed in a real 
military operation. In order to be able to under-
stand what the French and German Govern-
ments have in mind for European defence 
forces, more clarification is required. 
48. At its meetings on 30th October and 18th 
November, preparing the European Council in 
Maastricht, the WEU Council of Ministers dis-
cussed the abovementioned proposals in the 
context of an in-depth discussion on the place 
and role ofWEU in the future European security 
architecture. As stated in the communique 
issued after the 18th November meeting, the 
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ministers were able to narrow their positions 
but, understandably, no decision was taken on 
this subject. 
V. A plethora of problems 
49. Now that an agreement over the estab-
lishment of European multinational force with a 
rapid reaction capability seems to be devel-
oping, with NATO's decision as a guiding prin-
ciple for future decisions in a European 
framework, many problems still remain to be 
solved. Some of the issues involved can be 
singled out as being of particular importance. 
They will be mentioned in this chapter. In the 
following chapters, attention will be paid to 
equipment under development in co-operative 
programmes, which is of vital importance for 
any rapid reaction force to be effective. 
50. The command structure of any kind of 
common European defence force is inevitably 
causing a certain amount of discord between 
European nations. 
51. The United Kingdom is in favour of a 
double-hatted command, which would allow the 
deployment of European multinational forces 
under NATO command in case of collective 
defence scenarios in accordance with North 
Atlantic Treaty obligations and the same forces 
to be deployed under WEU command in 
European contingencies or out-of-area opera-
tions. France is emphasising an option with a 
purely European multinational defence force 
under WEU command. 
52. Germany has not been completely unam-
biguous in its comments, but a double-hatted 
solution would probably have its preference. 
53. On the other hand, the German Defence 
Minister has been quoted as saying that in a con-
flict between NATO and European tasks, the 
European mission would have priority 2• 
54. Both the Italian and the Spanish Govern-
ments are said to be in favour of a double-hatted 
command structure. 
55. The question remains, however, as to 
whether a genuine European defence identity 
exists as long as it is dependent on United States 
command for all its operational activities, as it 
is at present under the command structure of the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
56. If the command structure is a priority 
issue to be decided unambiguously and at an 
early stage, the other problems to be addressed 
are certainly not of minor importance, as will be 
seen in the following paragraphs. 
57. For a rapid reaction force to be credible, it 
is essential to have an extremely flexible military 
2. The Independent, 8th October 1991. 
crisis management instrument, together with the 
political decision infrastructure for immediate 
decision-making and reaction to any kind of crisis. 
58. On the other hand, it seems obvious that 
any decisions on a WEU military force will 
be premature if attention is not paid at the same 
time to the creation of infrastructure for 
planning and for organising WEU manoeuvres. 
59. If military personnel are to be part of mul-
tinational units, it is essential to co-ordinate dif-
ferent national training programmes and 
methods from the very start, in order to make 
them familiar with the procedures and operating 
methods of a multinational force. 
60. Joint exercises and the use of training 
facilities in contingency areas are indispensable 
and should be strongly promoted. There should 
be exercises and training programmes both in 
Europe and out-of-area on an all-arms, inter-
service and inter-allied basis. They should also 
reflect the further development of common doc-
trines and procedures within the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
61. All units should certainly employ the 
same procedures and doctrines in order to 
operate coherently. It will be vitally important 
for all formations to speak a common language 
and use compatible communications equipment. 
62. Many problems connected with setting up 
a multinational rapid reaction force stem from 
the lack of standardisation and interoperability 
of equipment. Logistic support for multinational 
formations is more complicated and communi-
cations difficulties are multiple, which will have 
a negative influence on C3I activities, vital in 
military operations of modern armed forces. 
63. When multinational forces are created, it 
is advocated that several different national divi-
sions be combined at the level of the multina-
tional corps. Experience has demonstrated that 
setting up multinational units at a lower level 
would create too many problems as regards 
organisation, logistics and command. 
64. No official statement has been made on 
the operational concept for a rapid reaction 
force and it should be admitted that operations 
will have to be adapted to the different nature of 
various possible contingencies. 
65. For the rapid reaction force to be 
effective, it should be capable of implementing 
the manoeuvre war concept, in which offensive 
air and long-range artillery systems prevent the 
movement of an enemy's ground and air 
reserves and paralyse his command systems, 
while at the same time ground forces manoeuvre 
and concentrate to strike at an enemy's vital 
terrain or assets. It goes without saying that high 
mobility and a balanced force of all arms where 
the operational level should also be able to 
control and direct long-range assets are essential. 
311 
DOCUMENT 1292 
66. The air component should include all 
systems for air superiority, long-range attack 
and ground support. Indirect fire artillery 
systems should have a long-range attack capa-
bility. Apart from that, there should be an 
armoured force for manoeuvre. This should 
include tanks, armoured infantry, anti-tank heli-
copters, air defence systems and long-range 
artillery, all capable of both strategic and opera-
tional mobility. 
67. Finally, one important subject which is 
more of a political than of a military operational 
bearing should certainly be addressed with care. 
It is suggested that with changes in political stra-
tegic relations in Europe, the different elements 
of a rapid reaction force should not be posi-
tioned exclusively on German soil, but that the 
different national components should be sta-
tioned on the territory of other nations as a 
proof of the multinational and multidirectional 
character of these forces. 
VI. Existing capabilities 
in European countries 
68. In the following paragraphs a succinct 
review is given of the existing and planned capa-
bilities in those European nations whose armed 
forces might participate in a future rapid 
reaction force. 
69. As of now, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the United Kingdom each have some 
kind of rapid reaction force available, or being 
set up at a national level. 
70. The aim of all these forces is to be able to 
intervene in hotbeds of tension at very short 
notice. They should allow tension and force rela-
tions in crisis areas to be changed very quickly 
and aggressive enemy action to be controlled or 
slowed down until main action forces arrive in 
the theatre of operations. 
71. Some of the abovementioned nations 
have already designated specific units for 
participation in a multinational force, while 
others, as will be seen, are still in a less advanced 
state of preparations. 
72. Since the structure of the proposed multi-
national forces has not yet been agreed upon in 
detail, some disparities may appear in national 
plans for contributing to these forces. 
(a) Belgium 
73. Belgium will assign its para-commando 
regiment to the rapid reaction force. This regi-
ment is now being transformed into a brigade, 
reinforced with a Recce squadron, equipped 
with light tracked vehicles and a battery of 
105 mm towed artillery. The A-129 combat 
helicopters and the transport helicopters which 
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have been ordered could, under specific circum-
stances, be used to support the para-commando 
brigade. 
(b) France 
74. It should be noted that, after the NATO 
Council meeting in Copenhagen, France's Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs stressed that the debate 
on force restructuring was not yet closed, that 
the alliance was in a transitory phase and that 
only at NATO's Rome conference could final 
decisions be taken. 
75. The French Defence Minister made it 
clear that future security threats and risks will be 
diversified and difficult to predict, which means 
that one should be prepared to face them at 
several different levels: national, European, 
Atlantic and multinational. 
76. More specifically, he said that Europeans 
should have flexible forces at their disposal 
which, if need be, could operate together in a 
coherent and efficient way. In order to achieve 
this, WEU member states should develop mech-
anisms for co-operation and co-ordination. A 
permanent military planning and co-ordination 
centre at the WEU Secretariat-General would be 
an extremely useful basic instrument. 
77. Similar ideas have been put forward and 
worked out in recent reports of the Assembly's 
Defence Committee presented by Mr. De Hoop 
Scheffer. 
78. In the Gulf war there was a need to rein-
force the force d'action rapide (FAR) with pro-
fessionals and with materiel from other units 
because of the distance of the war theatre, the 
level of forces present, the different services and 
the allied character of the operation. For the 
future, with possible operations of a widely dif-
ferent level of intensity, studies are being con-
ducted to set up completely professional units 
which could intervene immediately and any-
where in the world and provide reinforcement 
with heavy equipment. These army corps units 
could temporarily even be placed under opera-
tional command of the force d'action rapide. 
79. According to the French Defence Min-
ister, Pierre Joxe, other lessons from the Gulf 
war were the need to improve the interopera-
bility of equipment with that of the most 
important allies for actions within or out of 
Europe, improve the airlift capability, watch the 
availability and sufficiency of supplies, in par-
ticular for the most modem weapons, and create 
an internal balance in the armed forces between 
conscripts and professionals adapted to the dif-
ferent operations to be envisaged. 
the new law on the military equipment pro-
gramme at the beginning of 1992 3• 
(c) Germany 
82. The German Government has not yet 
taken a final decision on the German contri-
bution to the rapid reaction corps and State Sec-
retary Willy Wimmer declared that for the time 
being the units still to be designated will be 
provided without specific or additional heavy 
materiel. Mr. Wimmer did not exclude, however, 
a future change in equipment due to new tasks 4• 
83. Meanwhile, it could be observed that the 
German Government has been lacking consis-
tency and transparency in its comments on the 
role of WEU, rapid reaction forces and a 
European defence force. In the early days of 
the Yugoslav crisis, when Germany had just 
assumed the presidency of WEU, the German 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hans Dietrich 
Genscher, opposed any out-of-area operation by 
a rapid reaction force in the WEU framework. 
In recent months he has proposed establishing a 
security council within the CSCE framework 
and making the CSCE capable of action through 
CSCE " blue helmets ", a new peace-keeping 
force. Mr. Genscher argues that such action 
could widely expand the opportunities for con-
flict prevention on European soil. Mr. Scheer 
(SPD) welcomed these ideas, saying that a 
peace-keeping force should be established in the 
CSCE framework in order to control ethnic vio-
lence and regional conflicts. 
84. Later, after a trilateral meeting in Weimar 
between Ministers for Foreign Affairs from 
France, Germany and Poland, these ministers 
stated that NATO and WEU should continue to 
play an important role to ensure stability in 
Europe 5• 
85. When in Washington to meet the United 
States foreign minister on 2nd October, Mr. 
Genscher and his United States counterpart, 
Mr. Baker, published a new initiative which, 
after having paid obligatory lip service to the 
EC, WEU and the CSCE, endorsed a largely 
extended role of NATO in a European-Atlantic 
community from Vancouver to Vladivostok 
which should al~o be implemented in new insti-
tutional relations between NATO and the new 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and 
in the Soviet Union. 
86. Only some days later, the German Gov-
ernment, together with the Government of 
France, submitted a new initiative in the 
framework of the European intergovernmental 
80. A thorough revision of intelligence 3. Assemblee Nationale, written questions and ministerial 
systems at strategic and tactical level is needed. answers, 8th July 1991. 
4. Written answers to parliamentary questions, Bundestag 
81. All these subjects will be discussed in the 12/767, 14th June 1991. 
French national parliament in the framework of s. FAZ, 30th August 1991. 
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conference, mentioned in Chapter IV, envis-
aging a reinforced role for the EC and WEU 
which can scarcely be seen as a logical com-
plement to the American-German initiative in 
Washington. 
(d) Italy 
87. According to the Ministry of Defence, the 
Italian contribution to the rapid reaction corps 
will consist of four brigades and four support 
units at battalion level. These units are: 
- one brigade in the multinational 
southern region division which is said 
to include also a Greek and a Turkish 
brigade; 
- two brigades in the division with a per-
manent Italian command, which will 
also include a Portuguese brigade; 
- one brigade in the mechanised United 
Kingdom division; 
- four battalions or groups which will be 
placed in the different support brigades 
(reconnaissance, engineering, helicopters 
and health). 
88. The specific equipment for these units 
will be defined by a working group which has 
just been established and whose task is to define 
structural details and solve organisational 
problems. At the moment, a new procurement 
process has been started and more modem con-
cepts of equipment are being studied with a view 
to improving mobility and flexibility for the dif-
ferent units. 
89. The rapid intervention force of the Italian 
armed forces is now fully operational and regu-
larly carries out training activities. 
90. The new defence white paper has been 
announced but not yet published because recent 
developments in the politico-military situation 
have made further revision necessary, but it is 
expected to be published before the end of 1991. 
(e) The Netherlands 
91. The Dutch Defence Minister, Relus ter 
Beek, said that the establishment of the new 
Dutch air-mobile brigade of 2 000 men, to 
be included in the rapid reaction force as 
announced in the 1991 defence white paper, will 
cost 5.2 billion guilders up to 2001. Of 3 320 
million guilders earmarked for equipment, 3 100 
million will be needed for the acquisition of 20 
to 25 transport and 40 armed helicopters, 
including the cost of leasing armed helicopters 
until 1995. The Dutch parliament has not yet 
agreed to these ambitious plans. 
92. Anti-tank weapons, mortars, air defence 
missiles and specialised vehicles will become 
available through the restructuring of other units 
or, if need be, through procurement. 
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93. In order to upgrade its transport capa-
bility, the Royal Netherlands Air Force intends 
to procure two second-hand McDonnell Douglas 
DC-lOs which will be converted into tankers. 
These DC-lOs should provide the air force's 
F-16s the extended range needed for deployment 
on NATO's southern flank or out-of-area. 
94. Furthermore, five or six medium-weight 
transport aircraft will be acquired with the 
CASA CN-235M and the Alenia G-222 as candi-
dates on the shortlist. It should be noted here 
that the Dutch parliament has asked the gov-
ernment to reconsider its plans for an upgraded 
transport capability taking into account the pos-
sibility to include Fokker, the national aircraft 
manufacturer, in the competition for new air-
craft. The government has responded positively 
to this request. 
95. For the forty advanced armed helicopters 
to be procured, final decisions regarding the 
type have not yet been taken, but it has been 
said that they should not exclusively have an 
anti-tank role but also be capable of carrying out 
escort, anti-armour, air-to-air and reconnais-
sance roles. 
96. The idea is to lease 20 armed helicopters, 
eventually culminating in the procurement of 40 
dedicated, advanced helicopters. The candidates 
being mentioned are the McDonnell Douglas 
Apache, the Eurocopter Tiger and the Boeingl 
Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche. The two heli-
copters last mentioned, however, will not be 
available until the year 2000. 
97. The order for medium-lift transport heli-
copters is expected to be placed in 1992, with 
1994 as the planned in-service date of the first 
helicopters. No candidate for this procurement 
has been mentioned, but the NH-90 must be 
excluded, since it will only become available 
by 2000. 
98. The aim is to have sufficient airlift 
capacity to deploy the operational part of an air-
mobile battalion over a range of 300 km in one 
wave. This should include 300 to 400 infantry 
troops, a staff element, a combat support 
element with mortars, engineers and communi-
cations and a forward area refuelling and 
rearming post with fuel and ammunition sup-
plies to support some of the armed helicopters. 
99. For the proposed rapid reaction force, the 
Royal Netherlands Air Force is planning to offer 
an air defence/fighter brigade. This contribution 
could include three F-16 A/B squadrons and up 
to four SAM squadrons, each a mix of improved 
Hawk and Patriot PAC-112 fire units. According 
to Dutch air force officers, this mix permits 
point defence in the shortest possible time with 
a 360 radar coverage of both aircraft and tactical 
ballistic missile threats. 
100. Among the new equipment to be acquired 
will be a mobile light-weight low-level air 
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defence radar system, helicopter mounted mine-
dispensers and 270 buggy-type vehicles. 
101. The air-mobile brigade has two armoured 
infantry battalions, equipped with YPR-765 
AFV s, one tank battalion with Leopard 1-Vs and 
field and air defence artillery. The anti-armour 
capacity of the battalions will consist of 
both TOW and Dragon anti-tank weapons, of 
which the Dragons eventually will be replaced 
by TRIGAT. There will be fire support from 81 
mm and 120 mm mortars while air defence will 
be provided by portable Stingers. The first bat-
talion should be operational by 1993, with the 
second to follow in 1994. A third battalion will 
be filled with mobilisable personnel who have 
served in the two standing battalions. 
(f) Spain 
102. In 1988, the decision was taken to set up a 
national Spanish rapid reaction force. Imple-
mentation awaits further analysis of its compo-
sition. It has been determined that it will not 
have a fixed organic structure. A division head-
quarters is being created within the army com-
ponent. The combat units will be assigned for 
operat~ons or exercises each time according to 
the planned task following the task force prin-
ciple. The parachute brigade and the legion 
forces, plus a light brigade, are initially the units 
to be trained to operate with the rapid reaction 
force. This rapid reaction force may also be used 
to accomplish missions for the common defence 
of the alliance, but it needs further airlift capa-
bility to be really effective. 
103. Recently, it has been proposed that the 
fuerza de intervencion rapida should be made 
permanent, reinforced with specialised units for 
specific operations. This point was emphasised 
by the Spanish Defence Minister, Mr. Garcia 
Vargas, in conversation with the Rapporteur in 
Madrid in October. While the fuerza de 
intervencion rapida is thought to consist of a 
brigade of approximately 4 000 men, its core 
should be formed by a fuerza de intervencion 
inmediata, an elite battalion of a few hundred 
men which should act as the vanguard of the 
Spanish armed forces in unforeseen crises, while 
the remaining units of the brigade, moving less 
quickly, are on their way. 
104. Among the possible tasks of the fuerza de 
intervencion rapida are operations on foreign 
territory in addition to mutual assistance com-
mitments concluded with the NATO allies and 
also operations out of Europe if so decided by 
the Spanish Government. 
105. It should be noted that any Spanish con-
tribution to an allied RRC will not be part of 
NATO's military structure, in accordance with the 
existing agreements between Spain and NATO. 
106. In principle, Spain is prepared to con-
tribute a brigade of around 4 000 troops. 
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107. As regards force modernisation, Spain is 
especially keen to take new procurement deci-
sions in co-ordination with its European allies 
in order to ensure the greatest possible 
standardisation of equipment. 
108. Among the equipment decisions to be 
taken in the future are the procurement of a 
replacement for its MBB B0-105 anti-tank heli-
copter, a tactical transport helicopter and a fixed 
wing-tactical transport aircraft, which are all 
connected with the formation of an RRC. 
109. In this matter, however, no early deci-
sions are expected since the Spanish defence 
budget is under great pressure, with possibly 
more budget cuts ahead. 
110. The Spanish Minister of Defence has 
declared that the only viable way for a European 
defence force would be the double-batted 
formula where units of the national armed 
forces would be assigned missions in the 
framework of both NATO and WEU. He added 
that the actual debate on this subject was a 
political one and that it would take years before 
a European defence force would materialise, 
since this is not a matter which can be impro-
vised. 
(g) Turkey 
111. Turkey has said it wishes to contribute 
two brigades to the southern flank (fourth) 
division of the NATO rapid reaction force. It 
has also proposed to locate the fourth division's 
headquarters in Turkey to underscore this coun-
try's growing regional importance after the Gulf 
war 6• 
(h) United Kingdom 
112. According to existing planning, the 
United Kingdom army will play a major role in 
the ARRC. One of the reasons for this key 
position is that the British armed forces are par-
ticularly well-trained and experienced because 
of their all-professional character. 
113. More specifically, the United Kingdom 
army will provide the ARRC's commander, a 
significant proportion of the headquarters infra-
structure and associated corps combat support, 
including communications, reconnaissance, depth-
fire and air defence units. 
114. To one of two multinational divisions 
that will form part of the corps, the army will 
contribute an air-mobile brigade - 24 Air-
mobile Brigade - including two air-mobile 
infantry battalions and two aviation regiments, 
together with supporting arms. It will also assign 
to this corps the 1st (United Kingdom) 
6. Defense News, lOth June 1991. 
Armoured Division, a strong armoured division 
based in peacetime in Germany, comprising 
three armoured brigades, each consisting of two 
armoured regiments, two armoured infantry bat-
talions and a full range of supporting arms. 
115. This armoured division will be reinforced 
considerably with high-quality new equipment 
such as the Warrior armoured infantry fighting 
vehicle, the self-propelled AS-90 155 mm how-
itzer, due to enter into service in 1992, and the 
multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS). In the 
not too distant future, the air defence capability 
of the division will be provided by the Starstreak 
high-velocity missile and Rapier Field Stan-
dard C, both in an advanced state of development. 
116. The army will further provide a second 
more lightly-equipped division, the 3rd (United 
Kingdom) Division, based in the United 
Kingdom and comprising two mechanised bri-
gades, and 5 Airborne Brigade. If required, this 
second division will also be able to take 
command of the United Kingdom/Netherlands 
amphibious force of which 3 Commando 
Brigade, Royal Marines, is the British com-
ponent. 
117. Altogether, the United Kingdom contri-
bution to the ARRC will amount to some 55 000 
soldiers, together with a number of individual 
reservists and territorial army units. 
118. Appendices 11 and Ill of this report show 
the likely composition by the mid-1990s of the 
two British divisions and their constituent bri-
gades which are planned to participate in the 
ARRC. In its contribution to the ARRC, the 
United Kingdom is building on the important 
lessons learned in the Gulf war. 
VII. The role of tanks 
119. While many analysts have been trying to 
announce the end of the tank's role on the 
battlefield, the Gulf war provided evidence to 
the contrary. In fact, tank battles on a large scale 
failed to occur, but after weeks of massive air 
attacks to reduce the resistance of Iraqi troops, 
tanks and armoured vehicles had to cross the 
frontiers of occupied Kuwait in order to drive 
the Iraqis out and take possession of Kuwaiti 
territory. 
120. In particular, the United States M-lAl 
Abrams tanks were able to detect and destroy 
enemy tanks at a greater distance than their 
opponents. 
121. Improved armour, sophisticated night 
version equipment, less weight, higher speed 
and guns with improved bearing are require-
ments being met by the new French Leclerc and 
the British Challenger 2 main battle tank. 
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122. The so-called armoured gun system 
(AGS), a 22 ton lightly-armoured vehicle, which 
is air transportable and equipped with a rela-
tively heavy gun, may be useful equipment for 
future rapid reaction forces. If such vehicles 
cannot replace the main battle tank, they can 
certainly fill a gap until heavier equipment has 
been brought into the theatre of operations. 
123. In June 1991, the British Government 
announced that it would purchase 130 to 140 
Challenger 2 tanks to re-equip two Chieftain reg-
iments in Germany. The first Challenger 2 is 
expected to be delivered in mid-1994. It further 
intends to proceed with a programme to upgrade 
the 420 Challenger 1 tanks which will remain to 
make up the bulk of the British army's tank 
fleet. 
124. A programme for a mid-life modern-
isation of the Leopard 2 main battle tank for the 
Dutch and German army, which would also 
include modernisation of Swiss Leopards, is 
threatened by serious cost overruns. 
125. The first production Leclerc tank will be 
delivered to the French army just before the end 
of 1991, but there is still great uncertainty over 
the number of Leclercs to be procured. Instead 
of the originally-expected 1 400, the army might 
procure far less with figures now being quoted of 
between 300 and 1 000. The first Leclerc tank 
regiment will be formed in 1995. 
126. It should be noted here, however, that the 
United States army, under strong priorities in 
its armoured systems modernisation plan, has 
indefinitely postponed the further development 
of a new tank and a new infantry fighting 
vehicle. The army now prefers to have combat 
support vehicles such as the advanced field 
artillery system, a combat-mobility vehicle, a 
rearming vehicle and a fast command and 
control vehicle, able to keep up with the modern 
tanks. 
127. Even if less tanks may be needed in the 
future, they should be up to date and well 
equipped. It is hoped that there will be enough 
modern tanks in future European armed forces 
to make tank operations feasible and credible. 
VIII. Helicopters 
128. Helicopters in all kinds of different con-
figurations are due to play an ever more 
important role in future military operations. 
Since they are the epitome of flexibility, 
mobility and versatility, helicopters must be 
considered vital equipment for rapid action 
forces. It may nevertheless take until the end of 
the century for the main participants of a multi-
national rapid action force to have new dedi-
cated helicopters at their disposal. 
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(a) Attack and reconnaissance helicopters 
129. The Franco-German Tiger which is being 
developed in a combat-support and an anti-tank 
version will most probably not be in service in 
the French and German armed forces before 
1998. 
130. If the planned 125 Apache attack heli-
copters are procured for the British armed 
forces, they will probably come into service in 
1998. 
131. At the moment, the British army is exam-
ining the acquisition of the Boeing!Sikorsky 
RAH-66 Comanche light reconnaissance heli-
copter to replace its Westland Lynx helicopters 
by 2005. 
132. The Netherlands army has an early 
requirement for combat helicopters which 
should fulfil different roles. 
133. The three abovementioned helicopters are 
under review as possible candidates, which 
would ultimately lead to the same in-service 
time-frame, but a lease arrangement for half the 
number required is being considered as an inter-
mediate solution. 
134. Spain has shown an interest in the Tiger 
helicopter, but budgetary restraints exclude an 
early decision. Italy now has a number of A-129 
Mangusta anti-tank helicopters in service, with 
more to come. 
135. Belgium has acquired a number of Agusta 
A-109 helicopters which have been adapted for 
an anti-tank role. 
136. Recently, the United Kingdom has 
announced that it would withdraw from the pro-
gramme for a long-range anti-tank missile AC3G 
Trigat in which it is now engaged together with 
France and Germany. The two reasons given by 
the Ministry of Defence were budgetary con-
straints and the high costs of the programme. 
137. The Trigat long-range anti-tank missile of 
the new fire-and-forget generation, with a range 
of 5 000 m, is meant to replace the HOT and 
TOW anti-tank missiles by 1998 and should be 
the main weapons system for the Franco-
German Tiger helicopter. Some industry sources 
have suggested that for a future missile 
replacement, the United Kingdom might wish to 
choose from a competition between the 
European long-range Trigat and the United 
States advanced Hellfire anti-armour missile. 
Others say that the United Kingdom has 
announced the decision to withdraw in order to 
put pressure on its partners to diminish the pro-
gramme cost or to enable it to pay less while 
remaining a partner in the Trigat programme. 
(b) Tactical transport helicopter 
138. The NH-90 tactical transport helicopter, 
now under development in a co-operative pro-
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gramme with France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands as participating nations, will make 
its first flight in 1995. It will be in service in 
1998 at the earliest. 
139. Italy and the United Kingdom might well 
acquire the transport version ofthe EH-101, but 
no orders have yet been placed, apart from the 
44 EH-101 Merlin anti-submarine warfare heli-
copter for the British Royal Navy. 
140. With the abovementioned time-scales in 
mind, it appears that altogether it will take ten 
more years before a European rapid action force 
will be equipped adequately with a sufficient 
number of up-to-date helicopters to be used in 
different roles. 
IX. The importance of airlift capability 
141. In my earlier report on weaponry after the 
Gulf war, attention was already paid to the 
serious deficiencies which came to light in the 
airlift capability of European armed forces. 
142. It turned out that of all the nations that 
could possibly participate in a RRF, only France 
and the United Kingdom have a strategic airlift 
capability. But their existing fleet ofDC-8Fs and 
VC-10 MK1s respectively is aging quickly. 
143. Moreover, the House of Commons report 
on the Gulf war, quoted earlier, gave new insight 
into what the existing RAF Air Transport Fleet 
(A TF) could do to transport helicopters to the 
war theatre. Helicopters are crucial in providing 
in-theatre mobility as well as attack and recon-
naissance capabilities. Generally they have to be 
transported by air or sea to the theatre of opera-
tions. 
144. The United Kingdom support helicopter 
force deployed to the Gulf comprised 12 Chi-
nooks, 19 Pumas and 12 Sea King IVs. United 
States Air Force C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft 
airlifted 11 Chinooks, 15 Pumas and 2 Sea 
Kings, while the remainder were sent by cargo 
ship. 
145. Helicopters transported by air required 
some preparation at the United Kingdom 
airhead. For the Chinooks, this took approxi-
mately 30 hours, and the rebuild · in the Gulf 
about 2 days. The Pumas required less prepa-
ration, with stripdown taking some five hours 
and recovery about ten hours. The Sea Kings 
required 3 days' preparation and 4 days to reas-
semble. 
146. The Hercules is the only RAF transport 
aircraft capable of carrying a helicopter. The 
Puma is the largest helicopter that the Hercules 
can carry, but preparation takes some 48 hours 
and recovery some 72 hours. 
147. This sounds not very encouraging for 
an ARRC of more than 70 000 troops and 
j 
j 
' ; 
equipment which should be deployable in five to 
seven days. 
148. The C-130 Hercules can be operated from 
readily-prepared unsurfaced airfields, but the 
prefabricated surface which is necessary for 
other aircraft is exceedingly bulky and would 
require shipment by sea or land. 
149. Lynx and Gazelle helicopters deployed 
with 1 (BR) Armoured Division were trans-
ported by a mixture of RAF Hercules, USAF 
C-5, chartered Belfasts and chartered shipping. 
Both aircraft types required 4 hours for prepa-
ration and 3-4 hours for recovery, whether trans-
ported by air or sea. 
150. One of the conclusions drawn by the 
House of Commons Defence Committee from 
Operation Granby was that it is no longer real-
istic to plan for a major out-of-area operation 
without some support from allies. 
151. At the moment, the only ally really 
capable of a large-scale strategic airlift is the 
United States. The question now is whether the 
United States will be capable of providing the 
necessary airlift in future contingencies when 
there may be a need for power projection at 
short notice. In the Gulf war, the coalition forces 
had six months to prepare the military offensive 
and to bring in sufficient troops and equipment 
by sea and by air, but this may not be the case in 
a possible future emergency. The United States 
Air Force will most probably not replace its 
C-141 strategic transport aircraft by C-17s on a 
one-for-one basis. 
152. Of the European allies, only France and 
the United Kingdom have a long-distance air 
transport capability, but in view of the transport 
requirements of a modem rapid reaction force, 
this can barely be called a strategic airlift capa-
bility. 
153. It has been pointed out earlier that France 
has four DC-8Fs, aged between 25 and 30 years, 
of which two will be phased out shortly, while it 
is hoped to keep the other two in service until 
the end of the century. 
154. The United Kingdom has 13 VC-10 
MK-ls, now 20 to 30 years old, while it has 9 
Tristars which, after a current modification pro-
gramme, will all be used as tanker/transport or 
tanker/cargo aircraft. 
155. None of the aircraft mentioned, however, 
has been designed for the strategic airlift of 
heavy equipment for military purposes. As a 
consequence, they do not have a cargo bay of 
sufficient height and width, nor do they have a 
front or rear loading ramp. 
156. If Europe is really committed to the new 
military concepts which are now being worked 
out, calling for the projection of power at short 
notice to almost any place in the world, it will 
have to procure the appropriate means. 
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157. For improving Europe's military airlift 
capabilities, the only possible candidates are the 
McDonnell Douglas C-17, which made its first 
flight on 15th September 1991, and the Airbus 
A-340 M, a military version of the civilian 
A-340-300, and the Future Large Aircraft, now 
being proposed by Euroflag. 
X. Candidates for Europe's airlift capability 
(a) The Airbus A-340 M 
158. At present, Aerospatiale and MBB are 
examining the possibilities of developing dif-
ferent military versions of the civilian long-
distance carrier A-340-300, which made its first 
flight in October 1991. The following versions 
are proposed: 
(i) A-340 M, for transporting a 
maximum of 434 troops. Apart from 
the installation of military communi-
cations and navigation equipment, 
this version would be very similar to 
the civilian A-340-300. 
(ii) A-340 M Combi, for transporting 
295 troops and 20 tons of freight, 
with a 3.58 m x 2.57 m cargo door in 
the aft fuselage. 
These two versions could be available as from 
1996. 
(iii) A-340 M cargo, capable of carrying 
heavy loads. For this purpose, the 
load floor should be reinforced con-
siderably. A large cargo door, 6. 79 m 
x 2.57 m should give access to the 
upper deck, while there should be 
two cargo doors in the lower deck, 
with dimensions of 2. 7 4 m x 1. 72 m 
and 2. 78 m x 1.67 m respectively. 
It could also be equipped with 
an autonomous loading system. 
According to studies which have been 
carried out, the A-340 M would be 
able to transport lighter equipment 
up to the size of an AMX 10 RC 
armoured reconnaissance vehicle or a 
V AB armoured personnel carrier. 
This cargo version should have a 
5 000 nautical miles range with a 
maximum load of 53 tons. It could 
also be equipped with two refuelling 
pods for in-flight refuelling of accom-
panying fighter aircraft. If the 
decision to develop this version is 
taken in 1994, first deliveries could 
take place in 1997. 
(iv) AMP-340 Tanker, an in-flight refu-
elling tanker aircraft with 3 pods, 
capable of carrying 128 tons of fuel. 
There is no early requirement for this 
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version, which could replace existing 
French C-135 and United Kingdom 
Victor and Tristar tanker aircraft, but 
not before the years 2010-15. 
159. In Europe, the demand for a troop 
transport and cargo version of the A-340 M is 
believed to be fairly limited. According to 
Aerospatiale's estimates, it would be for not 
more than 40 aircraft up to 2010. A basic A-340 
M version would cost between 20 and 150 
million, dependent on the number of aircraft 
procured and the period during which a pro-
duction line should be kept open. It should be 
noted, however, that the A-340 M, while capable 
of providing long-distance logistic transport, 
cannot perform strategic missions with a tactical 
profile. 
(b) The McDonnell Douglas C-17 
160. The McDonnell Douglas C-1 7 is a stra-
tegic military transport aircraft, developed to 
replace the C-141 Starlifter. The C-17 has been 
designed to operate in rugged conditions and 
should be capable of landing on short airfields, 
thus enabling it to perform strategic missions 
with a tactical profile. It has a specially-designed 
large-size cargo bay, equipped with a loading 
ramp and an autonomous loading system. These 
characteristics enable the C-17 to transport even 
the heaviest arms and equipment of a rapid 
reaction force to the theatre of operations. The 
arms would include multiple-launch rocket 
systems, Patriot air defence systems, main battle 
tanks (Challenger, Leclerc and Leopard) and 
Apache attack helicopters. With a maximum 
payload of 78 tons, it will have a range of 2 400 
nautical miles. 
161. The C-17 now being built for the United 
States Air Force is equipped with Pratt & 
Whitney power plants. However, a study by 
McDonnell Douglas and the European engine 
manufacturer Rolls-Royce has demonstrated 
that the installation of Rolls-Royce RB 211-535 
power plants would provide a perfect alter-
native, making .the C-17 exceed the existing 
requirements while reducing maintenance costs. 
The cost of the C-17 is now estimated at approx-
imately $200 million, but might be lower if more 
than the 120 aircraft now being procured by the 
United States Air Force were built. 
(c) Tactical airlift, the European future large air-
craft 
162. A large number of European nations will 
need a replacement for their existing fleet of tac-
tical transport aircraft by the early years of the 
next century. Aircraft in use for this purpose 
now are mainly the Lockheed C-130 Hercules, 
the C-160 Transall and also the G-222. 
163. Discussions in the Independent European 
Programme Group (IEPG), with Belgium, 
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France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom as participating nations, 
resulted in a draft outline European staff target 
(OEST) in April 1988. This draft OEST contains 
a number of requirements such as an improved 
payload capacity, increased range and speed, 
good short field performance and improved 
survivability, threat avoidance and man-
reuvrability. Moreover, a reduced life cycle cost 
in peacetime operation, major savings in man-
power and day/night all-weather operability 
were considered to be essential. 
164. Aerospatiale (France), Alenia (Italy), 
British Aerospace (United Kingdom), CASA 
(Spain) and Deutsche Airbus (Germany) then 
joined forces in Euroflag SRL, a Rome-based 
company, with a view to developing the future 
large aircraft (FLA) designed to satisfy the 
requirements of the IEPG member countries 
mentioned earlier. 
165. Meanwhile, SONACA and SABCA (Bel-
gium) and TAl (Turkey) have shown their 
interest in the programme. Negotiations on their 
legal status in Euroflag are expected to lead to an 
agreement in the weeks to come. 
166. Preliminary studies by Euroflag have led 
to a design concept with a four-engine turbofan, 
a rear loading ramp, a maximum payload of 25 
tons and a maximum range of approximately 
4 500 km. With its cargo bay dimensions of 4 m 
width, 3.55 m height and 17.30 m length, ramp 
excluded, it will be able to transport a Tiger 
attack helicopter and two pallets or four Gazelle 
SA 342 light helicopters or else a 4 ton lorry, 4 
3/4 ton vehicles with 3/4 ton trailers and their 
crews. 
167. The FLA cargo bay's size as compared 
with the United States C-5, C-141 and C-17 and 
with the C-130 and C-160 which it should 
replace is given in Appendices IV and V. 
168. Possible derivative versions of the basic 
model include a combined tactical transport/ 
convertible tanker, a long-range maritime patrol 
and an electronic warfare/surveillance/airborne 
early warning version. 
169. Euroflag estimates the total requirement 
in Europe until 2015 at 300 aircraft, or 350 if a 
long-range maritime patrol version is available. 
Unit price of an aircraft in the basic tactical 
transport version is said to be $ 5 million. 
1 70. If nations concerned could agree to a 
twelve months prefeasibility study at a cost of 
6.51 million ecu at the end of 1991, the first air-
craft could be available in 2003-2004. 
1 71. As regards the cost of the FLA, calcula-
tions have been submitted to the French armed 
forces which allow a preliminary estimate to be 
made. 
172. If France procures 52 FLAs from a full 
programme for the production of 300 aircraft, 
the total cost for France would be F 6 167 
million for development and F 23 257 million 
for the series of 52 aircraft, or a unit cost 
including development of F 565 million 
(January 1990 value) - approximately $ 94 
million. In a more optimistic vision of a total 
production of 750 FLAs, the same number of 52 
aircraft would cost F 2 633 million for devel-
opment and F 21 450 million for the aircraft, or 
a unit cost of F 463 million including devel-
opment - approximately $ 77 million. It should 
be noted that this second vision seems rather 
irrealistic at the moment. 
XI. The choice between different options 
173. There can be little doubt that the Gulf war 
has demonstrated a number of deficiencies in 
airlift capability. Happily, the allied forces had 
some six months to build up their forces, using 
both sea- and airlift, before military operations 
started. Also, every now and then the United 
States was able to provide European allies with 
the huge cargo bays of their C-5 Galaxies and 
C-141 Starlifters. 
1 7 4. Europeans should realise that in future 
crises the situation may be quite different. There 
may be less time to prepare military out-of-area 
operations and the infrastructure near the 
theatre of operations may be less favourable 
than it was in the Middle East with new har-
bours and modern airfields. 
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one of the priority issues to be addressed. It 
should be recalled here that, according to the 
early ARRC concept, the entire corps of more 
than 70 000 troops including equipment should 
be deployable 911 five to seven days' notice. 
177. To give an idea of the number of aircraft 
needed to move a relatively small rapid reaction 
force with equipment, the example one may give 
is that the air transport fleet is assumed to 
consist of the following aircraft: 30 C-1 7 s, 10 A 
340 Ms, 20 C-130s, 20 C-l 60s, 10 G 222s, 10 
C-212s. 
178. The theatre of operations is assumed to be 
within six hours' flying time from the rapid 
reaction force's bases, which means that aircraft 
can make two deliveries each day. After two 
days, the force available in the theatre would 
consist of: 
1 Patriot squadron (750 tons of equip-
ment, 45 vehicles and 75 personnel); 
30 Apache attack helicopters; 
90 main battle tanks (Challenger, Leopard 
11, Leclerc); 
20 multiple-launch rocket systems; 
10 tactical missile systems; 
195 Scorpion light tanks; 
90 M-113 armoured personnel carriers; 
30 AMX-13 light tanks; 
60 AML Scout cars; 
17 000 troops; 
680 tons of light artillery equipment and 
fuel. 
179. The third day should then be used pri-
marily for transporting fuel for the vehicles and 
helicopters and food and water for the troops. 
180. The existing fleet of transport aircraft of 
Europe's armed forces is only capable of trans-
porting equipment up to the size of an AMX-13 
light tank. 
181. Replacement of the existing transport air-
craft by the FLA would considerably enhance 
the airlift capacity as compared to the C-130 
and the C-160 in both range and payload, as can 
be seen in Appendices VI and VII. 
175. Moreover, the United States may have a 
reduced airlift capability in the future, which 
could make it less easy for it to provide generous 
assistance to its European allies. It should be 
noted that congressional debates on defence 
spending are increasingly acrimonious. While 
under current plans a 25 % reduction in forces is 
envisaged by 1995, further reductions cannot be 
excluded. The United States administration is 
under growing attack from critics, asserting that 
it has failed to address problems at home. The 
Defence Secretary, together with the chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has now ordered a 
new comprehensive review of future military 
needs that could result in deeper reductions in 
the armed forces. This could include the can- 182. The FLA has the great advantage of being 
celling or extension of production schedules of able to move a Tiger helicopter without compli-
new weapons programmes and, in the coming cated stripdown and recovery operations 
debates on priorities, the C-l 7 programme, requiring highly-specialised labour. According 
which earlier had been criticised for cost to Euroflag, the only operations would be to fold 
overruns, may well have difficulty in escaping away the tail section and the tail rotor, take off 
unharmed. the main rotor head and the wings holding the 
missile systems. Euroflag claims that the FLA 
176. In the future, European armed forces will could also hold the Apache, but no details can be 
increasingly have to rely upon their own capabil- given as regards stripdown and recovery opera-
ities and their own equipment. If they are tions. Obviously, the C-17 has the additional 
serious in setting up a rapid reaction force which advantage of a still larger cargo bay and a 
could also be deployed for out-of-area opera- payload of 78 tons, roughly three times the FLA 
tions, sufficient airlift capacity will have to be payload. It can move the most heavy battlefield 
319 
DOCUMENT 1292 
equipment without problems. Its range, how-
ever, would not exceed the FLA's range. 
183. The A-340 M is an aircraft completely dif-
ferent from all the abovementioned. It has a 
very long range and can take a 53 ton payload, 
but is based on a civilian aircraft design, which 
means that it has a cargo bay of limited height, 
no forward or aft loading ramp and no capa-
bility to land on rugged airstrips. It is able to 
transport people and packages and, theoreti-
cally, light battlefield equipment up to the size 
of an AMX 10 RC armoured reconnaissance 
vehicle. For moving this kind of battle 
equipment, however, it would always remain a 
second best solution which, considering the 
price of an A 340 M, would still be quite 
expensive. 
184. For an optimal value for money solution, 
Europe's armed forces may have to consider the 
procurement of a mixed fleet of the aircraft 
mentioned in Chapter X. The House of 
Commons Defence Committee has rightly 
pointed out that it is no longer realistic to plan 
for a major out-of-area generation without some 
support from allies. It is suggested here that, in 
the future, WEU could offer a framework for the 
common procurement and operation of an air 
transport fleet for its member countries. 
185. The committee is pleased that one of the 
activities of the WEU Defence Representatives 
Group (DRG) since the June 1991 Council of 
Ministers' meeting in Vianden is to examine 
Europe's strategic mobility needs. At the 
moment, the DRG is waiting for a Franco-
German in-depth study on this subject, but it 
seems that only slow progress is being made 
within this study since it was announced by the 
German presidency in July 1991. It is now 
expected that the Franco-German study will be 
submitted to the DRG in May 1992, after which 
consideration could be given to a wider multina-
tional study. 
186. The committee argues that the study of 
Europe's strategic mobility needs is a matter of 
urgency which should obtain the attention that 
it deserves. 
XII. Conclusions 
187. Diplomacy without arms is like music 
without instruments. The Yugoslav crisis has 
taught Europe how true this statement of the 
Prussian King Frederick the Great still is. This 
present report has demonstrated that there are 
still many problems to be overcome before a 
true European defence force could be opera-
tional. 
188. There can be little doubt, however, that 
the core of any such force should have a rapid 
action capability in order to control an armed 
crisis in its early stages. 
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189. Questions regarding the command structure 
should be solved at an early stage. A well-
defined division of labour between NATO and 
WEU regarding operational activities would also 
be helpful. It would certainly be useful if these 
questions could be considered in an open and 
less dogmatic atmosphere than has too often 
been the case until now. An awareness of his-
toric events and developments is useful for a 
better understanding of existing international 
relations, but never should it be turned into a 
dogmatic exercise since this excludes inventive 
solutions for new situations. The collapse of 
communism is the ultimate proof of how dan-
gerous it can be to rely upon dogmatism. 
190. If Europe is striving for a political union 
with a common foreign and security policy, 
which in the longer run will also call for a 
common defence policy and a European defence 
force, this should not only be seen as a means of 
countering possible threats or as a determined 
policy to score off existing security organ-
isations, but also as an expression of sover-
eignty, as an indispensible ultimate means to 
support diplomatic action. 
191. In some ways, the procurement of new 
equipment for the armed forces in order to allow 
them to face up to new tasks and challenges 
should be seen in the same light. A rapid 
reaction force will need basic equipment to 
make it operational and effective. This report 
has especially mentioned a few areas where basic 
equipment may be lacking in the near future or 
where it may not be available at all unless the 
European nations concerned take procurement 
decisions. It is well known that programmes to 
develop and procure major equipment take 
many years before they come to fruition. A 15 to 
20 year time-frame is no exception, particularly 
not for multinational co-operative programmes. 
192. It would be ill-advised for European 
nations to assume that for some basic 
equipment such as strategic military airlifters, 
ground support and satellite intelligence they 
will be able to rely upon their American allies in 
all circumstances in the future. It should be 
recognised that these allies are also feeling the 
pinch of defence budget constraints. Even the 
vital C-17 strategic airlifter programme is under 
heavy criticism from Congress and there will be 
less aircraft available than planned originally. 
193. Early in October this year, the United 
States House of Representatives did not vote the 
financial means required for the installation of 
the 401st tactical fighter wing with 72 F-16 air-
craft from Torrejon in Spain at the Italian air 
base Crotone, even though they knew that the 
allies had considered this necessary for the pro-
tection of the southern flank. 
194. Europeans will have to set up a rapid 
reaction capability and increase their capability 
• 1 
for out-of-area operations. For these capabilities 
to be credible, they will have to adapt their 
airlift and in-flight refuelling capability. At the 
same time, many nations will have to change the 
structure of their conscript armed forces and 
make it possible for volunteers to be sent to the 
theatre of operations. 
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195. The WEU Secretary-General, Mr. van 
Eekelen, has rightly pointed out that the United 
States has now come to accept WEU as a useful 
instrument for out-of-Europe contingencies. This 
is an even bigger reason for Europe to develop and 
maintain capabilities for intervention when and 
where the political will exists to take it. 
NOTES: 
( 1) Headquarters Includes a multinational element. 
(2) Multinational Airmobile Division. 
(2) 
MNAD 
(1) 
ARRC 
(3) Multinational Division comprising contributions from Southern Region nations ; 
composition yet to be decided. 
(4) Available to ARRC if required. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Illustrative composition oflst (UK) armoured division 
4Armoured 
Brigade 
(as 7 Bde) 
Two Armoured 
Regiments 
(Challenger) 
1st (UK) Armoured Division 
7 Armoured 
Brigade 
Divisional troops : including Armoured 
Reconnaissance, Artillery, Engineer, Signal 
and Aviation Regiments 
(CVR(T), MLRS, Engineer equipment 
including Bridging, Lynx, Gazelle) 
20Armoured 
Brigade 
(as 7 Bde) 
Two Armoured Infantry 
Battalions 
Self-Propelled 
Artillery Regiment 
(Warrior) (AS90) 
Illustrative composition of3rd (UK) division 
3rd (UK) Division 
1 Mechanised 
Brigade 
19 Mechanised 
Brigade 
(as 1 Bde) 
Armoured Armoured Two Mechanised Self-Propelled 
Regiment Infantry Infantry Artillery 
Battalion Battalions Regiment 
(Challenger) (Warrior) (Saxon) (AS90) 
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Divisional troops ; including Armoured 
Reconnaissance, Artillery, Engineer, Signal 
and Aviation Regiments 
(CVR(T), MLRS, Engineer equipment 
including Bridging, Lynx, Gazelle) 
Two Parachute 
Battalions 
5Airborne 
Brigade 
Two Infantry 
Battalions 
Parachute 
Artillery 
Regiment 
(Light Gun) 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Major roles of the British army in the mid-1990s 
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Statistics on Yugoslavia 
1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffe/en (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, 
Beix, Brito, Candal, Caro, Collart, Cuatrecasas(Alternate: Diaz), De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra. Feldmann, Forni (Alternate: 
Seit/inger), Foschi, Goerens, Guizzi, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martinez (Alternate: 
Moya), Martino, Muller, ncriaux, Pieral/i, de Puig, Reddemann, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton, Mr. Soe/1, Mrs. Staels-
Dompas, MM. Thyraud, Ward. 
N. B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
329 
DOCUMENT 1293 
Draft Recommendation 
on Europetlll union and de,elopmenta in Central and Eaatern Europe 
(i) THE AssEMBLY notes that, while events in summer 1991 both in the Soviet Union and in Yugo-
slavia do not directly endanger the security of WEU member countries, they significantly increase the 
risks to Europe's security. 
(ii) It hopes the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht will allow a decisive step to be taken. 
towards co-operation between WEU and the Community in the framework of a European union. 
(iii) It welcomes the fact that the various proposals made at the intergovernmental conference on 
external policy and security and the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council in Rome tend to 
strengthen the role assigned to WEU in ensuring the maintenance of peace throughout Europe. 
(iv) It reiterates the advice given by the Presidential Committee to the WEU Council of Ministers 
and the intergovernmental conference that " parliamentary control of the measures by which WEU 
shoulders Europe's new security and defence responsibilities must remain the task of the WEU 
Assembly which is composed of delegations from national parliaments whose attributions in this 
respect are unchanged ". 
(v) It considers that, at the present juncture, the modified Brussels Treaty provides more than ever 
the juridical basis for European co-operation in defence and security matters and it regrets that the 
Council has not yet agreed to give it any indication about the course it intends to follow in revising the 
treaty. 
(vi) It notes with satisfaction that, at its meeting on 18th November, the Council decided to set up 
operational bodies meeting some of the requirements implied by WED's new responsibilities. 
(vii) It welcomes the fact that NATO has taken decisions to strengthen the CSCE and started to 
organise a permanent dialogue with all the countries which were members of the Warsaw Pact and that 
the Council has decided to organise parallel action. 
(viii) It notes, too, that the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland have started to 
take coherent action in all areas leading to their association with Western Europe but also that they are 
expressing serious concern about their security. 
(ix) It recalls the urgency of implementing its Recommendation 506 on Europe and the Yugoslav 
crisis. 
IT THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Meet at ministerial level the day after the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht to 
prepare the adaptation of WEU to the new situation created by the decisions taken by the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome and by the Maastricht meeting, with particular regard to: 
(a) the organisation and command of WEU forces earmarked for the defence of Europe, and 
their co-ordination with NATO; 
(b) the organisation and command of possible WEU rapid action outside the NATO area or in 
the framework of United Nations or CSCE decisions; 
(c) the necessary revision of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(d) defining the respective roles of the IEPG and a future WEU armaments agency; 
(e) moving the Permanent Council and the Secretariat-General to Brussels in order to help WEU 
to carry out its share of responsibilities in decisions on external and security policy matters 
taken by the European union and to develop co-operation between WEU and NATO along 
the lines of the Presidential Committee's advice of 26th March 1991. 
2. Propose forthwith to the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland: 
(a) participation in meetings of the Council when matters relating to the security of Central and 
Eastern Europe are discussed; 
(b) association with the activities ofthe WEU satellite centre for everything relating to the verifi-
cation of the CFE Agreement; 
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(c) the possibility of participating in the activities of the IEPG and all forms of European 
co-operation in armaments matters. 
3. Propose to Hungary, and any country making a formal request, the posting of military observers 
to Hungarian territory, in the area of its frontier with Yugoslavia, in order to record any further vio-
lation of Hungarian territory or air space by Yugoslav belligerents. 
4. Take without delay the necessary military and naval measures to enforce the embargo on certain 
supplies to Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav republics decided by the Twelve on 8th November. 
5. Co-ordinate as soon as possible humanitarian operations for Yugoslav civilians and afford them 
naval protection. 
6. Establish the necessary co-operation between member countries with a view to their partici-
pation in a peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia as soon as the conditions exist for making this legitimate. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Goereru, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In July 1991, the committee instructed 
your Rapporteur to prepare a report on WE:U 
and the political union of Europe. The mam 
purpose then was to follow the twelve-power 
intergovernmental conference on the joint 
external policy and security aspects of the 
European union in order to allow the Assembly, 
prior to the Maastricht meeting in December 
1991 at which it is planned to adopt the new 
treaty, to express its views on matters within its 
purview and to draw conclusions for the WEU 
Council before the latter in turn proceeded to 
revise the modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. Two series of events since then, outside 
twelve-power Europe and WEU, will probably 
have a strong influence on the work of both the 
intergovernmental conference and the WEU 
Council. First, there was the heightening of the 
Yugoslav crisis which progressively took on the 
dimensions of a full-scale civil war and is 
already having major repercussions on the whole 
of Europe that may well become even worse. 
Second, there was the coup d'etat in the Soviet 
Union on 19th August. Admittedly, on 21st 
August it was plain that this had failed. 
However, it was a serious crisis from which the 
Soviet state can obviously not emerge intact. 
Moreover, throughout Central and Eastern 
Europe it aroused new fears that Western 
Europe must not neglect when considering its 
future and, above all, that of its security 
policy. 
3. It was therefore normal for a study of the 
prospects of a European union including 
external and security policy to take these facts 
into account. For this reason, the Presidential 
Committee therefore decided, on 11th Sep-
tember, to change the subject entrusted to your 
Rapporteur by including it in the agenda of the 
second part of the thirty-seventh session of the 
Assembly under the title " European union and 
developments in Central and Eastern Europe ". 
4. On 15th October, the Presidential 
Commmittee adopted, under urgent procedure, 
a first recommendation on WEU's action in the 
Yugoslav crisis. The present document, while 
analysing certain aspects of that affair, is more 
concerned with explaining the second sub-
stantive text which, going beyond current 
events, tries to draw lessons from the crisis for 
the organisation of European security as it is to 
be defined at the summit meeting on 9th 
December and by the Council of WEU. 
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5. In order to prepare this report, your 
Rapporteur went to Hungary and Poland on 7th 
and 8th November to obtain direct information 
about the security concerns of those two coun-
tries and their intentions in regard to 
co-operation with Western Europe in this area. 
Since Mr. Dienstbier, Czechoslovak Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, is to address the Assembly on 
3rd December, he did not visit Prague. He 
wishes to express here his sincere gratitude to 
the governments and parliaments of the two 
countries which received him, not only for their 
warm welcome but, even more, for the level of 
the talks he was able to have in all of them. 
Special thanks are due to Mr. Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Poland, Mr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Deputy Min-
ister of Defence, Mr. Szoka'i and Mr. Sandoz 
Peisch, Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign 
Affairs of Hungary, Mr. Joo Rudolf, Under-
Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Andrzej 
Wielowieyski, former Vice-President of the 
Polish Senate, Mr. Gyorgy Papp, Mr. Kocsenda 
Antal, Mr. Rockenbauer Zoltan, Mr. Gabor 
Perjes and Mr. Lajos Horvath, members of the 
Hungarian National Assembly, Mr. Andrzej 
Towpik, Director of the Department of 
European Institutions at the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Ferencz, Coun-
sellor to the Prime Minister of Hungary, and 
Mr. Baba and Mr. Jozsef Nyerki from the Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs of Hungary. His talks 
with them provided important information and 
above all confirmed the direction he intended 
his report to follow by improving his under-
standing of how Hungary and Poland viewed 
their place in the Europe of tomorrow. Your 
Rapporteur must also stress the contribution 
made to his thinking by the talks on 8th July 
between several Assembly committees and Mr. 
Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
on 30th October between the Presidential Com-
mittee and Mr. Genscher and on 6th November 
between the Political Committee and Mr. van 
Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
6. Finally, your Rapporteur has to point out 
that, after an initial discussion on 16th October, 
the Political Committee decided to defer the 
final examination and adoption of the report 
until 27th November so that the Assembly may 
debate a text on 4th December which takes 
account of the latest developments in a situation 
which has changed very quickly in recent weeks 
and adopt a r~commendation adapted to the cir-
cumstances just before the meeting of the Euro-
pean Council in Maastricht on 9th December. 
Your Rapporteur has endeavoured to meet this 
concern. 
11. Prospects for European union in June 1991 
(a) The intergovemmental conference 
7. Since the beginning of 1991, two intergov-
ernmental conferences, one on economic and 
monetary union and the other on joint external 
and security policy, have been held by the 
twelve members of the European Community in 
preparation for a European Council meeting at 
the level of heads of state or of government in 
Maastricht in December 1991. The aim of this 
European summit meeting is to decide on the 
changes the Twelve are prepared to make to the 
Rome Treaty to extend the Community's 
responsibilities in these two areas, to redefine 
the respective powers of the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament and to 
specify the links by which political co-operation 
and WEU should be associated with the 
European Council and the Community. The 
work of the conference was prepared by several 
proposals the external policy and security 
aspects of which have already been analysed by 
your Rapporteur in Document 1261. 
8. Both intergovernmental conferences met 
with difficulties and when, on 17th June, the 
Luxembourg Government, which then held the 
presidency of the Community, after consulting 
the various member countries, tabled draft 
changes to the Rome Treaty, it was strongly 
criticised, on the one hand by those in favour of 
moving quickly towards a union that would be a 
true European federal state and, on the other, by 
countries which were more anxious to safeguard 
their national sovereignty in the areas concerned, 
as was the case in particular for the United 
Kingdom. Nevertheless, it then seemed likely 
that the already considerable difficulties would 
be overcome in time and that the European 
summit meeting in Maastricht would make sig-
nificant progress towards European union. 
(b) The problem of enlarging the Community 
9. Although the intergovernmental con-
ference groups the twelve member countries of 
the Community, it must not forget that the latter 
will be enlarged in coming years. The question 
·of enlargement arose with the announcement of 
Austria's candidature, followed, in June, by that 
of Sweden, and with the negotiations being held 
with EFT A, which indicated that there would be 
a move by all the EFT A member countries 
towards progressive accession to the Com-
munity. In fact, all those countries have pros-
perous economies, with structures not basically 
different from those of the EEC. From this point 
of view, therefore, their accession would present 
no major problem. Conversely, two of them 
have neutral status that it would be difficult to 
reconcile with membership of a European union 
whose responsibilities included external and 
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security policy. Since 1815, Switzerland has 
been committed by international treaty to a per-
petually neutral status, and it has always con-
sidered that this neutrality governed its external 
policy in all respects. Moreover, Austria's neu-
trality is written into its constitution and modi-
fication of its constitutional law proclaiming 
that neutrality was the condition for the signing 
of the 1955 Treaty of State which marked the 
end of the second world war for that country. 
Neither country can renounce its neutral status 
on its own authority. This is not so for Sweden, 
which, since 1815, has been pursuing a neutral 
policy without however being bound by an inter-
national statute, or for Finland, which, since the 
end of the second world war, has had to pursue a 
neutral policy that was a pledge of its friendly 
relationship with its Soviet neighbour but which 
is not guaranteed by treaty. It is nevertheless dif-
ficult to see how these two countries could take 
part in a union that included foreign and 
security policy if they did not renounce the prin-
ciple underlying their policy of neutrality. It 
should also be recalled that Cyprus, Malta and 
Turkey have applied officially for membership. 
10. Furthermore, three Central European 
countries have announced their intention to join 
the European Community as soon as possible, 
i.e. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Their 
reasons are clear: following the disbandment of 
the Warsaw Pact and of Comecon, to which, 
moreover, they had made a major contribution, 
they feel the need for a link with a European 
economic and political entity which would help 
them to redirect their own economies and guar-
antee their security. Other Central and Eastern 
European countries have, in various ways, 
shown their interest in closer links with the 
Community, although continuing uncertainty 
about the course being followed by their regimes 
and their external policy for the time being pre-
cludes their applying for membership. 
11. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
have already carried out the political reforms 
necessary to set up democratic regimes which 
are already working more or less satisfactorily 
with serious hopes of stability. They have also 
shown true solidarity with the Community 
countries, particularly during the Gulf crisis. 
The only real obstacle to their early accession is 
the state of their economies which, in spite of 
major reforms and opening to western firms and 
goods, are not yet ready to come to grips with 
the wider Western European market. At present, 
therefore, it would seem that these countries can 
consider only association agreements with the 
Community. Agreements are now being nego-
tiated, but it is necessary for them to be con-
cluded in the very near future. The associations 
must be seen in terms of a progressive 
enlargement of the European union in their 
direction. Other Central, Eastern or Southern 
European countries will probably also wish to 
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take their place in the European Community in 
subsequent years, but today it is not possible to 
draw up an exhaustive list of those countries. 
However, there are ample signs that the Com-
munity is increasingly recognising its vocation 
as the federator of Europe, in the economic area 
at least. The question is whether it can also play 
this role in external and security policy. 
12. In June 1991, it therefore appeared that 
the Community would eventually group a large 
part of Europe but that it could take its time in 
doing so. It seemed possible to strengthen its 
institutions before moving on to the stage of 
enlargement. The Maastricht summit meeting 
and then, at the end of 1992, the completion of 
the single market were to allow this deepening. 
Only subsequently would it tackle the problems 
raised by the various candidatures. While the 
remarks made by the President of the French 
Republic, Fran9ois Mitterrand, in Prague in 
June at the conference on the concept of a con-
federation of Europe, when he said the Central 
European countries would have a long wait at 
the Community door, seemed to some to be 
unduly discouraging, they reflected a fairly real-
istic view of the importance of the problems to 
be solved. The approach might be slow in order 
to handle enlargement satisfactorily so as not to 
dilute what the Community had attained and 
paralyse the future European union. 
13. However, subsequent events make it nec-
essary to reconsider these facts. On the one 
hand, instability in Central Europe, revealed by 
the serious unrest in Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union, suggests that countries in that region will 
not be able to wait long for Western Europe to 
assume responsibility for their security and eco-
nomic stability. These events also showed that, 
when such crises arose, the Twelve were not yet 
prepared to agree on a joint external policy or 
military action. It must therefore be seen 
whether it will be possible to build a sound 
enough European union before the question of 
enlargement becomes crucial. During his visit to 
the former GDR, and in particular in Dresden 
on 19th September, President Mitterrand spoke 
in favour of the accession of the Central 
European countries without mentioning the 
need for a very long wait, thus adopting the 
same attitude as many European governments, 
including Germany. Time is no longer on our 
side and the Community is being forced to con-
sider its enlargement even before the negotia-
tions on strengthening, which are proving dif-
ficult and will quite obviously not be completed 
at Maastricht, have led to a European union in 
the full meaning of the term. 
Ill. Yugoslavia and Europe 
(a) The collapse of the Yugosla11 state 
first world war as far as the Austro-Hungarian 
and Ottoman Empires were concerned, Yugo-
slavia grouped round the former Kingdom of 
Serbia a very large proportion of the southern 
Slavs - Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrans -
and a number of minorities such as Hungarians 
in Vojvodina and Croatia, Albanians in Kosovo, 
Bulgarians in Macedonia and Muslims in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the second world 
war, Yugoslavia was also given Istria, where 
there was an Italian minority. In fact, there is 
considerable intermingling of these populations 
within what was to become the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945 and above all 
within several of its component republics, par-
ticularly Bosnia-Herzegovina. A few details are 
given at appendix showing the composite nature 
of the federation and its component republics. 
15. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, dominated 
by a Serb element which went out of its way to 
impose its law on the country, was constantly 
contested by some of the ethnic groups of which 
it was composed and, above all, by the Croats 
from whom emanated the Ustachi movement, 
responsible for the assassination of King Alex-
ander in Marseilles in 1934 and which took 
advantage of the second world war to set up a 
Croat state which, with Axis support, imposed a 
cruel reign of terror in the regions peopled by 
the Serbs under its control. This does not mean 
there were no Yugoslav national feelings, and 
these were embodied in the resistance 
movement led by the Croat communist Tito, 
which fought at one and the same time the Axis 
armies, the Ustachis and the Serb Chetnik mon-
archist movement. It was Tito's partisans who 
took power at the end of the war without the 
Soviet Union intervening. They instituted a 
communist regime, the only one of its kind, 
which broke with Moscow in 1949, and formed 
a new federal-type state. The dictatorship of 
Tito and the Communist Party succeeding in 
quelling nationalist claims and allowed Yugo-
slavia to play an important role on the interna-
tional scene. 
16. With Tito's death in 1980 came a weak-
ening of the federal state and a renewal of natio-
nalist claims, first by the Albanians in Kosovo 
and then, too, by the Croats and Slovenes. The 
collapse of communist ideology in Eastern 
Europe in 1989 encouraged Yugoslavia to move 
towards more democratic practices. Free elec-
tions were held in all the republics in 1990. They 
produced clear majorities for anti-communist 
forces in Slovenia, Cr.oatia and Macedonia and 
for former communists who had become 
"socialists" in Serbia and Montenegro. It was 
not very clear who had the majority in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. These elections allowed the 
Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia 
14. Set up in 1920 further to the Treaties of to set up non-communist, nationalist govern-
St. Germain, Trianon and Sevres ending the ments with the support of large majorities in 
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their parliaments, while the former communists 
retained a proponderant influence in Serbia and 
the federation. Thus, to renewed national dis-
putes, ideological and political struggles were 
added which grew decidedly worse in spring 1991. 
17. On 25th June, Slovenia and Croatia pro-
claimed their independence. However, they then 
accepted a moratorium postponing its imple-
mentation until 7th October. In August, they 
were followed by Macedonia and, in October, by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and unrest again broke out 
in Kosovo, whose local assembly was dissolved 
by the Serbian Government in May 1990 after it 
had proclaimed that the province was now a 
fully-fledged republic. Slovene and Croat armed 
forces managed to liberate the territory of the 
two republics from the federal authority and 
Croat forces, with the support of local militias 
armed with equipment recuperated from the 
federal army and procured from several Central 
European countries. They also blockaded federal 
forces in their Croatian bases. For their part, the 
Slavonian Serbs on the territory of the Croatian 
Republic took up arms against that republic 
with the active support of the federal army and 
Serb militias. Although presided by a Croat, Mr. 
Stipe Mesic, the Federal Government first set 
about restoring order by claiming its authority 
throughout the country. Seeing that this had 
failed, in July it appeared to wish to negotiate 
with the two dissident republics, but the cease-
fires it signed, in particular in Brioni on 7th July 
urged by the European Community, were not 
respected by the federal army dominated by 
Serb elements and officers or by the Slavonian 
Serb militias. Whereas hostilities then came to 
an end for Slavonia, in August and early Sep-
tember the federal army conducted an offensive 
which allowed it to occupy a large part of Cro-
atian territory in Slavonia and along the fron-
tiers of Croatia and Bosnia, where it threatened 
Zagreb and the ports along the northern Dal-
matian coast. For about twelve days after a 
further cease-fire which the republics and the 
federal state signed on 17th September under 
pressure from the European Community, the 
forces involved seemed to be respecting it. The 
Community had made Lord Carrington respon-
sible for leading a peace mission in Yugoslavia 
and presiding the conference in The Hague 
intended to work out the conditions for a return 
to peace. However, when, on 30th September, 
the Croatian forces took over a federal army 
base, hostilities were resumed with new violence 
and the Serbs launched an offensive against Dal-
matian ports, and Dubrovnik in particular. 
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of October, while the Croats and Slovenes 
deserted the federal army in large numbers. 
Conversely, private militias have increased, par-
ticularly in Croatia, and now pay little heed to 
the governments of either Zagreb or Belgrade, 
thus negating each of the cease-fires signed by 
the republics and federal authorities. On 5th 
November, the twelfth cease-fire was concluded 
without any of the earlier ones having ensured 
more than a slackening off in the fighting for 
more than a few hours or, at best, a few days. 
The federal army itself seems out of the control 
of what is left of the federal power. It is just as if 
Yugoslavia has already ceased to exist and each 
section of the population is trying to occupy a 
strong position before negotiations between 
independent republics. The war today is some-
thing of a series of conflicts between the govern-
ments of certain republics and national minor-
ities with the support of other republics or the 
federal army. This situation adds to the diffi-
culty of the negotiations in The Hague, presided 
since July by Lord Carrington, since, apart from 
the government of the Slovene Republic, no 
authority seems capable of really committing 
itself on behalf of the portion of Yugoslav 
society that it is supposed to represent. 
19. This civil war has attained a degree of vio-
lence and led to clashes between national senti-
ments so serious that a return to the status quo 
ante bellum seems out of the question. Where 
the future of Yugoslav territory is concerned, the 
question is whether it will be possible to 
maintain a link between the various republics, 
whether the frontiers between those republics 
will remain as they are and what protection 
minorities will have if certain republics such as 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia or even Monte-
negro show sufficient cohesion to be able to 
form independent states. These various ques-
tions are on the agenda of the conference in The 
Hague, but they obviously depend on the estab-
lishment and maintenance of an effective cease-
fire. 
20. On 3rd October, the non-Serb members, 
including the President, Mr. Mesic, were 
removed from the collegial presidency of the 
Yugoslav Federation, thus significantly weak-
ening the latter's hopes of continuing as a de jure 
state. Yet, on 4th October, the same presidency, 
in agreement with Serbia, made major conces-
sions at the peace conference, declaring that it 
was prepared to recognise the independence of 
republics so wishing, in exchange for the lifting 
of the blockade of the federal barracks in 
Croatia and guarantees that minority rights 
would be respected. But at the same time it 
18. While, at the outset of the conflict, the decreed partial mobilisation in Yugoslavia and 
aim of the government and federal army was to surrounded the city of Dubrovnik. Since the 
maintain the existence of a Yugoslav state, this moratorium on the effective proclamation of the 
no longer seems to be the case. The non-Serb independence of the Slovene and Croatian 
members of the collegial presidency of the Republics expired on 7th October, the reconsti-
federal state left that institution at the beginning tution of a Yugoslav state now seems out of the 
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question, but the peace conference is still con-
sidering whether it is possible to define certain 
links, in particular economic, which would asso-
ciate the sovereign states. 
21. At the beginning of November, the main 
obstacle to a effective cease-fire stemmed from 
the fact that the " Serb bloc ", consisting of 
Serbia, Montenegro and the federal army, 
insisted that the cease-fire line, which might be 
guaranteed by international monitors protected 
by a small military deployment, be located on 
the territory of the Republic of Croatia and cor-
respond to the present front line. Conversely, 
the Republic of Croatia insisted that the 
cease-fire line be along its frontier with Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia. It is therefore apparent 
that both sides consider the conditions for the 
cease-fire binding on the future of Yugoslavia. 
Hence it is necessary to pursue at one and the 
same time the negotiations on the return to 
peace and the search for a cease-fire, as is being 
done at the conference in The Hague. However, 
this makes the achievement of an effective 
cease-fire unlikely in the near future. The eco-
nomic sanctions decided by the Twelve on 8th 
November for the entire Yugoslav territory are 
obviously intended to force the two parties to 
agree on the cease-fire, but it seems unlikely that 
the effect will be felt very quickly. On the other 
hand, a marked failure of the conference in The 
Hague could but lead to recognition of the inde-
pendence of the republics by the international 
community, which would in no way settle the 
main problem, that of the right of minorities 
within the republics. 
(b) I'M threatened spread of tile conflict 
22. In view of the number of alien minorities 
living in Yugoslavia, the crisis affects neigh-
bouring countries which fear they may be 
threatened by a spread of the conflict since they 
feel a degree of solidarity with one or other 
faction of the Yugoslav population, particularly 
as they are receiving increasing numbers of ref-
ugees. 
23. (a) Hungary is worried about the fate of 
some 500 000 Hungarians, the majority of 
whom live in Vojvodina, an autonomous ter-
ritory dependent on Serbia, but others live in 
Croatia, particularly in the part of Croatian ter-
ritory occupied by the federal army in August 
1991. Members of the Hungarian minority are 
now being called up to serve either in the federal 
army or in the Croatian army, and are thus 
being forced to fight each other for causes that 
they cannot endorse. Anxious not to be caught 
up in an internal Yugoslav conflict, Hungary, 
whose territory and, above all, air space have 
been violated several times since the civil war 
started, is supporting efforts by the European 
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Community and the United Nations to establish 
a cease-fire. It is asking for the more important 
alien minorities, i.e. Albanians and Hungarians, 
to be represented at the peace conference as well 
as the republics. 
24. In fact, Hungary is afraid that, if the con-
flict continues, it may be dragged in by Yugoslav 
forces which wish to internationalise the war. It 
has had to take in several tens of thousands of 
refugees, including many members of the Hun-
garian minority and several thousand deserters 
from the federal army. Furthermore, although it 
has considered the violations of its air space to 
be in general due to initiatives taken at a low 
level, it is questioning why, at the beginning of 
November, the federal air force dropped a 
scatter bomb on its territory near the frontier 
which, by mere chance, caused no casualties. It 
is now wondering whether this was not a delib-
erate policy of provocation on the part of certain 
military authorities. 
25. Anxious not to give a foothold to such 
provocation, Hungary withdrew its armed forces 
from the immediate vicinity of the frontier and 
gave its wholehearted support to initiatives by 
the Twelve, the CSCE and the United Nations 
to promote a cease-fire. However, above all it 
explains why the question of the country's 
security, which had moved to back stage in Hun-
garian concerns once Soviet forces had left, has 
again become a matter of urgency for Hungary, 
particularly as the revolt of Croatia and Slovenia 
might well encourage claims by certain minor-
ities in some of Hungary's other neighbouring 
countries, such as Romania and Czechoslovakia, 
where there are large Hungarian minorities esti-
mated at more. than 200 000 in Slovakia and 
more than 2.5 million in Romanian Transyl-
vania. Hence it was not just to move closer to 
the European Community but also because of 
very serious, well-justified fears for its security 
that in October Hungary, in association with 
Czechoslovakia and Poland, again asked to join 
NATO and is seeking to tighten its relations 
with both WEU and twelve-power Europe. 
26. (b) Austria's frontiers and air space have 
also been violated, particularly at the beginning 
of the conflict when the struggle included Slo-
venia. It has had to take in many Croatian and 
Slovenian refugees and has been strongly in 
favour of international recognition of the inde-
pendence of the Slovene and Croatian 
Republics, which were part of the Austro-
Hungarian empire prior to 1918 and with which 
it has close relations. However, it did not wish to 
take an isolated initiative in this sense. 
27. (c) Bulgaria considers the people Yugo-
slavia calls" Macedonian" to be in reality Bul-
garian. It recognised immediately the inde-
pendence of Macedonia proclaimed on 15th 
September, but part of the Bulgarian public 
wishes the Republic of Macedonia to be linked 
, 
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with Bulgaria and the difficulties standing in the 
way of the formation of a coalition government 
in Bulgaria following the elections on 13th 
October may lead to the parties outbidding each 
other in this connection. 
28. (d) Greece, a member of the European 
Community, is worried about the possible cre-
ation of a state bearing the name of Macedonia 
that might claim the Greek part of Macedonia. 
The Prime Ministers of Bulgaria and Greece met 
in Athens from 24th to 26th September and then 
signed an agreement of co-operation, good-
neighbourliness and friendship in Sofia on 7th 
October and considered a meeting enlarged to 
include other Balkan countries, including Serbia 
and Romania, but this was eventually postponed 
at the request of Bulgaria. Mr. Samaras, Greek 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, has said his 
country will in no event recognise a country 
" bearing the historic Greek name of Mace-
donia". 
29. (e) There is an Italian minority in the Dal-
matian part of Croatia, and Italy showed par-
ticular concern at the land offensive, air raids 
and naval blockade targeted on the larger Dal-
matian ports at the beginning of September. 
This minority seems in reality to be far larger 
than shown in official Yugoslav statistics and 
the lack of enthusiasm it showed for the 
explosion of Croat nationalism seems to have 
led the Croatian people and authorities to take 
rigorous measures against it. Its status, 
acceptable in a federal state that includes many 
other minorities, would be far less so in a Cro-
atian national state. 
30. (f) The Albanians, who are in the majority 
in the autonomous Serbian territory of Kosovo, 
are calling for Kosovo to be reunited with 
Albania. However, although Albania is itself in 
the midst of too serious a crisis to embark upon 
dangerous ventures abroad, it may be tempted 
by the political benefits of a burst of national 
feeling. 
(c) The principles iniiOIJied 
31. Since July, the Western European press 
and television have been showing daily pictures 
of the atrocity of this civil war, testifying to the 
relentlessness of the belligerents and their deter-
mination not to give in. However, it may be 
noted that, during the first two months of hostil-
ities, the media in the various western ocuntries 
did not show the same pictures or report the 
same incidents. Some concentrated on the 
blockade of the federal army base in Croatia, the 
misfortunes of the Serbs in Slavonia and 
accounts of continued Yugoslav national senti-
ments among some of them, while others laid 
greater stress on the will for independence of the 
Croats and Slovenes, the inferior weapons of the 
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Croatian Republic's forces and the air raids to 
which the people of Croatian towns are subject. 
These media orientations revealed different 
kinds of feelings about the Yugoslav crisis and 
the combatants and showed that national public 
opinion had conflicting reactions to these 
events. To some extent, they reflected political 
viewpoints and reactions which varied from one 
country to another. 
32. Everyone certainly agreed that Europe 
must do its utmost to put an end to the war and 
the accompanying atrocities, but they differed 
significantly about how this could be achieved. 
Thus, in the Federal Republic and Italy, public 
opinion in July was firmly in favour of 
recognising the independence of the Croatian 
and Slovenian Republics, whereas in France it 
seemed far more reserved on this point. 
However, these differences died down as the 
civil war developed and, while there are still dif-
ferences between reactions, they are no longer a 
major obstacle to European action to promote a 
compromise peace. At the meeting of the 
European Council on 19th September 1991, 
Germany and France together proposed the for-
mation of a European buffer force for 
deployment in Yugoslavia as soon as the 
essential conditions were met, while the United 
Kingdom was extremely reserved about the idea. 
33. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
Europe was split by an ideological conflict 
between those in favour of the right of states, of 
which Metternich was the most important 
champion, and the liberals, who were in favour 
of the right of peoples to self-determination. The 
former considered that priority should be given 
to a European order guaranteeing peace and 
based on a balance between the great powers. 
The latter wanted a new order whose guarantee 
would be the satisfaction of the peoples. In 
1919-20, the Treaties ofVersailles, St. Germain, 
Trianon and Sevres represented an attempt to 
build Europe on the basis of the principle of 
nationalities, at the same time trying to rec-
oncile this with the need to create viable states, 
before the weaknesses of this edifice were 
revealed at Munich in 1938. However, in the 
aftermath of the reunification of Germany and 
the Baltic republics' proclamations of indepen-
dence, it might have been thought that, apart 
from Poland's frontiers, the political geography 
of the Europe of Versailles would be rebuilt on 
the ruins of the Europe of Y alta. The revolt of 
the Slovenes, and then of the Croats and Mace-
donians, against the Yugoslav state indicates 
that this is not at all the case. 
34. What the Slovenes, Croats and Macedo-
nians are now claiming, like the Albanians of 
Kosovo, is application of the same right to self-
determination on which the Europe of 1920 that 
they are aiming to destroy was said to be based. 
There are no real criteria allowing the notion of 
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nationhood to be defined or a clear idea to be 
obtained of the conditions on the basis of which 
the international community should recognise 
the right of a people to form a state. At the most, 
it can be accepted that a certain level of national 
will is necessary but that maintaining internal 
order and international peace must also be taken 
into account. Yugoslav national movements are 
based on ethnic, religious or linguistic interests 
·and contest an existing state that is recognised 
by the international community. The struggle of 
the Slovenes and Croats is proof of the existence 
among them of a strong national will, but certain 
details are still lacking that would allow us to 
measure what remains of Yugoslav national 
feelings in each section of the country's society. 
35. Moreover, the peaceful reunification of 
Europe following the collapse of the Soviet 
system is being achieved on the basis of the prin-
ciples laid down in the CSCE Final Act signed in 
Helsinki in 1975, which were clarified and con-
firmed in the November 1990 Charter of Paris 
for a new Europe. These principles certainly 
concern individual and collective freedoms, the 
application of democracy and respect for minor-
ities within each country, but they also include 
the inviolability of frontiers and non-inter-
ference in states' internal affairs. This does not 
imply the intangibility of states and frontiers but 
excludes all individual or collective right to 
intervene in the internal affairs of a state. It is 
certain that, without the adoption of these pro-
visions, neither the Soviet Union nor, moreover, 
any of its allies, not to speak of Yugoslavia itself, 
would have subscribed to these texts which 
made a major contribution to allowing the 
recent evolution in Central and Eastern Europe 
towards more liberal and democratic regimes. 
To abandon these principles might jeopardise 
this evolution. 
36. When the present report was discussed by 
the Political Committee, some of its members 
stressed that progress made towards establishing 
a new international order, in particular during 
the Gulf crisis, had laid the foundations for new 
international law authorising the international 
community to intervene in the internal affairs of 
a country if the principles set out in the United 
Nations Charter, or the Charter of Paris for 
members of the CSCE, were not respected. They 
believed that, as soon as one of the fundamental 
principles on which a new international order 
might be based, in particular respect for human 
rights and the rights of minorities and demo-
cratic foundations, were clearly violated, it was 
henceforth for the international community as a 
whole to intervene to ensure that they were 
respected. The question raised is twofold. It 
stems first from the weakness of positive law in 
this area. It is clear that the requirements of the 
international community cannot be the same 
vis-a-vis economically developed countries and 
more or less underdeveloped countries. Pressure 
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exercised by the international community to put 
an end to dictatorships in Spain, Portugal and 
Greece or even to bring about the end of 
apartheid in South Africa were moderate and 
did not involve the use of force. Is it possible to 
tackle any more energetically the problem of 
Yugoslavia or that of many African, Asian or 
Latin American states where there is no reason 
to think that the West would be able to solve the 
economic, social and cultural problems facing 
those countries? 
3 7. Your Rapporteur can but note that 
European public opinion is evolving towards the 
definition of a certain right to intervene in the 
internal affairs of states where the fundamental 
rights of individuals or groups of individuals are 
flagrantly violated. However, he has at the same 
time to note that this evolution, evident in 
certain declarations by the CSCE at its meetings 
in Copenhagen in 1990, on the human 
dimension ofthe CSCE, and Geneva in 1991, on 
national minorities, has been included in pos-
itive law only in exceptional cases such as that 
of the treaty of good neighbourliness and 
co-operation concluded between Germany and 
Poland on 17th June 1991. This treaty devotes 
three long articles (20, 21 and 22) to the guar-
antee of extremely precise, broad-ranging rights 
for the minority of each nation on the territory 
of the other and also the duty for members of 
the two minorities to behave loyally towards the 
state in which they live and to obey its laws. He 
believes the WEU Assembly would be carrying 
out useful work by examining this question. In 
tackling the Yugoslav problem, the Twelve and 
WEU seem to have kept to a traditional concept 
of law since they offered mediation to all parties, 
envisaged resorting to armed force only in con-
ditions accepted by all and confined themselves 
to limited economic sanctions to induce the 
republics to negotiate. They cannot be blamed 
for keeping strictly to the law in regard to a 
concept of the evolution of international rela-
tions which has not yet been translated into texts 
that are commitments in the strictest meaning of 
the word. 
38. Furthermore, can democratic societies be 
asked to sacrifice human lives for causes that do 
not directly concern them? The question is clear 
where Yugoslavia is concerned: would Western 
Europe be prepared to accept significant losses 
in the hope, but not the certainty, of restoring 
peace between the Yugoslav peoples? These con-
siderations mean that any proposal to involve 
Europe in armed interventions in that country 
must be approached cautiously. 
39. Europe, as embodied in the twelve-power 
Community, has a major role to play in seeking 
a peaceful solution to a conflict which calls in 
question the survival of a Yugoslav state. Not 
without reason, the Americans seem to have 
considered that, ifthe Yugoslav affair was not to 
• 
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assume a worldwide dimension, it was essential 
for NATO not to become involved, relying 
simply on twelve-power measures, particularly 
as the Soviet Union readily believed, prior to 
19th August at least, that the attitude adopted 
by the West towards Yugoslav dissension would 
be reflected in its attitude towards contestation 
of the Soviet state by a number of its component 
republics. This is obviously why the Soviet 
Union has so far been very reserved about the 
Yugoslav crisis and, on 6th July, made known 
its opposition to any armed intervention by the 
West. At the beginning of October, however, it 
tried to induce the belligerents to accept a cease-
fire, but it failed to do any more than the 
Twelve. 
40. The question is therefore whether twelve-
power Europe, over and above its appeals for a 
cease-fire, its offers to help to apply it and its 
contribution to the search for a constitutional 
compromise that would probably provide only a 
fragile basis for a lasting order, will, when all is 
said and done, opt for the right of each of the 
Yugoslav peoples to constitute a sovereign state 
or for the maintenance of a federal state at any 
cost. It is hard to envisage it playing a military 
part in guaranteeing peace through the interme-
diary of WEU if Europe has not agreed on its 
aims. So far, it has decided to do its utmost to 
induce the representatives of the republics to 
agree on the future of what used to be Yugo-
slavia so as to place its force at the service of a 
freely-consented peace. There is no proof that it 
will manage to do so. Were the conference in 
The Hague to be a failure, it would have to 
express its opinion and it seems hardly ready to 
do so. 
(d) The Europetlll approach 
41. Developments in Yugoslavia had been a 
subject of preoccupation for the Western 
European countries for a long time and it was 
not by chance that this was the first, and until 
quite recently more or less the only, question to 
be tackled by the Mediterranean Sub-Group set 
up by the WEU Council. The armed conflict 
which started in spring 1991 was considered by 
the Council at its ministerial meeting in 
Vianden on 27th June 1991. The statement it 
issued was a simple appeal for " a negotiated 
solution among the parties concerned, having 
due regard to all the principles of the CSCE ". 
42. The worsening of the situation in July, 
first of all in Slovenia and then in Croatia, 
caused a meeting of the CSCE emergency com-
mittee responsible for consultations in the event 
of a crisis to be convened in Prague on 3rd and 
4th July and the European Community 
examined the possibility of forming a team of 
observers to monitor the application of the truce 
reached by the Slovene Government and the 
federal army on 3rd July. The ministers for 
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foreign affairs of the Twelve, meeting in The 
Hague on 5th July, decided to impose an 
embargo on supplies of arms to the parties 
involved, to freeze financial assistance and to 
send the European troika to Yugoslavia. On 8th 
July, at a meeting in Brioni with Serbian, Cro-
atian, Slovene and federal leaders, the troika 
obtained the adoption of a joint declaration 
including an immediate cease-fire, the return of 
the federal army to its barracks and a three-
month moratorium by the Croatian and Slovene 
Republics on the implementation of their decla-
rations of independence to allow an agreement 
on the future of Yugoslavia. In fact, the Brioni 
agreement allowed peace to be restored only in 
Slovenia when federal forces withdrew from the 
republic. 
43. This was not so in Croatia, where fighting 
continued to worsen, in Slavonia and in Krajina 
and, on 29th July, the ministers of the Twelve 
proposed extending the mandate of the 
cease-fire monitors to include Croatia. However, 
in spite of a further intervention by the 
European troika, Serbia and Montenegro were 
against this measure and, on 6th August, the 
ministers for foreign affairs of the Twelve, con-
demning the use of force by any republic to 
impose solutions on other republics, called for 
the opening of negotiations on the future of 
Yugoslavia, invited the Commission to study 
economic sanctions that might be taken against 
parties refusing the cease-fire and measures to 
be taken in favour of parties that co-operated. 
They launched an appeal for CSCE support, 
approved the intention expressed by Belgium, 
France and the United Kingdom to inform the 
Security Council of the Twelve's initiatives and 
took note of the decision to convene the WEU 
Council to examine the conditions for a possible 
WEU contribution to stabilising an agreed 
cease-fire. 
44. In fact, at the request of France, the 
German presidency had convened a meeting of 
the WEU Permanent Council on 7th August. 
According to the communique: 
" ... It examined whether WEU could 
make any contribution to the mainte-
nance of an agreed cease-fire in Yugo-
slavia. 
The Council agreed to continue to follow 
closely developments in the situation in 
Yugoslavia. 
Member countries agreed to continue 
their reflections on possible concrete con-
tributions they might make to the mainte-
nance of an agreed cease-fire, taking into 
account the efforts made in other interna-
tional fora, such as the European Com-
munity and the CSCE. 
Further meetings will be held as nec-
essary." 
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45. In reality, it would appear that member 
states then decided to examine on a national 
basis the military options according to which 
WEU might make a contribution in the event of 
a political decision by the Twelve in this sense, 
and in particular: the military anchorage of a 
civil team of observers or monitors, simple mil-
itary observation or peace-keeping force. Once 
the capitals had completed their assessments, 
the delegations were to meet in the Council and 
its working groups to continue to examine the 
options open to WEU. 
46. This amounts to saying that WEU, 
without adopting a position on the political 
aspects of the problem, has made a technical 
examination of the possibilities of military 
action by member countries in the light of deci-
sions to be taken in the framework of the 
Twelve. At the beginning of September, the 
United Kingdom Delegation is reported to have 
submitted a document to the Council in which, 
on the basis of experience acquired from buffer 
operations for which the United Kingdom had 
been responsible in Northern Ireland and 
Cyprus, it considered that a buffer force 
designed to ensure respect for a cease-fire 
accepted by all parties would require the 
mobilisation of a force of about 40 000 men for 
a period that it would be difficult to determine 
in advance but which would, in any event, last 
many months. 
47. On 27th August, the ministers for foreign 
affairs of the Twelve, noting the further deterio-
ration in the situation in Croatia, decided to 
impose their mediation in the Yugoslav crisis 
and, even in the case of Serbia not endorsing the 
plan, to organise a peace conference in The 
Hague in which the republics concerned and the 
Yugoslav state would be invited to participate 
and, finally, call for a new cease-fire to be con-
cluded by 1st September. On 30th August, the 
Federal Government accepted the prolongation 
of the mission of the European civilian 
cease-fire monitors in Croatia but refused mil-
itary participation. It also accepted mediation 
by the Community and the convening of the 
peace conference. However, this acceptance of 
the Twelve's initiatives has not prevented the 
fighting from continuing almost without inter-
ruption since then or the federal army's advance 
into Croatian territory. 
48. The conference in The Hague for its part 
started on 7th September under the chair-
manship of Lord Carrington, former United 
Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence. After 
three plenary sittings, it set up three working 
groups to study respectively institutional ques-
tions, questions of minorities and economic 
relations that should be maintained or estab-
lished between the republics. Their task ought to 
be to ascertain the issues that should be sub-
mitted to an arbitration commission presided by 
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Mr. Badinter, former French Minister of Justice. 
Thus, this conference is a forum for negotiations 
on the future of Yugoslavia which does not go 
into immediate questions such as the intro-
duction and monitoring of a cease-fire. 
However, it is clear that the evolution of the sit-
uation on the spot has a considerable influence 
on the progress of the conference. 
49. In these circumstances, the French and 
German Governments agreed to propose to the 
Twelve, at their meeting in The Hague on 19th 
September, that a buffer force be sent to Yugo-
slavia. This would nevertheless be subject, on 
the one hand, to the establishment of an 
effective cease-fire and the creation of a neutral 
zone between the two sides and, on the other, to 
the agreement of all parties concerned. Believing 
these conditions were not met and alive to 
British arguments about the number of troops 
and means necessary for such an operation, the 
ministers merely asked the WEU Council to 
provide solely for the establishment of a small 
force to protect civilian monitors of the cease-
fire. Morever, noting that an agreement between 
all the parties concerned in favour of such a 
measure was hardly probable, the Twelve 
decided to ask the Security Council to intervene 
and fix a mission to be assigned to the Com-
munity. 
50. Meeting the same day, the WEU Council 
set up a working group to study the size and 
nature of the forces to be deployed in each of the 
possible hypotheses and report to it at its minis-
terial meeting on 30th September. 
51. At the ministerial meeting on 30th Sep-
tember, no decision seems to have been taken 
other than to pursue this study. According to 
information given to the press by the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council at the close of the 
meeting, attended by the Prime Minister of 
Turkey, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Norway and a 
representative of Canada, the following deci-
sions were taken: 
(i) The Council examined the report by 
the ad hoc group and approved it. 
(ii) WEU would strengthen its action in 
favour of the monitors and Lord 
Carrington's mission. Consideration 
was given to increasing the number 
of monitors from about 80 to 250 
and extending their mission to 
include Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
(iii) When the Community decided, after 
Lord Carrington had given his 
opinion, that WEU should act, the 
WEU Council would be convened 
within a few hours. 
(iv) The conditions for any action 
remained: 
(a) the agreement of all parties; 
(b) effective respect of the cease-fire. 
(v) The Council would study Security 
Council Resolution 713 and its 
implications for WEU, particularly 
in regard to the application of the 
arms embargo. 
(vi) WEU would continue its work. 
(vii) WEU would immediately convey its 
decisions to: 
(a) the Community; 
(b) NATO; 
(c) the CSCE group of senior offi-
cials; 
(d) the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 
52. It has to be noted that, after three months' 
diplomatic efforts, Europe had achieved only 
very limited results in its attempts to restore 
peace in Yugoslavia: it managed to put an end to 
hostilities in Slovenia and to promote the con-
vening of a conference associating the republics 
and the federal state under the chairmanship of 
Lord Carrington to examine the conditions for a 
return to peace. It took a number of economic 
measures to exercise pressure on the parties 
involved. It had the Yugoslav question brought 
before the Security Council which, in Resolution 
713 of 25th September 1991, gave its support to 
Community initiatives and to the conference on 
Yugoslavia and decided to place an embargo on 
all supplies of arms to the country. However, it 
did not manage to obtain a lasting cease-fire, 
which was its main objective. In these circum-
stances, military action in the framework of 
WEU to restore peace is still out of the question 
because any operation designed to guarantee the 
cease-fire depends inevitably on the existence of 
such a cease-fire and the agreement of all 
parties. 
53. The only alternative would have been an 
operation on quite a different scale designed to 
impose peace by the use of force. No member of 
the Community proposed this. Since 6th July, 
the Soviet Union had been saying quite plainly 
that it would be against this, nor was the United 
States in favour of such action. Germany was 
unable to participate. The United Kingdom 
ruled out the prospect of major military action. 
The other countries did not seem prepared to do 
much more and, legally, a humanitarian oper-
ation similar to that in favour of the Kurds 
could have found backing in a Security Council 
resolution. The latter is not empowered to 
promote an intervention in the internal affairs 
of a member state of the United Nations and, in 
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any event, the Soviet Union and China do not 
seem at all prepared to agree to one. 
54. Hence it cannot be claimed that Europe's 
meagre results in the Yugoslav crisis are due to a 
failing on the part of WEU. The political deci-
sions were taken at twelve-power level, the 
WEU Council having been convened on 7th 
August at ambassadorial level and on 19th and 
30th August at ministerial level only following 
specific decisions by the Twelve in order to deal 
with the truly military aspects of a European 
action. It did what was asked of it by instructing 
an ad hoc group to prepare four options, which 
were presented to the Council and approved by 
it on 30th September: 
55. First option: logistic underpinning, with 
the mission to support the work of EEC mon-
itors, which would possibly require the presence 
of 2 000 or 3 000 personnel. 
56. Second option: escort and protection by 
armed military forces in order to ensure the 
safety of the civilian monitors, composed of 
5 000 to 6 000 persons. The group recognised 
that, starting from this option, there would be an 
inherent change in quality. 
57. Third option: peace-keeping force com-
posed of military personnel of between 4 500 
and 5 000, with additional support personnel of 
3 000 to 5 000, to monitor and, if possible, 
maintain the cease-fire. This force's mandate 
would then be restricted to policing the cease-
fire. 
58. Fourth option: peace-keeping force of 
20 000 military personnel and additional 
support personnel of 10 000 to monitor the 
implementation of the cease-fire and contribute 
to maintaining peace by military surveillance of 
combat areas, encouraging negotiations on the 
spot so as to reduce tension and re-establish 
trust between the adversaries, deterring viola-
tions of the cease-fire agreement and preventing 
the extension of the conflict into other areas. 
59. Implementation of one or other of these 
options was to be decided by the Twelve and it 
is clear, at the time of writing, that they are not 
prepared to go beyond the second option. This 
was confirmed at the ministerial meeting on 
29th October. 
60. However, the ministers for foreign affairs 
of the Twelve, meeting in Rome on 8th 
November on the occasion of the NATO minis-
terial meeting, decided to take economic sanc-
tions covering the entire Yugoslav territory: sus-
pension of the economic agreement between the 
EEC and Yugoslavia, restrictions on imports of 
Yugoslav textile products and suspension of the 
generalised preference system applying to Yugo-
slavia. These measures are not likely to have 
immediate effects or, consequently, to force the 
belligerents to lay down their arms. The only 
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sanction likely to do so, i.e. an embargo on oil 
products, has been called for by the Twelve in 
the Security Council and, if this is decided, 
WEU might be required to take naval action to 
ensure its application. Finally, the EEC has 
retained the possibility to grant financial 
assistance to republics co-operating with the 
European mediators, while imposing immediate 
economic sanctions on the whole of Yugo-
slavia. 
(e) Lessons to be learned from the crisis 
61. The first thing that has to be noted is 
Europe's weakness vis-a-vis the Yugoslav crisis. 
It seems that, in a conflict of this kind, which is 
of primary concern to European security, it can 
act only through diplomatic channels which, in 
this case, proved ineffectual. It had to turn to 
the CSCE and then to the Security Council to try 
to obtain a mandate which was too limited to 
allow effective action and to make it possible for 
Lord Carrington's mediation on behalf of the 
Twelve to overcome the exacerbated national 
sentiments of the parties involved. 
62. Western Europe itself was too divided ini-
tially to overcome a number of obstacles such as 
the opposition of the Soviet Union and China to 
any intervention in the internal affairs of Yugo-
slavia and the repeated insistence of the United 
States that NATO be consulted prior to any 
decision committing its European members. 
While, in mid-September, the French and 
German Governments agreed to propose the 
deployment of a buffer force, Germany did not 
intend the Bundeswehr to take part in this oper-
ation, to which the United Kingdom was 
opposed. Moreover, since the proclamation of 
independence by Slovenia and Croatia, 
Germany had been proposing to recognise it. 
This obviously encouraged the two republics' 
claims and also made the Serbs feel that Europe 
was hostile to their cause. It took two months for 
viewpoints to draw sufficiently close to allow 
Europe to take real action at diplomatic level by 
imposing its mediation. Finally, France and 
Germany agreed that possible recognition of the 
independence of the Yugoslav republics should 
be granted simultaneously by the Twelve. They 
were followed by the others, which should give 
special importance to any decision taken by the 
Twelve in this respect. Furthermore, agreement 
was reached, but not until 8th November, on 
limited economic sanctions. These facts never-
theless suggest that, at the present juncture, no 
European structure, however integrated, would 
be able to do more than the Twelve did during 
the summer. 
itary commitment, already implemented during 
the Gulf crisis, worked properly: WEU defined 
military options and said it was prepared to 
implement them when the Twelve so decided 
and in conditions determined by the Twelve. 
Similarly, the presence at the WEU Council 
meeting of countries that were not members but 
could take part in the task set by the Twelve is 
nothing new but is tending to become a practice 
that conforms to WEU's vocation of ensuring 
the security of Europe as a whole. The presence 
of Ireland was a noteworthy innovation since it 
showed it was moving closer to the Twelve in 
security matters. Your Rapporteur does not 
know whether Czechoslovakia and Poland were 
also invited and why they did not take part in 
the meeting on 30th September in view of the 
fact that, at the beginning of August, France had 
proposed their participation as well as that of 
Sweden in maintaining peace in Yugoslavia, 
while excluding that of the countries bordering 
on Yugoslavia. 
64. Assuming responsibility for Europe's 
security, while hardly allowing effective action 
in the Yugoslav conflict, should lead the Twelve 
and WEU to give more serious consideration 
than hitherto to the consequences this crisis may 
have both for the countries bordering on Yugo-
slavia and for Central European states which 
might run the risk of disintegrating should their 
inhabitants in turn call for independence. 
65. This is the case, in particular, for Czecho-
slovakia, where there is unrest in the Slovak 
part, and it is feared that premature recognition 
of Croatia and Slovenia by the Community 
countries might encourage Slovak nationalists. 
Admittedly, Czechoslovakia has already said it 
would not use force in response to Slovak dissi-
dence, but it is certainly not in Europe's interest 
to see a country which has just returned to 
democracy and respect for freedoms to find 
itself as a consequence, challenged and 
weakened by a particularist movement which 
could not express itself during the communist 
dictatorship. It is not certain that Slovakia is the 
only region of Eastern Europe liable to react in 
this way and, in Western Europe itself, there are 
several regions where separatist unrest might 
thus be strengthened. 
66. Conversely, any assurances that might be 
given by the Community or WEU in respect of 
the external security of non-member countries 
would be likely to strengthen states faced with 
nationalist claims. There is certainly no question 
giving formal guarantees such as those the 
United Kingdom gave Poland and the Baltic 
states with effect from 15th March 1939, 
because such guarantees, with nothing in 
exchange, give those benefiting from them too 
63. Conversely, mechanism for placing WEU much freedom of action in their external rela-
at the service of the Twelve for implementing tions, as Beck's Poland showed only too well, 
any policy they defined once this implied a mil- but of giving guarantees through the devel-
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opment of economic, political and military soli-
darity such as the Community and WEU can 
offer. Naturally, there can be no question of 
promising others what Europe has been unable 
to do for Yugoslavia but, vis-a-vis the Yugoslav 
affair, WEU must make it quite plain that the 
legal and other obstacles that opposed its inter-
vention in the internal affairs of a state would 
not apply in the case of a conflict between two 
countries. These two initiatives could doubtless 
help to allay the fears of Yugoslavia's neigh-
bouring countries and maintain peace and sta-
bility in Central Europe, which are in the 
interest of all. It is preferable to avert crises 
while there is still time than to try to remedy 
them when conflicts come out into the open and 
passions are unleashed. 
IV. Europe and developments 
in the Soviet Union 
67. Since 1985, Europe has been wondering 
about the nature, extent and possible conse-
quences of developments in the Soviet Union. It 
welcomed unreservedly the elimination of 
Soviet domination of Central Europe which led 
to the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact and 
Comecon, the reunification of Germany and a 
move towards democracy by most countries in 
the region, albeit at rather different rates, even 
before the Red Army had withdrawn. It was also 
delighted at the strides made by the CSCE and, 
in particular, the adoption in November 1990 of 
the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and the 
progress made towards disarmament with the 
CFE agreement, although the application of that 
agreement did not seem entirely satisfactory, 
above all since the CSCE has not yet proved its 
effectiveness in regard to collective security, as 
the Yugoslav crisis has just shown. 
68. Conversely, internal developments in the 
Soviet Union have caused some concern. Apart 
from the case of the Baltic republics, whose 
annexation had never been recognised by most 
western countries and whose return to indepen-
dence had been one of its aims, the West has 
never sought the dislocation of the Soviet state 
but merely its integration in a more open inter-
national community, which implied the 
liberalisation of its regime and the recovery of 
its economy. Whatever certain conservative ele-
ments in the Soviet Union may have claimed, 
the West has never supported the republics' calls 
for independence and it has endeavoured to 
support the Soviet economy, at the same time 
favouring a government which was attempting 
to make essential reforms while maintaining the 
country's cohesion. 
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of the Communist Party might, had it suc-
ceeded, have led to a crisis in relations between 
the Soviet Uriion and the West. The latter, 
without interfering in the internal affairs of the 
Soviet Union, has never relaxed its encour-
agement to all those who resisted the coup_ d'etat 
on 19th August 1991, nor its assistance to the 
Soviet authorities following the failure of the 
coup. The latter were unable to prevent eleven 
of the fifteen Soviet republics proclaiming their 
independence and the weakening of central 
power. It is a moot question whether the treaty 
of union now being negotiated will leave suffi-
cient room for manreuvre for the leaders of the 
union in external and security policy matters. It 
should be decided by the end of 1991. Since the 
West is anxious for undertakings entered into by 
the Soviet Union in all fields to be properly 
applied, it can but trust that it will find a single, 
responsible interlocutor for continuing the 
current arms limitation negotiations, ensuring 
that they are applied and, in general, for all 
matters relating to Europe's security. 
70. It would also seem that the autonomy 
acquired by the republics is leading to renewed 
claims by national, ideological or religious 
minorities, to the repression of separatist move-
ments that are to be feared far more by a 
republic that professes to be national than by a 
federal state and even to armed clashes between 
republics, as has been the case of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia in the last two years. 
71. Although the instigators of the coup on 
19th August do not seem to have had a great 
deal of support from the Soviet people or even 
from the Communist Party, army or KGB, it is 
not clear either, according to information now 
available, that there was such massive popular 
support for the legal authorities as the media, 
and television in particular, suggested. In fact, it 
seems evident that the Soviet people were 
extremely disoriented by the radical challenge to 
all the values which had constituted ideological 
dogmas and Soviet propaganda for more than 
seventy years. So far, perestroika has merely 
increased the confusion in the economy and 
those who implemented it at federal state level 
do not seem to have very strong support from 
the public whose standard of living and eco-
nomic and social security has deteriorated quite 
significantly. It is just as if, at the same time as 
Marxism-Leninism, a certain concept of the 
state is collapsing in the Soviet Union, making 
way for a multitude of individual or collective 
claims. This movement should not surprise the 
West where, for more than twenty years, there 
has been a similar trend, but where it took root 
more slowly and has been accompanied by the 
development of Community Europe and by 
decentralising reforms. This transformation of 
69. The attempted takeover of power by a society has not therefore been so dramatic as in 
group of men who seemed determined to put an the Soviet Union. Thus, the coup on 19th 
end to the reforms and restore the dictatorship August, in spite of its failure, indicates a fragility 
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of the Soviet state and society greater than was 
previously apparent. The risks of coups d'etat, 
of the dismantling of the union, of major eco-
nomic, social and political crises and of anarchy 
at every level seem greater than ever in spite of 
President Gorbachev's efforts to base the 
" Union of Sovereign Republics " on a new 
treaty of union that would leave the central state 
most of the control over external and defence 
policy but which it is not evident all the 
republics will sign. 
72. Admittedly, these are internal Soviet 
matters that do not directly concern either WEU 
or even the European Community. Never-
theless, Europe as a whole is affected by this 
sudden weakening of the principal European 
power. Naturally, this weakening has positive 
aspects, particularly for the countries which 
were members of the Warsaw Pact and have 
managed to recover almost total freedom of 
action. However, the Soviet Union is still a 
leading military power and any restoration of a 
sufficiently strong political power in the union 
or in a newly-independent republic would again 
change the European balance. First of all, this is 
a source of concern for the security of several 
Central or Eastern European countries which 
have common frontiers with the Soviet Union 
and Polish, White Russian, Ukrainian and Mol-
davian people on both sides of the frontiers. The 
situation is similar for the Asian countries which 
have frontiers with the Soviet Union. Turkey in 
particular fears the rising power of Islamic fun-
damentalism in the Central Asian Muslim 
republics and its possible repercussions in Asia 
Minor. 
73. The second question raised by the weak-
ening of the Soviet Union is the devolution of 
the army, and above all of nuclear weapons, in 
the event of the reconstituted union not 
retaining sufficient authority in military 
matters. Apart from the risk of a dissemination 
of nuclear weapons in favour of states with 
uncertain frontiers and whose external policy 
cannot be foreseen, there is also a danger of 
those states not agreeing to apply arms limi-
tation commitments entered into by the central 
state, thus jeopardising all the work accom-
plished in this area in the last ten years. 
74. The question of the extent to which 
Western Europe should still consider the union 
to be its only legitimate partner in its exchanges 
with the former USSR now arises. The solution 
so far adopted of recognising only the union is 
encountering steadily increasing difficulties 
because relations with the centre do not allow 
many matters to be handled with the parties 
directly concerned, i.e. essentially the republics. 
In 1990, certain Central European countries, 
such as Poland, grasped the extent of the 
movement taking shape in the Soviet Union and 
started to establish relations with some of the 
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republics, particularly those with which they had 
common frontiers. The legitimate concern to 
privilege the union shared by the Western 
European countries must not prevent them from 
establishing a dialogue with the republics, 
particulaly those which may become significant 
military and nuclear powers, as this will be 
essential in order to induce them, each of its 
own accord, to respect past treaties concluded 
by the union, particularly in regard to arms limi-
tation, non-proliferation and respect for human 
rights, the rights of minorities and frontiers. 
75. It was probably in view of the weakening 
of Soviet military strength and of the risks of 
nuclear disssemination that, on 29th September, 
President Bush took the spectacular step of pro-
posing the elimination of all American short-
range weapons stationed in Europe, a very large 
reduction in those carried on board aircraft or 
surface ships and the end of the permanent state 
of alert of American strategic bombers. At the 
same time he asked the Soviet Union to follow 
suit. The American initiative thus gave Mr. 
Gorbachev a reason to speed up nuclear disarm-
ament throughout the republics. Hence it is not 
surprising that, on 5th October, the Soviet Pres-
ident answered the American proposal posi-
tively, while making new proposals of his own 
on disarmament matters. 
76. However, it must be realised that Pres-
ident Bush's initiative has major consequences 
for Western European security since it implies, 
in the immediate future, a radical change in 
NATO strategy, a weakening of its defensive 
capability and probably, in the long run, a much 
larger withdrawal of American forces stationed 
in Europe than planned. This would mean that, 
relatively soon, Western Europe, i.e. in this con-
nection WEU, would have to play a propor-
tionally far larger part than in the past in the 
military deployment designed to ensure 
European security, just when the risk of Article 
V of the modified Brussels Treaty having to be 
applied seems much less but when Article VIII is 
taking on new importance since it is under that 
article that the ·members of WEU have to 
examine threats to international peace that may 
arise from the crises in Eastern Europe. WEU 
must draw the full consequences from this situ-
ation and the Twelve's faltering approach to the 
Yugoslav affair seems to show that they are 
hardly ready to do so yet. 
77. Furthermore, the at least provisional 
relinquishment by the Soviet Union of its role in 
policing international order in the area it con-
trolled has made a major contribution to the 
outbreaks of disorder in that region and the 
resurgence of nationalism. The West is obliged 
to replace it, using methods that are certainly 
different, as the promoter of order in Europe 
and throughout the world, and Western Europe 
will have a leading role to play in this area 
I 
should the United States and NATO turn away 
from certain matters. Its relations with the coun-
tries that have left the Warsaw Pact will also 
have to take account of this new situation. 
V. The problem of European union 
in autumn 1991 
78. Succeeding Luxembourg in the presidency 
of the Community, the Netherlands, noting the 
objections to the Luxembourg proposal, in turn 
drew up a proposal to modify the Rome Treaty 
that it submitted on 24th September. It was dis-
cussed by the ministers for foreign affairs in 
Brussels on 30th September just when the min-
isters were to decide on their position towards 
the Yugoslav crisis. There is obviously no direct 
link between the discussions in the context of 
the intergovernmental conference and those in 
the context of political co-operation, but the 
ministers were clearly mainly concerned with 
decisions to be taken in relation to Yugoslavia 
and one might well wonder to what extent 
underlying feelings about European union 
helped to determine the choice of some of them 
about the action that might be taken by the 
Twelve and WEU in Yugoslavia. 
(a) The Netherlands proposal 
79. The Netherlands proposal, "Towards 
European union", did not try to fix perma-
nently the responsibilities and structures of the 
union, that it preferred to call the " Com-
munity", but simply to enable the Twelve to 
take a major step in that direction. Unlike the 
Luxembourg " non-paper ", it included a long 
and detailed chapter about external policy and 
security. After agreeing that, in this area, 
member states retain specific responsibilities, 
the Netherlands presidency foresaw that, in the 
context of the eventual definition of a defence 
policy, at latest in 1996, consideration would 
have to be given to subsequent measures to be 
taken in this connection in the light of events 
occurring in the meantime. This common 
security policy would be complementary to the 
policy resulting from the obligations stemming 
for certain members from the treaties estab-
lishing NATO and WEU which continue to 
make a substantial contribution to security and 
stability. The Council promoted cohesion 
between the Community's security policy and 
the policy pursued by a number of states in the 
framework of WEU and NATO with due respect 
for the specific responsibilities of each of those 
organisations. Within those limits, the European 
Commission would have received a right of" eo-
initiative" and the European Council could 
have been expected to vote by qualified 
majority, i.e., according to a Portuguese pro-
posal, by a majority of eight members. 
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80. Generally speaking, the Netherlands pro-
posal stressed the federal vocation of the 
European union and provided for a significant 
growth in the powers of the European Par-
liament and the Commission. This vocation was 
demonstrated in particular by the abandonment 
of the division of the union into more or less 
independent pillars as proposed in the Luxem-
bourg proposal, each, according to its own pro-
cedure, dealing with matters within its purview. 
In such matters as foreign policy, security and, 
finally, defence, the Netherlands proposal would 
have given the Community far stronger means 
of action than many member states and 
probably also most candidate countries were 
prepared to grant it, particularly since this 
integral structure would have made it possible 
for the Court of Justice to intervene in affairs 
that states did not intend to submit to it. In this 
proposal, it was a matter of remaining within the 
Community structure to define the tasks the 
Community and its member states, each within 
its own purview, set themselves, as Mr. Piet 
Dankert, Netherlands Minister for European 
Affairs, said, on the basis of Community expe-
rience that would grow. It would then have suf-
ficed progressively to eliminate derogations and 
move from " the Community and member 
states " to " the Community " thanks to the dis-
appearance of the system of evolutive provisions 
and bridges provided for in the Luxembourg 
proposal. None of these proposals left much 
room for WEU, condemned as a result to see 
most of its activities transferred to the Twelve in 
the short or medium term without the Com-
munity being given any guarantee that it would 
effectively have means of implementing a policy 
defined on such bases. 
81. Finally, in an interview published in Le 
.. Monde of 25th September 1991, Mr. Dankert 
said it was impossible at present to take steps 
leading to the operation of a twenty-power Com-
munity when decision-taking procedures would 
have to be modified far more profoundly than 
now. He did not believe member states were 
ready for this. 
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82. This proposal was circulated just when 
the Twelve had been compelled to admit that, in 
the absence of true political understanding 
between them, their possibilities of action were 
still very limited, as shown by the Yugoslav 
crisis. In any event, the proposal apparently 
encountered serious objections. On 30th Sep-
tember, it was rejected by the ministers for 
foreign affairs of the Community, inter alia 
because most of them would not agree to their 
foreign policy and collective security being 
subject to bodies that might, without their 
consent, take decisions involving the right for 
the Community to deploy their armed forces or, 
on the contrary, to refuse their involvement in 
matters which they might believe to be of impor-
tance to their country. The Twelve therefore 
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decided to take up the Luxembourg proposal 
again as a basis for their work, perhaps using the 
Netherlands proposal to amend some aspects of 
that proposal. In other words, no progress has 
been made by the intergovernmental conference 
since June. 
83. In point of fact, apart from the positions 
of principle defended by one or other on the 
more or less federal nature of the future 
European union, it would appear that the slow 
approach adopted in 1990 towards the 
enlargement of the Community is no longer 
defensible since the events in summer 1991. In 
an article in the International Herald Tribune of 
29th August 1991, Mr. Eduardo Punset, Pres-
ident of the Polish Delegation to the European 
Parliament, and Mrs. Romana Sadurska 
described, in particularly firm terms, a position 
which is not only that of most Central and 
Eastern European countries but is also increas-
ingly shared by Western European countries. It 
read: "Now is the time for the Community to 
make clear its commitment to Central Europe. 
At the least, it should open its markets, allow in 
workers and help in restructuring these econ-
omies. Better, Brussels should accept a realistic 
deadline for these nations' full EC mem-
bership." Events in the Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia give special weight to this remark and any 
plan to restructure the Rome Treaty that post-
poned until a more propitious time consider-
ation of the problem of the enlargement of the 
Community, now a priority, would have every 
chance of disappearing into thin air. In fact, the 
association agreements between Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary and Poland and the European 
Community are due to be concluded in 
November 1991 and these agreements should be 
considered merely as the first stages of a process 
leading to accession. 
affairs, it was the member countries that had to 
decide how they would contribute to a co-
ordinated action, effective in the first case, pos-
sible in the other, and that it was member coun-
tries and not any of the European institutions 
which decided what they were prepared to do. A 
majority decision-taking mechanism could not 
at the present juncture oblige them to abide by 
decisions to which they did not subscribe, and 
the enlargement of the Community, particularly 
if on a large scale, would not facilitate the taking 
of collective decisions which, strictly, must 
conform to the principle of unanimity or qual-
ified majority. 
85. The Yugoslav crisis was a particularly 
good opportunity for the expression of a 
European identity because the two great powers 
had decided, if not to remain outside, at least to 
stay in the background. However, it took two 
months for this identity to emerge. It is not 
within the powers of any institution to create it 
and certain governments may be reproached for 
having suggested the contrary, making it seem as 
if Europe has failed because it has not yet 
managed to impose a cease-fire in Yugoslavia 
that it did not have the powers to ensure was 
accepted by the parties involved. It is still to be 
hoped that the economic measures decided 
upon by the Community on 8th November will 
induce these parties to return to a better frame 
of mind or that the weakening of the federal 
army due to the fact that, even among the Serbs, 
a large part of the population and servicemen 
are showing little enthusiasm for the cause 
upheld by the government and military leaders 
may induce the latter, in one way or another, to 
accept European mediation. 
86. These considerations make your Rap-
porteur believe that the lesson that the intergov-
ernmental conference might learn - and the 
84. What the intergovernmental conference is rejection of the Netherlands proposal by a strong 
trying to do, at least for external and security majority of the Twelve makes it possible to say: 
policy matters, is to instigate institutional pro- apparently will learn- from the Yugoslav affair 
cedure whereby a European identity might be is that, in present circumstances, the wisest 
defined in these areas. Clearly, the identity of a course for Europe is not to wish to form a too 
significantly enlarged Community will not be coherent, too unified whole. However, pre-
the same as that of a twelve-power Community vailing uncertainty about the future of Europe 
with a predominance of members of the Atlantic should encourage it more than ever to handle 
Alliance and it would seem unwise, unless it is each area separately, using existing instruments 
intended to force all candidate countries to and providing for their extension in the light of 
repudiate their own political identities, to fix the possibilities of today. To link WEU and the 
here and now an institutional framework into Community organically by unduly binding pro-
which they would have to fit as the price of their cedures might be an obstacle to Europe's 
accession to the economic advantages that the progress towards unity. This would effectively 
Community is supposed to offer them. From prevent the possible and necessary enlarge-
this point of view, the Netherlands proposal, ments, in particular of the Community to 
which included the integration of external policy include the EFT A countries and of WEU to 
and defence very closely in a single Community include member countries of the Atlantic 
mechanism, hardly corresponded to the reality Alliance, and at the same time the rap-
of today's Europe, in spite of the compromises prochement of the Central European countries 
for which it left room. It took little account of with one or the other and the strengthening of 
the fact that, in both the Gulf and the Yugoslav both organisations in areas within their purview. 
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This option in no way rules out association in 
operations such as the one carried out during the 
Gulf war and planned in the case ofYugoslavia, 
or the development of permanent relations 
between WEU and the Community, ensuring 
that such relations do not lead to mutual 
blockages, which would probably have been the 
case if the Netherlands proposal had been 
adopted. Nor does it preclude a regular 
exchange of information between WEU and 
NATO, either directly, or through the interme-
diary of the CSCE, as has been the case during 
the Yugoslav crisis. 
(b) The Anglo-ltalian and Franco-German proposals 
of October 1991 
87. On 4th October, the United Kingdom and 
Italy presented a "Declaration on European 
security and defence " at the intergovernmental 
conference designed to guide the work of the 
conference in this area. According to this decla-
ration, " the development of a European identity 
in the field of security and defence shall be 
pursued through an evolutionary process 
involving successive phases". It adds that "the 
special relationship between Western Europe 
and North America... is a key element of the 
European identity " and " the revision of the 
alliance's tasks and strategy and the devel-
opment of a common foreign and security policy 
in the context of political union are comple-
mentary ". Hence the alliance should be consoli-
dated by the development of this European 
identity, for which WEU would be responsible 
" in two complementary directions: as the 
defence component of the union and as the 
means to strengthen the European pillar of the 
alliance ". In this context, meetings of WEU and 
of NATO would be synchronised and links 
established between WEU and NATO presi-
dencies, secretariats and parliamentary assem-
blies. " The alliance will remain the essential 
forum for agreement on policies bearing on the 
security and defence commitments of its 
members " but, on other matters, in particular 
" to protect European interests outside the 
NATO area", decisions would be made in WEU 
in close consultation with NATO. As to the 
operational role, " a European reaction force ... 
autonomous, separate from the NATO 
structure ", under WEU control, should be 
developed for operations outside the NATO 
area. 
88. This proposal has the great merit of 
setting Europe's defence and security in the 
framework of an institution which corresponds 
to the reality of the Europe of today, while asso-
ciating it with NATO and, to a lesser degree, 
with the Community. However, the role it 
assigns to NATO will be contested by some and 
it will probably be necessary to seek a new 
balance in favour of the link with the Com-
347 
DOCUMENT 129 3 
munity. However, it seems to provide an 
important working basis for the intergovern-
mental conference. 
89. In the meantime, on 11th October Pres-
ident Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl 
addressed a number of proposals to Mr. 
Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, 
and these were published on 14th October. The 
Political Committee asked our colleague, Mr. 
Caro, to submit to it an analysis of the Franco-
German proposal, most of which your 
Rapporteur believes he can sum up here. 
90. These proposals were a logical follow-up 
to the document addressed by France and 
Germany to the intergovernmental conference 
for its meeting on 4th February 1991. This text, 
together with the Anglo-Italian proposal of 4th 
October, is of direct concern to WEU, its work 
and its future. 
91. The French Head of State and the 
German Head of Government set their thinking 
on the security and defence of Europe in the 
framework of the intergovernmental conference, 
i.e. decisions and measures of the union in this 
matter may be wholly or partly worked out and 
implemented by WEU which is an integral part 
of the process of European union. This is 
entirely in conformity with Article I of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty and gives WEU two dis-
tinct roles: 
(i) to implement in an area outside the 
competences of the Community the 
decisions of the twelve-power 
European Council; 
(ii) if necessary, to take the place of the 
Twelve to work out decisions that the 
Twelve would not have been in a 
position to take. 
92. Thus, at the top, the European union 
would have a European Council formed of heads 
of state and of government under which there 
would be, in addition to the Community, the 
present political co-operation, becoming 
political union, and WEU. This provision would 
not affect the commitments stemming from the 
modified Brussels Treaty or the Washington 
Treaty for the signatory countries, nor specific 
aspects of the defence policy of certain member 
countries, which is probably directed at Ireland, 
but perhaps also France and the United Kindom 
for their nuclear force arrangements and 
overseas commitments, and Germany for the 
limits that its basic law imposes on the use of the 
Bundeswehr. In reality, the reservations implied 
by this article suggest that the policy determined 
by the Council will not truly commit all member 
countries: as is now the case for WEU, it would 
only be a question of co-ordinating the action of 
countries which so wish and which can take part 
in joint action. This, moreover, is what 
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underlies the second part of the same paragraph 
which specifies that these provisions of the 
present chapter are not an obstacle to closer 
co-operation between certain members of WEU 
and the Atlantic Alliance - obviously to allow 
the development of Franco-German co-
operation. 
93. The two governments seek a better appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty, of 
The Hague platform and of the Vianden 
communique, thanks to a strengthening of WEU 
to make it capable of defining a true European 
defence identity, assuming greater responsibil-
ities and achieving the stage-by-stage building of 
WEU as the defence component of the union. 
To this end, they propose sending to the 
members of the Community which are also 
members of the Atlantic Alliance an invitation 
to adhere to the modified Brussels Treaty and to 
offer observer status in WEU to those that are 
not members of the alliance. 
94. The Franco-German proposal also refers 
to the development of a clear, organic rela-
tionship between WEU and the union and the 
operational organisation of WEU which acts in 
conformity with directives from the union. To 
this end, it proposes: 
(a) Harmonisation of the sequence and 
duration of presidencies, which raises a practical 
problem since three members of the Community 
are not members of WEU. It is known that the 
WEU Council has drawn up a table to overcome 
this difficulty by attributing the presidency of 
that organisation in turn to WEU countries 
during the half years in which the presidency of 
the Community is held by countries which are 
not members of WEU. 
(b) The allusion to the synchronisation of ses-
sions and methods of work seems to indicate 
that the meetings of the WEU Council will be 
held after meetings of the corresponding Com-
munity bodies and would deal with the same 
subjects. 
(c) Closer co-operation should be established 
between: 
(i) the Secretariat-General and the 
Council of Ministers of WEU on the 
one hand and, on the other, the Secre-
tary-General and the Council of Min-
isters of the union; 
(ii) the parliamentary Assembly of WEU 
and the European Parliament. Here it 
should be specified in what areas such 
co-operation might be applied. 
Inviting observers to sessions? The 
WEU Assembly has practised this in 
recent years but without reciprocity. 
The sovereignty of each parlia-
mentary assembly leaves little possi-
bility of going further, other than on 
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the basis of a clear division of respon-
sibilities which can be done only if the 
future of each institution is clearly 
defined. In a communique of 17th 
October 1991, Mr. Robert Pontillon, 
President of the WEU Assembly, 
expressed views on this matter that 
should be examined more carefully 
because they propose a juridical basis 
for the co-operation mentioned in the 
Franco-German text: 
" ... Alongside the European Par-
liament elected by direct uni-
versal suffrage, the WEU Assem-
bly for its part is already fully 
competent to be one of the two 
chambers of a parliament of the 
European union, the one com-
posed of representatives of the 
parliaments of member states in 
which priority would be given to 
handling matters arising from the 
application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty in the area of 
security and defence ... ". 
(d) The creation of a WEU military planning 
group responsible for: 
- planning joint action including in the 
event of crises, 
- operational planning for co-operation 
in the event of natural catastrophes, 
- co-ordinating the study of requirements 
in all areas of co-operation, 
- the organisation of joint manreuvres, 
- closer military co-operation comple-
mentary to the alliance, in particular in 
logistics, transport, training and infor-
mation, 
- closer co-operation in armaments with 
a view to creating a European arma-
ments agency, 
- regular meetings of chiefs-of-staff. 
95. These various proposals all take up rec-
ommendations of the Assembly which can but 
be gratified to see two governments endorsing 
them. 
(a) The transformation of the WEU Institute 
into a European academy for security and 
defence is clearly a criticism of the status of the 
Institute agreed by the WEU Council in 
November 1990, no doubt because this status 
makes the Institute too dependent on the 
Council, but the notion of academy is not very 
clear and the two countries should say what they 
mean by this term. According to the Secretary-
General, who spoke to the Political Committee 
on 6th November, the purpose would be 
to entrust the Institute with an educational 
role, the details of which should be specified. 
(b) The transfer of the Secretariat-General of 
WEU to Brussels seems to have already secured 
the agreement of all the governments, but the 
question of who would form the Permanent 
Council is a subject of division. The Franco-
German proposal seems to reconcile the two 
views in paragraph IV 3 with a dual hat proposal 
for the permanent representatives to the alliance 
and to the Community which solves the problem 
at the level of words but not in reality because it 
does not answer the question of who will 
manage WEU and who will be authorised to 
take decisions concerning its action. In fact, it 
leaves open the question of whether WEU is to 
be first the European pillar of the alliance or the 
armed wing of the Community. 
(c) The constitution of military units 
dependent on WEU also raises a problem. 
Would they be units under NATO command? 
Would one set up WEU commands in time of 
peace? Would it be a question of a mobile force 
or of a force for the defence of Europe? Here 
again, agreement on words does not make 
.agreement on realities any easier. 
96. In regard to co-operation between WEU 
and the alliance, general agreement on three pro-
posals seems probable: strengthening the role 
and responsibilities of Europeans in the alliance 
by setting up a European pillar, making practical 
arrangements to ensure openness and comple-
mentarity between WEU and the alliance and 
developing co-operation between the secre-
tariats-general of WEU and the alliance. 
97. Conversely, it will be noted that France 
and Germany agreed to propose regular 
co-ordination between WEU member states 
with the aim of defining a joint position on all 
essential matters in the alliance, this being just 
what the American authorities opposed in their 
messages to the WEU countries at the beginning 
of 1991. This proposal follows the sheer logic of 
a European union which claims responsibility 
for its security and defence. 
98. While the Franco-German proposal offers 
simple observer status for members of the Com-
munity, it offers association for members of the 
alliance. This corresponds to a practice inaugu-
rated during the Gulf crisis and continued with 
the Yugoslav crisis that has not run up against 
serious objections. However, it proposes only 
" relations " with other European states, which 
is very far removed from what several of those 
states expect in order to guarantee their security: 
in Recommendation 500, the Assembly pro-
posed that some of them be granted true asso-
ciate status in WEU so that, without bringing 
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into play Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, they would be given the security guar-
antees they have needed increasingly since the 
events in summer 1991. 
99. Finally, the Franco-German text is accom-
panied by an account of a bilateral decision 
to strengthen Franco-German military co-
operation with a view to setting up a European 
corps that might include forces of other WEU 
member countries and which might also become 
a model for closer military co-operation between 
the WEU member states. This is not therefore a 
proposal but notification of a decision already 
taken by the two countries which is not, 
however, intended to be exclusive. 
100. It may be noted that, apart from one clear 
difference in the overall approach, the practical 
arrangements proposed by France and Germany 
are no different from the Anglo-ltalian proposal, 
which means that a compromise between the 
two proposals might well be found. The recom-
mendations adopted by the WEU Assembly in 
recent years reflect similar differences of 
opinion, which did not prevent the Assembly 
adopting by very large majorities recommenda-
tions relating to specific points, many of which 
may be found in both the Franco-German and 
the Anglo-ltalian texts. The fact that Italy 
approved the Franco-German proposal confirms 
the impression that there is no fundamental con-
flict between the two texts. This is what Mr. van 
Eekelen, Secretary-General ofWEU, has said on 
several occasions. It was also the opinion 
expressed by the Netherlands and Italian Min-
isters for Foreign Affairs, Mr. van den Broek 
and Mr. De Michelis. 
101. In fact, in both the Anglo-ltalian and the 
Franco-German texts, WEU seems to have a 
leading role to play in the organisation of 
European security in the next few years. The 
question is how, in a future which it seems very 
daring to set in 1996, it will be integrated in a 
European system that also includes the Eco-
nomic Community and political co-operation. 
The Franco-German proposal has the great 
merit, here and now, of linking WEU closely 
with the political consultation known as political 
union. This is quite clearly the means of giving 
some weight to the union since Europe's ability 
to play a role in international life will depend on 
its relationship with WEU since the Commu-
nity's economic means would no longer be 
enough to ensure implementation of a European 
policy, as is the case with Yugoslavia. This close 
link between WEU and political co-operation is 
thus the condition for the existence of a 
European political union since the Community 
is not able to set up an armed force itself. 
102. Yet, in order to attain this result, WEU 
must no longer be content with forming a sort of 
interface between Europe and NATO, as has 
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been the case since its creation in 1954; it must 
resume most of the prerogatives of Western 
Union between 1948 and 1950, when its mil-
itary responsibilities were transferred to NATO. 
This means WEU should henceforth have armed 
forces of its own with proper headquarters. The 
Anglo-Italian proposal accepts this, just as the 
Franco-German proposal accepts that NATO is 
still an essential part of Europe's security which 
must continue to be part of the relations of 
openness and continuing consultations with 
WEU. However, the Anglo-Italian proposal sep-
arates the responsibilities of the two 
organisations geographically, assigning to WEU 
command and a WEU rapid reaction force 
responsibility for actions outside the zone guar-
anteed by the North Atlantic Treaty, whereas 
the Franco-German proposal does not restrict 
WEU action but also intends it to represent 
Europe in NATO and to have its own forces in 
Europe. It is just as if the first document drew 
lessons from the Gulf crisis while the second 
also took account of those of the Yugoslav crisis 
and today's threats to European stability. In the 
first case, WEU would remain a European com-
plement to NATO, which was obviously the 
view of those who signed the 1954 protocols, 
while in the other NATO would be an admit-
tedly essential adjunct to a policy of defence of 
Europe by Europeans. 
103. Is it necessary take a decision on this fun-
damental matter in order to make progress? It 
does not seem essential since the practical mea-
sures implied by both proposals largely overlap. 
In view of present uncertainty about the rate at 
which the European union will be able to 
develop in the decade ahead, it seems on the 
contrary wise to avoid theological debates and 
to advance in the directions mentioned in the 
two series of proposals. In particular, consider-
ation might be given to organising European 
defence on the basis of the Franco-German 
decision to set up a European corps that might 
include forces from other WEU member states 
without all those states necessarily taking part. 
WEU has already demonstrated the full flexi-
bility the modified Brussels Treaty allows it in 
such cases, particularly as shown during the 
naval deployment in the Gulf. 
uation in Europe in 1991. After defining the 
requirements of European security, this text 
reaffirms the essential role of NATO, which is a 
permanent link between the security of North 
America and of Europe. It is the tangible 
expression of a collective effort aimed at 
defending the common interests of all its 
members thanks to " common commitment and 
mutual co-operation among sovereign states". 
106. This document therefore distinguishes 
two essential roles for NATO: " protecting peace 
in a new Europe " through dialogue and 
co-operation with countries hitherto members of 
the Warsaw Pact and through a policy of" man-
agement of c.rises and conflict prevention ", a 
policy that is, however, restricted by the prin-
ciple that" none of [the alliance's] weapons will 
ever be used except in self-defence ", thus lim-
iting its deterrent role whenever it is no longer a 
question of the direct' protection of member 
countries. The deployment of forces will 
therefore no longer play an important role in 
NATO's defence concept and it may even be 
wondered what is meant by the concept that has 
been defined as a " reduced forward presence " 
since the same document states that the notion 
of forward no longer exists. In any event, the 
overall size of forces and their readiness will be-
reduced, their geographical distribution " will 
ensure a sufficient military presence throughout 
the territory of the alliance ". Then there are 
" the shorter warning times to which the 
northern and southern regions will be subject ", 
and, in the southern region " the military capa-
bilities in the adjacent areas ". Finally, these 
forces "will require enhanced flexibility and 
mobility ". There will be " main defence forces ... 
to ensure the alliance's territorial integrity and 
the unimpeded use of their lines of communi-
cation " and " immediate reaction forces ". 
107. For the first time, NATO recognises a spe-
cific role for Europe in this document since 
" integrated and multinational European struc-
tures, as they are further developed in the 
context of an emerging European defence 
identity, will also increasingly have a similarly 
important role to play in enhancing the allies' 
ability to work together in the common 
defence". 
(c) The NATO summit meeting in Rome 108. The role of nuclear forces in the alliance is 
recognised and there is a continued requirement 
104. Furthermore, at the meeting of heads of for " widespread participation by European 
state or of government of the member countries allies involved in collective defence planning in 
of the Atlantic Alliance in Rome on 7th and 8th nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear 
November 1991, four texts were adopted which forces on their territory and in command, 
throw new light on the future of the Atlantic control and consultation arrangements ". 
Alliance and Europe's role in that forum: However, sub-strategic nuclear forces can 
therefore be reduced " significantly " and " will 
105. (a) A text on "The alliance's new stra- consist solely of dual capable aircraft", while 
tegic concept", which is the first true collective nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-
expression of a defence policy that meets the sit- range nuclear missiles " will be eliminated ". 
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109. (b) A "Rome declaration on peace and 
co-operation " provides for " a new European 
security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, 
the European Community, WEU and the 
Council of Europe complement each other ". 
NATO's security policy will be based on " dia-
logue; co-operation; and the maintenance of a 
collective defence capability". However, the 
declaration underlines the need: 
" to ensure the necessary transparency 
and complementarity between the 
European security and defence identity as 
it emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and 
the alliance. We welcome the spirit in 
which those allies who are also members 
of the Twelve and WEU have kept the 
other members of the alliance informed 
about the progress of their ongoing discus-
sions on the development of the European 
identity in foreign and security policy and 
defence should be adequately involved in 
decisions that may affect their security. 
The alliance's new strategic concept, being 
an agreed conceptual basis for the forces 
of all allies, should facilitate the necessary 
complementarity between the alliance and 
the emerging defence component of the 
European integration process. As the 
transformation of the alliance proceeds, 
we intend to preserve the operational 
coherence we now have and on which our 
defence depends. We welcome the per-
spective of a reinforcement of the role of 
WEU, both as the defence component of 
the process of European unification and 
as a means of strengthening the European 
pillar of the alliance, bearing in mind the 
different nature of its relations with the 
alliance and with the European political 
union. We note the gradual convergence 
of views in the discussions concerning the 
developing European security identity 
and defence role compatible with the 
common defence policy we already have 
in our alliance. We feel confident that in 
line with the consensus in Copenhagen, 
the result will contribute to a strong new 
transatlantic partnership by strengthening 
the European component in a trans-
formed alliance. We will help move this 
development forward. " 
110. The alliance also embarks upon a true 
eastward-facing policy addressed to all the coun-
tries which were formerly members of the 
Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union and 
the three Baltic countries (but not Albania or 
Yugoslavia) which would associate them closely 
with NATO by: 
"annual meetings with the North Atlantic 
Council at ministerial level in what might 
be called a North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council; 
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periodic meetings with the North Atlantic 
Council at ambassadorial level; 
additional meetings with the North 
Atlantic Council at ministerial or ambas-
sadorial level as circumstances warrant; 
regular meetings, at intervals to be 
mutually agreed, with: 
- NATO subordinate committees, inclu-
ding the Political and Economic Com-
mittees; 
- the Military Committee and, under its 
direction, other NATO military author-
ities. " 
111. This North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
would not jeopardise renewed NATO support 
for the CSCE and the arms limitation negotia-
tions. 
112. (c) A declaration on "The situation in 
Yugoslavia" which, it should be pointed out, 
expresses the decision not to " recognise any 
unilateral change of borders, external or 
internal " imposed by force, condemns federal 
army attacks on Dubrovnik and other Croatian 
towns and urges " all parties to co-operate fully 
with the European Community " for imple-
menting a cease-fire and at the conference in 
The Hague. 
113. (d) A declaration on "Developments in 
the Soviet Union" which France did not 
endorse, in particular because it affirmed that 
the allies are firmly convinced that the political 
change must be accompanied by economic 
freedom and a move to a market economy, 
which the President of the French Republic con-
sidered to be unacceptable interference in 
internal Soviet affairs. 
114. From WEU's point of view, it should be 
noted that the decisions taken by the North 
Atlantic Council are likely to facilitate the deci-
sions to be taken by the heads of state or of gov-
ernment of the Community in Maastricht by 
setting aside all the objections made by the 
United States to the definition of a European 
security and defence identity. The place 
reserved for a European defence organisation in 
the Atlantic Alliance, but separate from NATO, 
is clearly indicated and its need for the solidarity 
of the alliance is confirmed. 
(d) WEU and Central Europe 
115. However, there is some ambiguity in the 
twofold programme referred to in the texts 
adopted in Rome. On the one hand, they 
organise a purely defensive system which is 
admittedly not directed against any country (but 
the reference to " forward " suggests that it is 
still turned in a certain direction), but which 
rules out any military intervention not required 
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to defend member countries. On the other hand, 
they launch a vast co-operation undertaking in 
security matters with all the former members of 
the Warsaw Pact, but excluding non-aligned 
European countries and drawing no distinction 
between countries which have adopted a clear 
policy intended to draw them closer to Western 
Europe in all areas and those which have not 
actually taken this step. It should be recalled, for 
instance, that, as recently as 5th April 1991, 
Romania signed a treaty of co-operation and 
good-neighbourliness with the Soviet Union, 
Article 4 of which specifies that Romania and 
the Soviet Union will not be part of an alliance 
that is contrary to the interests of the other, thus 
in fact giving the Soviet Union a say in, or even 
a right of veto over, Romania's external policy. 
Since then, Romania has tried to draw closer to 
NATO and referred to the denunciation of that 
treaty, but, to say the least, the course it is fol-
lowing is not very clear. 
116. Your Rapporteur believes that it is not in 
WEU's interest to follow the same course as 
NATO in this connection, which would 
moreover lead to duplication which the govern-
ments have rightly wished to avoid. On the con-
trary, by adopting a more restrictive and 
stringent policy, it can help to meet the security 
concerns of a number of Central European coun-
tries and, for that, it must take as a basis 
NATO's recognition of the special nature of its 
relations with the European Community. This 
effectively means that any enlargement of the 
Community must take account of the intention 
shared by all member governments to strengthen 
the European pillar of the alliance and also the 
wish expressed by all members of the alliance for 
Europe to have a greater say in NATO decisions. 
For WEU, this implies not only a global rap-
prochement with all the countries which were 
members of the Warsaw Pact, such as NATO 
has embarked upon, but closer association for 
any such countries which have already started 
the process leading towards accession to WEU, 
in accordance with the proposal in the 
Assembly's Recommendation 500. 
11 7. WEU's initiatives should have a twofold 
aim. On the one hand, the link between WEU 
and the Community should be marked and, on 
the other, there should be a response to the 
global approach to Western Europe adopted by 
several Central European countries and to their 
legitimate security concerns, without however 
extending application of the treaty, and particu-
larly Article V, to countries not able to fulfil all 
the commitments it implies and which, 
moreover, in any event the WEU member coun-
tries would not be prepared to defend by " all 
the military and other aid and assistance in their 
power". 
of areas in which those countries, and probably 
Czechoslovakia, too, are prepared to co-operate 
with WEU, as its Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Dienstbier, will have an opportunity to 
specify when he addresses the Assembly on 3rd 
December. 
119. (i) Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Poland, wrote to Mr. Dumas, 
then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
expressing the wish that his country be invited 
on an ad hoc basis to attend WEU Council 
meetings which related to matters concerning 
which Poland might make a useful contribution, 
particularly matters relating to Central and 
Eastern Europe. The answer he received said 
nothing of how this proposal would be followed 
up. The Assembly for its part has received no 
information from the Council about this 
approach, which nevertheless seems to conform 
entirely with the practices inaugurated by the 
Council when it invited certain countries that 
are not members of WEU to take part in its dis-
cussions on the Gulf question. 
120. (ii) There would appear to be no reason 
why the WEU centre for interpreting satellite 
data should not be opened to participation by 
the three countries, at least for everything 
relating to control of the application of the CFE 
Treaty. 
121. (iii) Participation of the three countries in 
the activities of the IEPG, in conditions to be 
defined, would meet at one and the same time 
western industrialists' concern to see the market 
for which they produce extended and the three 
countries' concern to equip their armies with 
western equipment and weapons and to keep 
their armaments industries going through 
co-operation with western firms. This seems 
particularly urgent since these countries often 
have only aging, obsolescent Soviet arms. They 
obviously have very limited means of payment, 
but it seems in the interest of all for them to be 
invited to take part, here and now, in an 
appraisal of Europe's armaments requirements. 
Western European military assistance in the 
modernisation of the armaments of those three 
countries, particularly the Hungarian air force, 
will probably be essential if Europe wishes them 
to be able to ensure their own security in view of 
the present risks to peace in that area. However, 
such assistance will assume its full meaning and 
the necessary magnitude only in the framework 
of organised co-operation, alone capable of 
giving those countries access to advanced mil-
itary technology. 
122. (iv) The co-operation that started in 
March 1991 between the three countries and the 
WEU Institute for Security Studies was highly 
appreciated. It has already helped to allow them 
to redirect their thinking on security matters 
118. During his visits to Hungary and Poland, and, if the statute of the Institute is to be 
your Rapporteur was able to discern a number changed, as suggested in the Franco-German 
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proposal, in its new form it should open its 
doors even wider to full, wholehearted partici-
pation by representatives of those countries. 
Similarly, the latter might be invited to take part 
in the European sessions organised by member 
countries' institutes for defence studies. 
123. (v) There has been a large-scale devel-
opment of the Assembly's exchanges with the 
parliaments of the three countries and the sym-
posium it is organising in Berlin from 31st 
March to 2nd April 1992 should allow it, in 
agreement with the parliamentary delegations of 
those countries, to continue the initiatives it has 
already taken. 
124. (vi) In the immediate future, Hungary is 
mainly concerned that its security is being 
threatened by many, geographically limited, vio-
lations of its land and air frontier with Yugo-
slavia. Sending even a small number of Com-
munity or WEU observers to monitor the 
Hungarian side of that frontier would not raise 
the same legal or practical problems as sending 
observers to Yugoslav territory. However, it 
would help to enhance Hungary's security and 
that of the whole of Europe, which has every-
thing to fear from an extension of the Yugoslav 
conflict. It would also respond to Hungary's 
gesture in authorising any Western European 
observers wishing to move from one Yugoslav 
republic to another to use its territory so as not 
to have to cross areas of fighting. 
125. These proposals, which are based on a 
general appraisal of the policy of the Three and 
in particular on the considerable effort they 
have already made to appear before Western 
Europe not as seeking isolated assistance but as 
an association of countries already involved in 
an advanced stage of regional co-operation, 
should in no way affect the cohesion of WEU: 
but they should confirm its intention, in its own 
area, to accompany the opening decided upon 
by the Community towards countries which 
appear to be permanently committed to choices 
of internal and external policy which make them 
fully western countries until such time as they 
are able to join both the Community and 
WEU. 
(e) The WEU Council meeting on 18th November 1991 
126. At its regular meeting in Bonn on 18th 
November, the WEU Council of Ministers was 
at last able to start its own thinking on the place 
and role of WEU in the future European security 
architecture on the basis of the decisions taken 
by the North Atlantic Council in Rome and the 
progress achieved at the intergovernmental con-
ference. This was only a first step since the 
Council instructed the Special Working Group 
" to complete their work on this subject before 
the next conclave of the EC foreign ministers on 
2nd December". It would decide, if necessary, 
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to meet again before the Maastricht summit 
meeting on 9th December. It was nevertheless 
able to issue two communiques, one on the 
future activities ofWEU and the other on Yugo-
slavia. Furthermore, what your Rapporteur has 
been able to learn from remarks by certain min-
isters at their press conferences at the close of 
the meeting allows him to comment on a few 
points. 
127. There is no doubt that the decisions the 
alliance ministers took in Rome allowed the 
positions of member countries to draw much 
closer on many important questions. The min-
isters set WEU the task of developing " the 
European security and defence identity ", linked 
with the European union through relations that 
still have to be defined and with NATO through 
relations of " transparency and complemen-
tarity ", in conformity with the decisions of the 
North Atlantic Council. 
128. However, the most important was the def-
inition of the " future tasks and specific tasks of 
WEU ", which cover three areas: 
129. (a) "Operational co-operation among 
member states " has not led to the creation of a 
military planning unit, which will be decided 
only after Maastricht, as will the creation of an 
ad hoc group to study the Franco-German pro-
posal on co-operation in strategic transport. The 
Council did not indicate the subjects of the 
working group's studies on " the operational 
organisation of co-operation within WEU both 
in the politico-military field and in the military 
field ", which were to be pursued further in the 
light of decisions on the future role of WEU. 
130. On the other hand, the Council took the 
necessary steps to implement the decisions on 
space co-operation taken in Vianden on 27th 
June since it decided to establish the satellite 
data interpretation and training centre in 
Torrejon, Spain, with effect from 1st January 
1992 and to appoint a British Director. It also 
decided to set up in Paris in 1992, under Italian 
chairmanship, a study group "to examine the 
necessity and desirability of a medium- and 
long-term realisation of a European space-based 
observation system". Finally, the Council 
" noted with approval the preparatory steps 
taken to set up multinational inspection teams 
as part of the implementation of the verification 
regime laid down in the CFE Treaty " and 
" rules for the co-operation of multinational 
teams ", taking into account " the possibility of 
co-operation with all CSCE member states ". 
131. (b) The Council asked the Mediterranean 
Sub-Group to study " the question of develo-
ping contacts between WEU and the Maghreb 
states". 
132. (c) The Council reaffirmed its intention 
to enhance " the dialogue on security and 
co-operation between WEU and the countries of 
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Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic 
states and the Soviet Union" and added to the 
measures already decided: 
- invitations to the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs and Defence of Bulgaria, Czech-
oslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania to take part in a special 
meeting with the members of the 
Council; 
- organisation of seminars in those coun-
tries by the Institute for Security 
Studies; 
- expansion of the WEU Institute schol-
arship programme; 
- fact-finding visits by the Presidency 
and the Secretary-General to the Soviet 
Union and to the Baltic states, if the 
latter are interested. 
133. The communique adds that " ministers 
expressed the conviction that these measures 
envisaged by WEU and the similar endeavours 
by the Atlantic Alliance and the European Com-
munity are mutually complementary and rein-
forcing". 
134. To tell the truth, your Rapporteur is not 
very convinced by this assertion and he recalls 
the countless declarations by the Council that 
WEU should in no case duplicate the work of 
NATO. He can but note that, however useful it 
may be, the WEU Council's decision leads to 
WEU being used for a task that the North 
Atlantic Council has just specifically assigned to 
NATO. He will certainly not complain about 
such a dialogue being developed but would 
underline that this is in no way a substitute for 
specific offers of co-operation such as he is 
asking the Council to make to the three Visegrad 
countries. He doos not wish WEU's initiative, 
which merely seeks some kind of dialogue with a 
variety of countries, to dispense the Council 
from associating those three countries with 
WEU's effective work to promote Europe's 
security. 
135. In regard to Yugoslavia, the declaration 
by the WEU Council bears a strong resemblance 
to the NATO statement in the principles it 
defines, but differs in that it proposes effective 
WEU participation: 
(a) " in operations in order to establish 
humanitarian corridors ", which 
seems to be saying that member coun-
tries are prepared to co-ordinate the 
deployment of their navies to ensure 
the protection of ships sent to take 
supplies to or evacuate civilians; 
(b) in the application of a possible 
"United Nations Security Council 
resolution concerning a peace-keeping 
operation in Yugoslavia" by giving 
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" practical support " as soon as the two 
necessary conditions are fulfilled; 
(c) by making available to the United 
Nations "details of the contingency 
planning work already done by WEU 
experts ". These plans will moreover 
be developed and adapted " in antici-
pation of a United Nations reso-
lution ". 
136. What seems significant is not so much the 
decisions effectively taken by the Council on 
18th November as the unanimity in attempting 
to define a role for WEU after the NATO deci-
sions but before Maastricht, both in regard to 
the dialogue with Eastern Europe, where the dif-
ference between the aim NATO has set itself and 
the one WEU has set itself is probably not 
defined well-enough, and in regard to opera-
tional co-operation between member states. The 
will shown to express WEU's views before 
Maastricht on its own role as " the defence com-
ponent of the European unification process " 
meets a concern constantly expressed by the 
Assembly for WEU not to wait for decisions to 
be taken in other forums before affirming its 
own vocation. It will therefore welcome the fact 
that the Council has, however tardily, rallied to 
these views that it was still rejecting in its reply 
to Recommendation 504. 
VI. Conclusions 
137. The Assembly will have to vote on the 
draft recommendation in the present report five 
days before the start of the Maastrict summit 
meeting. This will obviously give special weight 
to its decisions but it also makes it most difficult 
for your Rapporteur to draw conclusions which, 
in any event, will be out of date soon after they 
are drafted. However, he thinks a number of 
considerations he has developed here will 
remain relevant, but that the Assembly will have 
to take up and go further into several of them 
after Maastricht. 
138. Following the publication of the Anglo-
Italian and Franco-German proposals, and 
above all the decisions taken at the NATO 
summit meeting in Rome, it would seem that 
the Twelve will be able to take a number of deci-
sions in Maastricht of importance for the future 
of Europe without being able to achieve more 
than the outline of a political union. In any 
event, the role that should be earmarked for 
WEU in the coming years can be seen relatively 
clearly. The twofold link which must associate it 
with both the Community and NATO makes it 
possible for it to define its own activities 
without being unduly tied by options taken by 
one or the other provided the governments are 
willing to concentrate their preoccupations on 
Europe's security needs rather than on institu-
tional structures. 
139. The NATO summit meeting shows that 
that organisation is to follow two aims simulta-
neously: adapting military co-operation between 
Western Europe and America to the new real-
ities of international society and developing an 
all-European security system. The first of these 
two directions leaves far more room for WEU 
than it occupied previously in the NATO mil-
itary deployment. It gives the alliance's 
endorsement of a trend that started with the 
decision to reactivate WEU taken by the Seven 
in 1984 which accelerated with the Gulf crisis. It 
is becoming increasingly clear that Europe must 
prepare to play a rOle of its own in establishing a 
defence system that meets its original vocation: 
to ensure the security of member countries, con-
solidate peace in Europe and promote world 
progress towards a peaceful order. The second 
direction adopted by NATO should lead WEU 
to support the effort undertaken by the CSCE, 
the Council of Europe and NATO to give peace 
in Europe a firm structure and, in particular, to 
give assurances of support to certain countries 
which are concerned about the possible conse-
quences of the re-emergence of nationalism in 
Central and Eastern Europe, especially, today, 
in the territories of Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union. This does not necessarily imply an 
enlargement of WEU to include new members 
which, at the present juncture, have little to con-
tribute to a collective defence system and which 
might involve Western Europe in ventures into 
which it would not intend to follow them. It is 
enough to imagine what the present Yugoslav 
crisis would have meant for WEU had Yugo-
slavia, in one capacity or another, been allowed 
to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty at 
some time in the past to realise that the utmost 
caution is necessary in giving formal guarantees 
to any new country. 
140. Nevertheless three countries- the Federal 
Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and 
Poland - are making a combined effort to 
organise solidarity in the centre of Europe 
stemming from their choice to adopt democratic 
regimes, reorganise their economies on liberal 
bases, draw closer to the European Community, 
renounce any claims to change their frontiers 
and pursue, and ensure that their neighbours 
pursue, a policy that protects alien communities. 
Before the Assembly meets, those three coun-
tries will probably have signed an act of associ-
ation leading to future accession to the 
European Community. This is why, in June, the 
Assembly asked the Council to consider their 
association with the work of WEU. Your 
Rapporteur has tried to set out here the areas in 
which he believes such association to be possible 
and desirable. 
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141. There seems little need to pay heed to accu-
sations sometimes heard that such association 
would discriminate against other countries which 
also left the Warsaw Pact. So far, none of those 
countries has made any such approach, i.e. a 
global, clear and coherent approach, to Western 
Europe, its values and its concept of an order of 
peace and security in Europe. They are not being 
left on one side if they are told they should do 
likewise if they wish to be treated in the same way 
as the three countries of the Visegrad group. 
NATO is now offering them the possibility of a 
dialogue with the West on security questions. So 
they are not being left out in the cold. However, 
the time does not seem ripe for them to be asso-
ciated with a Western Europe that is rightly 
anxious not to allow its identity to be diluted just 
when it is starting to affirm it. 
142. The fact that the problem of European 
union arises at a time when the boundaries of 
Europe, as embodied in the Community and 
WEU, are open to question obviously does not 
facilitate the steps being taken by governments 
in the intergovernmental conference on external 
and security policy. However, this coincidence 
has the merit of making the European govern-
ments face up to the facts. 
143. The time has now passed when Europe 
could prefer enlargement to deepening. Neither 
morally nor materially can it renounce 
enlargement. The Maastricht summit meeting 
should show that it still wants a deeper Europe. 
However, succeeding with one and the other, 
and above all reconciling the two, still implies a 
progressive, rigorous approach. Just as Maas-
tricht will not set up the United States of 
Europe, Western Europe should not imitate the 
nevertheless very desirable approach by NATO 
to all the countries which were members of the 
Warsaw Pact. On the contrary, in the framework 
of both WEU and the Community, it must, 
when the time comes, make any progress the sit-
uation effectively allows. Your Rapporteur con-
siders the decisions taken by NATO in Rome 
and the association of the three Visegrad coun-
tries with the Community afford WEU a possi-
bility of taking a major step for the development 
of its own activities and for strengthening its 
contribution to the establishment of a new order 
of peace in Europe as a whole provided it does 
not try to replace the Atlantic Alliance or to 
compete with the CSCE. The modified Brussels 
Treaty - subject to slight revision, as proposed 
by the Assembly in Recommendation 504, to 
which your Rapporteur regrets the Council did 
not wish to give a serious reply - more than ever 
provides the basis for deepening and enlarging 
WEU to make it the instrument of European 
union in the defence area. 
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APPENDIX 
Statistics on Yugoslaria 
I. Federal State 
YUGOSLAVIA 
Area 
Population in 1990 1 
of which: Serbs 
% illiteracy 3 
Croats 
Muslims 2 
Slovenes 
Albanians 
Macedonians 
Montenegrans 
Hungarians 
% unemployment 4 
Average wage 5 
YUGOSLAVIA'S ECONOMY 
(in $ '000 million) 
Overall GNP 
Per capital GNP 
Variation in volume of GNP 
Assistance granted ( + or -) 6 
Gross external debt 
%inflation 
Revenue from tourism 
Rate of the United States dollar 
YUGOSLAVIA'S FOREIGN TRADE 
(in $ '000 million) 
Exports of goods fob 
Imports of goods fob 
Trade balance 
Exports of services 
Imports of services 
Balance of services 
Balance of payments 
23 670000 
36.3% 
19.8% 
8.9% 
7.8% 
7.7% 
6.0% 
2.6% 
1.9% 
II. Republics 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
Area 
Population 5 
of which: Serbs 
Croats 
Muslims 2 
% illiteracy 3 
% unemployment 4 
Average wage 5 
356 
4 443 000 
32.2% 
18.4% 
39.2% 
255 804 sq.km 
9.5% 
15.0% 
380 469 dinars 
1989 figures 
60.00 
2 550 
1.5% 
-0.33 
19.93 
1 239.9% 
2.23 
2.876 
19 8 9 figures 
+ 13.56 
- 13.50 
+ 0.06 
+ 5.80 
-10.10 
- 4.30 
+ 2.43 
51121 sq.km 
14.5% 
14.0% 
338 925 dinars 
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CROATIA 
Area 
Population 5 
of which: Croats 
Serbs 
% illiteracy 3 
% unemployment 4 
Average wage 5 
MACEDONIA 
Area 
Population 5 
of which: Macedonians 
Albanians 
Serbs 
% illiteracy 3 
% unemployment 4 
Average wage 5 
MONTENEGRO 
Area 
Population 5 
of which: Montenegrans 
Muslims 2 
Albanians 
Serbs 
% illiteracy 3 
% unemployment 4 
Average wage 5 
SLOVENIA 
Area 
Population 5 
of which: Slovenes 
Serbs 
Croats 
% illiteracy 3 
% unemployment 4 
Average wage 5 
4 681 000 
75.1% 
11.5% 
2 088 000 
67 % 
19.6% 
2.3% 
633 000 
68.5% 
13.4% 
6.5% 
3.3% 
1 943 000 
90.5% 
2.2% 
2.9% 
Ill. Serbia (Republic) 
Area 
OLD SERBIA 
Area 
Population 5 
of which: Serbs 
% illiteracy 3 
% unemployment 4 
Average wage 5 
357 
5 832 000 
85.4% 
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56 538 sq.km 
5.6% 
6 % 
437 870 dinars 
25 713 sq.km 
10.9% 
16.0% 
274 585 dinars 
13 812 sq.km 
9.4% 
18.0% 
297 571 dinars 
20251 sq.km 
0.8% 
3.0% 
615 843 dinars 
88 000 sq.km 
56000 sq.km 
11.1% 
11 % 
364 559 dinars 
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IV. Autonomous provinces 
KOSOVO 
Area 
Population 5 
of which: Albanians 
Serbs and 
Montenegrans 
% illiteracy 3 
% unemployment 4 
Average wage 5 
VOJVODINA 
Area 
Population 5 
of which: Serbs 
Hungarians 
Croats 
% illiteracy 3 
% unemployment 4 
Average wage 5 
1 894 000 
77.5% 
14.9% 
2052000 
55.8% 
21.7% 
7.1% 
10 900 sq.km 
17.6% 
25 % 
272 554 dinars 
21800 sq.km 
5.8% 
11.0% 
380 469 dinars 
l. The ethnic groups indicated and the corresponding percentages are from official Yugoslav sources. 
2. By " Muslims" is meant Islamised, Serbo-Croat speaking populations officially considered as a national group. 
3. Over the age of ten (1981 figures). 
4. 1989 figures. 
5. 1988 figures. Population figures are estimates. 
APPENDIX 
6. "Gross" assistance granted to Yugoslavia amounted to $ 745 million in 1987, $ 637 million in 1988 and$ 636 million in 
1989, but the repayment of the capital of earlier loans gives negative" net" assistance. 
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Amendment 1 
European union and de,elopments 
in Central and Eastern Europe 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by MM. Pieralli and Brito 
2nd December 1991 
1. In paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out" outside the NATO area or". 
Signed: Pieralli, Brito 
l. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 2 
European union and developments 
in Central and Eastern Europe 
AMENDMENT 2 I 
tabled by Mr. Jurgens 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
2nd December 1991 
2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " to prepare the " and insert " to 
consider which ", and after " meeting " insert " should be prepared ". 
Signed: Jurgens 
1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 3 
European union and developments 
in Central and Eastern Europe 
AMENDMENT 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
2nd December 1991 
3. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, at the end add " under the authority of the 
United Nations". 
l. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment agreed to). 
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Operational arrangements for WEU -
the Yugoslav crisis 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee 2 
by Mr. De Hoop Schel/er, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on operational arrangements for WEU- the Yugoslav crisis 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur 
APPENDICES 
I. A chronology of events, June-November 1991 
11. The Yugoslav protagonists 
Ill. The Yugoslav republics 
IV. Map of Yugoslavia 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
27th November 1991 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Uyttendaele (Vice-Chairmen); MM. 
Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Cariglia, Chevalier, Cox, De Decker, Dees, Ewing (Alternate: Lord Newa/1), Fernandes Marques, 
Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret, Fourre, Irmer, Jung, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Marten, Mota Torres, Moya, 
Pecchioli, Perinat, Scheer, Sinesio, Speed (Alternate: Sir Russell Johnston), Steiner, Sir John Stokes, MM. Vazquez (Alternate: de 
Puig), Veira Mesquita, Zierer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling its Recommendation 506 on Europe and. the crisis in Yugoslavia; 
(ii) Welcoming the series of initiatives taken by the WEU Council to help support the continuing 
search for a lasting peace in Yugoslavia; 
(iii) Congratulating the Council especially concerning the prompt actions taken to prepare the pos-
sible options for a WEU peace-keeping force and in particular France for making available the nec-
essary facilities at Metz to allow the WEU joint contingency study group to function effectively; 
(iv) Pleased that some member countries are prepared to participate in operations to establish 
humanitarian corridors and that Italian and French ships are already involved in evacuating children 
and the wounded; 
(v) Supporting the efforts ofWEU member states in the United Nations Security Council in favour 
of a resolution concerning peace-keeping operations in Yugoslavia and stressing the readiness ofWEU 
nations to give practical support to such operations, in addition to making available to the United 
Nations details of the contingency planning work already carried out by WEU; 
(vi) Reiterating the warning that the stationing of peace-keeping forces should not sanction the 
seizure of any territory by force; 
(vii) Convinced that the achievements of WEU over the past three years in creating the necessary ad 
hoc operational structures to meet different contingencies with pragmatic and practical solutions augur 
well for the important new roles soon to be devolved to the organisation; 
(viii) Considering that all the various proposals concerning the future organisation of European 
security assign a major operational role to WEU, both as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance 
and as the defence dimension for the coming European union; 
(ix) Convinced that there must now be a rationalisation and concentration of WEU; 
(x) Stressing the importance of adequate and appropriate operational structures, together with a 
realistic budget, for all component parts of WEU, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Continue every effort to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis, supporting the con-
tinuing initiatives of the European Community, the CSCE and the United Nations; 
2. Make all the necessary preparations to ensure that appropriate forces would be ready to take part 
in peace-keeping operations, given the right conditions, in particular concentrating on command and 
control arrangements, rules of engagement, communications, intelligence and logistics; 
3. Encourage all member states to take part in humanitarian operations, whatever may have been 
previous limitations on action outside traditional areas - " all of one company " should be the example 
set by WEU nations; 
4. Instruct the joint contingency study group to examine urgently the most effective ways of: 
(a) grounding all military aircraft in Yugoslav air space; 
(b) using electronic counter measures (ECM) to best effect; 
(c) imposing effective arms and oil embargos on all Yugoslav belligerents (even to the extent of 
helping control landward frontiers by offering to second police and/or customs officers to 
third countries); 
and make available the results of such studies to the United Nations and other bodies as appropriate; 
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5. In the light of experience of both the Gulf and Yugoslav crises and in the knowledge that WEU 
will be given a definite role to play as an operational organisation complementary to both the Atlantic 
Alliance and the European Community, take the necessary preliminary measures: 
(a) to move the seat of the Permanent Council to Brussels and form the Permanent Council 
itself by" double hatting" either NATO Permanent Representatives, or EC Permanent Rep-
resentatives, or with a combination of the two; 
(b) institute a planning staff as urged by the Assembly in Recommendation 502 and ensure that 
it maintains a liaison link with both the Atlantic Alliance and European union; 
(c) invite the United States to appoint an Ambassador to Western European Union; 
(d) form a military advice group of nine experts on detachment for normal lengths of 
appointment, to provide the military expertise necessary for the Secretariat-General and to 
ensure continuous liaison with national defence ministries; 
6. Give the necessary political and military impetus to the above by: 
(a) convening an extraordinary Council meeting after Maastricht; 
(b) convening a further meeting of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff early in the New Year; 
7. Help the four countries (France, Germany, Belgium and Spain) which have decided to form a 
European army corps, to be headquartered in Strasbourg, to elaborate ideas so that such a unit will be 
compatible with proposals regarding a European rapid action force; 
8. Ensure that appropriate provisions are made concerning 
- command, control, communications and intelligence; 
- transport; 
- logistics; 
- standardisation, if possible, or at least interoperability of equipment used by multinational 
units; 
- common procurement (e.g. through links with the IEPG and the Eurogroup); 
9. Seek to develop military satellite communication systems within WEU,' as suggested by the 
French Defence Minister, Mr. Joxe, on 6th and 7th November 1991, and associate non-member coun-
tries such as Canada and Norway (which have already expressed an interest) with not only this project, 
but also the satellite data interpretation and training centre and in addition the study on a European 
space-based observation system; 
10. Examine the possibility of making a WEU concerted contribution when it comes to disaster 
relief, pollution control and crisis management generally, thus ensuring that WEU expertise is used to 
best advantage. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur) 
1. In the light of the sad events in Yugo-
slavia, the Political Committee of the Assembly 
decided earlier this year to produce a major 
report, examining the Yugoslav situation in the 
context of " European union and developments 
in Central and Eastern Europe " (Rapporteur: 
Mr. Goerens) 1• WEU has played an ancillary 
role right from the beginning of the crisis, sup-
porting efforts by the European Community, the 
CSCE and the United Nations to find a peaceful 
solution to the present internecine conflict. 
2. Of late, however, it has become obvious 
that the operational arrangements being pre-
pared by WEU have a potential far beyond the 
immediate crisis in Yugoslavia. 
3. The parallel debate on European union 
described by Mr. Goerens in his report implies a 
new and definite role for WEU. What has been 
elaborated for Yugoslavia, in terms of military 
planning, command and control, communica-
tions logistics, etc., will have a lasting effect on 
WEU and is providing a basis for future WEU 
operational co-operation. 
1. The present appendices are designed to complement the 
background statistics given in the Political Committee's 
report. 
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4. Which is why the Defence Committee has 
decided to build on the recommendation 
adopted only a few months ago (Recommen-
dation 498: " The Gulf crisis - lessons for 
WEU ",Rapporteur Mr. De Hoop Scheffer) and 
produce now a comprehensive set of recommen-
dations on " Operational arrangements for WEU ". 
5. These recommendations are self-explana-
tory and will be presented formally in only a 
matter of hours. 
6. The recommendations are therefore as 
up-to-date as possible and are designed to give 
the political impulse required for making WEU 
a more operational organisation, whatever may 
be the formal decisions taken at Maastricht on 
WEU's place in relation to NATO and European 
political union. 
7. The meeting of the WEU Ministerial 
Council in Bonn on Monday 18th November 
has already set the ball rolling- we must make 
certain that it gains sufficient momentum to 
enable WEU to play its full part in helping to 
guarantee lasting European security. 
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1991 
27th June 
28th June 
29th June 
3rd July 
5th July 
7th July 
8th July 
lOth July 
2nd August 
6th August 
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A chronology of erents 
Vianden: Declaration on Yugoslavia. 
The WEU ministers for foreign affairs express their keen concern at present devel-
opments in Yugoslavia. They appeal to Yugoslav leaders to avoid confrontation, 
refrain from recourse to force and resume the dialogue in order to safeguard 
national unity. The Ministers want a return to the normal operation of federal insti-
tutions and ask the CSCE states to encourage a negotiated solution with due respect 
for the principles of the CSCE. 
The Federal Government announces unilaterally a cease-fire in Slovenia. 
The cease-fire is respected in Slovenia but fighting breaks out again in Croatia. 
Prague: Emergency meeting of the CSCE. A team of observers is sent to stabilise the 
cease-fire and supervise the return of armed forces to their barracks. 
Washington: J. Baker proposes that the United States and the EEC suspend their 
assistance to Yugoslavia and apply an embargo on arms sales. 
The Hague: Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Twelve. It is decided to send 
a dual troika to Yugoslavia, to suspend Community assistance amounting to 
F 6 000 million planned for between now and 1996 and to impose an embargo on 
sales of arms. 
Brioni agreements between the Slovene, Croatian and Federal authorities. The 
European Community asks Croatia and Slovenia to suspend their accession to inde-
pendence for three months. 
Bonn: Meeting of the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly. It declares that 
a peaceful settlement must be found that reconciles nations' right to self-
determination and the principle of the inviolability of frontiers. It recalls WEU's 
special responsibility for maintaining peace and international security. 
The Slovenian Parliament accepts the Brioni agreements. 
The Hague: Political co-operation meeting of the EEC ministers for foreign affairs. 
A thirty- to fifty-strong team of civilian and military observers is sent to enforce the 
three-month truce accepted by all parties to the Brioni conference and to relieve the 
ten senior officials of the European troika (Netherlands, Luxembourg and Portugal) 
who have been in Yugoslavia since 9th July. 
The German Government votes in favour of sending a European buffer force to 
Yugoslavia although for constitutional reasons German armed forces cannot take 
part. 
A European troika is sent to Yugoslavia, not to announce a military intervention but 
to try to extend the EEC's monitoring task to include Croatia. 
The Hague: The EEC implicitly threatens Serbia with economic sanctions. It asks 
the Yugoslav Presidency to convene negotiations on the future of the country, 
otherwise the Twelve themselves will convene such a conference on the basis of the 
principle that no changes in frontiers by force are acceptable and that any solution 
will have to respect the rights of minorities. 
The Twelve have asked the Commission to inform them about possible economic 
and financial sanctions that might be taken against parties refusing the cease-fire 
and refer to selective assistance by the EEC with political connotations. 
Differences between the Twelve on the possibility of recognising the independence 
of the breakaway republics. 
Call for the matter to be placed before the United Nations Security Council. 
Call for support from the other European states members of the CSCE in the EEC's 
efforts to restore peace. 
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7th August 
8th August 
·21st August 
27th August 
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Call for an appraisal of how WEU might help to stabilise the situation without there 
yet being any question of sending European peace-keeping forces. 
Soviet opposition to such a possibility which might internationalise the conflict. 
On the spot, hope of an unconditional and absolute cease-fire agreement in Croatia 
which may be proclaimed by the Yugoslav Presidency at midnight. 
Roland Dumas calls for an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Permanent Council 
and believes everything should be ready for sending a buffer force if so decided. 
Cease-fire in Croatia. 
London: Meeting of the WEU Permanent Council which decides not to intervene 
and to continue to follow developments. 
Prague: meeting of the CSCE emergency committee on Yugoslavia. 
United Nations: Belgium, France and the United Kingdom announce that they 
reserve the right to convene the Security Council for informal consultations. 
Paris: Roland Dumas, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, announces that France is 
in favour of early consultations of the Yugoslav people under international control. 
Declaration by Mr. Pontillon, President of the WEU Assembly, who believes that if 
WEU is to support efforts by the EEC and the CSCE it must also be prepared to 
co-ordinate action by member states to ensure respect for a cease-fire agreement. 
The collegial Presidency and the Presidents of the Yugoslav republics study the 
adoption of another cease-fire. 
Extraordinary meeting of the European Council. 
The European Community is dismayed at the growing violence in Croatia. 
It recalls its determination never to recognise a change of frontier that does not 
come about by peaceful means. 
It calls on the Federal Presidency to put an immediate end to the illegal use of the 
Yugoslav army by the Serb side. 
It calls on Serbia to drop its objections to the activities of the team of monitors being 
extended to include Croatia. 
It believes a cease-fire agreement should allow it to convene a peace conference and 
introduce arbitration procedure. 
At the peace conference, there should be a rapprochement between Yugoslavia, the 
Federal Presidency, the Federal Government and the presidents ofthe republics, on 
the one hand, and the President of the European Council, representatives of 
member states and the Commission, on the other. 
For the arbitration procedure, the relevant authorities will have to submit their 
dispute to a five-member arbitration board composed of two members appointed 
unanimously by the Federal Presidency and three chosen by the European Com-
munity. In the case of disagreement about which members are to be appointed by 
the Yugoslav side, they will be appointed by the three members chosen by the Com-
munity. 
The arbitration board will have to take a decision within two months. In the absence 
of an agreement on respecting the cease-fire and on the peace conference by 1st Sep-
tember, the Community is considering additional measures, possibly including 
international action. 
Emergency meeting of the Croatian Government calling for the rapid organisation 
of a general call-up. 
28th August Paris: President Mitterrand receives Mr. Tudjman, Croatian President. 
29th August Paris: President Mitterrrand receives Mr. Milosevic, Serb President. 
1st September Declaration by the Yugoslav branch of the European Movement supporting the EEC 
declaration of 27th August 1991. 
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2nd September Belgrade: Leaders of the Federation and of the six republics accept the European 
Community's peace plan of 27th August. The Yugoslav republics agree that there 
should be a cease-fire guaranteed by the Community. Serbia accepts the presence of 
foreign observers to monitor the cease-fire in Croatia. 
3rd September Lord Carrington is appointed Chairman of the conference on peace in Yugo-
slavia. 
7th September The Hague: Opening of the conference on peace in Yugoslavia. Invitations have 
been sent to the presidents of the six republics, the President and Prime Minister of 
the Federation and the ministers for foreign affairs of the Twelve. Hans Dietrich 
Genscher warns that in the event of the conference being unsuccessful his country 
will immediately recognise Croatia and Slovenia. 
8th September Referendum in Macedonia: 95% of the electorate vote in favour of indepen-
dence. 
9th September Prague: CSCE declaration on Yugoslavia: embargo on arms sales: support for the 
European Community peace conference. 
11th September Madrid: The Spanish Government says it agrees to WEU having a buffer force. The 
Minister of Defence, Mr. Garcia Vargas, thinks it necessary for Europe to have a 
defence organisation capable of intervening and helping to solve European conflicts. 
He therefore considers WEU should have a NATO-compatible rapid action force. 
European observers are sent to the Croatian combat area. 
15th September Macedonia proclaims its independence. 
16th September The Hague: The Netherlands Presidency of the EEC asks the German Presidency of 
WEU to convene a ministerial meeting on the subject of a buffer force because of 
the deteriorating situation and the impossibility for observers to go to the scene of 
the fighting. 
For the same reasons, the Netherlands convenes an extraordinary meeting of the 
Twelve on 19th September. 
The Netherlands proposal follows the declaration by Mr. Mitterrand who wishes the 
United Nations Security Council to consider the matter and says that if, for legal 
reasons, the United Nations cannot intervene, it will be for the European Com-
munity to assume its responsibilities, a possibility to which the Serb Minister for 
Foreign Affairs is strongly opposed. 
Paris: Mr. Pontillon, President of the WEU Assembly, strongly supports the Nether-
lands initiative. 
17th September Igalo: Lord Carrington obtains the signing of a cease-fire between Mr. Tudjman, 
Croatian President, Mr. Milosevic, Serb President, and Mr. Kadijevic, Yugoslav 
Minister of Defence, but there is a problem due to the absence of political control 
over the military factions. The cease-fire is not respected. 
The Yugoslav President, Mr. Stipe Mesic, asks the United Nations Security Council 
to decide to send a buffer force. 
There are differences in WEU: 
Portugal and the United Kingdom are against sending a European buffer force. Por-
tugal would prefer to send United Nations forces and believes, too, that recognising 
Croatia and Slovenia will not solve the conflict. 
Italy says it is prepared to take part in a buffer force. 
For constitutional reasons, Germany cannot send troops outside the NATO area but 
it is prepared to participate by providing logistic support. 
18th September The cease-fire is broken in Croatia. 
19th September Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council which lays down very strict conditions 
for sending a force to protect European observers: effective respect for the cease-fire: 
agreement of all the Yugoslav parties. 
This force will not have a peace-keeping role but a protective role to enhance the 
credibility of the European commitment since only 80 of the 200 observers are at 
present operational. 
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The Hague: Meeting of the EEC ministers for foreign affairs. They rule out sending a 
European buffer force as proposed by the Netherlands Presidency, Mr. Mitterrand 
and Mr. Kohl. The Twelve reiterate the principles they laid down at the start of the 
crisis: the use of force is unacceptable; any change of frontier imposed by force is 
unacceptable; the rights of minorities must be respected; account must be taken of 
all interests and legitimate aspirations. 
The Twelve also consider that the possible deployment of troops must be explicitly 
approved by the CSCE and the United Nations. France asks that the United Nations 
deal with the Yugoslav question without delay. 
22nd September Cease-fire in Croatia. 
23rd September The Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly holds a meeting under urgent 
procedure and asks the Council of Ministers to urge the United Nations to form a 
buffer force to enforce the cease-fire in Yugoslavia. 
It declares that WEU is prepared to shoulder its responsibilities in the context of 
such a proposal. 
25th September United Nations: The Security Council adopts a resolution decreeing an embargo on 
supplies of arms to Yugoslvia. 
The idea of sending an emergency force is not accepted: some countries wish to limit 
the possibility of United Nations interference in the internal affairs of member 
states. 
30th September The Ad Hoc Group submits the four options open to WEU for an intervention: 
logistic underpinning with the mission to support the work of EEC monitors, which 
would require the presence of 2 000 or 3 000 personnel; escort and protection by 
armed military forces composed of 5 000 to 6 000 persons to ensure the safety of 
civilian monitors; peace-keeping force composed of between 4 500 and 5 000 mil-
itary personnel, with added personnel of 3 000 to 5 000, to monitor and keep the 
cease-fire. This force's mandate would be restricted to assuring the policing of the 
cease-fire; peace-keeping force of 20 000 military personnel and an added support 
group of l 0 000 to monitor the setting up of a cease-fire and contribute to keeping 
the peace by military surveillance of combat zones, encouragement to negotiations 
so as to reduce tension and re-establish trust, deterrence of all violations of the 
cease-fire agreement and preventing the conflict spilling over into other areas. 
3rd October The Serb bloc in the collegial presidency takes over federal power, decreeing that 
there is an imminent danger of war. 
7th October The Croatian presidential palace is bombed. 
8th October 
lOth October 
The Yugoslav army undertakes, as from midnight, to respect the cease-fire abso-
lutely provided that, beforehand, the European Community guarantees identical 
respect on the part of Croatia. 
The United States is considering sanctions in co-ordination with the EEC. 
The Twelve again turn to the United Nations. 
Adoption of a general cease-fire agreement in Croatia. The blockade of federal army 
barracks and Croatian ports must be lifted simultaneously. 
The Croatian Parliament votes to confirm independence and to break completely 
with the federation. 
Independence of Slovenia. 
Appointment of Mr. Vance as official representative of the United Nations Secretary-
General. He is to present a factual report to Mr. Perez de Cuellar, who will inform 
the Security Council. 
After the Ad Hoc Group presents WEU's four intervention options, France endorses 
the fourth. 
It wishes forces to be deployed that are appropriate to the various situations that 
might arise. WEU's military role is not to fight except in self-defence, but the United 
Kingdom is in favour of the first option: an unarmed military mission to give 
logistic support to Community observers. The Netherlands prefers the third option 
and totally rules out the fourth. 
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11th October 
14th October 
15th October 
15th-25th 
October 
16th October 
18th October 
19th October 
25th October 
26th October 
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France believes the first two options would be ineffective politically and militarily 
and would be dangerous for WEU's role. 
WEU should co-ordinate actions by member countries to ensure the military 
embargo, which should be global: at sea, on the land and in the air. It therefore 
requires political will and involves the United Nations. 
The Serb bloc in the Yugoslav collegial presidency is opposed to the Yugoslav army 
evacuating Croatia. 
The Hague: Fifth plenary meeting of the conference on Yugoslavia. 
The WEU Assembly's Presidential Committee adopts Recommendation 506 on 
Europe and the Yugoslav crisis, recommending that the Council: 
- promote without delay effective measures to ensure respect for the embargo on all 
supplies of arms to Yugoslavia decided upon in Security Council Resolution 713; 
- proceed immediately to prepare the possible implementation of each of the 
various options considered by the Ad Hoc Group on 30th September to help to 
ensure respect for a cease-fire; 
- ensure Europe's security; 
- urge the Security Council and the CSCE to give a further mandate to WEU to 
facilitate a return to peace. 
Mediation attempt by Mr. Gorbachev: he obtains an undertaking that the dialogue 
will be resumed and fighting stopped (in vain). 
Draft tripartite declaration by the United States, the EEC and the Soviet Union 
whose contents are not very different from the the others but whose political signifi-
cance would force the Yugoslavs to play a more active part in the peace conference. 
Sarajevo: The parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopts a memorandum on its sov-
ereignty. 
Moscow: Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Tudjman sign the ninth cease-fire. 
Metz: WEU military cell. 
Meeting of military representatives of the headquarters of WEU countries to con-
sider forming a force that might be sent to Yugoslavia on condition the belligerents 
agree. 
The ninth cease-fire is broken. 
The Hague: Plenary meeting of the conference on peace in Yugoslavia. The 
European Community draws up a plan for a new Yugoslavia providing for: an asso-
ciation of sovereign, independent republics; maintenance of present frontiers 
between the republics; measures to protect the rights of minorities under interna-
tional control. 
This proposal is rejected by Mr. Milosevic who considers it is outside the terms of 
reference of the peace conference. The proposal would need a popular refe-
rendum. 
Signing of an unconditional, immediate cease-fire. 
Evacuation of federal barracks in Croatia. The European Community is considering 
recognising Croatia and Slovenia if the federal army has not evacuated Croatia 
within one month. 
Tripartite declaration by the EEC, the United States and the Soviet Union: Moscow 
and Washington endorse European Community initiatives. 
Cease-fire decreed by the federal army and the Croatian President but not respected. 
Serbia rejects the European plan for remodelling the Yugoslav Federation. 
The Hague: Third meeting of the peace conference. The Serbs do not take part as 
they believe Croatia has not lifted its blockade of Yugoslav army barracks. 
Trieste: Meeting between the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. De Michelis, 
and representatives of the Slovene minority in Italy and the Italian minority in 
Yugoslavia. 
370 
APPENDIX I DOCUMENT 1294 
28th October Brussels: European political co-operation declaration that the Community has 
decided to co-operate with the five republics willing to negotiate to find a solution to 
the conflict. On the Serb ultimatum, the European Community asks the Serbs to 
stop holding up the peace process otherwise, on 5th November, the Community will 
take economic sanctions against Serbia, pursue the conference with the other five 
republics to find a political solution in the prospect of the recognition of the inde-
pendence of republics so wishing and will ask the Security Council to consider 
taking further restrictive measures on the basis of Chapter VII. 
29th October Belgrade: Major land and air offensive by the Yugoslav army against Vukovar where 
large numbers of Croatian forces are entrenched. 
Bonn: The WEU ministers of defence and foreign affairs believe conditions are not 
right for a WEU intervention in Yugoslavia. 
30th October The Serb Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs announces that he will take part in the 
meeting of the peace conference on 5th November but that Serbia does not accept 
the 28th October ultimatum. 
3rd November The Serb bloc finds the latest European proposals fundamentally unacceptable, but 
Mr. Milosevic, the Serb President, says Serbia cannot accept the ultimatums and 
pressure to which it is subject. 
Serbia rejects the idea that Yugoslavia no longer exists as a state (European Com-
munity proposal of 18th October). 
The Serb bloc affirms that the Serbs all have the right to live in a single state and it 
wants the Serbs to have the right to secede. 
Mr. Stipe Mesic, Yugoslav Federal President, is in favour of an oil embargo which 
he believes would be the only effective measure. He says the Croats will make no ter-
ritorial concessions. 
4th November The Twelve draw up a series of restrictive measures to be taken against Serbia if it 
does not accept the political settlement proposed by the European mediators: 
- restrictive Community measures: denunciation of the co-operation agreement: 
implementation of the necessary procedures and, in particular, consultations with 
the European Parliament; immediate suspension of the co-operation agreement: end 
of financial co-operation and tariff preferences; restrictions on textiles; abolition of 
generalised preferences; suspension of benefits from the Phare programme; 
- possible additional restrictive measures in co-operation with other international 
organisations such as the United Nations and the CSCE: total embargo; embargo on 
oil products; freeze of Yugoslav holdings in Community banks; suppression of 
Yugoslav's participation in international organisations; 
- independent positive measures in favour of " entities " to promote the peace 
process: restoration of trade preferences; application of the Phare programme; pos-
sible participation in Community or international programmes (Tempus, 
Eureka). 
Political settlement proposed by the Community: the present Yugoslav Federation 
will become a free association of sovereign, independent republics; individual inte-
gration of republics at political and economic level; any republics so wishing may 
form a common state; economic co-operation will not necessarily follow market 
economy principles but may be organised in accordance with other forms of own-
ership; possibility of a customs union or single market. 
This last European plan now glosses over the return to independence of the prov-
inces of Kosovo and Vojvodina which have been annexed by Serbia. 
5th November Conclusion of the twelfth cease-fire (not respected). 
The Hague: eighth plenary session of the conference on peace in Yugoslavia. The 
Chairman of the conference makes the pursuit of the discussions dependent on 
respect of the latest cease-fire. If it is not applied by 8th November, he will rec-
ommend that the ministers for foreign affairs adjourn the conference. 
Serbia rejects the European Community's peace plan but wishes to continue the 
negotiations. 
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8th November Rome: The ministers for foreign affairs of the Twelve decide to apply restrictive 
measures against republics making an agreement impossible. The Chairman, Mr. 
van den Broek, announces that the Community has decided to take measures in 
accordance with the sanctions proposed by the Commission to the Council in 
Brussels on 28th October. 
9th November The Hague: Mr. Bush announces that the United States is to associate itself with 
European economic sanctions and the proposed oil embargo that the Community is 
asking the United Nations to apply. 
The Yugoslav Presidency (under Serb control) asks for United Nations troops to be 
sent to Croatia as a matter of urgency and for the situation of Serbs in Croatia to be 
examined by the Security Council. 
12th November Economic sanctions are formally adopted by the Council of the Community but the 
compensatory positive measures are still be studied since certain member states 
believe all responsibility does not lie on the same side. 
The Twelve call for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. 
The German Government has decided to recognise Croatia and Slovenia in 
December. 
Noordwijk: The Twelve declare that the deployment of peace-keeping forces 
depends on the prior establishment of an effective cease-fire, but Mr. Major will not 
agree unless there is a political settlement of the crisis in the meantime. 
Declaration on humanitarian action: joint action with UNICEF to establish human-
itarian security and peace corridors. 
The Twelve ask the United Nations Security Council to examine the consquences of 
requests by the Yugoslav parties to send peace-keeping forces. 
13th November Lord Carrington visits Yugoslavia to meet Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Tudjman, who 
have asked for the deployment of international peace-keeping forces in the crisis 
areas, but there is a problem regarding the exact area where they should be deployed. 
Cease-fire in Dubrovnik. 
15th November United Nations: Meeting of the Security Council in camera: the United Nations 
special envoy, Cyrus Vance, lays down five conditions for sending a peace-keeping 
force: agreement of all parties; clear mandate; undertaking by members of the 
United Nations to provide the necessary troops and assume financial responsibility; 
support of the Security Council. 
16th November Thirteenth cease-fire agreement (not respected). 
18th November Bonn: Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers. The ministers for foreign affairs 
and defence launch an appeal to the United Nations Security Council to speed up its 
discussions with a view to sending a buffer force to Yugoslavia. The ministers say 
the WEU member countries are prepared to provide practical support for such an 
operation but that the stationing of peace-keeping forces will absolutely not imply 
recognition of territory taken by force. 
19th November The Serb bloc in the Yugoslav Presidency rejects the presence of foreign warships in 
the Adriatic to guarantee the security of humanitarian convoys. 
20th November Adriatic: The Italian ship San Marco and the French ship La Ranee, escorted as far 
as Yugoslav territorial waters, begin operations to evacuate the wounded, women 
and children. The British assault ship Fearless, visiting Venice, is earmarked for 
WEU operations. 
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The Yugoslav protagonists 
Mr. Ante Markovic (Prime Minister) (elected in 
1989) 
In June, the Federal Prime Minister still 
thought the nationalist movements were merely 
a phenomenon following the fall of communism. 
He thought the economic link would be enough 
to maintain the union between the six 
republics. 
Pending a political agreement on the 
country's future, he had implemented economic 
reforms and a " minimum programme " likely to 
suit everyone. 
Mr. Markovic 
Mr. Markovic is 70. Of Croatian origin, 
he directed a large firm in Zagreb for twenty-five 
years. From 1982 to 1986, he was President of 
the Executive Council of the Assembly of 
Socialist Croatia before being elected President 
of that republic. In 1990, he founded the Demo-
cratic Reform Party, which was attached to 
"Yugoslav" principles. 
Several republics wish him to be dropped: 
Croatia and Slovenia consider his minimum 
programme to be too " centralising " while Mon-
tenegro and Serbia find it too "decentralising". 
He has been left out of recent events: the 
army did not even inform him of its operations 
in Slovenia. 
General Blllgoje Adzic 
As Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav army, 
he is the man the least inclined to seek a 
peaceful solution to the conflict. He believes he 
can win peace by force. He is the strong man of 
the army and very close to the Serb leader, Mr. 
Milosevic. His inflexible attitude towards the 
Croatians dates back to the second world war 
when his entire family was massacred by Nazi 
collaborators in the independent Croatian state 
set up by Hitler. He thought it was inconceivable 
for a Croatian to become President of the col-
legial directorate of Yugoslavia and Mr. Stipe 
Mesic tried in vain to stop him holding any 
senior military command post. 
Mr. Millln Kucan, President of the Slovenian 
Republic 
Democratisation has been under way in 
Slovenia since 1986 and Mr. Kucan thought it 
was possible to reform the old system progres-
sively. 
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He was a member of the Youth 
Organisation of the Communist League and 
then joined the Central Committee. He has been 
President of the Slovenian Parliament and was 
Secretary-General of the party in 1986. In the 
latter post, he promoted the development of a 
multi-party system and freedom of the press, 
thinking he could thus offer a model for the 
whole of Yugoslavia. 
In spite of his communist past, he was 
elected President of the republic after the free 
elections in April 1990 that were lost by the 
Democratic Reform Party to the advantage of a 
Christian Democrat pro-independence coa-
lition. 
Mr. Franjo Tudjman, President of Croatia 
He was a former supporter of General 
Tito. After the war, he entered the Federal Min-
istry of Defence and the Yugoslav army head-
quarters and resigned in 1961. In 1972, he was 
condemned to two years in prison for taking 
part in the democratic and nationalist 
movement that was severely repressed by Tito. 
In 1981, he was again condemned to three years 
in prison for criticising the single-party socialist 
system. Henceforth, he was not allowed to leave 
the country or to work in the administration. 
In the campaign for the 1990 free elec-
tions, he made very nationalist remarks and 
exasperated the Serb minority in Croatia, who 
form 11% of the population of that republic. He 
then organised local referenda on attachment to 
Belgrade. However, he has toned down his state-
ments since he became President. 
Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia since 
May 1989 
He represents a Serbia which wishes to 
dominate Yugoslavia. He is socialist, nationalist 
and close to the army. He believes the Serbs 
must be prepared to defend their country. 
However, his popularity has declined in the last 
two years because he did not introduce the nec-
essary economic reforms. Furthermore, on 9th 
March 1991, he ordered the militia to intervene 
brutally to put down a peaceful demonstration 
calling for liberalisation of the media. In May 
1991, he prevented the election of Mr. Stipe 
Mesic at the head of the collegial rotating state 
presidency and encouraged the Serbs in Croatia 
to organise themselves, thus making the other 
republics more afraid of the renaissance of the 
" Greater Serbia ". 
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The Yugoslav republics 
In 1918, Yugoslavia became a state con-
sisting of six nations, fifteen minorities and four 
religions. 
Serbia 
With its President, Mr. Milosevic, it is 
trying to become Greater Serbia again but, since 
the rioting in March 1991, the latter's popularity 
has steadily fallen. It is also under pressure from 
the international community, which holds it 
responsible for the conflict, particularly as it will 
accept no intervention from the outside. 
Its aim is to extend its territory to the 
maximum and to impose a realignment of its 
frontiers. 
Croatia 
For Mr. Tudjman, President of Croatia 
since April 1991, the " dissociation " of Croatia 
represents the struggle between freedom and 
communism. However, he has shown great mod-
eration since the beginning of the crisis, going so 
far as to propose autonomous status to the 
600 000 Serbs in Croatia and to open his gov-
ernment to the opposition and minorities. 
However, he will not give in over the now estab-
lished principle of the independence of 
Croatia. 
Croatia, which has dubious historical 
legitimacy, is very attached to the artificial1945 
frontiers and bases its right to " dissociation " 
on the fact that, unlike Serbia, which is 
orthodox, it has always been catholic and has 
remained closer to the Germanic world than to 
Russia. 
Slovenia 
This is the wealthiest republic in Yugo-
slavia. The Slovenes therefore believe they have 
suffered the most from the waste of socialist 
management. 
Mr. Peterie, the new Prime Minister, is in 
favour of a market economy and Mr. Kucan, the 
President of Slovenia, is in favour of indepen-
dence, confirmed de facto by Belgrade since the 
withdrawal of federal troops from Slovenia at 
the beginning of July. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
This republic has two original features: 
40% of its population consists of Muslims 
- Slavs islamised by the Ottoman Empire - and 
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the River Drina, the historical frontier between 
the Holy Roman Empire and Byzantium, flows 
through it. 
In December 1990, the moderate Muslim 
Mr. Ilija Izetbegovic was elected democratically 
and formed a tripartite coalition with the 
pro-Serb and pro-Croation parties. However, the 
republic was coveted by the Serbs, on the one 
hand, because they wanted an outlet to the sea 
and by the Croatians, on the other, who were 
prepared to share it with the Serbs in order to 
achieve peace. 
However, if the conflict were to spread to 
this republic, experts, who are very pessimistic, 
agree that it would then degenerate into a true 
religious war. 
Montenegro 
This republic is Serbia's only ally. It is tra-
ditionally communist-run and its inhabitants 
consider themselves to be Serbs. 
Kosovo 
Since 1990, this autonomous province has 
been under the protection of Serbia, which 
oppresses the Albanian minority and has held 
the region under semi-siege since 1980 when 
periodical opposition demonstrations started. 
Vojvodina 
This autonomous province was Hun-
garian until 1918. Hungary would certainly not 
fail to raise this point if a break-up of the fede-
ration were to call in question the location of 
Yugoslavia's frontiers. 
Macedonia 
This republic already has a nationality of 
its own but the six-month old multi-party coa-
lition is on the verge of collapse. It does not 
conceal its ambitions in the event of Yugoslavia 
breaking up. 
There are two reasons for the break-up of 
the Yugoslav Federation: first, inability to 
overcome differences between the wealthy north 
(Croatia and Slovenia) and the underdeveloped 
southern republics and, second, opposition 
between supporters of democracy and 
liberalisation and " the others ". 
Three risks probably also face Yugoslavia 
today: lebanonisation of the conflict, economic 
collapse - since all means of communication 
have been cut - and internationalisation of the 
conflict. 
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Document 1294 
Amendment 1 
Operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
2nd December 1991 
1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after " operations " insert " under the 
authority of the United Nations". 
Signed: Hardy 
1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment amended and agreed to). 
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Document 1294 4th December 1991 
Amendment to Amendment 1 
Operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis 
AMENDMENT TO AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Sir Dudley Smith 
on behalf of the Defence Committee 
In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after " operations " insert " preferably 
under the authority of the United Nations". 
1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment to amendment l agreed to). 
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Signed: Sir Dudley Smith 
Document 1294 
Amendment 2 
Operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis 
AMENDMENT 2 I 
tabled by Mr. Tummers 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
2nd December 1991 
2. In paragraph 10 of the ·draft recommendation proper, after "pollution control" insert "pro-
tection of cultural heritage ". 
Signed: Tummers 
1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment agreed to). 
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Document 1294 
Amendment 3 
Operational arrangements for WEU- the Yugoslav crisis 
AMENDMENT 3 I 
tabled by Mr. Lagorce 
2nd December 1991 
3. In paragraph 5 (c) of the draft recommendation proper, after "the United States" add "and 
Canada". 
l. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment agreed to). 
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Signed: Lagorce 
Document 1295 
The situation in East Timor 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 1 
tabled by Mr. Brito and others 
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure 
with a request for urgent procedure 
27th November 1991 
1. While affirming its commitment to defending the freedom and democracy of nations in 
accordance with international law, the Assembly condemns the massacre in East Timor on 12th 
November and the continuous violence of the occupying Indonesian forces. 
2. In face of a policy of forced annexation by the Indonesian Government, constituting a crime of 
genocide, which is being pursued and is worsening, the Assembly considers the international com-
munity must take further action to bring about conditions in which the people of East Timor may 
exercise the right to self-determination and independence. This right is recognised by the Charter of the 
United Nations and resolutions of that organisation's Security Council and General Assembly, the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, the European Parliament and also by the Conference of Non-Aligned 
Countries. 
4. To this end, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU calls upon the Indonesian Government: 
(a) to stop all violence and violation of international standards guaranteeing respect for human 
rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence; 
(b) to withdraw armed forces from the territory of East Timor and create the political conditions 
necessary for the free exercise of self-determination; 
(c) to open up the territory of East Timor effectively and immediately and allow international 
aid and human rights organisations and United Nations missions to exercise their humani-
tarian activities there and assess the situation in regard to the violation of human rights. 
The Assembly asks the international community: 
(i) to place an immediate embargo on arms for Indonesia; 
(ii) to suspend immediately agreements with and economic and military support to Indo-
nesia. 
Signed: Brito, Stoffelen, Soell, Mackie of Benshie, Kirkhill, Pieralli, Finsberg, Caro, de Puig, 
Muller, Diaz. 
1. See 8th sitting, 2nd December 1991 (urgent procedure agreed to). 
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Document 1296 29th November 1991 
Action by the Presidential Committee 
REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee 
by Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Political action 
II. Administrative action 
APPENDICES 
I. Recommendation 506 on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis 
11. Letter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, to Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-
Office of the Council 
1. While, in political matters, the Presi-
dential Committee endeavoured to follow 
closely the progress of negotiations on the archi-
tecture of European security and to prepare the 
Assembly's debates on the subject, it was the 
problem raised by the civil war in Yugoslavia 
that led it to make declarations on behalf of the 
Assembly and address a recommendation to the 
Council. 
2. In budgetary matters, the need for the 
Assembly at last to have a budget for the current 
financial year led it to adopt, on its behalf, a 
revised draft budget for 1991. 
I. Political action 
3. On 8th July, a joint meeting of the Presi-
dential Committee, the Defence Committee and 
the Political Committee was held for exchanges 
of views with the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, Mr. Genscher. The Presidential Com-
mittee met on that occasion and concluded its 
discussions with a statement on Yugoslavia. 
4. It first endeavoured to set out the prin-
ciples which should govern a peaceful settlement 
of the dispute between certain republics and the 
central autborities. It recalled the need to rec-
oncile the requirements of the right of nations to 
self-determination with the principle ofthe invi-
olability of frontiers and it affirmed that WEU 
had special responsibility in regard to the con-
flict in Yugoslavia. The Presidential Committee 
therefore called on member countries to offer 
their assistance to the parties concerned in order 
to work out the conditions for a lasting peace 
acceptable to all and, possibly, take the nec-
essary steps to guarantee that they are respected 
by following whatever decisions are taken in the 
framework of the CSCE. 
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5. As the dispute turned into an increasingly 
acute conflict, the Presidential Committee, 
meeting on 23rd September 1991 under urgent 
procedure, issued another statement in which it 
urged the WEU Council to ask the United 
Nations Security Council to set up an effective 
force in which WEU would play its full role in 
order to ensure a cease-fire in Yugoslavia. 
6. Finally, the Presidential Committee con-
sidered it could no longer confine itself to 
issuing statements and that it was incumbent 
upon it to submit a formal recommendation to 
the Council in the framework of its responsibil-
ities under Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure 
which is invoked whenever it seems necessary to 
ensure the continuity of the Assembly's action in 
the period between sessions. 
7. The Presidential Committee wished to 
give its views on the basis of accurate infor-
mation. Noting the absence of am official com-
munication from the Council on the situation in 
Yugoslavia, the Presidential Committee 
expressed the wish that the Defence and 
Political Committees hold a grouped meeting in 
Paris on 15th October to be briefed on the 
political and military conditions ofWEU partic-
ipation in a possible peace-keeping operation in 
Yugoslavia. At the close of this meeting, the 
committees were to deliberate and the Presi-
dential Committee was to vote on a draft recom-
mendation drawn up on the basis of a report by 
the Political Committee. 
8. At the request of the Presidential Com-
mittee, the President of the Assembly asked the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council to ensure 
that the Assembly was informed about the work 
of the Council and its working groups in this 
matter. 
9. Also on behalf of the Presidential Com-
mittee, Mr. Pontillon asked the Secretary-
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General to instruct the WEU Institute for 
Security Studies to give the Assembly an inde-
pendent opinion on " the military aspects " of a 
particularly complex situation and on " the tech-
nical requirements of the various actions for 
which WEU might possibly be made respon-
sible". 
10. Still in order to meet the wishes of the 
Presidential Committee, contacts were made 
with the authorities of certain member countries 
which were asked to designate experts to guide 
the work of our committees on the aspects of the 
problem within their purview. 
11. The Presidential Committee had to note 
with regret that only the representative of the 
chairmanship-in-office briefed the committees. 
The Institute was not authorised to present the 
study the Assembly wanted and the experts 
requested were not able to give the Assembly the 
benefit of their knowledge. 
12. The Presidential Committee hopes the 
chairmanship-in-office will endeavour to facil-
itate the Assembly's access to information to 
allow an institutional dialogue between the two 
WEU organs to be developed further so as to 
improve parliamentary scrutiny of ·European 
security policy, which is a fundamental aspect of 
WEU and a reason for the Assembly's exis-
tence. 
13. At the meeting on 15th October 1991, the 
Presidential Committee adopted, with a few 
slight amendments, the draft recommendation 
included in the report by the Political Com-
mittee. This text, given at Appendix I hereto, 
having been adopted in application of the pro-
cedure provided for in Rule 14, paragraph 2, of 
the Rules of Procedure, it now has to be ratified 
by the Assembly. 
* 
* * 
14. On 30th October, after an extraordinary 
meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Presi-
dential Committee resumed its dialogue with 
the chairmanship-in-office at a joint meeting 
which allowed an exchange of views on Yugo-
slavia, the architecture of European security, 
developments in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the new risks, such as that of nuclear prolife-
ration. 
15. Conversely, the Presidential Committee 
did not hold a joint meeting after the ordinary 
meeting of the Council of Ministers on 18th 
November since the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council is to report the results of that meeting to 
the Assembly on 3rd December. 
16. Not only has the Presidential Committee 
considered crises, it has endeavoured to avert 
them. In the context of the Assembly's recom-
mendations on establishing a just and lasting 
peace throughout Europe, it examined how to 
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follow up Order 77 by which the Assembly 
decided to organise, in 1992, a symposium on 
co-operation between WEU and any Central 
European countries so wishing with a view to 
establishing a new order of security in Europe. 
17. It was agreed that the symposium would 
be held at the Reichstag in Berlin from Tuesday, 
31st March, to Thursday, 2nd April 1992, 
inclusive. The symposium will be organised by 
the Presidential Committee and the President of 
the Assembly will take the chair. It will include 
participants and speakers. Participants will be 
parliamentarians designated by the presidents of 
the parliaments of the countries invited. Each 
country's delegation may consist of a maximum 
of six parliamentarians. Speakers will be persons 
invited. by the Presidential Committee in the 
light of the subjects to be tackled. 
18. In application of Order 77 of the 
Assembly, the parliaments of Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland will be invited to take part 
in the symposium. The question of extending 
invitations to other countries will be examined 
in the near future. 
19. Finally, the Presidential Committee is 
responsible for ensuring that the Assembly's 
work keeps in close touch with international 
current events and the work of the Council. It 
therefore had to adapt the agenda of the second 
part of the present session to rapidly evolving 
circumstances. It deferred the Assembly's exam-
ination of certain reports, such as the one by Mr. 
De Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee 
on reserve forces and one that Mr. Aarts was to 
have presented on behalf of the Technological 
and Aerospace Committee on the problems 
raised by the exportation of armaments, while 
the Defence Committee was instructed to 
present a report on operational arrangements for 
WEU- the Yugoslav crisis, to be prepared by 
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer. Finally, it instructed the 
Political Committee to give its views on the 
progress of work of the intergovernmental con-
ference and the WEU Council with a view to 
consolidating Europe's security and defence 
identity. In this spirit, it changed the title of the 
report being prepared by Mr. Goerens on behalf 
of that committee to " European union and 
developments in Central and Eastern Europe ", 
so that the report would take account of events 
in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union during the 
summer. 
II. Administrative action 
20. In budgetary matters, the Presidential 
Committee first ended its dispute with the 
Council about the budget for the current 
financial year. 
21. It will be recalled that, at the June 1991 
session, the Assembly approved a revised draft 
budget that took up most of the estimates in the 
draft budget refused by the Council at the end of 
last year. However, apparently the Council was 
still finding it as difficult as before to give a 
unanimous answer. The majority of its members 
refused to allow the Assembly to create three 
grade B posts and to regrade other posts and also 
any increase in the Assembly's operating budget 
that exceeded 5.51 %. The Assembly would thus 
have been forced to cut appropriations for its 
activities in order to recruit, on the planned 
date, the two new officials that the Council had 
authorised. The President of the Assembly had 
underlined that the Council could not ask the 
Assembly to reduce its activities to offset the 
creation of posts. 
22. Nevertheless, during a visit to the Per-
manent Council on 18th July, the President of 
the Assembly was able to reach a compromise 
solution due solely to the fact that the financial 
year was by then so advanced that the repercus-
sions of the recruitments to fill the two new 
posts were very considerably reduced. The 
savings thus made allowed the increase in the 
Assembly's overall budget to be kept within the 
limits of 5. 51%. On 11th September, therefore, 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration, and then the Presidential Com-
mittee, approved, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Rule 49, paragraph 5, of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly's revised budget for 
the financial year 1991 as set out in Document 
1241, Addendum 3. This budget includes the 
creation of a grade A5 post and a grade A2 post 
but not the three grade B posts or the regradings 
initially requested by the Assembly and refused 
by the Council. The Assembly is asked to ratify 
the action taken by the Presidential Committee 
in accordance with the procedure set out in Rules 
14 and 49. 
23. On 7th October, the Council said it 
approved this budget, i.e. less than three months 
before the end of the year. Never had a budget 
been approved so late. Until then, the 
Assembly's activities were financed in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of 
the Financial Regulations, which lays down that 
" if the budget is not approved by the Council at 
the beginning of the financial year, expenditure 
may be incurred ... for Heads 11 to V of the oper-
ating budget within the limits of one-twelfth of 
the total appropriations for all these heads for 
the preceding financial year ". 
* 
* * 
24. Together with the Committee on Budg-
etary Affairs and Administration, the Presi-
dential Committee therefore had to make the 
necessary arrangements for the next financial 
year. The draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1992 was approved unanimously by the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
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tration and then by the Presidential Committee. 
This budget, which is circulated as Document 
1281, repeats the Assembly's proposals on which 
agreement has not been reached with the 
Council, i.e. the recruitment of three grade B 
assistants and a few regradings. 
25. In order to avoid the difficulties encoun-
tered by the Assembly in the procedure for 
approving the budget for the financial year 
1991, the President of the Assembly went to 
London on 7th November to explain to the Per-
manent Council the political guidelines under-
lying the budget for the financial year 1992. He 
was accompanied by the Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration, Mr. Rathbone, the Clerk and the Clerk 
Assistant responsible for administrative and 
financial questions. 
26. The Permanent Council, with the Secre-
tary-General in the chair, showed great interest 
in the political presentation of the Assembly's 
budget thus made for the first time and some 
ambassadors spoke favourably of their govern-
ments' intentions in regard to the budget thus 
presented. 
27. Nevertheless, we have had to note that, on 
the contrary, the Assembly's budget was 
received quite differently by the members of the 
Council's Budget and Organisation Committee, 
i.e. the representatives of the ministries of 
finance, since these officials refused all the 
Assembly's proposals for the creation of posts 
and regradings. 
28. In order to induce the Council to adopt a 
more favourable position than its experts, the 
President of the Assembly wrote to the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council (see letter at 
Appendix 11). 
29. However, the Council's opinion, which 
was communicated to the Assembly on 27th 
November 1991, confirms the position adopted 
by the Budget and Organisation Committee. 
The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration and the Presidential Committee 
will have to meet on the first day of the plenary 
session to propose a line of conduct for the 
Assembly. 
30. We can but regret that, once again, the 
Council has given its views just before the 
session on a draft budget that was communi-
cated to it on 12th September. The Assembly is 
thus forced to postpone consideration of its 
draft budget until the Wednesday morning 
sitting so as to have the minimum of 
twenty-four hours necessary for examining it, as 
correctly prescribed in its Rules of Procedure. 
However, such delays must not become a rule. A 
change in procedure for adopting the budget 
should, in my opinion, be envisaged if the 
Assembly is to have time to consider the budget, 
with due regard for efficiency and dignity. 
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The Assembly, 
APPENDIX I 
RECOMMENDATION 506 1 
on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis 2 
(i) Deploring the constant worsening of the civil war that is tearing Yugoslavia apart; 
(ii) Considering that pursuit of the war is endangering pea9e throughout Europe; 
APPENDIX I 
(iii) Considering that it is for WEU, under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
to help to restore peace in Yugoslavia to the best of its ability; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Community and member states have called on the WEU Council to 
implement the military aspects of the policy defined by the Twelve; 
(v) Considering that the commitment of the European Community, in agreement with the CSCE 
and with the subsequent support of the Security Council, allowed the peace conference to be convened 
in The Hague in which all the parties to the conflict are taking part and which may lead to a political 
solution to the Yugoslav crisis; 
(vi) Deploring, however, that this co-ordination has not yet allowed a real, lasting cease-fire to be 
achieved as a prelude to a return to peace in Yugoslavia; 
(vii) Expressing the hope that the mission assigned to Lord Carrington will succeed in the near future; 
(viii) Gratified that the Council duly informed NATO and the CSCE of the results of its meetings but 
deploring the fact that it neglected to inform the Assembly, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CoUNCIL 
,, 
,, 
I 
I 
4 
1. Decide upon and implement without delay effective measures to ensure respect for the embargo ~ 
on all supplies of arms to Yugoslavia decided upon in Security Council Resolution 713; 
2. Proceed immediately to prepare the possible implementation of each of the various options con-
sidered on 30th September 'to help to ensure respect for a cease-fire once it becomes effective; 
3. Strengthen its organisation and ability to intervene to ensure Europe's security and urge the 
Security Council and the CSCE to give a further mandate to WEU to facilitate a return to peace; 
4. Continue to associate any European countries that might make a contribution with all appro-
priate action to secure a cease-fire and eventual peace in Yugoslavia; 
5. Use all appropriate means to bring pressure to bear on the parties to the conflict to ensure the 
success of the conference in The Hague on peace in Yugoslavia; 
6. Continue to inform NATO and the CSCE of its decisions; 
7. Inform the Assembly without delay of the results of each of its ministerial meetings. 
1. Adopted by the President Committee on 15th October 1991 in application of Rule 14, paragraphe 2, of the Rules of Pro-
cedure. 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1283). 
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APPENDIX 11 
Letter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, 
to Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, 
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council 
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Paris, 18th November 1991 
The Assembly wishes to avoid the budgetary controversies which might jeopardise the atmo-
sphere of understanding and co-operation which must govern relations between the two parts of the 
organisation. It was to ensure a better grasp of the reasons underlying the Assembly's action that I went 
to London to explain to the Permanent Council the political context within which our draft budget for 
the next financial year is set. I was led to believe that the Council was satisfied to receive this infor-
mation and had listened with interest to the Assembly's arguments. 
However, the report I have been given of the recent meeting of the Budget and Organisation 
Committee seems to show that the financial experts responsible for submitting recommendations to 
the Council took no account of the effects of the enlargement of the range of the Assembly's activities 
on the conditions in which its secretariat works. 
As I am aware of your concern to give security and defence Europe its full force and to make par-
liamentary supervision of European defence policy wholly effective, I am writing to you, in your 
capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, to ask you to invite the WEU Council to take a dif-
ferent standpoint from the purely financial one of zero growth which seems to have been the basis of 
the position of its budgetary experts. I should be very grateful if you would remind it that the measures 
planned to allow the assembly of European defence to fulfil its new tasks form a whole so that one 
cannot recruit senior officials of Portuguese and Spanish nationality without recruiting executive staff 
or taking account of changes in the duties of certain officials to adapt them to the Assembly's greater 
volume of work. 
The draft budget for the financial year 1992 completes the adaptation of the Office of the Clerk 
to the enlargement of WEU and provides for a minimum adjustment in the budget to allow us to 
finance our activities. Its adoption will allow the Assembly to establish fruitful co-operation with the 
Council. We shall thus be able to tackle together the great task of building political Europe, which is 
also the Europe of defence, to which the Assembly wishes to bring the support of the representatives of 
the people. 
Mr. Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER, 
Vice-Chancellor, 
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, 
Auswartiges Amt, 
Adenauerallee 101, 
D-5300 BONN. 
Robert PoNTILLON 
I. Adopted by the President Committee on I 5th October 1991 in application of Rule 14, paragraphe 2, of the Rules of Pro-
cedure. 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf ofthe Political Committee (Document 1283). 
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Document 1297 2nd December 1991 
Procedure for approving the budget 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 1 
tabled by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure with a request for urgent procedure 
The Assembly notes that present procedure for approving the budget: 
(a) makes it impossible for it to consider properly the Council's position on its draft budget 
before the plenary session at which it has to be voted; 
(b) seems to give technical arguments by budget experts priority over political considera-
tions. 
It consequently asks the Presidential Committee to work out, in agreement with the Council, 
new procedures based on a political dialogue between the Council and the Assembly to ensure that the :: 
Assembly and its committees have time for proper reflection and debate. 
l 
.. 
l. See 8th sitting, 2nd December 1991 (urgent procedure agreed to). 
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Document 1298 
The situation in East Timor 
DRAFT RESOLUTION 1 
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee 2 
by Mr. Brito, Rapporteur 
3rd December 1991 
1. While affirming its commitment to defending the freedom and democracy of nations in 
accordance with international law, the Assembly condemns the massacre in East Timor on 12th 
November and the continuous violence of the occupying Indonesian forces. 
2. From the outset of annexation, the occupying Indonesian forces were faced with resistance from 
the population of East Timor. In sixteen years, this has led to the death of 200 000 Timorese. 
3. In face of a policy of forced annexation by the Indonesian Government, constituting a crime of 
genocide, which is being pursued and is worsening, the Assembly considers the international com-
munity must take further action to bring about conditions in which the people of East Timor may 
exercise the right to self-determination and independence. This right is recognised by the Charter of the 
United Nations and resolutions of that organisation's Security Council and General Assembly, the 
Council of Europe, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the European Parliament and also by the Con-
ference of Non-Aligned Countries. 
4. To this end, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU calls upon the Indonesian Government: 
(a) to stop all violence and violation of international standards guaranteeing respect for human 
rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence; 
(b) to withdraw armed forces from the territory of East Timor and create the political conditions 
necessary for the free exercise of self-determination; 
(c) to open up the territory of East Timor effectively and immediately and allow international 
aid and human rights organisations and United Nations missions to exercise their humani-
tarian activities there and assess the situation in regard to the violation of human rights. 
The Assembly asks all member states: 
(i) to place an immediate embargo on arms for Indonesia; 
(ii) to suspend immediately military support to Indonesia. 
l. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Sir Geojfrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, 
Beix, Brito, Candal, Caro, Collart (Alternate: De Bondt), Cuatrecasas (Alternate : Diaz), De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra (Alternate : 
Moya), Feldmann, Forni, Foschi, Goerens (Alternate: Mrs. Ers), Guizzi, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Lord Mackie of 
Benshie, MM. Martinez, Martino, Muller, Pecriaux, Pieralli, de Puig, Reddemann, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton, Mr. Soell, 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Thyraud, Ward (Alternate: Rowe). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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